speaking, the bill should be filed before any judgment at law settling the right of the respective parties to the property in question; the object of the bill being to protect the complainant from the vexation attendant upon defending all the suits that may be instituted against him for the same property. But a bill of interpleader may be filed after a verdict at law, if the effect of the action at law was merely to ascertain the damages due the plaintiff at law who was a defendant in the equity suit.2] § 807. The true origin of the jurisdiction is, that there either is no remedy at all at law, or the legal remedy is inadequate in the given case. If an interpleader at law will lie in the case, and it would be effectual for the protection of the party, then the jurisdiction in equity fails. So, if the party himself, seeking the aid duty is claimed. Lord Redesdale, in his Treatise on Pleading, twice asserts the proposition, that, where two or more persons claim the same thing by different or separate interests, and another person, not knowing to which of the claimants he ought, of right, to render a debt or duty or to deliver property in his custody, fears he may be hurt by some of them, he may exhibit a bill of interpleader against them; p. 48 (4th edition). And again, at p. 141, he says, that where two or more persons claim the same thing by different titles, and another person is in danger of injury from ignorance of the real title to the subject in dispute, courts of equity will assume a jurisdiction to protect him. A case of interpleader then arises, where the same subject, whether debt, duty, or thing, is claimed. Now, when the subject in dispute has a bodily existence, no difficulty can arise on the ground of identity; for no dispute can arise as to identity of matter. But, where the subject in dispute is a chose in action, which has no bodily existence, it becomes necessary to determine what constitutes identity. Where the claims made by the defendants are of different amounts, they never can be identical; but where they are the same in amount, that circumstance goes far to determine their identity. The amount, however, may not be sufficient of itself to deter mine the identity; for the amount may be the same, and the debt may be different." See also Sieveking v. Behrens, Mr. 2 Mylne & Craig, 581. Lord Chief Baron It might have been a far more useful jurisdiction, if it had gone to the full length of the intervention of the civil law. See Merlin, Répertoire, Intervention. See also Gaill. Pract. Observ. Lib. 1, Obs. 69, cited also by Mr. Eden. 1 [Cornish v. Tanner, 1 Younge & Jervis, 333; Yarborough v. Thompson, 3 Smedes & Marsh. 291; Union Bank v. Kerr, 2 Md. Ch. Dec. 460. 2 Hamilton v. Marks, 19 Eng. Law & Eq. 321.] 8 Ibid. and note (h) to Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, p. 49; [Oil Run, &c. Co. v. Gale, 6 W. Va. 525]. of the court by bill of interpleader, claims an interest in the subject-matter, as well as the other parties, there is no foundation for the exercise of the jurisdiction; for, in such a case, he has other appropriate remedies.2 [So, if the plaintiff has lent himself in any way to further the claims of either party to the fund in controversy, or to aid one in obtaining possession thereof, to the exclusion of the other, he can obtain no relief by this bill.3] And, besides, a bill of interpleader always supposes that the plaintiff is the mere holder of a stake, which is equally contested by the other parties, and as to which the plaintiff stands wholly indifferent between them; so that when their respective rights are settled, nothing farther remains in controversy. But that can never be truly said to be the case, when the plaintiff asserts a personal right or claim, which remains to be settled between him and the other parties; or the plaintiff seeks relief in the premises against either of them. The true ground upon which the plaintiff comes into equity is, that, claiming no right in the subject-matter himself, he is, or may be, vexed by having two legal or other processes, in the names of different persons, going on against him at the same time. He comes, therefore, into court upon the most obvious equity, to insist that those persons, claiming that to which he makes no claim, should settle that contest among themselves, and not with him or at his expense and hazard. If their respective titles are doubtful, there is so much the more reason why he should not be harassed by suits to ascertain and fix them; and unless, under such circum 1 [That the complainant would be benefited indirectly by the success of the parties to the bill of interpleader, is not an objection to the bill. Oppenheim v. Wolf, 3 Sand. Ch. 571.] 2 Langston v. Boylston, 2 Ves. Jr. 103, 109; Angell v. Hadden, 15 Ves. 244; Mitchell v. Hayne, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63; Bedell v. Hoffman, 2 Paige, Ch. 200; Aldridge v. Thompson, 2 Bro. Ch. 149; Slingsby v. Boulton, 1 Ves. & Beam. 334; Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cowen, 691, 703. And see post, §824; see Hathaway . Foy, 40 Mis. 540. 3 [Marvin v. Ellwood, 11 Paige, 365.] ✦ Lincoln v. Rutland and Burlington R.R., 24 Verm. 639. Mitchell v. Hayne, 2 Simons & Stu. 63; Moore v. Usher, 7 Sim. 383; Bedell v. Hoffman, 2 Paige, 199, 200; Badeau v. Rogers, 2 Paige, 209; Story on Equity Plead. § 291, 292. Hence it is said, that if, upon a sale by an auctioneer, a deposit is made by the purchaser, and the auctioneer is afterwards sued for the deposit by the purchaser, and he claims a right to deduct from the deposit his commission and the auction duty, a bill of interpleader will not lie by the auctioneer against the vendor and the purchaser, to ascertain their title to the deposit; because the auctioneer makes a personal claim to a part of the fund, and is, therefore, not indifferent between the parties. Mitchell v. Hayne, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63. But see Farebrother v. Prattent, Daniel, 64, 70; Fairbrother v. Nerot, id. p. 68; note; post, § 814, and note, as to the case of an auctioneer. stances, courts of equity afford him protection, he will, in almost every event, be a sufferer, however innocent and honorable his own conduct may have been. § 808. In regard to bills of interpleader, it is not necessary, to entitle the party to come into equity, that the titles of the claimants should be both purely legal. It is sufficient to found the jurisdiction that one title is legal and the other is equitable.2 Indeed, where one of the claims is purely equitable, it seems indispensable to come into equity; for, in such a case, there can be no interpleader awarded at law. Thus, for instance, if a debt or other claim has been assigned, and a controversy arises between the assignor and the assignee respecting the title, a bill of interpleader may be brought by the debtor, to have the point settled, to whom he shall pay. Where the title of all the claimants is purely equitable, there is a still broader ground to entertain bills in the nature of a bill of interpleader; for courts of equity, in virtue of their general jurisdiction, may grant relief in such Nor is it necessary (as may be gathered from what has been already said) that a suit shall have been actually commenced by either or both of the conflicting claimants, against the party, either at law or in equity. It is sufficient that a claim is made against him, and that he is in danger of being molested by conflicting rights.5 cases. § 809. But in every case of a bill of interpleader, the court, in order to prevent its being made the instrument of delay or of collusion with one of the parties, requires that an affidavit of the plaintiff should be made, that there is no collusion between him and any of the other parties; and, also, if it is a case of money 6 1 [So where there are two claimants to a fund, and one sues the stake-holder in equity without making the other a party, the stake-holder may file an interpleader bill. Prudential Assurance Co. v. Thomas, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 74.] 2 Paris v. Gilham, Cooper, Eq. 56; Martinius v. Helmuth, Cooper, 245; s. c. Daniel, 68, note; 2 Ves. & Beam. 412 (2d edit.), note; Morgan v. Marsack, 2 Meriv. 107; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 348; Richards v. Salter, 6 Johns. Ch. 445; Smith v. Hammond, 6 Sim. 10; Crawford v. Fisher, 10 Sm. 479. See Hamilton v. Marks, 5 De Gex & Smale, 638; 19 Eng. Law & Eq. 321. 3 Duke of Bolton v. Williams, 4 Bro. Ch. 309; s. c. 2 Ves. Jr. 151, 152. 4 See Wright v. Ward, 4 Russ. 215; Lowndes v. Cornford, 18 Ves. 299. See Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cowen, 691. 5 Langston v. Boylston, 2 Ves. Jr. 107; 1 Eq. Abr. 80, I. in marg.; Morgan v. Marsack, 2 Meriv. 107; Alnete v. Bettam, Cary, 65, 66; Angell v. Hadden, 15 Ves. 244; s. c. 16 Ves. 202; Farebrother v. Prattent, 5 Price, 303; s. c. Daniel, 64, 70; Fairbrother v. Nerot, cited Daniel, 70, note; Richards v. Salter, 6 Johns. Ch. 445, 447; Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cowen, 691. 6 See Williams v. Halbert, 7 B. Mon due by him, that he should bring the money into court; or, at least, should offer to do so by the bill.1 § 810. A few cases, to illustrate these doctrines, may not be without use, to the more full understanding of their purport and effect. Thus, where A. received money of B., upon the terms, that if so much should appear, upon an adjustment of accounts, to be due by C., the same should be paid to the latter, and what was not due should be repaid to B., and A. gave a bond accordingly; there, B. having died before any adjustment of accounts, and the creditors of B. and C. having severally sued A. for the money, the court, on his bringing the money into court, decreed an account between the parties, and that the bond should be cancelled, and a perpetual injunction awarded to the proceedings at law. In this case, the court, as we perceive, went beyond the mere decree of an interpleader, and sustained the bill for an account, as well as for other relief, without sending the parties to law. § 811. So, where there were several sets of annuitants, who had distrained for rents upon a tenant's farm, and he brought the rents into court, and prayed that the annuitants might interplead, it was decreed accordingly, and referred to a master to settle their priorities. So, where there was an entire rent-charge which had been split into several parts by the owner, and there were different persons claiming the different parts; it was held, that the tenant. might bring a bill of interpleader, to compel the parties to ascertain their shares respectively. So, where the owner of an estate, upon which a rent-charge had been secured, filed a bill to compel the grantee, and the executors of a person to whom it had been assigned, to interplead, a question having arisen, which of them was entitled to receive it, the court sustained the jurisdiction.5 roe, 184: [Mt. Holly, &c. T. Co. v. Ferree, 2 C. E. Green, 117. A counter affidavit will not prevent the injunction, but the plaintiff may be put under an undertaking as to damages. Manby v. Robinson, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 347.] 11 Mad. Pr. Ch. 142, 143; Mitford Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 49; id. 143; Metcalf v. Hervey, 1 Ves. 248; Dungey v. Angove, 3 Bro. Ch. 36; Langston v. Boylston, 2 Ves. Jr. 109, 110; Errington v. Attorney-General, Bunbury, 303; Stevenson v. Anderson, 2 Ves. & B. 410; Warrington v. Wheatstone, Jac. 202; Atkin son v. Manks, 1 Cowen, 703, 704; Williams v. Walker, 2 Rich. Eq. 291; Shaw v. Coster, 8 Paige, 339. [See Parker v. Barker, 47 N. H. 278; Williams v. Wright, 20 Tex. 499.] 2 Hackett v. Webb, Rep. temp. Finch, 257, 258; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 T. 3 Aldridge v. Thompson, 2 Bro. Ch. 149, 150. 4 Angell v. Hadden, 15 Ves. 244; s. c. 16 Ves. 203; 2 Meriv. 164. See also Paris v. Gilham, Coop. Eq. 35. 5 Duke of Bolton v. Williams, 4 Bro. Ch. 297, 430; s. c. 2 Ves. Jr. 138. So, where a tenant was liable to pay rent, but there were several persons claiming title to it in privity of contract or tenure, he was held entitled to file a bill of interpleader to compel them to ascertain to whom it was properly payable.1 § 812. And here it may be proper to state, that, in the cases of tenants seeking such relief, it must appear that the persons claiming the same rent, claim in privity of contract or tenure as in the case of a mortgagor and mortgagee, or of trustee and cestui que trust; or, where the estate is settled to the separate use of a married woman, of which the tenant has notice, and the husband has been in receipt of the rent.2 In cases of this sort, the tenant does not dispute the title of his landlord; but he affirms that title, and the tenure and contract, by which the rent is payable; and puts himself upon the mere uncertainty of the person to whom he is to pay the rent. But if a claim to the rent should be set up by a mere stranger, under a title paramount, and not in privity of contract or tenure (as, if the stranger should bring ejectment against the tenant 1), there the tenant cannot compel his landlord to interplead with such a stranger; for it is not a demand of the same nature, or in the same right. The stranger cannot demand the rent as such, but he has, if successful in the ejectment, only a right to damages for use and occupation; whereas the landlord claims the rent, as such, in privity of contract, tenure, and title. The debt or duty is not the same; and interpleader lies only, when it is so, or in privity.5 [Thus, if an administrator claims rent from 1 Dungey v. Angove, 2 Ves. Jr. 310, 812; Metcalf v. Harvey, 1 Ves. 248; Hodges v. Smith, 1 Cox, 357; Cowtan v. Williams, 9 Ves. 107; Clarke v. Byne, 13 Ves. 383. See Stephens v. Callanan, 12 Price, 158; Jew v. Wood, 1 Craig & Phillips, 184. [So if two persons are claiming of a corporation the dividends upon the same stock. Mills v. Townshend, 109 Mass. 115.] 2 Ibid.; Johnson v. Atkinson, 3 Anstr. 798; Coop. Eq. Pl. Introd. 35, 36; Crawshay v. Thornton, 7 Sim. 391; s. c. 2 Mylne & Craig, 1. 8.Whitewater Valley Canal Co. v. Comegys, 2 Carter, 469. 4 Lord Hardwicke, in Metcalf v. Harvey (1 Ves. 249), said, that a bill of interpleader cannot lie as to the possession of an estate; but it must lie as to the pay ments of some demand of money. This might be true in the case then under consideration. But a bill of interpleader will also lie as well as to chattels as to money. 5 Ibid.; Woollaston v. Wright, 3 Anstr. 801; Smith v. Target, 2 Anstr. 530; Coop. Eq. Pl. ch. 1, p. 48, 49. Lord Rosslyn, in Dungey v. Angove, 2 Ves. Jr. 310, has expounded this doctrine very satisfactorily. The reason," says he, "is manifest; for, upon the definition of it, a bill of interpleader is, where two persons claim of a third the same debt, or the same duty. With regard to the relation of landlord and tenant, the right must be the object of an ejectment. The law has taken such anxious care to settle their rights, arising out of that relation, that the tenant attacked throws |