and extended its benefits to many cases of honest, but unavoidably doubtful, litigation. The jurisdiction in equity seems, however, to have been left substantially upon its old foundations. § 824. But although a bill of interpleader, strictly so called, lies only where the party applying claims no interest in the subjectmatter; yet there are many cases where a bill, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, will lie by a party in interest, to ascertain and establish his own rights, where there are other conflicting rights between third persons. As, for instance, if a plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief against the owner of property, and the legal title thereto is in dispute between two or more persons, so that he cannot ascertain to which it actually belongs, he may file a bill against the several claimants in the nature of a bill of interpleader for relief. So it seems, that a purchaser may file a bill, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, against the vendor or his assignee, and any creditor who seeks to avoid the title of the assignee, and pray the direction of the court as to whom the purchase-money shall be paid. So, if a mortgagor wishes to redeem the mortgaged estate, and there are conflicting claims between third persons as to their title to the mortgage money, he may bring them before the court, to ascertain their rights, and to have a decree for a redemption, and to make a secure payment to the party entitled to the 1 The act is the Stat. of 1 and 2 Will. IV. ch. 58. It recites that it often happens that a person, sued at law for the recovery of money or goods, wherein he has no interest, and which are also claimed of him by some third party, has no means of relieving himself from such adverse claims but by a suit in equity against the plaintiff and such third party, usually called a bill of interpleader. It then enacts, that upon application of a defendant sued in courts of law, in any action of assumpsit, debt, detinue, or trover, showing that the defendant does not claim any interest in the subject-matter of the suit, but that the right thereto is claimed or supposed to belong to some third party, who has sued or is expected to sue, for the same; and that such defendant does not in any manner collude with such third party, but is ready to bring the money into court, &c., the court may make an order on such third party to appear and state his claim, &c. And powers are given to the courts to direct an issue to try the same. See 2 Chitty's money.1 General Practice, ch. 5, § 3, p. 342, 343, 344. [And see Common Law Procedure Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. ch. 126), § 12.] 2 Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Company v. Clute, 4 Paige, 483; Thompson v. Ebbets, Hopkins, 272. This same doctrine would apply to a case where a person was taxed in two towns for the same property, and did not know to which town tax should properly belong; and asked by his bill to have the amount of tax with which he was chargeable, as well as the persons to whom it was payable, ascertained. Ibid.; unte, § 813 a. [So a bill to have a contract surrendered up for fraud may be maintained against different parties claiming as assignees of the contract who have sued at law thereon. McHenry v. Hazard, 45 N. Y. 580.] 8 Parks v. Jackson, 11 Wendell, 443. 4 See Goodrick v. Shotbolt, Prec. Ch. 333, 334, 335, 336; Bedell v. Hoffman, 2 Paige, 199; Mitchell v. Hayne, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63; 1 Mad. Ch. Pr. 146, 147; s. p. Gilb. Eq. 18. In these cases, the plaintiff seeks relief for himself, whereas in an interpleading bill, strictly so called, the plaintiff only asks that he may be at liberty to pay the money, or deliver the property to the party to whom it of right belongs, and may, thereafter, be protected against the claims of both. In the latter case the only decree to which the plaintiff is entitled, is a decree that the bill is properly filed, or, in other words, that he shall be at liberty to pay the money, or bring the property into court, and have his costs, and that the defendants interplead, and settle the conflicting claims between themselves.2 So a bill, in nature of an interpleading bill, will lie by a bank, which has offered a reward for the recovery of money stolen, and a proportionate reward for a part recovered, where there are several claimants of the reward, or a proportion thereof, one or more of whom have sued the bank. And in such a bill all the claimants may be made parties, in order to have their respective claims adjusted.3 [* § 824 a. By the English statute, as well as by the New York Code of Procedure, courts of law may direct an interpleader to settle the rights of conflicting claims to the same property, in such cases as the courts of equity will allow an interpleader bill. But a debtor has no right to interplead his creditor with one of his creditors who claims a lien upon the debt or property in the hands of such debtor. Nor can a suit of interpleader be maintained where the plaintiff denies the title of both the claimants. Nor will it entitle the plaintiff to an injunction in such case, that both the claimants have brought suits against the plaintiff for the same property, and that the plaintiff claims a conspiracy between 1 See ante, § 807, 809; Mitchell v. Hayne, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63; Meux v. Bell, 6 Sim. 175. See East India Company v. Campion, 11 Bligh, 158, 182, 185. 2 Anon., 1 Vern. 351; Bedell v. Hoffman, 2 Paige, 200; Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cowen, 691; Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Co. v. Clute, 4 Paige, 384, 392; 1 Eq. Abridg. 80. 3 City Bank v. Bangs, 2 Paige, 570; Merchants' Bank of Providence v. Packhard and others, Circuit Court of Rhode Island District, November Term, 1838. See Gray v. Pitman, 5 Scott, 795; [Fargo v. Arthur, 43 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 193]. 4 [*23 & 24 Vict. ch. 126, § 12. But this will not extend to equitable claims. Hurst v. Sheldon, 13 C. B. n. s. 750. See also Tanner v. European Bank, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 261. And that equitable rights may be considered in a special case, see Rusden v. Pope, L. R. 3 Ex. 269. 5 Hornby v. Gordon, 9 Bosw. 656. See, for statutory provisions in other States, Nelson v. Goree, 34 Ala. 565; Rohrer v. Turrill, 4 Minn. 407; Bates v. Lilly, 65 N. C. 232. 6 United States Trust Co. v. Wiley, 41 Barb. 477; Lund v. Seamen's Bank, 37 Barb. 129. 7 McHenry v. Hazard, 45 Barb. 657; 45 N. Y. 580; Barker v. Swain, 4 Jones (N. C.), Eq. 220. the defendants to harass him by multiplicity of suits, or that he is in danger of suffering from a double recovery. Where two claimants both demand the same property of the plaintiff, and he has done acts tending to the recognition of the claim of both, he cannot maintain a bill of interpleader against them.2] § 827. Seeks to preserve property for the party entitled. § 829 a. Form of appointing receiver. § 830. Regard is had to legal and equitable priorities. § 831. The appointment rests in discretion. Officer of court. § 832. Importance of the discretion thus exercised. § 833. The receiver is put in possession as the agent of the court. § 833 a. And acts strictly under its control. § 833 b. Can only take possession against parties to the suit. §834. Cases where a receiver will be appointed. § 835. Will not change the possession except for cause. § 836. Will not oust executors except for misconduct. § 837. Will not infringe the rights of prior encumbrancers. § 838. Receiver appointed to apply rents to extinguish interest. § 839. Trustee often required to pay money into court. $840. So may also the banker of such trustee. § 841. This is done to secure the fund. § 842. Will also require deposit of writings with master. § 843. Bills Quia timet to protect the interests of reversioners, &c. § 844. So also to protect a remainder in personalty. § 845. This remedy applied to all future interests in personalty. § 845 a. The use of personal estate gives no right to possession. § 846, 847- One in remainder may demand security. § 848. Terant for life may be decreed to keep down a charge on land. § 849. Sureties may protect themselves by bills Quia timet $850. Will decree specific performance of covenant to indemnify. § 851. Same redress allowed to prevent waste.] 1 McHenry v. Hazard, 45 Barb. 657; 441. Where a party has by his own neg. 45 N. Y. 580. lect subjected himself to two claims, and * Sablicich v. Russell, Law Rep. 2 Eq. has suffered one of them to pass into a § 825. IN the next place, let us proceed to the consideration of another class of cases, where the peculiar remedies administered by courts of equity constitute the principal although not the sole ground of jurisdiction; and that is, BILLS QUIA TIMET. We have already had occasion, in another place, to explain, in some measure, the nature of these bills, and the origin of the appellation; and to show their application to cases of covenants and contracts with sureties and others, where a specific performance is necessary to prevent future mischief. They are called (as we have seen) Bills Quia Timet, in analogy to certain writs of the Common Law, whose objects are of a similar nature. Lord Coke has explained this matter very clearly in his Commentary on Littleton. "And note" (says he) "that there be six writs in law, that may be maintained, Quia Timet, before any molestation, distress, or impleading. As, (1.) A man may have a Writ of Mesne (whereof Littleton here speaks) before he be distrained; (2.) A Warrantia Charta, before he be impleaded; (3.) A Monstraverunt, before any distress or vexation; (4.) An Audita Querela, before any execution sued; (5.) A Curia Claudenda, before any default of enclosure; (6.) A Ne injuste vexes, before any distress or molestation. And these be called Brevia anticipantia, writs of prevention.”2 § 826. Now, bills in equity Quia timet, answer precisely to this latter description. They are in the nature of writs of prevention, to accomplish the ends of precautionary justice. They are, ordinarily, applied to prevent wrongs or anticipated mischiefs, and not merely to redress them when done. The party seeks the aid of a court of equity, because he fears (Quia timet) some future probable injury to his rights or interests, and not because an injury has already occurred, which requires any compensation or judgment, it seems he cannot bring a bill of interpleader; so where a garnishee admits assets without pleading an assignment of which he has had notice. Haseltine v. Brickey, 16 Gratt. (Va.) 116. It seems that if the danger of twofold responsibility ceases before final decree, the bill must be dismissed. Kerr v. Union Bank, 18 Md. 396. That a debtor to an estate may interplead the parties in interest, and an administrator whose authority is alleged to have expired, but who has obtained a decree against him, see Fowler v. Williams, 20 Ark. 641. Where a daughter (mortgagor) had paid off a mortgage belonging to the estate of her father with funds claimed by his widow as hers, it was held, not a case for interpleader by the executor, since both parties did not claim a common fund, but one party claimed the fund while the other disclaimed the fund, but claimed the mortgage was discharged. Liddel's Ex'or v. Starr, 5 C. E. Green, 274.] 1 Ante, § 701 to 710, 730. See also 1 Mad. Ch. Pr. 178, 179; Viner, Abridg. title, Quia timet, A. and B.; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 148. 2 Co. Litt. 100 a. See also Mitf. Eq. PL by Jeremy, 148. other relief. The manner in which this aid is given by courts of equity is, of course, dependent upon circumstances. They interfere sometimes by the appointment of a receiver to receive rents or other income, sometimes by an order to pay a pecuniary fund into court, sometimes by directing security to be given, or money to be paid over, and sometimes by the mere issuing of an injunction or other remedial process, thus adapting their relief to the precise nature of the particular case, and the remedial justice required by it.1 § 827. In regard to equitable property, the jurisdiction is equally applicable to cases where there is a present right of enjoyment, and to cases where the right of enjoyment is future or contingent. The object of the bill in all such cases is, to secure the preservation of the property to its appropriate uses and ends; and wherever there is danger of its being converted to other purposes, or diminished, or lost by gross negligence, the interference of a court of equity becomes indispensable. It will, accordingly, take the fund into its own hands, or secure its due management and appropriation, either by the agency of its own officers or otherwise. Thus, for instance, if property in the hands of a trustee for certain specific uses or trusts (either expressed or implied) is in danger of being diverted or squandered, to the injury of any claimant having a present or future fixed title thereto, the administration will be duly secured by the court, according to the original purposes, in such a manner as the court may, in its discretion, under all the circumstances, deem best fitted to the end; as by the appointment of a receiver, or by payment of the fund, if pecuniary, into court, or by requiring security for its due preservation and appropriation.2 § 828. The same principle is applied to the cases of executors and administrators, who are treated as trustees of the personal estate of the deceased party. If there is danger of waste of the estate, or collusion between the debtors of the estate and the executors or administrators, whereby the assets may be subtracted, 1 Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, 2, p. 248 to 254; id. B. 3, ch. 2, § 2, p. 350; post, § 827, 828, 829, 830, 839, 845, 847. [If an instrument, assessment, or record is void on its face, a bill Quia timet will not lie. It is only where the proceedings are apparently good on their face, and it re quires some extraneous evidence to show that they are voidable, that equity will interfere. Harkness v. Public Works, 1 McArthur, 121; Minnesota, &c. Oil Co. v. Palmer, 20 Min. 463.] 2 Ibid. |