Bad, however, as things may be, yet, under the present circumstances, I do not tank it possible for France, rash and enterprizing as her chief magistrate unquestionably is, to invade any part of our empire, from the mouth of the British Channel to the German Ocean. Of the perfect safety of Ireland I will not be so positive, unless a considerable squadron be stationed there, however confident I may be in its security, so long as our Channel fleet is consigned to the care and command of the unrivalled officer who now conducts it. The great Cornwallis is ever vigilant and active: his soul is in his profession, and he is wholly devoted to the service of his King and Country, and to maintain the procd pre-eminence of our marine. He has no political intrigue in contemplation, to favourite rendezvous at any of our anchorages, but is himself constantly at his station before the mouth of our enemy's port, without ever delegating his authority to another. You will therefore, I am sure, Join with me in saying, that if the admiralty have no other mind, they certainly have evinced a discretion in the choice of this Eastrious commander, which so far entitles them to the thanks of the country. The many distinguished traits, in the professional character of Admiral Cornwallis, are fresh in the mind of every man at all contersant with the naval history of this country, during the last and American war, that I shall not at present enter into a detail of them, though I think it right just to cal! your attention to his ten months close blockade of Brest, on his succeeding Earl St. Vincent in the command of the fleet, during which period, the enemy were literally locked up in port, and also to his incomparable retreat with five ships of the kne and two frigates, before thirteen ships of the line and fifteen frigates of the enemy. This grand evolution exhibited such a proof of his superior energy and strength of mind in the most critical situation, that it is impossible to admire and extol it too much. The perfect safety with which he effected his retreat, and the order in which he conducted it in the face of one of the greatest sea officers France could ever boast of, must evidently impress upon the minds of the whole French naval service, the vast and decided superiority of the British navy. In fact, it almost goes to shew, that even so small a British force as that which The I have described, under an able comman der, is impregnable. Having been led into a kind of discussion respecting our navy, I shall, hereafter, request to call your attention to the state and distribution of it, upon the preliminary treaty of peace, upon the definitive treaty of peace, upon the remonstrance made to France respecting the affairs of Switzerland, and upon the delivery of the King's message. Upon signing of the preliminary treaty, our navy was triumphant throughout the world. The Northern Confederacy being dissolved, a friendly communication established with Denmark and Sweden; and the young Emperor of Russia (whose father had been at the head of the confederacy) ready to enter into our views. Not a ship of ang nation, except those in strict amity with us, dared to traverse the ocean. whole coasts of Holland, Flanders, France, Spain and Italy, were completely blockaded from the Erus even to the Adriatic; and the bugbear of invading this country, which the Consul had held out, and which had been too inconsiderately re-echoed forth by those in this kingdom, whose duty it was to convince the nation, that his threats must be impracticable, so long as our coasts were completely protected, and those of France and Holland entirely sur rounded by more than three hundred and eighty vessels of war, including sixty-seven sail of the line, seven ships of fifty guns, ninety-six frigates, and two hundred and fifteen smaller vessels of war. This was the force on the first of October, eighteen hundred and one, employed in the defence of Great Britain and Ireland, in the annoyance of France and Holland, and in blockading their ports. Nothing could more strongly shew the absurdity and fallacy of the threat held out by Buonaparté to invade us, than the fact of his not daring to send either the combined fleet, or even (literally speaking) a single vessel to sea. The few craft which had stolen along shore and got into Boulogne, for the purpose, as was said, of receiving troops to invade this country, were in part destroyed by the light flotilla under the command of the hero of the Nile; and those which escaped destruction, would have been brought away had they not taken the ground, or been secured by chains made. fast on shore. To be guarded, however, at this juncture, against an evil of such magnitude as invasion, is undoubtedly the duty of government, by making every precautionary arrangement, and such a distribu * This force is exclusive of the fleet in the Mediterranean, and on the coast of Spain. Supplement to N 1.-Price 10d. tion of the military force, as to meet the enemy at any and every point. But to hold out, under the circumstances which then existed, any thing tending to impress upon the minds of the people the probability of invasion, while this country was protected by such a marine as we had in 1801, was certainly deserving the severest reprehension, as an alarm of that kind could only contribute to check commercial speculation, to divert the attention of all descriptions of people from their usual avocations, and to disturb the public mind.-Such was the state of France and of this country, 'as far as regards the marine of the two nations in Europe, and the security of their coasts; while nearly the whole trade of the world was in our hands: for, if we except America, there was scarcely a vessel of any other nation passing on the seas. Although I shall not urge the point, yet I do most firmly believe, that, had we but continued the war six months longer, a safe and honourable peace would have been the result; and that, we should now have been not only in a state of perfect tranquillity, but have been acknowledged the sovereign of Malta, with even less difficulty than we obtained the cession of Trinidada and the Dutch settlements in Ceylon. I shall reserve some observations which I propose to offer respecting Malta until another opportunity, when I shall call your attention to the state of our marine, upon the delivery of the King's message, which I consider as originating immediately from the discussion which took place relative to that Island.. I shall now briefly state why I conclude Buonaparte would have made peace with this country upon safe and honourable terms, had the government held a language upon opening the negotiation, which our commanding situation then entitled us to assume. France, it will be recollected, had made peace with the Emperor and the Germanic Body, on the first of February, preceding the Preliminary Treaty of London; so that without a renewal of hostilities on the continent, or without a prospect of making a successful attack upon Ireland, (for as to an invasion of Great Britain, Buonaparté was convinced the attempt must have been fruitless ;) the Consul was aware that his establishments could not be maintained, as the contributions he bad levied in the Germanic States were exhausted, and he had no means to resort to for the support of his legions and his reduced fleet, but such as he could extort from bis wretched subjects, or from his more wretched allies the Dutch and Spaniards; who were already groaning under the scourge with which he enforced his arbitrary mandates. The truth 18, that France, Spain, Holland, Flanders, and the Italian Republic, as it is now called, were so completely exhausted, owing to the ravages they had sustained in the course of the late revolutionary war; and also, by a total stop being put to all commercial and maritime intercourse; by the entire annihilation of their foreign trade; by the capture of nearly all their colonies; and by their internal manufactures being completely at a stand from the want of capital and of bands to proceed; from this last circumstance France particularly suffered. To peace alone therefore, with this country, did the French nation look with anxiety, for the restoration of their colonies, their commerce, their navigation, and their manufactories. Upon these grounds, I should contend, if I were inclined to expatiate on this subject, that the Preliminary Treaty with France should not have been made on the terms, or at the time it was concluded.. I propose now, Sir, to make a few observations upon the grand expedition which Buonaparté sent to St. Domingo soon after the Preliminary Treaty was signed with this country. This expedition was, as you have justly observed in your Register, volume first, page sixteen, &c. far superior to any that had been dispatched to the new world at any former period. The anxiety which the sailing of that armament caused in this country, particularly amongst those who were immediately connected with Jamaica, induced the First Lord of the Admiralty to send, on the close of the month of January, 1802, after the mutiny had subsided in the Bantry Bay squadron, a reinforcement to Jamaica under Rear Admiral Campbell, the flag officer, in whose ship the mutiny first broke out. A farther reinforcement was ordered from the squadron at Gibraltar; but these divisions did not get to Jamaica until some time after Villaret's fleet had reached Cape François. Upon the arrival of the French armament at St Domingo, there were at Jamaica threeships of the line and one old fifty gun ship. The ships of the line under the command of the French Admiral amounted to twenty-two sail, and he was soon followed by ten sail more; (including three Dutch ships) from Brest, Cadiz, and Toulon. The frigates and corvettes amounted to more than forty sail, and the whole were perfectly equipped for war, and not as transports, or even ships armed en flute, for the conveyance of troops. The consequence of this liberal acquiescence in the govern ment of this country to the demand of France, upon the truce being made between the two nations, for what more can a Preli minary Treaty be called? was, that Great Britain was under the absolute necessity of sending reinforcements to Jamaica amounting to twenty sail of the line; so that upon the signature of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, (six months after the Preliminary Treaty) we had about one bundred and twelve vessels of war, including twenty-three sail of the line, which was in the whole thirty-three ships of war more than we had in that part of the world at the time of signing the Freliminary Treaty. The line of bittle ships were farther augmented, till they amounted to more than thirty sail, before it was deemed adviseable to withdraw any part of them. The expense which the nation must have incurred (after having been several months in a state of pacification) in the maintainance of this immense naval establishment, in that quarter of the globe, is certainly of no trifling import; though it appears (notwithstan ling it was double the force which had been kept in the West Indies at any period of the war,) to have almost entirely escaped the attention of Parliament; the conduct too of the First Lord of the Admiralty, inexcusable as it was, has not met with the smallest animadversion, with regard to the impicy of suffering such a fleet as that which the Consul sent out, to depart from Europe completely armed for the purposes of war, instead of being as mere transports for the conveyance of troops. For, as you have justly observed, Toussaint had no fleet to oppose them; consequently, they ought to have been disarmed before they were sent cut. In much of the reasoning you have advanced on the subject of this armament, I entirely concur with you; though I confess, I always entertained an opinion different from yours, as to its ultimate result; viz. the subjugation of the Blacks, and the entire restoration of the Colony to France. To eflect the reduction and conquest of the Blacks, Buonaparté certainly proceeded on a grand scale; but the nature of West-India warfare had not been duly considered; nor did the effects of the climate upon European constitutions appear to have been foreseen. We have now, however, an evidence of its fatality, not only from the official accounts of the French Generals, but from every other quarter through which there has been any intercourse with St. Domingo. In addition to the ships I have already stated, as having accompanied Villaret to that Island, or which, soon after followed him; several others, both from Brest and Toulon, have been sent thither with reinforcements of troops. The total number of ships of the line that have been dispatched to St. Domingo since the signing of the Preliminary wheaty is about forty-six sail, including a few which have made a second voyage; and the total number of troops that have arrived there, is little, if any short of fifty thousand men. Of the ships, all except seven or eight of the line, and a few frigates have returned to Europe; and these are now, it is imagined, on their way home. The Jamappe of seventy-four guns, is said to have arrived at L'Orient, from the Leeward Islands on the 28th ultimo Of the troops sent to St. Domingo, not one fifth part are at this moment in existence; and not one tenth part fit for service. Such have been the destructive effects of the climate, and of the hostility they have experienced from the Blacks. That the French have as yet abandoned St. Domingo, I cannot be induced to believe; but, that they will be obliged to abandon it, if the war between Great Britain and France continues, I have not the smallest doubt, provided they have not already entered into a treaty with the blacks, or do not speedily negotiate with them for the purpose of retaining some of the ports and the trade of the colony. It is, however, to be expected, and much to be wished, that, in consequence of the faithless conduct of Lecleic towards Toussaint, the blacks will not listen to such a proposal; for in such an event the evils sending the Jamaica squadron to blockade proach them.The small Island of Tortue, to which the French have been lately in the habit of sending their convalescents, for the purpose of enjoying its salubrious breezes, and a vegetable diet, would surrender to any force that might be sent against it, on the first summons. About two years ago, I recollect having seen a pamphlet, in which a minute account is given of Tortue, and the peculiar advan tages which this country might be expected to derive from the possession of it, and mak ing it an entrepôt for the supplies of which it was supposed Toussaint might then be in need, and which the author of the pamph let recommended should be furnished him through the medium of that island, which it was argued Toussaint might easily have been induced to concede to this country. If prompt measures be taken by ministers, and no treaty has been concluded between the French and blacks, by which the possession of the sea ports has been surrendered to France, the enemy will have no choice, except that of either submitting to the blockading fleet, or to their desperate foes, the blacks. In either case the trade of that immense island, must, in a great measure, come into our hands. As a sugar colony it is not likely to be cultivated by the blacks, at least if ever it should be, it will not for many years, unless Europeans settle amongst them; but the coffee and cotton plantations, and the cultivation of indigo may be by them well attended to, and will, in all probability, be extended and improved under their management. I shall not at present enlarge more on the subject of St. Domingo; but shall conclude this letter with a few remarks upon the debates which took place in the House of Commons on Monday last respecting the augmentation of the military establishment. It would seem from what the Secretary of War said upon the subject, it is the intention of government again to extend our military operations to the West Indies, with a view, no doubt, of bringing Martinique, St. Lucia, and the other French and Dutch colonies once more under the dominion of the British crown; but before such an important measure be determined on, is it not the duty of minis. ters and of Parliament to consider well the -enormous expense incurred by this country in prosecuting the late war in that part of the world? and above all the immense number of valuable lives lost to the nation in the course of the eight years in which we were engaged in hostility with France; and that for this sacrifice, we have not at this moment one foot of French territory annexed to the British Empire? for all our con quests have been restored to France without the smallest reservation whatever, improved by British capital and industry, and in a higher state of cultivation, than even under the antient French monarchy. With this melancholy truth before us, and the declaration of his Majesty, that he has no views of conquest in contemplation, have we any reason to expect that a different line of conduct will be pursued on the termination of the present contest, should the whole of the French colonies fall into our hands? With this impression on my mind, I am most decidedly of opinion, that no military operations should be carried on against the colonies of France; but that the war abroad should be solely naval. Our own islands, most undoubtedly, should be kept in a state of perfect security, and should not again be exposed to the incursions of the brigands from the adjacent colonies of Guadaloupe, St. Lucia, or Martinique.By allotting respectable military establishments to each of our own islands, by a judicious disposition of our naval forces in the West-Indies, and by a vigilant, active, and close blockade of the French Islands, these would, in all probability, be nearly as soon in our possession as though we were to proceed against them by regular attack, without incurring one twentieth part of the expense, and without sacrificing the lives of his Majesty's loyal subjects. - You will conclude from this, Sir, that I am of opinion, our military operations should be confined eatirely to Europe, and in that you will be perfectly right; for if we are ever to have peace with France, we must give the French people reason to know, that we are not only perfectly secure against the vain threats of the Consul, but that we can, and will alarm and assault their coasts and ports, from one extreme of their empire to the other. To make any effectual impression on France the following must be our system of operation.-The militia is now nearly embodied; the yeomanry and volunteers are called out; and the army is augmenting. For the defence of our own coasts, and for the offence of those of France, ten thousand men should be embarked with o little delay as possible. The troop ships which the late administration adopted with such manifest advantage, should be instantly brought forward for this service, a Fight flotilla with a number of bombs, and some fire vessels, should be attached to them, and put under the command of active, enterprizing, and discreet officers. Such, for instance in the military department as Generals Burraud and Moore; and in the na val department, as Sir Edward Pellew and Sir Sydney Smith. Every other consideration should give way to such a plan of operations, which would not only tend to reanimate the whole British nation, but to depress and confound the government and people of France. It would give additional naval security to our coasts, even suppose the troop ships were not suffered to carry more than ten or twelve guns each, and it would be the quickest and best way of bringing ten thousand soldiers to any point, supposing, (impracticable as I conceive it) the enemy should effect an invasion of our country; but in this, I have already said, I have no belief. With respect to the security of Ireland, of which I have not so positively spoken, nothing can be more efficient and better calculated for its protection, than an embarked force of such magnitude; as it would instantly be ready, in the event of an invasion of that country to proceed directly to the spot where the enemy might have effected a landing.A similar system should be adopted in the MediterraBean, for the purpose of alarming and annoying the whole coast of France and her allies. In my next I shall probably give you some farther observations on the subject-1 am, Sir, yours-and a Friend to my Country. TO THE EDITOR. EARL ST. VINCENT. SIR,I read with much satisfaction in your Register of the 4th of June, some observations on the conduct of the Admiral who commanded on the Mediterranean station in the year 1798, in permitting the expedition for Egypt under Buonaparté, to be formed at Toulon, to leave that Purt, and to reach its distant destination without the smallest interruption from the British fleet. -That a transaction of this extraordinary Dature, and evidently so big with mischief, should have escaped animadversion at the time it happened, can only be accounted for by the general delirium which Lord Nelson's victory then occasioned in the nation, and the sanguine expectations entertained in consequence, that the great objects of this expedition must thereby be frustrated. The importance of the possession of Malta and of Egypt by our enemies, was, as your correspondent observes, as well understood in this country then as now; and no one who seriously reflected upon the measures that produced this evil, could for a moment hesitate to pronounce them criminally reprehensible. -Amongst the observations above alluded to, which by the by appear to have been in Correctly printed and not completed, it is in sinuated, that half the force under Lord St. Vincent's command *, viz. twelve sail of the line with a large proportion of frigates and smaller vessels, would have been sufficient effectually to have blockaded the Spanish fleet in Cadiz, whilst the remainder might have been employed to watch the port of Toulon. Every act of Lord St. Vincent's conduct, that I have heard mentioned, seems to prove this to have been his opinion likewise, as far as relates to the Spaniards; nor can it be wondered it should be so, the action off Cape St. Vincent, between H. L. with 14 sail of the British line, and Don Lewis Cordovo with 27 sail of the Spanish, having happened only a short time before; in which the latter lost 2 or 3 of their largest and best ships. It is evident that Lord St. Vincent employed not more in general than eight or nine ships of the line to blockade Cadiz, and they appear to have performed the service effectually for a great length of time, except on five or six days, when the Spanish Admiral (having stripped all the fishing boats employed in the fishery off Cadiz, of their men; and, having also taken all those belonging to the ships of war and other vessels he left in port) made an unsuccessful effort with 20 ships of the line, to surprise Sir William Parker, who then commanded the British squadron of eight sail; from which he returned in three or four days with disgrace into Cadiz; having contrived in that short time, to get some of his ships aground and damaged in other respects. When the account of the Spanish fleet being at sea reached Lisbon, on the 8th of February, 1798, where Lord St. Vincent then was with the body of his fleet, so little did his Lordship appear apprehensive for his squadron under Sir William Parker, or for any mischief the Spanish fleet was likely to do whilst at full liberty to act, that he would not suffer any of his ships to pass the bar of the Tagus, and join Sir William that day, although the commanders of several were ready and desirous to do so, the occasion being very favourable. And a week or ten days afterwards on his Lordship's re-establishing the blockade of Cadiz, where the Spanish fleet had re-assembled, he employed no more ships for the purpose than he had done before. His Lordship returned to the Lord St. Vincent's fleet in March, April, and May, 1798, consisted generally of twenty-three or twenty-four sail of the line, of which, none less than seventy-four guns. Some fifty and forty-four gun ships on two decks, with a large proportion of frigates and smaller vessels. His Lordship had also at his disposal during a part of this time, s Portuguese ships of the line, and several of thir frigates. |