month of January next will decide the question. In the mean time, however, it is proper to shew what that decision is likely to be.- -We have already seen, that the income up to October, exclusive of the sum derived from the new taxes imposed since the estimate was made, that is to say, the war taxes, amounted to 30,129.835 I. This was the produce of four quarters up to the 10th of October last; and, if we suppose that the present quarter, including arrears, will amount to as much as the last quarter, we certainly are far from under-rating its produce. The charge upon this income, or fund, will be, for the present year, excluding expenses incurred by new loan, and exclu ding also interest on Imperial loan, together with some other charges, 25,590,864 1., * which sum being deducted from the income, leaves a surplus of 4,538,9711., instead of 7,845,000 1., at which it was estimated by Mr. Addington, or at least, instead of at least, instead of 6,500,000 1., which he relied on, and which , he actually included in his ways and means for the year. A short time will now fully discover who has been correct, and who incorrect, as to this subject. The hasty remarks here made will, at any rate, serve to awaken attention, amongst some few persons, and, as far as they have that effect, will guard against that despondency, which a financial deficit, suddenly announced, is apt to create in this money-loving community, especially at a time when there appears to be less hope than ever of seeing an end to the

RESTRICTION ON THE BANK.- On this subject, so closely connected with every ra tional view that can be taken of our ability to continue the war for any length of time, some observations were offered to the public in a preceding sheet. But, it was not then remarked, that, the paying, or not paying, in specie, at the Bank of England, is, by our enemy, if not by the world at large, considered as the proof of whether we are able, or unable, to carry on the present war, to an extended period, without utter ruin to our national credit, or, in other words, without a national bankruptcy. The late Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Rose, in bis "Brief Examination of the Finances," observes, when speaking of the income tax, which had just then, in 1799, been imposed, that, amongst other great advantages arising from the resolution to levy a considera. ble portion of the taxes within the year, would be," to convince our enemies, and to

* See account of consolidated fund for the year ending the 5th January, 1803. Political Register, Vol. 1 p. 609.

+ See Vol. II. p. 910, et seq.

"inform all Europe, that, if France built "hopes on the expected overthrow of our "financial system, and trusted to the failure "of our resources, that those hopes were "vain."* Lord Auckland, upon the same occasion said;-"such, then, my lords, is "the plan before us; establishing a sys "tem of supply essentially important in the "present struggle, essentially beneficial on "the eventual return of peace, and such as "will hereafter induce all nations to pause. "before they bring upon us the necessity of

engaging in a new war with them."† France has not "paused" long. How delu sive, alas! have been all, yes all, the promises of the English financiers for twenty years past! And, how obstinately blind, how incorrigible, have been the people! The people? But, indeed, the people, properly so called; the people of Britain, know nothing of the matter.-Returning to the sub-1 ject more directly in view, we find Mr. Addington, in proposing bis income tax, his plan for " raising a great part of the supplies within the year," we find him, too, holding out to us, as one of its most beneficial effects," that of convincing the enemy "of this country, that it is hopeless for him "to contend with our finances, and of con

vincing the other powers of Europe, that "they may safely join with us, in a com

mon cause, for that the resources of this. "country are such as to give full security for "the punctual discharge of any engage:

ments it may enter into." It is truly surprising that these financiers should, at periods so distant, repeat each others senti ments and words so exactly. But to all this boasting, all this grand display of "inex"haustible resources," Buonaparté laco nically replies: "pay your bank-notes in gold"and silver, and then we will believe you, "without your going to war, and without; your adding twelve millions annually to

your taxes "§ The stoppage of cash pay ments, therefore, which the blind partisaus of Ministers would fain have us regard as a thing of no conséquence, is, in the opinion of our enemy, the criterion of our pecuniary means. Nor, can there be any doubt, that it is so in the opinion of the world; and as all credit depends entirely upon opinion, that which the world thinks, relative to our credit, really exists.-On the 13th instant, a debate took place in the House of Lords, on the third reading of the Bank Restriction

* Rose's Brief Examination, 5th Edit. p. 75+ Lord Auckland's Speech, 8th Jan. 1799, pam phlet copy, p. 30.

See his speech, 13th June, 1803, Vol. 11.

p. 906.

$ Moniteur of 17th of June, 1803.

Bill. Some remarks, well worthy of public attention, were made by the Lords Grenville and King, and by his Grace the Duke of Norfolk. Lord Hawkesbury replied to some of those remarks. The conversation, for such it was rather than a debate, was in teresting; and the apathy of the nation as to the subject was tolerably well pourtrayed in the number of peers present, which amounted only to fourteen!Lord Grenville dwelt much upon the vast increase of private paper, and apprehended the worst consequences from the further increase of it, because, he said, being payable in specie, it was likely to obtain a preference to the bank paper. But, this notion stems to be erroneous, because all private paper is payable in bank paper, at best, seeing that, of whatever sort the private paper may be, it can never be more than the evidence of a debt, and for no debt can a man be arrested, provided he tender bank paper to the amount of it. His lordship thought, that a joint committee of the two houses of parliament, or a committee of each house, ought, as soon after the recess as convenient, to be appoint ed to examine into and report upon, the state of the bank, and of the currency of the country; and, he also wished to see some measure prepared, for supporting, in case of invasion, the credit of the private paper of the part of the country, in which the invasion might take place Lord Hawkesbury having observed, that he doubted of the increase of paper, since the first act of restriction on the bank, Lord King produced the accounts to shew, that the bank paper had nearly doubled since that time, whereupon Lord Hawkesbury said, that he did not mean the bank paper, but the private paper! Every man at all conversant with the subject knows, that, as Lord Grenville stated, since the first act of restriction, the private paper has increased more than the bank of England paper. Driven from this, Lord Hawkes. bury seemed to contend, that the increase of paper was owing to the increase of “trade, capital, and national prosperity;" and, if his Jordship's position be true, the progress of the increase of paper must be peculiarly encouraging to the people. The bank of Eng and notes in circulation,

What a cheering prospect! According to Lord Hawkesbury's doctrine, our trade, capital and national prosperity, have been almost doubled in the space of six years! This is the sort of accounts, this is the financial view, to send to the different courts of Eu rope! Prosperity doubled in the short space of six years! Break your heart, Buonaparté, it is useless for you to contend with Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury!--And, not only has our prosperity been increasing along with the increase of bank notes, but, which is something truly curious, the value of our silver and gold, and of every thing else, even down to our bread and cheese, has also been increasing, and, except in peculiar cases, this increase has kept an exact pace with that of the bank notes! Happy, thrice happy, people!-Lord King stated, that, though there were, perhaps, few ine stances, in which English bank notes underwent, as yet, a positive discount, still, they had depreciated, as clearly appeared from the price of standard silver, which, previous to the stoppage of cash payments, was 5s. 2d. an ounce, and which is now 5s. Ed. This is a rise in the value of silver, or a fall in the value of bank notes, of more than nine per centum. There is no arguing against this fact. It is decisive as to the depreciation of bank paper; but, whether that depreciation be a mark of prosperity, or of the contrary, shall be left for Mr. Addington and his supporters to decide- Both Lord Grenville and Lord King alluded to what had been said by Mr. Addington relative to the sin of boarding. They thought the imputation of "unpatriotic motives," extremely absurd. In times of scarcity, they observed, nothing was so common as to hear a clamour against the hoardings of the mealmen, corn-dealers, and farmers; and this clamour was just as unreasonable, but not more, than the clamours of those, who are now railing against persons hoarding money; for that, as in times of scarcity of provisions, the hoarding of corn and flour was the only effectual security against famine, so, in times, like the present, the hoarding of money was the means most likely to prevent a total want of the precious metals. Lord Hawkesbury observed, that his colleague, Mr. Addington, recognizing as he did, the principles of freedom of trade, could not, in a tone of censure, have alluded to the amassing of gold and silver as objects of commerce, but only to the hoardings occasioned by a want of confidence in the country. To this Lord King replied, that, as to the blame cast on persons whom a want coufidence led to hoard, it put him in mind of the history of the assignats. Robespiere, his lordship said, in order to re

store confidence, passed a decreee to prevent | people from keeping more than a certain sum of gold or silver in their possession, the effect of which decree was the total annihilation of the assignats.The hoarders of France were accused of incivism; people here are accused of unpatriotic motives. The former wanted confidence in Robespierre's government, the latter in the government of Mr. Addington, who is not less the cause of national ruin in political, than in commercial concerns. The contemptuous opinion which the world entertains of his administration, keeps all the courts of Europe aloof from us; it has dipped us into a most dangerous dispute with America; it has shaken the confidence, which foreigners have heretofore had in our pecuniary establishments, and our public securities; and, amidst all this, shall the people be blamed, if they wish to provide a few shillings, which is all that seems to be now left, against an hour of calamity? Shall every man be accused of "baseness" (that's the word he made use of) if he refuses, by way of proof of his confidence in Mr. Addington, to suffer his children to starve for want of bread? Besides, Mr. Jekyll, who first complained, in parliament, of the unpatriotic practice of hoarding, and whose observations the minister highly applauded, seems, when in asserting, upon the authority of a banking-house, that, unless hoarding was "put a stop to," there would not, in a short time, be any hard-cash to be seen; when citing this authority, he seems to have forgotten, that there had long been in circulation a pamphlet, written in and published from a banking-house, which pamphlet, agreeably to its title, inculcates the doctrine, that " guineas are an unnecessary and expen"sive incumbrance," and that there ought to be no currency but that of paper. From such a quarter, instead of a complaint against hoarders of hard money, one would naturally have expected an eulogium on their useful labours, for what can be more pleasing or of greater utility than that which tends to rid us of "an unnecessary incumbrance?" It has, in leed, been very well, and perhaps, very truly observed, that, as familiarity seldom fails to create contempt, guineas may now be viewed, in banking houses, as well as every where else, with a little more respect than formerly; but this circumstance, it is to be presumed, ought by no means to weigh against those who are vying with the bankers, in testifying this respect --At the close of the conversation in the house of lords, the Duke of Norfolk observed, that

if ministers would, whenever the bank-directors pleased, come to parliament and obtain a law to protect thsoe directors against the legal demands of their creditors, it might be feared, that, in return, those directors might, at some time or other, give ministers such aid as would enable them to dispense, for a time at least, with the concurrence of parliament. In answer to this, Lord Hawkesbury denied, in the most positive terms, that the bill was introduced at the request, or even at the suggestion, of the bank directors. There was, indeed, an incontestible proof of this, and it is a wonder his lordship did not cite it; to wit; that the bill is to "restrain". the directors from paying in specie, which, therefore, they are, doubtless, very desirous of doing! But, why then, not take off the restraint? Why not let these gentlemen give a loose to their noble natures?-The fact is, that this connection between the bank and government, that is to say, between the bank directors, and all the bankers and partners in bankinghouses through the kingdom, on the one part, and the ministers on the other part, is one of the new and great points of our national situation, and one of the principal causes of our disgraceful acquiesence in every measure, the immediate object of which is the increase of factitious wealth. Let the Nobles, let the Clergy, let the Gentry, let the Merchant and Manufacturer, think well of, and be duly prepared for, the final consequences of this connection. It is an object, which the statesman, who would rescue his country from ruin, ought to have constantly in view. He must, indeed, expect to be loaded with obloquy by the numerous and the ever-active swarm of paper-dealers, and by the news-papers, almost the whole of which these dealers have, either directly or indi rectly, at their command; but, that oblo quy he must set at defiance; the current, or rather the torrent of events, which is fast rolling on, will soon wipe from his memory the recollection of the falsehood and abuse, with which he is now assailed. When one looks forward only to the distance of five or six years; when one considers, not what may, but what must happen before the end of that time, with what contempt, or rather, with what perfect indifference, one looks down upon those ignorant and venomous beings, who are railing at and cursing every man, who has the sense (and it does not want much) to perceive, and the honesty to forewarn them of, the dangers and calami ties that await them!

LETTER IV.

FROM A CONTINENTAL OBSERVER.

Hamburgb, Nov. 4, 1803.

SIR,-In my three former letters, I took the liberty of discussing four questions, relating to the proposition which your correspondent Inquisitor had previously made, for the open and complete restoration of the ancient French monarchy, in the person of Louis XVIII. the lawful heir to the throne. You may, perhaps, have thought me incompetent to the discussion of a subject so important; but I must beg your forbearance a little longer, while I offer some reflections on the principle which ought, and must, constitute the basis of that grand and glorious project. The congress proposed by Inquisitor, is intended chiefly for the regulation of the respective interests of the different states of Europe; and, among others, of the re-established French monarchy. Undoubtedly, it will also combine and direct the various means of adjustment, which circumstances may render necessary. All these are points, however, upon which it becomes me to preserve a respectful silence---But what I propose to examine is, the principle by which the power to be given to Louis XVIII. for the internal government of France, should be regulated.-What, then, will be the previous stipulations which will be made with the French, relative to the great changes which must take place in the internal regulation of the kingdom? Will they be told that every thing shall remain in its present state: or, on the contrary, will it be agreed that every thing shall be restored, as nearly as possible, to the state in which it was before the revolution: or, will they acquiesce in a state of mezzo-termine which will leave some of the most durable traits of the revolution, and will not completely obliterate the rest: or, rather, will not all explanations relative to these objects be carefully avoided?-By attempting to put a period to the revolution, and to destroy the revolutionary government, Great Britain attempts the overthrow of that which is unlawful in its nature, iniquitous in its operation, and ever dangerous in its consequences: and, by the re-establishment of the monarchical authority, she performs an act which is just, lawful, and good. The revolution, though in reality so strong and so rich, is, neverthe less, destitute of all right; and, by all her efforts, has never acquired what rebellion can never produce. rights of the lawful Sovereign are, therefore, as perfect as if they had never been violated: and, to re-establish the monarchy is therefore, speaking strictly

with regard to its rights, to replace it as it was, and to endow it with the same power which it possessed before the revolution. Generally speaking, it would be more easy to re-establish it, simple and entire, than with modifications, such as they may be, which would open a door to new discontents and new struggles, both now and hereafter, and would render more complicated that which cannot be too plain. By adopting that principle, Europe would find it of great advantage in promoting and accelerating the restoration; and it would be of greater advantage in future, because the King would thereby be rendered better able to perform the engagements which he might have made with other states. at the important moment of his re-establishment. France would also find it of infinite benefit to her internal tranquillity and security. Before, it would have been impossible for her to be governed without the aid of military power, because all the bonds of authority were broken: but the revolutionary government has rendered the king an essential service, by taking upon itself, all the odium of an authority preserved by such means. I believe that there is scarcely an individual to be found, who does not think that France ought, at this time, to be governed by a power perfectly free, and totally unshackled. For my part I go further, for I think it absolutely necessary, that at first, the Monarch should be endowed with a power superior to that which he possessed before the revolution.I am aware that it will be said, that I make France but a poor present, in restoring her a government, against the abuses of which so much complaint has been made: a government where the authority of the Prince is not sufficiently limited; in fact, a government which, when we recollect the wonderful ease with which it was overthrown, must be supposed to conceal great and numerous defects. This objection is plausible; and, therefore, lest any should be misled by it, let us examine its force.--Abuses in government are like rust, they attach themselves to that which is most hard and most solid; and nothing but the most assiduous care can prevent them from destroying it by slow and almost imperceptible degrees. This care constitutes one of the most essential parts of the art of governing. If we examine the various governments of the world, ancient as well as modern, we shall always find that it is this rust which, sooner or later, produces th their decay. The more closely we investigate this subject, the more certain will be our conviction. For my part, I do not think that, before the revolution, the laws of