Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

Me. 503; Dous v. Greene, 16 Barb. 72; Lawson, I at the Bank of America, in the City and State
Usage, 215, 216, 217; Hutch. Carriers, § 87; 2 of New York, on the... day of...., A. D.
Rorer, R. R. 1097, 1098; Boston Chamber of Com- 187...., together with interest in gold thereon
merce v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 32 Am. & from the....day of..., 187, at the rate
Eng. R. R. Cas. 627; Great Western R. Co. v. of six per cent per annum, which interest shall
Bunch, L. R. 13 App. Cas. 31; Pickford v.
Grand Junction R. Co. 12 Mees. & W. 766; be payable semi-annually on the presentation
Kuter v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. 1 Biss. 35. and delivery at said Bank of America of the
coupons of interest hereto attached.

It is immaterial that the railroad company received no extra pay for the trunk; it could have charged it.

Judgment affirmed with costs, by reason of a

This bond being issued under and pursuant Parmelee v. Lowitz, 74 Ill. 116; Lemon v. to an order of the County Court of Jackson Chanslor, 68 Mo. 340; Indianapolis & St. L. R. County, by virtue of an Act of the General Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291 (23:898); Lake Shore Assembly of the State of Missouri, approved & M. S. R. Co. v. Foster, 2 West. Rep. 299, 104 March 23, 1868, entitled "An Act to Facilitate Ind. 293; McGill v. Rowand, 3 Pa 452; Giles the Construction of Railroads in the State of v. Fauntleroy, 13 Md. 127; Graffan v. Boston | Missouri," and authorized by a vote of the & M. R. Co. 67 Maine, 234. people taken August 30, 1870, as required by law, upon the proposition to subscribe fifty thousand dollars to the capital stock of the Pleasant Hill Division of the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company, which said Railroad Company last aforesaid and the former Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company were on the 4th day of October, 1870, consolidated as required by law, into one company, under the name of the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company.

divided court.

[439] THE COUNTY OF JACKSON, IN THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Piff. in Err.,

v.

THE NINTH NATIONAL BANK OF
NEW YORK.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 439.)

Judgment upon coupons of bonds of Jackson
County, Missouri, issued on behalf of Van Buren
Township to the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Rail-
road Company, rendered in favor of plaintiff for
the amount of the coupons, affirmed by operation
of law, this court being divided.

[No. 102.]
Argued Dec. 3, 4, 1888. Decided Dec. 17, 1888.

IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

States for the Western District of Missouri, to review a judgment in favor of plaintiff for the amount of certain coupons of bonds of Jackson County, Missouri, issued on behalf of a township in said county. Affirmed by reason of a divided court.

This suit was upon coupons attached to bonds issued by the County Court of Jackson County, in the State of Missouri, on behalf of Van Buren Township, in said county, under the provisions of,what is known as the "Township Aid Act of 1868." The following is the form of the bonds:

"No.....

$1,000.

And which said last named railroad company, as provided by law, and under the terms of said consolidation thereof, possesses all the powers, rights and privileges, and owns and controls all the assets, subscriptions, bonds, money and properties whatsoever of the two said several companies forming said consolidation or either of them.

In testimony whereof, the said County of Jackson has executed this bond by the presiding justice of the County Court of said County, under the order thereof, signing his

name hereto, and by the Clerk of said Court,

under the order thereof, attesting the same
This
and affixing the seal of said court.
done at the City of Independence, County of
Jackson, this....day of...., A. D. 187....."

These bonds were issued in aid of the same enterprise as those passed on by this court in Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U. S. 569 (23: 747) and Bates County v. Winters, 97 U. S. 83 (24:933) and 112 U. S. 325 (28: 744), but under different circumstances as to the terms and conditions of the petition upon which the vote was taken and the facts constituting the alleged subscription. The vote was taken upon a proposition to subscribe to the stock of the Pleasant Hill Division of the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company, and the bonds were issued by the county court to the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company.

United States of America. State of Missouri, County of Jackson. Issued pursuant to articles of consolidation, in payment of stock due the Lexington, Lake The bonds contain the same recitals, and are and Gulf Railroad Company, consolidated Oc-in all material respects similar, upon their face, tober 4, A. D. 1870.

Know all men, by these presents, that the County of Jackson, in the State of Missouri, acknowledges itself indebted and firmly bound to the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company in the sum of one thousand dollars, which sum the said County of Jackson, for and in behalf of Van Buren Township therein promises to pay in gold to said Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company, or bearer,

with those in the Bates County Cases; and one of the questions presented is, whether-upon the facts in this case, as it was upon the facts in those cases-there was a valid contract of subscription to the stock of the company proposed in the vote, before it was extinguished by the consolidation. The other question presented is, whether the bonds are not void because issued contrary to the terms and conditions of the proposition made by the voters of the township.

207

[blocks in formation]

And for a more particular assignment of errors, the plaintiff in error says:

First. It does not appear from the special finding of facts by the circuit court that the Township of Van Buren, or the County Court of Jackson County in its behalf, made any contract of subscription to the capital stock of the Pleasant Hill Division of the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company, or the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company, or any other company; nor was there in fact or law any subscription or contract of subscription by said Van Buren Township, or the County Court of Jackson County in its behalf, to the capital stock of any company; and the court therefore erred in rendering judgment for the defendant in error on the special finding of facts.

Second. It appears from the special finding of facts by the circuit court that neither the Pleasant Hill Division of the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad, nor the Lexington, Chillicothe and Gulf Railroad Company, nor the Lexington, Lake and Gulf Railroad Company ever located or built, or had any power or authority under their charters to locate or build, a railroad in compliance with the terms and conditions of the petition or proposition voted on by the voters of Van Buren Township, in this, that said petition and proposition called for a railroad to commence at the Town of Chillicothe, which is in the second tier of counties north of the Missouri River, and none of said companies had any power or authority to build a railroad north of the Missouri River. Therefore the County Court of Jackson County could not, in behalf of Van Buren Township, make any valid sub scription to the capital stock of either of said companies; and the court, for this reason, also erred in rendering judgment for the defendant in error upon the special finding of facts.

Messrs. C. O. Tichenor and Edward P. Gates, for plaintiff in error:

There was no subscription, or contract of subscription, to the stock of the Pleasant Hill Company.

Bates Co. v. Winters, 112 U. S. 325 (28: 744); Bates Co. v. Winters, 97 U. S. 83 (24: 933); Aspinwall v. Daviess Co. 63 U. S. 22 How. 364 (16: 296); Buffalo & J. R. Co. v. Falconer, 103 U. S. 821 (26: 471); State v. Garroutte, 67 Mo. 453; Weil v. Greene Co. 69 Mo. 284-5; Carlisle v. Saginaw Valley & St. L. R. Co. 27 Mich. 315; Sewall v. Eastern R. Co,9 Cush.12; Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364; Parker v. Northern Cent. Mich. R. Co. 33 Mich. 23; Hopper v. Covington, 10 Biss. 488, 118 U. S. 148 (30: 190);

Hannibal v. Fauntleroy, 105 U. S. 408 (26: 1103); Harshman v. Knox Co. 122 U. S. 306 (30: 1152); Cowdrey v. Caneadea, 16 Fed. Rep. Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U. S. 504 (25: 331); 532; Gilson v. Dayton 123 U. S. 59 (31.74); Scotland Co. v. Thomas, 94 U. S. 691 (24: 220); Marsh v. Fulton Co. 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 676 (19: Daviess Co. v. Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657 (29: 1040); Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U. S. 83 (28: 360);

1026).

The following cases show that the bonds in question were made and delivered without authority because of the failure and inability of the company to comply with the condition of the proposition voted on by the taxpayers:

Concord v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 625 (23: 628); Buffalo & J. R. Co. v. Falconer, 103 U. S. 821 (26: 471); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Aurora, 99 Ill. 205; Thomas v. Lansing, 14 Fed. Rep. 618; Mellen v. Lansing, 11 Fed. Rep. 829; 20 Blatchf. 278; Virginia & T. R. Co. v. Lyon Co. 6 Nev. 68; State v. Daviess Co. Ct. 64 Mo. 30; Wagner v. Meety, 69 Mo. 150; State v. Minneapolis, 32 Minn. 501; Memphis, K. & C.R. Co. v. Thompson, 24 Kan. 170; Lawson v. Schnel len, 33 Wis. 288; Portland & O. C. R. Co. v. Hartford, 58 Maine, 23; Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 89; Foote v. Mount Pleasant, 1 McCrary, 101; Cowdrey v. Caneadea, 16 Fed. Rep. 532.

If the bonds are void for want of authority to issue them, the levy and collection of taxes and payment of interest on them for a time by the county court cannot make them valid.

Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 U. S. 172 (30 911); Leslie v. Urbana, 8 Biss. 435 (affirmed in supreme court); Thomas v. Lansing, 14 Fed. Rep. 618; Lewis v. Shreveport 108 U. S. 282 (27: 729); Marsh v. Fulton Co. 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 676 (19:1040); State v. Daviess Co. Ct. 64 Mo. 30. Mr. J. B. Henderson, for defendant in error:

Where the constituent company has express authority to consolidate with some other desig. nated company, the subscription and bonds may be given to either the original or the consolidated company.

Washburn v. Cass Co. 8 Dill. 251; Harter Turp. v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562 (26: 411); Me nasha v. Hazard, 102 U. S. 95 (26: 85); Scotland Co. v. Thomas, 94 U. S.682 (24: 219); Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U. S. 499 (25: 330); Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 60 (26: 1008).

In the pending case there was an actual subscription of the stock to the constituent company before consolidation.

Nugent v. Putnam Co. 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 241 (22: 83); Cass Co. v. Gillett, 100 U. S. 585 (25: 585); Warren Co. v. Marcy, 97 U.S. 107 (24: 981); Moultrie Co. v. Rockingham Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 631 (23: 631); Clarke Co. Ct. v. Paris W. &. K. R. Turnpike Co. 11 B. Mon. 143; Western Sav. Fund Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 175; Lo gansport v. Blakemore, 17 Ind. 318; Sacramento v. Kirk, 7 Cal. 419.

Under the express statute law of Missouri and the repeated decisions of its courts, the act of Tilton Davis, the attorney and agent of the company, in declaring, as a matter of record, the company's assent to and approval of the order of subscription, is binding on the company even as between the original parties.

Preston v. Mo. & P. Lead Co. 51 Mo. 43; Lungstrass v. German Ins. Co. 57 Mo. 107. See Mer

chants Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 77 U.S. 10 Wall. 644 (19: 1018); State v. Kupferle, 44 Mo. 154; Kitchen v. Cape Girardeau & S. L. R. Co. 59 Mo. 514.

64

66

The words "powers," rights," privileges," ," and "immunities," had been defined and construed by the Supreme Court of Missouri. Under that construction the power to subscribe by a municipality is a "right" or "privilege" of the original company, which passes by virtue of consolidation to the new company.

Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Marion Co. 36 Mo. 294; New Buffalo Twp. v. Cambria Iron Co. 105 U. S. 73 (26: 1024); Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U. S. 499 (25: 330); Tipton Co. v. Rogers Locomotive & Mach. Works, 103 U. S. 533 (26: 344); Schuyler Co. v. Thomas, 98 U. S. 169 (25: 88); Scotland Co. v. Thomas, 94 U. S. 682 (24: 219); Harter Twp. v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562 (26: 411).

The township is estopped from asserting the invalidity of the bonds involved in this case.

Smith v. Clark Co. 54 Mo. 58; Ranney v. Baeder, 50 Mo. 600; Johnson Co. v. January, 94 U. S. 202 (24: 110); Jordan v. Cass Co. 3 Dill. 245; Reardon v. St. Louis Co. 36 Mo. 560; Steines v. Franklin Co. 48 Mo. 167, 188.

Is it possible that any principle of honest dealing can be invoked to avoid these securities? Jordan v. Cass Co. 3 Dill. 185, 245; Moultrie Co. v. Rockingham Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 631 (23: 631); Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. 74 (30: 323); East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S. 801 (24: 822); Nugent v. Putnam Co. 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 241 (22: 83); Tipton Co. v. Rogers Locomotive & Mach. Works, 103 U. S. 538 (26: 346); Harter Trp. v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562 (26:411); Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 683 (26: 526); Marcy ▼. Oswego, 92 U. S. 637 (23:748).

Judgment affirmed with costs and interest, by reason of a divided court.

[merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]

This suit was begun in the Circuit Court of the United States, Eastern District of Arkansas. The cause of action alleged in the complaint was the injury and death of the plaintiff's intestate caused by the negligence of defendant's servants in the particulars set forth in the declaration. The defenses set up in the answer were: (1) a denial of negligence on the part of the defendant or its agents; and (2) an averment that the injury was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff's intestate. The court below, after the evidence was in, instructed the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendant.

The case is brought to this court on a writ of error. The alleged errors are, the refusal by the court below to give to the jury certain instructions which the plaintiff requested it to give, and the giving of the instruction that the plaintiff had failed to make out a case for the jury to pass upon, and directing the jury to render a verdict for the defendant.

The plaintiff's intestate, Bauer, was a car inspector in the employ of the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company, and his place of work was the railroad yard of that company in Texarkana, where he was at the time he was killed. The defendant com. pany used that yard and the round-house therein in common with the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railroad Company. The plaintiff's intestate, Bauer, was run over and killed in that yard by a locomotive belonging to and operated by the defendant company. J. C. Atkinson, the engineer who was in charge of the defendant's locomotive at the time, testified:

"This engine had been taken out of the de fendant's round-house that morning to the south end of the yard to take a train out to Texas, but the purpose of taking the trains out was abandoned and the engine ordered back, when the accident happened. The way we were going the tender was ahead and first struck him."

Willis McDoniel, a witness for the plaintiff, testified:

"I saw Bauer when he stepped on the track ahead of the engine, coming towards me or in my direction. He was about the length of the tender ahead of the engine when he stepped on the track, coming in my direction, with his back to the engine. He came from the east side. I 'hollered' at him and tried to make

Action for death-negligence of railroad com- him hear, but he paid no attention. I called to

pany.

In a suit against the above named railroad company to recover for the death of plaintiff's intestate, caused by the negligence of the company and its servants, the court below, after the evidence was in, instructed the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendant and the judgment on the verdict is affirmed by reason of a divided court.

[No. 136.] Argued Dec. 19, 1888. Decided Jan. 7, 1889.

N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

to review a judgment on a verdict for the defendant directed by the Court in an action to recover for the death of the plaintiff's intestate caused by defendant's negligence. Affirmed by reason of a divided court. 181 U. S.

U. S., Book 88.

14

him to look out, as I saw he was in danger, but he did not seem to notice it. He did not seem to know that the engine was behind him. After he got on the track he walked forty or fifty feet before the engine struck him. I called to him all the time but he did not seem to hear me. from him when the engine struck him." I was from thirty to forty steps

Messrs. Sol. F. Clark and Sam. W. Williams, for plaintiff in error: Negligence by the defendant being established, contributory negligence is always a are any palliating circumstances whatever.

Filer v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. 49 N. Y. 47; Greenleaf v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. 29 Iowa, 14; Herrick v. Sullivan, 120 Mass. 576. And this is always to be solved according to 209

the circumstances attendant upon the transaction.

Pa. Canal Co. v. Bentley, 66 Pa. 30; Haight v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. 7 Lans. 11; Jenkins v. Little Miami R. Co. 2 Disney (Ohio), 49; Newhouse v. Miller, 35 Ind. 463; 6 Wait, Act. & Def. 584, 596 and cases there cited; Hoye v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 62 Wis. 666; Kaples v. Orth, 61 Wis. 531; Mark v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 32 Minn. 208; Townley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 53 Wis. 626; Johnson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 49 Wis. 529; Ireland v. Oswego, H.

Dublin, W. & W. R. Co. v. Slattery, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 1166.

Judgment affirmed with costs, by reason of a divided court.

THE CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COM- [432] PANY OF NEW YORK, Piff. in Err.,

v.

DAVID WRIGHT.

DELPHIA, Plff. in Err.

v.

& S. Plank Road Co. 13 N. Y. 533; Pa. R. Co. THE FIRE ASSOCIATION OF PHILA. [435] v. Barnett, 59 Pa. 263; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Murphy, 46 Tex. 366; Smith v. Fletcher, L. R. 9 Exch. 64; Kenworthy v. Ironton, 41 Wis. 647; Langhoff v. Milwaukee & P. du C. R. Co. 19 Wis. 489.

Negligence is a conclusion of fact to be drawn by the jury, under proper instructions from the court. It is always so where the facts, or rather the conclusion, is fairly debatable or rests in doubt.

Roll v. Northern Cent. R. Co. 15 Hun, 496; Steele v. Iowa Cent. R. Co. 43 Iowa, 109; Farley v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 56 Iowa, 337; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Dignan, 56 Ill. 487; Schultz v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 44 Wis. 638; Burns v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 69 Iowa, 450; Hunter v. Wanamaker (Pa.), 2 Cent. Rep. 70; Thompson v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 13 Cent. Rep. 240, 110 N. Y. 636; Blaiser v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co. 13 Cent. Rep. 231, 110 N. Y. 638; Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439 (24:506).

Messrs. John F. Dillon and W. S. Pierce, for defendant in error:

The court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendant.

The rule is well established that when the evidence given at the trial, with all the inferences that the jury may reasonably draw from it, is insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff, then the court ought to nonsuit the plaintiff or direct a verdict for the defendant. Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 121 (22:782); Randall v. Balt. & O. R. Co. 109 U. S. 482 (27:1005); Baylis v. Travellers Ins. Co. 113 U. S. 320 (28:990); Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. 8. 16, 18 (25:980, 981); Anderson Co. v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227, 241 (28:966, 971); Littlefield v. Internal Imp. Fund, 117 U. S. 419 (29:930); North Pa. R. Co. v. Commercial Bank, 123 U. 8. 733 (31:288).

The law is settled in England to the same effect.

Giblin v. McMullen, L. R. 2 Pr. C. 335; Wakelin v. London & S. W. R. Co. L. R. 12 App. Cas. 41; Metropolitan R. Co. v. Jackson, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 193; Davey v. London & S. W. R. Co. L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 213; S. C. on appeal, L. R. 12 Q. B. Div. 70; Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 4 Exch. 32.

The evidence given at the trial, with all the inferences that a jury might reasonably draw from it, was insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff.

Ellis v. Great Western R. Co. L. R. 9 C. P. 557; Culhane v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 60 N. Y. 133, 137.

DAVID WRIGHT.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed 432, 435.) Policies of fire insurance-liability upon.

The judgments in these actions in favor of plaintiff

below-for loss by fire of his hotel building insured by the companies above named, affirmed by reason of a divided court. [Nos. 139, 140.]

Argued Dec. 19, 1888.

Decided Jan. 7, 1889.

IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois, to review judgments in actions brought by the defendant in error, David Wright, upon policies of insurance issued by the above named companies against loss by fire of a hotel building, in favor of David Wright, the plaintiff below, for the amount of the loss.

Statement from brief for plaintiff in error.

The actions in the above stated cases were brought in the Circuit Court of Greene County, State of Illinois, upon two policies of insurance issued by the defendant companies. The first policy was in the Continental Insurance Company, was issued at Las Vegas, New Mexico, and covered $5,000 on "two-story adobe and wood-stuccoed shingle-roof hotel building, to be occupied for hotel purposes," from July 11, 1881, to July 11, 1882. The policy was dated July 11, 1881.

The conditions of this policy provided that the policy should be void "if in said premises there be kept gunpowder," etc.

The second policy was in the Fire Association of Philadelphia, and was concurrent with that in the Continental. Under the sixth condition, it was provided that the policy should be void "if any of the following named articles, or compounds containing any of them, be kept, stored, or used in or on the premises herein described, any custom or usage of trade or manufacture to the contrary notwithstanding; gunpowder," etc.

This policy was also issued at Las Vegas, New Mexico, on July 11, 1881.

The property covered by these policies was destroyed by fire on January 19, 1882, more than six months after they were issued.

The defendant companies failing to pay, aotions were brought therein in the Circuit Court of Greene County, State of Illinois. The cases were removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illi

The plaintiff's intestate brought the injury nois, the petition in each case stating "that the on himself by his own negligence. subject matter and controversy in said suit is

[blocks in formation]

that the case was to be appealed to this court, and that the transcript would be filed during the following month of October, 1886. The transcript was filed in this court on the 20th of October, 1886. This gave the appellees' solicitor twenty-two days' notice, before the transcript was filed.

Notice of an appeal to this court from the decree of November 26, 1883, of the court below, was entered of record below on the 4th of November, 1885, and the appeal bond approved by the Chief Justice below, on the 17th of November, 1885.

The affidavits herewith also show, that twice, subsequent to the filing of the transcript of record in this court, the appellees having advertised for sale, the same pieces of property embraced in the bills filed in the case, on account of the same arrears of taxes, or parts of them, which the appella it claimed had been

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL. paid, and had asked an injunction to restrain

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 449.)
Appeal when dismissed.

the sale on account of, the solicitor for the appellant called upon the solicitor for the appellees, and requested that the said sales should not be attempted, because the case upon these very taxes and pieces of property was dependMotion to dismiss the appeal in this case, on the ing in this court. ground that the decree from which the appeal under the circumstances would be disrespectThat any attempt to sell was taken is not a final decree and that no no-ful and out of order. In each instance the sotice of the appeal was given nor any citation is- licitor for the appellees had the sales postponed sued, granted. [No. 506.] indefinitely, upon notice and request. Submitted Jan. 14, 1889. Decided Jan. 21, 1889.

APPEAL from decor Columbiauran

Court of the District of Columbia, sustain

The facts above stated disclose just such a case as this court has always held to render a citation unnecessary.

"The object of a citation on appeal being ing demurrer to the bill with leave to the com-where, in point of fact, by agreement of parties, notice, no citation was necessary in a case plainant to amend.

On motion to dismiss. Dismissed.

Mr. Henry E. Davis, for the appellees, moves to dismiss the appeal, because the decree, from which the appeal was taken, is not a final decree; but if the said decree be deemed final no sufficient appeal therefrom was taken, for the only subsequent proceedings were that on the 5th day of November, 1885, there was filed in said court in the said cause a certain paper writing, as follows:

actual and full knowledge of the party appellee of the other side's intentions to appeal appeared of record."

68 U. S. 1 Wall. 690 (17: 677.)

..

is not avoided by the nonservice of a citation; 'An appeal, although allowed out of term, but this court will impose such terms as may be legal and proper."

94 U. S. 112 (24: 33).

When the parties have had notice, in fact, that an appeal has been taken, the citation is held to be unnecessary.

Phillips, Pr. 131.

"Notice is hereby given of the plaintiff's intention to appeal this case to the Supreme Court of the United States, being an appeal from the The stipulation of September 28, 1886, shows decision of the general term of the above Dis- just such an agreement, and knowledge of the trict Court entered on the 26th day of Novem-intention to appeal, as the above quotation ber, 1883.

"(Signed) J. W. Douglass,
Solicitor for plaintiff."

And an appeal bond, in the usual form, ap-
proved by D. K. Cartter, Chief Justice, on the
17th day of November, 1885, was on said day
filed in said court; but no notice of said sup-
posed appeal was given to the District of Co-
lumbia, nor was any citation thereon ever is
sued.

By the decree, the defendant's demurrer to the original and amended bill was sustained, with leave to the complainant to amend as she may be advised.

Mr. J. W. Douglass, for the appellant, in opposition to the motion to dismiss:

It appears by the affidavits filed herewith, and the stipulation contained in the transcript of record, that the appellees' solicitor had actual notice on the 28th of September, 1886,

from the case in 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 690 (17: 677), contemplates. If citation is simply notice, then the appellees in this case have all the notice that any party could demand or require.

If however, notwithstanding the above consideration, the court should think a more formal notice or citation is required, then the appellant asks that a citation be issued out of this court, to be served upon the solicitor of the appellees, upon terms as contemplated by the case in 94 U. S. 112 (24: 33), if any terms are considered necessary. This appeal has been here now two years, and actual knowledge of it had by the appellees and their solicitor for all that time, but no motion until now.

The demurrer was general to the entire bill, and the decree of November 26, 1883, sustained the demurrer. That was the end of our bill of course. The court below, however, added the gratuitous language "with leave to amend."

« AnteriorContinuar »