[470]

pavement; and that the second claim of the | linger; and that the Van Camp patent showed
reissue is infringed, because the temporary use
of the trowel or cutting instrument, to divide
the upper course into blocks, is the equivalent
of the tar-paper of the Schillinger patent, the
cutting making a division which controls the
cracking, and facilitates the taking up and re-
laying of the blocks or sections in the upper
course "without disturbing the adjoining sec-
tions," and the trowel being interposed to effect
its object during the process of forming the
pavement on the spot where it is to remain.
The invention of Schillinger was a very valu-
able one The evidence is that it entirely sup-
erseded the prior practice of laying concrete
pavements in a continuous, adhering mass.
The defendant introduced in evidence, on
the question of novelty, the following patents:
English patent to Claridge, No. 7489, of
1837; English patent to D'Harcourt, No. 7991,
of 1839; United States patent to Russ, No.
5475, of 1848; English patent to Chesneau, No.
350, of 1852; English patent to Coignet, No.
2659, of 1855; English patent to De la Haichois,
No. 771, of 1856; and United States patent to
Van Camp, No. 93,142, of July 27, 1869. All
of these patents, except the Van Camp patent,
were introduced in evidence on the part of the
defense in the case against the Greenway Brew-
ing Company, and it was held in that case that
none of them anticipated the Schillinger inven-
tion. A copy of the record in that case, em-
bracing the pleadings, and the evidence and
patents put in by the defendant in it, on the
question of novelty, forms part of the record
in the present case.

only blocks formed in moulds, and removable
from the moulds, or the pavement to be laid ce-
mented in the molds, and it not being stated that
the blocks should be formed on the spot where
they were to remain, nor that they should be
formed of cement and gravel or sand. It further
appears that, in the Van Camp patent, when the
blocks are made in moulds, they are like bricks, [471]
or artificial stones, or wooden blocks, which
are prepared and then brought to the place
where they are to be laid and put down in the
usual manner; and that when the blocks remain
in the moulds and are thus laid, they do not
present a uniform wearing surface of concrete,
or constitute a concrete pavement formed in
detachable blocks by joints.

Other testimony as to prior public use was introduced in this case, taken from the record in the case of Schillinger v. Phillip Best Brewing Co., in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which testimony was also introduced in the case against the Greenway Brewing Company, having been taken in November, 1882. In the decision in the latter case, it was correctly said of that testimony: "So far as it refers to prior use in Germany, not shown in a patent or printed publication, it was duly objected to in this case and must be excluded. As to the cement malt floor which Row laid in Baltimore twenty-five years ago, he shows that it was not made in sections detachable by free joints. The testimony of Botzler as to a prior malt floor laid by him in Chicago is too indefinite to amount to sufficient evidence to defeat a patent." So far as that testimony related to a pavement used in Germany, it was objected to at the time it was introduced in this case, as incompetent. It was clearly inadmissible under section 4923 of the Revised Statutes, because it did not show anything that had been patented or described in a printed publication.

An examinaton of the patents put in evidence by the defendant, in connection with the testimony in regard to them, shows that the Claridge pavement was not a concrete pavement, and was not formed in detachable blocks, but was a continuous asphalt pavement; that the D'Harcourt pavement was not a concrete pavement laid in detached blocks or sections, nor We do not think that the reissued patent, could one section be removed without disturb as it stood after the filing of the disclaimer, ing adjacent sections; that the Russ patent was open to the objection that it was not for shows a concrete foundation for a stone pave the same invention as that of the original pament, the pavement proper being constructed tent. Whatever there was of objectionable of granite or syenite placed on top of the con- matter inserted in the specification or the first crete foundation, such concrete foundation claim of the reissue, when it was granted, was not being formed in detachable blocks, but removed by the disclaimer. The re-issue was only being provided at certain places with re-granted within ten months after the original. movable panels, consisting of frames filled with The single claim of the original patent was reconcrete, to be lifted out to give access to water peated in the reissue as the second claim of the pipes or for other purposes; that the Chesneau latter; and the first claim of the reissue, as it pavement was not a concrete pavement laid in stood after the disclaimer, did not expand bedetached sections or blocks, but was a contin-yond the claim of the original what was claimed uous pavement, provided with panels to give in the reissue. access in certain places to gas and water pipes, As to the amount of the decree, we think the the panels being made of sections set in frames, court properly awarded the sum of 4 cents per which were removably inserted in the sur-square foot as the profits of the defendant, and [472] rounding pavement, and there was no arrange ment of tar-paper or its equivalent between adjoining blocks of concrete, for the purpose set forth in the Schillinger patent; that the Coignet patent did not show a concrete pavement, made in detachable blocks after the manner of Schillinger's, and built on the ground where it was to remain; that the De la Haichois pavement was not a concrete pavement laid in de- In Elizabeth v. Nicholson Pavement Co. 97 U. tachable blocks or sections, or having the ar- S. 126, 139 [24:1000,1006], it is said that “When rangement of tar-paper or its equivalent between the entire profit of a business or undertaking adjoining blocks of concrete like that of Schil-results from the use of the invention, the pat

that it was right to give to the plaintiff the
entire profits made by the defendant by the
laying by him of his concrete flagging, in view
of the testimony in the case. It clearly appears
that the defendant's concrete flagging derived
its entire value from the use of the plaintiff's
invention, and that if it had not been laid in
that way it would not have been laid at all.

[527]

entec will be entitled to recover the entire | tions of the respondents to the libel be overprofits if he elects that remedy.' This lan- ruled. Affirmed.

guage was quoted with approval in Root v. The facts are stated in the opinion.
Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 105 U. S. 189, 203
(26: 975, 980]. As in the case of the Nicholson |
patent, so in the case of the Schillinger patent,
the pavement was a complete combination in
itself, differing from every other pavement,
and the profit made by the defendant was a
single profit derived from the construction of
the pavement as an entirety. Callaghan v.
Myers, 128 U. S. 617, 665, 666 [ante, 547, 562] |
Within the decision in Garretson v. Clark
111 U. S. 120 [28: 371], the proof in this case
is satisfactory, that the entire value of the de-
fendant's pavement, as a marketable article,
was properly and legally attributable to the in-
vention of Schillinger.

Messrs. Frank Goodwin and Eugene P.
Carver, for appellants:

The law regards the rights of passengers and holds the carrier to the highest degree of care possible and requires him to make good all damages suffered through want of that care. Pa. Co. v. Roy, 102 Ū. S. 451 (26: 141).

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

JOHN HASKELL BUTLER, Admr., ET AL.,
Appts.,

v.

THE BOSTON AND SAVANNAH
STEAMSHIP COMPANY.

SAME v. SAME.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 527-558.)

Limited liability of ship owners-libel for lim-
ited liability a bar to other actions-Act of
February 28, 1871-extent of the law-effect
of state statute-disaster within county lim-
its-liability for death.

The courts of the United States, down to the Act of 1851, did not recognize the rule of the ancient or general maritime law, but refused to adopt it either in admiralty or common law.

Del. Col. v. Arnold, 3 U. S. 3 Dall. 333 (1: 624); The Amiable Nancy, 1 Paine. 111, 118; Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 465, 480, 492; Hale v. Washington Ins. Co. 2 Story, 176; New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 47 U. S. 6 How. 435 (12: 465).

The Limited Liability Act is not to be extended, even in respect to goods, by construction.

Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. The Tangier, 6 Am. Law Reg. 504, 510; King v. Am. Transp. Co. 1 Western Law Monthly, 186; S. C. 1 Flipp. 1; The Egypt, 25 Fed. Rep. 320; The Mamie, 5 Fed. Rep. 813; 8 Fed. Rep. 367; 105 U. S. 773 (26: 937); Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 32, 33 (30: 1085); Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. 58 N. Y. 126; Walker v. Western Transp. Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. 54 How. Pr. 146; Co. 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 153 (18:174); Haegi v. Dougan v. Champlain Transp. Co. 56 N. Y. 6; Chamberlain v. Western Transp. Co. 44 N. Y. 305; Wallace v. Providence &. C. S. 8. Co. 14 Fed. Rep. 56.

The liability of owners is not restricted by the Act of Congress providing for the security of passengers on steamboats. The Act does not take away any common-law liability.

1. The law of limited liability of ship owners ap-
plies to cases of personal injury and death, as well
as to cases of loss of, or injury to, property. It ex-
tends to liability for every kind of loss and injury.
2. Proceedings taken by the owner of the vessel,
by libel for limited liability, are a bar to actions
commenced to recover damages for losses sustained
by means of the stranding and sinking of the ves-
3. The Act of February 28, 1871, to provide for
the better security of life on board of steam vessels,
does not supersede or displace the proceeding for
limited liability, in cases arising under its provis-Dwyer, 29 Tex. 383; Re Long Island Transp.
ions.

sel.

4. The law of limited liability was enacted by Congress as a part of the maritime law of this country, and, in its operation, extends wherever public navigation extends.

5. A statute of a State cannot neutralize or affect the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction or the oper

ation of the maritime law in maritime cases.

Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 47 N. Y. 292; Swarthout v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 48 N. Y. 209; Curran v. Cheeseman, 1 Cinc. Super. Ct. (Ohio) 52; Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. 58 N. Y. 141; Houston & G. Nav. Co. v.

Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 599, 624; The Alpena, 8 Fed. Rep. 280; Rounds v. Providence & S. Steamship Co. 14 R. I. 344; The Amsterdam, 23 Fed. Rep. 112; Briggs v. Day, 21 Fed. Rep. 727, 728, 730, 731; Craig v. Continental Ins. Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 798; Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co. 118 U. S. 610 (30:

6. The Limited Liability Act applies to the pres-274); Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co. 119
ent case notwithstanding the disaster happened U. S. 397 (30: 450); The Favorite, 12 Fed. Rep.
within the technical limits of a county of Massa- 213; Providence & S. Steamship Co.v. Clare, 127
chusetts, and notwithstanding the liability itself
may have arisen from a state law.
U. S. 45 (32: 199); Siemen v. Sellers, 123 U. S.
285, 256 (31: 156).

7. This court expresses no opinion as to whether
a state law can create a liability in a maritime case,
within the dominion of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction, where neither the general maritime
law nor an Act of Congress has created such a lia-
bility.

[Nos. 244, 340.]
Argued April 10, 11, 1889. Decided April 22,

1889.

APPEALS
PPEALS from decrees of the Circuit Court

When the meaning is plain, the courts cannot look to the statutes which have been revised to see if Congress erred in that revision.

The Montana, 22 Fed. Rep. 730; Thommasen v. Whitwill, 12 Fed. Rep. 903; The Marine City, 6 Fed. Rep. 413: McDona'd v. Horey, 110 U. S. 628-630 (28: 272); Pentlarge v. Kirby, 20 Fed. Rep. 900.

When, in a statute, general words follow particular ones, the rule is to construe them as applicable to subjects ejusdem generis.

2 Pars. Cont. 7th ed. 501; Ala. v. Montague, 117 U. S. 609-611 (29:1003).

sachusetts, affirming decrees of the District
Court, one of them dismissing a libel against
a steamship company to recover damages for
death, and the other decreeing that the libelant
is entitled to the limitation of liability for loss The decree dismissing the petition and an-
of life and other damage, and that the excepswer of Butler is a final decree.

1528]

The appellees have separate and distinct de- | steamship City of Columbus, on Devil's crees in their favor depending on separate and Bridge, near Gay Head, at the western extremdistinct claims. ity of Martha's Vineyard, and near the mouth of Vineyard Sound, on the 18th of January, 1884. Most of the passengers and cargo were lost, and amongst the passengers lost was Elizabeth R. Beach, a single woman, of Mansfield, in the State of Connecticut. The appellants [529] represent her, Nathaniel Beach being appoint ed administrator of her estate in Connecticut, Butler being appointed ancillary administrator in Massachusetts, and the other two appellants being, one an aunt, and the other a niece of the deceased, dependent on her for support. The appellees, The Boston and Savannab Steamship Company, were the owners of the ship.

Davis v. The Seneca, Gilpin, 38; 8. C. but on other points, 3 Wall. Jr. 395; Westcot v. Bradford, 4 Wash. C. C. 492; Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U. S. 6 How. 201, 203 et seq. (12: 404); French v. Shoemaker, 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 86, 98 (20:270, 271); Bronson v. La Crosse & N. R. Co. 67 U. S. 2 Black, 531 (17: 360); Blossom v. Milwaukee & C. R. Co. 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 657 (17: 674); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61 (29: 329); Henderson v. Wadsworth, 115 U. S. 276 (29:379); Hassall v. Wilcox, 115 U. S. 593 (29:504); Benjamin v. Dubois, 118 U. S. 48 (30: 52); Dainese v. Kendall, 119 U. S. 54 (30: 305); Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27 (30: 1083); Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co. 117 U. S. 369 (29: 924).

Mr. Charles Theodore Russell, Jr., for appellee:

Under the Limited Liability Act, the limitation is extended to all losses by any act of the master done without the owner's order.

Maclachlan, Shipping, 118, 119; Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 116 (20:589); The Epsilon, 6 Ben. 378; The Rebecca, 1 Ware, 188.

Soon after the disaster occurred, and early in
February, 1884, one Brown and one Vance
commenced each of them an action at law

against the steamship company, in the Supe-
rior Court of the County of Suffolk, in Massa-
chusetts, to recover damages for losses alleged
to have been sustained by them by means of
the stranding and sinking of the vessel. There-
upon the steamship company, on the 18th of
February, 1884, in order to obtain the benefit of
the law of limited liability, filed a libel in the
District Court of the United States for the Dis-

Loss of life under the Massachusetts statute
cannot affect the right or extent of the limita
tion of liability provided by the Act of Con-trict of Massachusetts, against the said Brown
gress.

and Vance, and against all other persons who
had suffered loss or damage by said disaster.
This is one of the cases now before us on ap-
peal. The libel was in the usual form of libels
in causes of limited liability. It set forth the

Am. Steamboat Co. v. Chace, 83 U. S. 16
Wall. 522 (21: 369); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S.
99 (23:819); The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (30:
358); Rounds v. Providence & S. Steamship Co. 14
R. I. 344; The Epsilon, 6 Ben. 378; Re Long Is-ownership of the vessel, the business in which
land etc. Transp. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 599; The Al-
pena, 8 Fed. Rep. 280; The Amsterdam, 23 Fed.
Rep. 112; The City of Columbus, 22 Fed. Rep.
460.

Insurance for a mortgagee adds nothing to the owner's interest in the vessel.

she was employed, namely, as a passenger and freight steamship between Boston and Savannah, her sca-worthiness, her being well and thoroughly officered and manned and furnished and equipped as the law required. It stated that on the 17th of January, 1884, she Jones, Mortg. § 400; Hazard v. Draper, 7 Al- left Boston on a voyage to Savannah, having len, 267; Carter v. Rockett, 8 Paige, 437; Crom-on board about 83 passengers and considerable well v. Brooklyn F. Ins. Co. 44 N. Y. 42; Nich- merchandise, a list of the former, as far as ols v. Baxter, 5 R. I. 491; Vernon v. Smith, 5 known, and a schedule of the latter, being anBarn. & Ald. 1; Providence Co. Bank v. Ben- nexed to the libel. It stated that whilst prosson, 24 Pick. 204; Re Sands Ale Brewing Co. 3 ecuting said voyage, and while on the high Biss. 175; City Sav. Bank v. Pa. F. Ins. Co. 122 seas, to wit, in or near Vineyard Sound, the Mass. 165; Williams v. Ocean Ins. Co. 2 Met. steamship struck on the rocks near and off the 303; Rider v. Ocean Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 259. shore at Gay Head, in Martha's Vineyard, in the district of Massachusetts, about half past three in the morning of January 18th, 1884, and in a very few minutes thereafter heeled over, filled with water, and sunk, becoming a total wreck and loss; that most of the passengers and crew, about 100 in number, were drowned and lost, those surviving claiming to have suffered great injury, and that all the property [530] and effects of the passengers and crew, and all the cargo on board (except a small part, salved in a damaged condition, and of little value), together with said steamship, its machinery, tackle, apparel and furniture, were destroyed and lost.

The insurance money cannot be claimed by
the mortgagor nor by any creditor of the mort-
gagor.

May, Ins. §§ 6, 116; White v. Brown, 2 Cush.
412; Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins.
Co. 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 495 (10: 1044); Bank of 8.
C. v. Bicknell, 1 Cliff. 85; Hidden v. Slater
Mut. F. Ins. Co. 2 Cliff. 266.

The claim of these sufferers by the loss of
the steamship is confined to the res, or its
value.

Spring v. Haskell, 14 Gray, 309; Farnsworth v. Boston, 126 Mass. 1; Read v. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 427.

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court:

These two cases are so intimately connected, both in the proceedings and in the questions arising therein, that it will be most convenient to consider them together. They arose out of the stranding, sinking and total loss of the

The libel propounded other articles, as follows, to wit:

"Fifth. All said great loss of life, injury and damage to persons on board, and loss of and damage to property, were occasioned and incurred without the privity or knowledge of the libelant, the owner of said steamship.

Sixth. The libelant further alleges that, as

ship and her freight then pending, as by law
provided; and to that end the libelant prayed
that all claims for loss, damage, or injury to
persons or property by reason of the premises
might be heard and determined in that court,
and apportioned according to law, and that due
appraisement might be ordered and made of
the ship, her machinery and furniture, and of
her pending freight at the time of the loss, of-
fering to pay the appraised value into court or
give proper stipulation therefor, and that moni-
tion in due form should issue against said
Brown and Vance and any and all persons
claiming damages by reason of the premises,

it is informed and believes, certain persons or
corporations, owners or insurers of property on
board, and lost or damaged by and at the loss
of said steamship as aforesaid; certain other
persons, who claim to have been on board said
steamship at the time of the loss aforesaid, and
to have suffered in consequence thereof injuries
and damage to their persons and property; and
still other persons, claiming to represent per-
sons drowned and lost in said disaster, and
claiming to be entitled to recover and receive
large sums of money on account of the death
of and injury to said persons so represented by
them all make, or may hereafter make, claim
that the striking upon the rocks, and sink-citing them to appear, etc., and that all actions [532]
ing and wreck of said steamship, and the and suits concerning the matters set forth
loss of life, damage to persons and property might be restrained and enjoined.
aforesaid, were occasioned and incurred from
the fault and neglect of the libelant, or its offi-
cers and agents, and that the libelant is liable
and responsible to pay to them the loss and
damages arising as aforesaid; all of which
claims and allegations the libelant denies, and,
on the contrary, it alleges that all such losses
and damages were occasioned or incurred with
out its neglect, fault, privity or knowledge,
and, as it is informed and believes, without the
neglect or fault of its officers or agents, or any
of them.'

Upon the filing of this libel a monition was duly issued and published, and an injunction against actions and suits was granted, issued and published. The monition was returnable to the first day of July, 1884.

Notwithstanding these proceedings the appellants, on the 27th of September, 1884, filed a libel against the steamship company, in the same District Court for the District of Massachusetts, to recover damages for the death of said Elizabeth R. Beach. This is the other suit now before us on appeal. After stating the engagement of passage by Miss Beach on the steamship from Boston to Savannah, the charac

"Eighth. The losses and damage to persons and property incurred and occasioned by the said stranding, sinking, and loss of said steam-ter of the vessel as a coast wise sea-going steamship, and the alleged claims and liabilties made ship in the coasting trade, under enrollment against the libelant, by reason thereof, greatly and license, and the circumstances of the exceed the amount or value of the interest of stranding and loss, and the drowning of Miss the libelant, as owner, in said steamship, her Beach, the libel of the appellants averred and machinery, tackle, apparel and furniture, im- charged that the disaster was caused by negli [531] mediately after said loss, and in her freight gence on the part of those employed by the then pending. Upon and after the happening steamship company in managing the ship, and of said loss, said steamship, her machinery, by inefficiency in the discipline of the officers tackle, apparel and furniture, became a wreck and crew, and that no proper measures were and total loss, and, the libelant is informed taken to save the passengers. The libel further and believes, were then practically worthless, alleged that at the time of the disaster the secand the libelant's interest therein became and ond mate, one Harding, was in charge of the was of little or no value. The gross freight ship, and was not a pilot for those waters; that then pending on the voyage of said steamship it was a part of his duty to take charge of the to Savannah was of the value of about $1,000. ship alternately with the first mate; that it was "Ninth. The libelant, while not admitting an omission of duty on the part of the owner to but denying that it is under any liablity for the intrust to the second mate the charge of the ship acts, losses and damages aforesaid, and desir- without the aid of the special pilot; and that no ing and claiming the right in this court to con- pilot was on duty on the ship at the time of the test any such liability of itself or of said steam-accident. The libel further alleged that "There ship, claims and is entitled to have limited its was not proper apparatus on the vessel for liability, as owner therefor (if any such liabil-launching the boats;" "that the ship was not ity shall hereafter be found to exist), to the amount or value of its interest, as owner, in such steamship after said loss, and her freight then pending.

"Tenth. Said steamship, in her damaged and wrecked condition, now lies sunken near the shore at Gay Head, Martha's Vineyard, within this district, and within the jurisdiction and process of this honorable court.'

properly constructed in respect to bulkheads and
otherwise;" and that there was unfitness, gross
negligence or carelessness on the part of the
servants and agents of the respondents engaged
in navigating the ship, and in not taking proper
measures to save the passengers, and as dis-
played in the inefficiency of the discipline of the
officers and crew of the vessel; and that in re-
spect to these matters there was negligence and
carelessness on the part of the owner.

The libel further set out a statute of Massa-
chusetts of the following purport, to wit:

The libelant thereupon claimed and peti-
tioned that, in case it should be found that
there was any liability for the acts, losses, and
damages aforesaid, upon said steamship "City "If the life of a passenger is lost, by reason
of Columbus," or the libelant as owner thereof of the negligence or carelessness of the propri-
(which liability the libelant did not admit, but etor or proprietors of a steamboat, or stage
expressly and wholly denied, and desired in coach, or of common carriers of passengers, or
that court to contest), such liability should in by the unfitness or gross negligence or careless-
no event exceed the amount or value of the ness of their servants or agents, such proprie
interest of the libelant, as owner, in said steam-tor or proprietors and common carriers shall

[533]

[534]

be liable in damages not exceeding five thou- | the steamship company in the cause of limited
sand, nor less than five hundred dollars, to be liability, and filed a pleading which they enti
assessed with reference to the degree of culpa-
bility of the proprietor or proprietors or com-
mon carriers liable, or of their servants or
agents, and recovered in an action of tort, com-
menced within one year from the injury caus-
ing the death, by the executor or administrator
of the deceased person, for the use of the
widow and children of the deceased, in equal
moieties, or, if there are no children, to the
use of the widow, or, if no widow, to the use
of the next of kin:"

The libel further alleged that after the vessel struck, said Elizabeth R. Beach suffered great mental and bodily pain upon the vessel and was afterwards washed into the sea and drowned; that the value of her clothing and baggage lost was $150; and that by virtue of the premises and under the general admiralty jurisdiction of the United States the libelants were entitled to recover $50,000, and by virtue of the statute of Massachusetts, $5,000.

The steamship company, thereupon, on the 10th day of October, 1884, filed an exception and plea to this libel, setting up in bar the record and proceedings of the cause of limited liability previously instituted by them in the same district court, and then pending.

tled an Answer, Petition and Exceptions, and
by which they set up substantially the same
matter as had been averred in their libel and
the amendment thereto; and in addition, they
alleged that at the time of the disaster the
steamer and her freight were substantially in-
sured, and that the owners had received, or
were entitled to receive, a large amount of
money for said insurance, and would thereby
be substantially indemnified for the loss of
vessel and freight.

Afterwards, on the 19th of January, 1885,
the appellants moved in the same cause that
the steamship company be ordered to pay into
court the said insurance money. To this mo-
tion the company filed a written reply in
which they set up the fact that in pursuance
of an order of the court they had entered into
stipulation to pay into court the amount of the
appraised value of their interest in the ship and
freight. They further averred that, in pursu
ance of a covenant made at the time of their
purchasing the said steamship, in the mortgage
given for the purchase money, all the insur
ance procured by them had been assigned and
made payable to the vendors and mortgagees,
for whose benefit and security the policies
were kept on foot; and said parties had collect-

part payment of the mortgage notes, and the
libelants, The Boston and Savannah Steam-
ship Company, had not collected or received
any part of it. To this answer the appellants
filed an exception in the nature of a demurrer.

Upon these pleadings the parties agreed upon
a statement of facts, which, after stating the
titles of the two causes, was as follows, to wit:

"Statement of agreed facts.

"In the above entitled causes the following facts are agreed by the Boston and Savannah Steamship Company and John Haskell Butler, administrator, et al., party excepting to said libel of said company:

"First. All the allegations contained in the

teenth, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth arti-
cles of the answer, petition and exceptions of
said John Haskell Butler, administrator, et al.,
in said suit are true.

To meet this exception, the appellants, on
the 16th of December, 1884, filed an amend-ed the insurance money, and applied it in
ment to their libel, by way of replication, in
which they claimed the benefit of the Steam-
boat Inspection Act, passed February 28, 1871
(Title LII of the Revised Statutes U. S.),
which makes many regulations respecting the
steam machimery and apparatus of steam ves-
sels of the United States in the merchant serv-
ice, navigating the waters of the United States
and respecting their construction and manner
of lading and accommodating passengers and
merchandise, and the officers and crews with
which they are to be manned, and requires
sea-going steamers in the coasting trade when
under way and not on the high seas, to be un-
der the control and direction of pilots licensed
by the steamboat inspectors, imposes penalties
for loss of life through negligence and inat-eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, nine-
tention, and gives damages to the full amount
against the vessel and her master and owner to
persons injured, if the injury happens through
any neglect or failure to comply with the pro-
visions of the law, or through any known de-
fects or imperfections of the steaming appara-
tus, or of the hull. (Rev. Stat. Title LII, pas-
sim, SS 4401, 4493.) The appellants averred that
The City of Columbus was subject to this law,
and when the catastrophe happened was within
the waters of the State of Massachusetts, and not
upon the high seas, and not under the control
of a licensed pilot. They further averred that
there was connivance, misconduct, or violation
of law on the part of the owner in not provid-
ing or procuring the vessel to be under the
control and direction of a licensed pilot, and
that there was misconduct, negligence, and in-
attention to duty on the part of the captain,
second mate, or other persons employed on the
vessel, by which connivance, misconduct, and
negligence the life of said Elizabeth R. Beach
was destroyed.

On the same day, the 16th of December, 1884, the appellants appeared to the libel of

"Second. Except as relieved or affected by the Limited Liability Act of 1851 (U. S. Rev. Stats. SS 4283-5) and the Rules of the United States Supreme Court thereunder, the libelant, ship owner, is liable for all loss and damage caused by the stranding of said steamship 'City of Columbus.’

"Third. In respect to the cause of the disaster alleged, the respondents claim, in addition to the concession by libelant, the B. and S. Steamship Company, of negligence on the part of their agents and servants, as above agreed, that at the time of disaster the second mate was in charge of the ship; that he was not a pilot for the waters upon which the ship was then going, and was not licensed as a pilot by the inspectors of steamboats; and that no pilot was on duty on said ship at the time of the disaster; and, further, that the disaster was owing to the unfitness, gross negligence, or carelessness of the servants or agents of the libelant, who

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