655] THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appt., | bia, approved June 26, 1873, and were paid out

[656]

v.

THOMAS W. CORNELL

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 655-661.)

Cancellation of negotiable instrument effect of
erasing cancellation and reissuing. certifi
cates of indebtedness of District of Columbia.

to contractors, jobbers and laborers, and soon
became greatly depreciated in value, and were
bought and sold by brokers and speculators.

After the creation of the board of audit by
§ 6, most of these certificates, including those
the Act of Congress of June 20, 1874, chap. 337,
redeemed as provided in that Act. 18 Stat. at
in question, were presented to that board and

L. 119.

The certificates so redeemed were canceled by stamping across the face in ink, with a ribbon stamp, the words "Canceled by the Board of Audit.'" They were then inclosed in jackets, tied up in bundles of fifty in numerical order, and placed on a shelf under the counter in a

1. When the maker of a negotiable instrument
lawfully cancels it before maturity, his liability
upon it is extinguished, and cannot be revived
without his consent.
2. It is immaterial whether the cancellation is by
destroying the instrument, or by writing or stamp-
ing words or lines in ink upon its face, provided the
instrument, in the condition in which he puts it,
unequivocally shows that it has been canceled.
3. Where certificates of indebtedness of the Dis-room in the Treasury Department, occupied by
trict of Columbia, called sewer certificates, were re- several clerks employed by the board. The fact
deemed and canceled by the proper officers by of redemption was entered in a registry book.
stamping across their face marks of cancellation as
clear and permanent as the original signatures, the After the redemption and cancellation of the
liability of the District upon them cannot be re-certificates, and while they were in the custody
vived by its omission to take additional precaution of the board of audit, as above stated, they
against their being stolen and fraudulently restored
to their original condition by effacing the marks of
were stolen, in February or March, 1876, by
cancellation.
one George H. Farnham, who was then a clerk
in the employ of the board, and occupying a
desk behind the counter under which the cer-
tificates were deposited, but whose duties were
not connected with the redemption or care of

4. Such certificates were in no sense money or the equivalent of money and had no validity unless issued for a purpose authorized by law, and had not the character of commercial paper so as to render them, when fraudulently issued, valid in the hands [No. 55.]

of bona fide holders.

Submitted Nov. 1, 1888. Decided May 13, 1889.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of
Claims against the District of Columbia,
on stolen certificates of indebtedness which had
been redeemed and canceled and the marks of
cancellation erased. Reversed.
Reported below, 20 Ct. Cl. 229.
Statement by Mr. Justice Gray:
This was an appeal from a judgment of the
Court of Claims against the District of Colum-
bia for $7,750 and interest on certificates of in-
debtedness, commonly called sewer certificates,
issued by the Board of Public Works of the
District in the following form, with coupons
attached:

the certificates.

ly removed from a large portion of the certifi-
By the use of detersive soap Farnham entire-
Cates the marks of cancellation. From other
certificates, on which some ink marks still ap-
peared, he cut off the coupons and pasted them
over the partially effaced marks. In this con-
dition no signs or marks of cancellation or re-
demption were visible on the certificates, but
some of them still had a soiled or stained ap-
pearance.

The stolen certificates were sold by Farnham
to brokers in Washington, and by them to one
Ritchie, and by him to the claimant; and all
the purchasers bought them for value, in good
faith, and without notice that they had been
redeemed or canceled; and the certificates were
then in the same condition, in respect of
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
No. 1380.

Washington, July 1st, 1873.

This certifies that for work done under direction of the Board of Public Works,
and chargeable to the private property adjoining and benefited thereby, there is
due to the bearer Five Hundred Dollars, payable July 1st, 1876, with cight per
centum interest, payable semi-annually, as per coupons attached. Issued in ac-
cordance with Act of Legislative Assembly; secured by pledge to the Commis-
sioners of the Sinking Fund of assessments made in accordance with Act ap-
proved June 26, 1873, against private property benefited by improvements, and
receivable in payment of such assessments.
Board of Public Works,
By James A. Magrude

Countersigned:

Horace J. Frost,

For Commissioners of Sinking Fund.
The material facts, as found by the Court of
Claims, were as follows:

On July 1, 1873, such certificates to the
amount of about $2,000,000 were issued by the
Board of Public Works, under an Act of the
Legislative Assembly of the District of Colum-

Treasurer.

their

certificate.

Last six months' interest payable with

appearance as to indicating signs or evidences
of cancellation or redemption, as they were at
the time they were first negotiated by Farnham,
and as they are now.

The judgment of the Court of Claims in fa-
vor of the claimant was for the amount of such

[657]

[658]

[659]

[660]

certificates as were shown to have been so pur-
chased by him before their maturity. 20 Ct.
Cl. 229.

Messrs. A. H. Garland, Atty-Gen., R. A.
Howard, Assist. Atty-Gen., and W. I. Hill
for appellant.

Mr. Samuel Shellabarger and J. M.
Wilson for appellee.

Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of
the court:

were held by a majority of this court to be lia-
ble to a bona fide holder of interest bearing
treasury notes, printed by the Treasury Depart-
ment from genuine plates, and perfect in form,
complete and ready for issue, and never issued
by any authorized officer, but fraudulently or
surreptitiously put in circulation. In the opin-
ion, much stress was laid upon the considera-
tions that the notes, were perfect and complete
as soon as printed, and did not require the sig-
nature of any officer, but, as soon as they had
received the impression of all the plates and
When the maker of a negotiable instrument dies necessary to perfect their form, were ready
lawfully cancels it before maturity, his liability for circulation and use; that in this respect they
upon it is extinguished, and cannot be revived did not differ from coins of the mint when fully
without his consent. It is immaterial whether stamped and prepared for issue; and that these
the cancellation is by destroying the instrument, notes were intended to circulate and take the
or by writing or stamping words or lines in ink place of money, to some extent, for commercial
upon its face, provided the instrument, in the purposes; were made a legal tender for their
condition in which he puts it, unequivocally | face value, exclusive of interest, as between the
shows that it has been canceled. Scholey v. Government and its creditors, and passed readi-
Ramsbottom, 2 Camp. 485; Burbridge v. Man-ly from hand to hand as, or in lieu of, money.
ners, 3 Camp. 193; Ingham v. Primrose, 7 C.
B. N. S. 82, 86; Yglesias v. Mercantile Bank,
L. R. 3 C. P. Div. 60.

In Burbridge v. Manners, Lord Ellenborough said: "It is the duty of bankers to make some memorandum on bills and notes which have been paid,"-clearly indicating his opinion that the making of such a memorandum upon the securities would be sufficient to protect the bankers from being afterwards held liable to any holder thereof.

The decision in Ingham v. Primrose, holding the acceptor of a bill of exchange, who had torn it in halves and thrown the pieces into the street, liable to one who afterwards took it, in good faith and for value, from one who had picked it up and pasted the pieces together, proceeded upon the ground that the tearing of the bill into two pieces, as manifest on its face, "was at least as consistent with its having been divided into two for the purpose of safer transmission by the post, as with its having been torn for the purpose of annulling it." And the decision can be maintained, if at all, on that ground only. Barendale v. Bennett, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 525, 532.

In Baxendale v. Bennett, one who had given his blank acceptance on stamped paper to another and authorized him to fill in his own name as drawer, and received it back from him unfilled, and put it in the unlocked drawer of his desk, from which it was afterwards stolen, and filled up, without his authority, by inserting the name of another person as drawer, was held not liable to an indorsee for value.

In State v. Wells, Fargo & Co. 15 Cal. 336, cited by the claimant, treasury warrants of the State of California had been once lawfully is sued, presented and paid, but never canceled in any way before they were stolen and again put in circulation; and the suit was not upon the warrants, but was brought by the Siate against bona fide holders who had presented them a second time, and to recover back the value of bonds which the State had delivered to them in exchange for the warrants, and which they, in good faith, had since parted with.

Much reliance was placed by the claimant upon the case of Cooke v. United States, 91 U. S. 389 [23: 237], in which the United States

91 U. S. 404 [23: 245].

We are not prepared to extend the scope of that decision, and the facts of this case, as found by the Court of Claims, are quite different.

The certificates in suit, after they had been redeemed according to law, were canceled by the proper officers, by distinctly stamping in ink across the face words stating that fact, and in that condition were made up in bundles and put away on a shelf, whence they were afterwards stolen by a clerk, who had no duty or authority connected with their redemption or care, and who afterwards fraudulently effaced the marks of cancellation, by the use of detersive soap, and by pasting coupons over them, and then put the certificates in circulation.

The provision of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1875, chap. 162, § 16, by which certain officers of the District of Columbia are required to destroy by burning all redeemed certificates, is in terms and effect merely directory, and does not make the District liable on such certificates fraudulently put in circulation, after they have been otherwise unmistakably canceled. 18 Stat. at L. 505.

These certificates having been lawfully extinguished by stamping across their face marks [661] of cancellation as clear and permanent as the original signatures, the liability of the District upon them as negotiable paper could not be revived by its omission to take additional precautions against their being stolen and fraudulently restored to their original condition by such means as ingenious wickedness might devise.

Moreover, these certificates were in no sense money or the equivalent of money. Though negotiable instruments, they belonged to a peculiar class of such instruments, being made by a municipal corporation, and having no validity unless issued for a purpose authorized by law, and as to which this court has repeatedly laid down and acted on the following rule: "Vouchers for money due, certificates of indebtedness for services rendered, or for property furnished for the use of the city, orders or drafts drawn by one city officer upon another, or any other device of the kind, used for liquidating the amounts legitimately due to public creditors, are of course necessary instrumen for carrying on the machinery of municipal

565]

[566]

administration, and for anticipating the collec-
tion of taxes. But to invest such documents
with the character and incidents of commercial
paper, so as to render them in the hands of bona
fide holders absolute obligations to pay, how
ever irregularly or fraudulently issued, is an
abuse of their true character and purpose."
Nashville v. Ray, 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 468, 477
[22: 164, 169]; Wall v. Monroe County, 103 U.
S. 74, 78 [26: 430, 432]; Claiborne County v.
Brooks, 111 U. S. 400, 408 [28: 470, 473].

General Assembly of Florida, approved Janu-
ary 6, 1855, providing for and encouraging a
liberal system of internal improvements in that
State. Laws of Florida, 1855, chap. 610. By
that Act, so much of the five hundred thousand
acres of land granted to Florida by the Act of
Congress of March 3, 1845, as remained unsold;
the proceeds of the sale of such as were on
hand and unappropriated; all proceeds there-
after accruing from similar sales; and all the
swamp lands or lands subject to overflow,
granted to Florida by the Act of Congress ap-
proved September 28, 1850, with all the pro-
ceeds accrued and to accrue from their sale,
were set apart and declared a distinct and sepa

Considering the nature of these certificates,
the method in which they had been canceled,
and the means by which they were afterwards
put in circulation, we are of opinion that there
is no ground for holding the District of Colum-rate fund, to be called "The Internal Improve-
bia liable to this claimant.
Judgment reversed,

ment Fund of the State of Florida." The gen-
eral object and scope of the Act are stated in
Florida v. Anderson, 91 U. S. 667, 670, 676
[23: 290, 294, 297], where it was said that these
lands and their proceeds "were vested in the

THE UNION TRUST COMPANY OF NEW Governor, the comptroller, treasurer, attorney

YORK, Appt.,

v.

THE SOUTHERN INLAND NAVIGA-
TION AND IMPROVEMENT COM-
PANY ET AL.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 565-572.)

Deed, made in violation of injunction--lis
dens-efect of on purchase-collateral pro-
ceeding-improvement fund of Florida.

general, and register of state lands, and their successors in office, in trust to dispose of the same and invest their proceeds, with power to pledge the fund for the payment of the interest on the bonds (to the extent of $10,000 per mile) which might be issued by any railroad companies constructing roads on certain lines indicated by the Act. The companies, after compen-pleting their roads, were to pay, besides interest on their bonds, one per cent per annum on the amount thereof, to form a sinking fund for the ultimate payment of the principal. The Act declared that the bonds should constitute a first lien or mortgage on the roads, their equipment and franchises; and upon a failure on the part of any railroad company accepting the Act to provide the interest and the payments to the sinking fund as required thereby, it was made the duty of the trustees to take possession of the railroad and all its property, and advertise the same for sale at public auction." In the same case it was said that the trustees are mere

1. A deed, made in violation of an injunction, previously issued and served, is subject to the decree subsequently rendered, in the suit in which the injunction was granted.

2. All persons dealing with property are bound to take notice of a suit pending with regard to the title thereto, and will, on their peril, purchase the same from any of the parties to the suit.

3. A lis pendens, duly prosecuted, and not collusive, is notice to a purchaser so as to affect and bind his interest by the decree; and the lis pendens begins from the service of the subpena after the bill is

filed.

4. A decree, although erroneous but not void,
cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding.
5. The trustees of the internal improvement fund
of the State of Florida are merely agents for the
State, invested with the legal title of the lands for
their more convenient administration; and the State
remains the beneficial proprietor, subject to the
guaranties which have been made to the holders of
railroad bonds secured thereby.
[No. 191.]
Argued March 11, 12, 1889.

1889.

ly agents of the State, invested with the legal title of the lands for their more convenient administration; and that the State remains in every respect the beneficial proprietor, subject to the guaranties which have been made to the holders of railroad bonds secured thereby. See also Florida Cent. R. Co. v. Schutte, 103 U. S. 118 [26: 327]; Littlefield v. Improvement Fund TrusDecided April 22, tees, 117 U. S. 419 [29: 930]; Vose v. Reed, 1 Woods, 647; Vose v. Trustees of Improvement Fund, 2 Woods, 647.

APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Northern District
of Florida, dismissing a suit to adjudge that
the trustees of the internal improvement fund
of the State of Florida have no right in the
land embraced in a mortgage, and that said
lands are subject to said mortgage, and that the
property so mortgaged be sold to pay bonds se-
cured by the mortgage. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. William Fullerton and J. C. Cooper
for appellant.

Mr. Wayne MacVeagh for appellees.
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of
the court:

This suit arises out of certain transactions
connected with the execution of the Act of the
130 U. S.
U. S., Book 32.

On the third of November, 1870, Francis Vose brought a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida, against said trustees and others. Among the defendants were the Florida Canal and Inland Transportation Company, the Southern Inland Navigation Company (described in some parts of the bill and in some of the interrogatories annexed as the Southern Inland Navigation and Improvement Company), the New York and Florida Lumber, Land and Improvement Company, and M. S. Mickles, agent of the last named company. The object of that suit was to obtain an injunction and decree protecting the Internal Improvement Fund against waste and misappropriation by the trustecs, to the injury of Vose and others, who held unpaid bonds issued by the Florida Railroad 67

1043

[567]

[568]

Company in conformity with the Act of 1855. | contracted to be conveyed shall be restored to
The bill charged that the trustees had violated the said internal improvement fund, and be
the law of their trust by misappropriating subjected to sale by the agents appointed by
money received by them, leaving unpaid past- | decree of this court, rendered during the term
due coupons, by neglecting to collect the in accordance with the provisions of said de-
amount due the sinking fund created by the cree."
Act of 1855, and by illegally conveying mill- Subsequently, in May, 1875, the Southern
ions of acres of land to corporations that had Inland Navigation and Improvement company
no right to receive them, and that unless refiled its petition in the Vose suit, praying that
strained they would continue to waste and mis- the decree of December 4, 1873, be vacated,
apply, to the irreparable injury of the plaintiff, and it be permitted to file such pleadings as
Vose, and others, the fund intrusted to them for were necessary for the defense of its interests.
the use and purposes indicated in the Act. The grounds upon which this relief was asked
Among other allegations in the bill was one to were that the company had not been made a
the effect that "on the 28th day of July, 1868, party to the suit nor served with a subpena.
the said trustees, by resolution of that date, at- These grounds were controverted in an answer
tempted to secure to the said Southern Inland filed by Vose to the petition. The questions
Navigation and Improvement Company forty thus raised were heard by Mr. Justice Bradley,
thousand acres, or thereabouts, of the said trust March 26, 1877, who found that the Southern
lands, and that about the first of March, 1870, Inland Navigation and Improvement Compa-
they entered into an agreement with the said ny was duly made a party to the bill filed by
New York and Florida Lumber, Land and Im- Vose, was served with process of subpena
provement Company, by which they undertook thereon, and failed and neglected to appear and
to convey one million one hundred thousand answer the bill. Its prayer to vacate the order
acres of the same for the nominal price of 10 or decree of December 4, 1873, and permit it to
cents an acre, and that this vast domain was file necessary pleadings in that suit was denied.

and is to be selected from the most valuable of
the said trust lands."

On the 6th of December, 1870, the circuit
court issued an injunction to the trustees and
their successors, commanding them, among
other things, to desist "from selling or donating
or disposing of the land belonging to said trust,
otherwise than in strict accordance with the
provisions of said Act of 1855," and "from sell-
ing said lands for scrip or state warrants of
any kind, or for aught other than current
money of the United States." This injunction
was duly served upon the trustees within a few
days after it was issued.

On the 6th of February, 1871, an order was made reciting the service of subpena in chancery upon the "defendants" in conformity with the rules and practice of the court, and the bill was taken for confessed (except as to the defendant Walker) for want of an answer, plea or demurrer. The Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund subsequently appeared and were permitted to file their answer, controvert[569] ing the principal allegations of the bill. On the 10th of February, 1871, four days after the bill had been taken for confessed, a majority of the trustees, "for and in the consideration of the sum of one dollar to them in hand paid," conveyed to the Southern Inland Navigation and Improvement Company one million three hundred and sixty thousand six hundred acres of land; and, shortly thereafter, March 20, 1871, the latter company mortgaged the above and other lands obtained from the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, to secure the payment of bonds for a very large amount which the mortgagor company proposed to is

The present suit was instituted April 12, 1883, by the Union Trust Company of New York, against the Southern Inland Navigation and Improvement Company and the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund. Its object is to obtain a decree adjudging that the said trustees have no right, title or interest in the lands embraced in the mortgage of February 10, 1871; that the same are subject to said mortgage; and that the property so mortgaged be sold to pay the amount found to be due upon any outstanding bonds secured by that mortgage. The principal defense rests upon the above proceedings, orders and decrees in the Vose suit. The bill was dismissed with costs, and from the decree of dismissal the present appeal was prosecuted.

The argument at the bar covered several
questions of an interesting character, which we
do not deem it necessary to determine, as the
decree below must be affirmed upon the ground
that the deed of February 10, 1871, by the
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund to
the Southern Inland Navigation and Improve
ment Company-under which deed the present
plaintiff, as mortgagee of the grantee, claims
title-was made in violation of the injunction
previously issued and served upon said trustees
in the suit instituted by Vose. That suit, as
we have seen, had for its object the protect 03
of the rights of Vose and other holders of rail-
road bonds in the lands and money under the
control of the Trustees of the Internal Im-
provement Fund. The injunction bound the
trustees, and they and all other parties to the
suit, who were before the court, were con-
cluded by the decree subsequently rendered in
respect to the disposition of the lands that were
By a decree, rendered December 4, 1873, in the subject matter of the litigation. In County
the suit brought by Vose, it was among other of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96, 105 [24: 977,
things adjudged that "The contracts or agree- 980], it was said to be a general rule that "All
ments, entered into by the Trustees of the In-persons dealing with property are bound to take
ternal Improvement Fund, with the corporation
known as the Southern Inland Navigation and
Improvement Company, be rescinded, and the
same are hereby declared to be null and void;
and the lands undertaken to be conveyed or

sue.

notice of a suit pending with regard to the title
thereto, and will, on their peril, purchase the
same from any of the parties to the suit."
While this rule was said not to apply to nego
tiable securities, purchased before maturity,

[570]

[571]

to that fund the lands conveyed, or attempted
to be conveyed, to that company by the trust-
ees, the conveyance of February 10, 1871, and
the mortgage of March 20, 1871, based upon it.
is invalid as against the present Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Fund of Florida. De-
cree affirmed.

nor to articles of ordinary commerce sold in
the usual way, it was held to be applicable in
cases relating to land. And in support of this
view was cited the case of Murray v. Ballou, 1
Johns. Ch. 566, in which Chancellor Kent laid it
down as an established rule that "A lis pendens,
duly prosecuted, and not collusive, is notice to
a purchaser so as to affect and bind his inter-
est by the decree; and the lis pendens begins
from the service of the subpena after the bill is GEORGE D. HULING ET AL., Plffs. in [559]
filed." Here the Southern Inland Navigation
and Improvement Company accepted a con-

Err.,

v.

veyance of the lands in question from the THE KAW VALLEY RAILWAY AND

Trustces of the Internal Improvement Fund,
after service of the subpena, and a copy of the
injunction, upon the trustees, its grantors.
That company, therefore, took its titles pen-
dente lite, and its mortgagee, the Union Trust
Company, was bound by the final decree ren-
dered in the case to the same extent that it is
bound.

It is, however, suggested that the Southern Inland Navigation and Improvement Company was not a party to the Vose suit, and consequently was not bound by that part of the decree of December 4, 1873, adjudging that the contracts or agreements entered into by the trustees with that company "be rescinded, and the same are declared null and void, and the lands undertaken to be conveyed, or contracted to be conveyed, shall be restored to the said Internal Improvement Fund, and be subjected to sale by the agents appointed by the court.' To this suggestion there are two answers: First. The question whether the Southern Navigation and Improvement Company was a party defendant to the Vose suit, and therefore affected by the decree pro confesso, passed February 6, 1871, was determined adversely to it by the order of March 26, 1877, denying its application to have the order of December 4, 1873, set aside. From the order of March 26, 1877, no appeal was prosecuted; and in this collateral proceeding that order is to be taken as conclusively establishing the fact that the Southern Inland Navigation Company was a party to the Vose suit, was served with process of subpena therein, and neglected to appear and answer the bill. Second. The relief granted in the Vose suit in respect to the agreement or

IMPROVEMENT COMPANY.

(See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 559-565.)

Lands taken for railroad in Kansas-sufficiency
of notice-nonresident owner, when bound-
duty of owner-publication of notice—due
process of law-objection to commissioner,

1. A notice, given by commissioners appointed to
locate a railroad and assess damages for lands taken
in its construction under the statute of Kansas,
notifying all persons owning land on the line of the
commissioners would proceed to lay out the route
railroad in a certain section and township that the
for said road through said section and assess the
damages, is sufficient notice to the land owners.
required by the statute is sufficient to subject the
2. The publication of such notice in the manner
lands to the action of the commissioners and to
warn the owners of property to appear and defend
their interests.

3. The owner of real estate who is a nonresident, of the State within which the property lies, cannot evade the duties and obligations which the law imposes upon him in regard to such property by his

absence from the State.

4. It is the duty of the owner of the real estate
who is a nonresident, to take measures that, in
some way, be shall be represented when his prop-
erty is called into requisition; and if he fails to do
this and fails to get notice by the publication re-
quired in such cases, it is his misfortune and he
must abide the consequences.
plied to this class of cases.
5. Such publication is due process of law, as ap-

6. The objection that one of the commissioners
was not a freeholder cannot avail to defeat the
at the time of his appointment or at the time he
proceeding; such objection should be made either
proceeded to act as commissioner.

[No. 230.]

Argued April 1, 2, 1889. Decided April 22, 1889.

contracts which the Southern Inland Navina IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the Unit

tion and Improvement Company claimed to have with the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund was within the general scope of [572] that suit, and was fairly covered by the prayer for such relief as might be deemed just and equitable. Besides, if that company was a party to the Vose suit, and we have seen that it was, the decree, so far as it rescinds the agreement or contracts it bad with the trustees, and restores to the Internal Improvement Fund the lands covered by these contracts, was not void. If erroneous, it could only be avoided by an appeal. It cannot be questioned in this collateral proceeding.

It results from what has been said that the conveyance by the trustees to the Southern Inland Navigation Company was subject to such decree as the court might render in the Vose suit; and as the decree of December 4, 1873, rescinded the agreements which the latter had with the former in respect to lands con stituting a part of the trust fund, and restored

ed States for the District of Kansas, to review a judgment for defendant in an action against a railway company to recover for the value of land taken for its right of way and for damages incident to the taking. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Albert Young and Eppa Hunton, for plaintiffs in error:

The pretended notice lacks all the elements necessary to afford information to the parties affected, and is no notice and void.

2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 400; Vail v. Morris & E. R. Co. 21 N. J. L. 189; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Smith, 78 III. 98; Re New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 70 N. Y. 191; Clark v. Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. 120; State v. Plainfield, 38 N. J. L. 95; Strang v. Beloit & M. R. Co. 16 Wis. 635; State v. Perth Amboy, 29 N. J. L. 259; Peoria & R. 1. R. Co. v. Warner, 61 Ill. 52; 2 Desty, Taxn. 826; Eastman v. Little, 5 N. H. 290; Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush. 260; Kitsmiller v. Kitchen, 24 Iowa, 163; Corbin v. Young, 24 Kan. 198.

The notice is not "due process of law