shall be duly waived on the part of such ap-|and service of such citation shall not be duly It is also urged, in the motion made by Thomas W. Ferry and others to dismiss the appeal in No. 181 from the decree of October 8, 1883, that this court has no jurisdiction of it, because the amount involved is not more than $5,000. The ground urged is that the amount involved, so far as that appeal by Richardson and Day is concerned, is only $2,173,91, which is the amount that Day, as assignee of Richardson, was directed to pay into court as having been overpaid on his claim. As Richardson has died since the day these motions were argued, the order to be made will be entered nunc pro tunc, as of that day, February 4, 1889. HENRY G. THOMPSON, Appt., v. THOMAS G. HALL ET AL. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 117-122.) It appears by the master's report that he dis- Moreover, the circuit court, by reason of the petition of Sickles and Stevens for a rehearing, and by reason of the rehearing which was had, did not lose its hold upon the fund to be distributed, nor part with its control of the cause, [116] until the decree of October 8, 1883, was made, so far as claims against the fund created by the sale of the mortgaged property were concerned. That decree contained a provision that persons having claims against such fund, whether evidenced by bonds, coupons or otherwise, should present the same to the court within five days from the date of that decree, and that, in default thereof, the clerk should distribute to the parties the moneys in his hands. These provisions save the appeal of Richardson and Day from the decree of October 8, 1883, as to amount, and enable them to have adjudicated by this court, on the hearing of that appeal, at least their claim in respect of the 400 bonds not allowed to them. It is also objected, on the motion to dismiss made by Thomas W. Ferry and others, that, in the order of November 17, 1883, allowing an appeal to Richardson and Day from the decree of October 8, 1883, the appellees are not named; but it is stated only that "The other parties of said cause, original and intervening (as appearing in the said final decree)," are "appellees." But the bond on such appeal, filed November 28, 1883, is given to the clerk of the circuit court for the use and benefit of twenty-five appellees, naming them, and among them are by name the five appellees by whom the motion on that ground is made. We think the objection is not a good one. Upon the evidence in this case, held, that Johnson claimed in the patent issued to the plaintiff, as as- APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern Dis- Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opin- This is a suit in equity, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York, by Henry G. Thompson against Thomas G. Hall, J. F. Oliver, Samuel Leopold, and David L. Harris, for the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 232,975, granted October 5, 1880, to the plaintiff, as assignee of the inventor, Moses C. Johnson, for an improvement in cutting-pliers, on an application filed June 2, 1880. The specification, 'drawings, and claim of the patent are as follows: "This invention relates to cutting-pliers, and is an improvement on that class of pliers represented in United States patent No. 209,677, dated November 5, 1878, granted to T. G. Hall, to which reference may be had. In that invention, either of the two hand-levers may be turned on its pivot without turning the other; and the tool-body formed by the face or covering plates is permitted to vibrate, or turns more or less, with relation to the handles, and the central space between the cutting-faces of the jaw-levers, when the pliers are taken in the hand to be used, drops more or less out of line with the central line of the handles, making, as it were, a loose joint midway between the ends of the pliers. It results from these views that the appeals in [117] [118] [119] self swing or vibrate upon the pins or studs "In order to move the jaw-levers equally at a Fig. 1. Fig. 2. m "The body of the pliers is composed of two side plates, a b. These side plates are fixed together by the screws 2 3 4 5. Of these screws, those 2 3 are the fulcra of the jaw-levers e d, having at their ends the usual cutters or cuttingsurfaces c' d'. Each of these jaw-levers has a lip, 7, and the end of one meets the end of the other lip just as or just before the two cutting edges c' d' separate the wire or other metal end to be cut off by them, thus closing the space between the said jaw-levers and side plates, in which is placed the spring f, and preventing the entrance into said space of hard pieces of wire or other articles that would clog the pliers. These lips also serve another essential purpose-viz.; that of holding the ends of the spring from displacement, and obviating the employment of a separate pin or stud to hold the said spring at one end, as heretofore com notch are always in engagement, and so con- "I am aware, in bolt-cutters, where the short "The body composed of the side plates a b, the independent fulcra 2 3 4 5 for the jaw-levers and hand-levers, the jaw-levers provided with cutting edges and with lips e, and the handlevers having short arms g' h', and a prong and notch always in engagement, as described, combined with the V-shaped spring, held, as described, by the lips of the jaw-levers, all as and for the purpose set forth.' [120] One of the defenses set up in the answer is, that Johnson and Thompson surreptitiously obtained the patent in fraud of the rights of the defendants; that the defendants are trustees and directors of a New York corporation, known as the Interchangeable Tool Company; that that corporation was organized in August, 1878, for the purpose of manufacturing cutting-pliers or nippers, under letters patent No. 209,677, granted to the defendant Hall, November 5, 1878; that Hall invented certain improvements upon such pliers, and immediately described and explained them to the officers of the company; that the company thereupon caused a model of them to be made, embracing such improvements; that Johnson was employed to make such model pliers for the company, and made them for the company while in its employ, and under the direction of Hall; that Johnson was in the employ of the company, in making such pliers, from April 20, 1879, until May 1, 1880, during which time the company [121] made and sold upwards of 30,000 of such pliers, with the knowledge and consent of Johnson, and without any objection on his part, and without notice that he claimed to be the inventor of the whole or any part of such pliers, or intended to apply for a patent for the same; "The screws 4 5 serve as the fulcra for the that Hall was the first and original inventor of hand-levers gh, having short arms g' h', to act said original cutting-pliers and of said improveupon the ends of the longer arms of the jaw-ments thereon, and assigned to the company levers and turn them on their fulcra to close the jaws and bring the cutting-edges together. The spring f opens the jaws the instant the clasping pressure on the hand-levers is relaxed. mon. the whole of the patent of November 5, 1878, [122] the company for one year, was dismissed from There was a replication to this answer, proofs The testimony is voluminous and contradictory; and, without discussing it, it is sufficient to say that we are of opinion that the evidence establishes the conclusion reached by the Circuit Court, and that the decree must be affirmed; and it is so ordered. through means or under circumstances which ren- 4. The breach of a parol promise as to an interest 6. It is only when an oral agreement is clearly 7. Where there is enough in the bill to warrant APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court [123] Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fullor: Appellees, the widow and heirs of John Monroe, deceased, filed their bill against Nathaniel D. Moore and Helen Moore, to compel a conveyance of the one undivided sixth part of one hundred and sixty acres of mineral land in Ontonagon County, Michigan, which had been located by Nathaniel D. Moore, under an agree ment with James H. McDonald and John McKay, that Moore should have a one third interest in consideration of his services in prospecting for land having iron ore, and selecting and locating that in question. It was upon Moore's application that the patent was issued from the state land office at Lansing, in January, 1875, [124] to McDonald and McKay, the purchase money [122] NATHANIEL D. MOORE ET AL., Appts., being furnished by them and paid over by V. 1. Where a person has received a conveyance of him. By the testimony of Moore and McKay it was established that Moore was to have a one third interest, while McDonald admitted that he was to have an interest, but was uncertain whether it was to be one third or one fourth. One McIntyre testified that the agreement between Moore, McDonald and McKay was in writing and signed in his presence by McDonald and McKay, but he was not sure whether Moore signed it or not. The execution of such an agreement was denied, and the circuit court considered McIntyre's testimony too indefinite as to its terms to warrant proceeding upon it. On the 18th day of October, 1875, Moore, who was then unmarried, executed and delivered to John Monroe a deed in fee simple, with covenants of seisin, against incumbrances, and of general warranty, for an undivided one sixth interest in said lands, which was duly recorded [125] Palmer v. Sterling, 41 Mich. 221; Weare v. Linnell, 29 Mich. 224; Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y. 475; Everett v. Everett, 48 N. Y. 218; Stebbins v. Morris, 23 Fed. Rep. 360. Principles upon which courts of equity act are well settled. Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef. 413, 429; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. 49. An equitable estate requires the simultaneous existence of two estates or ownerships in the same subject matter-the one legal, the second equitable. 1 Pom. Eq. § 147. If A voluntarily conveys land to B, who verbally promises to hold the property in trust for C, the case falls within the statute, and chancery will not enforce the promise. Lantry v. Lantry, 51 Ill. 458; Brown, Frauds, SS 94, 95, 437; Walker v. Hill, 21 N. J. Eq. 202; Perry, Trusts, § 181; Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts, 213; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1014. December 20 1875. The consideration was No trust arises by implication where a grant- Further reference to the pleadings and evidence is made in the opinion. Hearing having been had upon bill as amended, answer, replication, and proofs, the circuit court, Judge Sage presiding, delivered its opinion, which is reported in 28 Fed. Rep. p. 824, and decree was thereupon entered for conveyance to complainants as prayed, and for rents and profits from the date of the filing of the bill, less the amount due on the two hundred and forty dollar note, from which decree this appeal was prosecuted. Mrs. Moore having died pending the appeal, Nathaniel D. Moore, Jr., her sole heir at law, and John McKay, administrator of her estate, were made coappellants with Nathaniel D. Moore. Messrs. Dan H. Ball, Irving D. Hans- Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Mich. 30; 2 Dan. Ch. Pl. The statute covers every case where an inter- Whiting v. Butler, 29 Mich. 144; Trask v. A contract void under the Statute of Frauds is a mere nullity. Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 421; Raub v. Smith, 61 Mich. 543; Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24; Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494; Dunphy v. Ryan, 116 U. S. 491 (29: 703). 147. A contract void under the Statute of Frauds, cannot be used for any purpose whatever. Chamberlain v. Dow, 10 Mich. 319; Hall v. Soule, 11 Mich. 494; Holland v. Hoyt, 14 Mich. 238; Grimes v. Van Vechten, 20 Mich. 410; Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Mich. 48. The holder of a good title clothes his grantee with the rights, and conveys to him the same title, which he himself holds. East v. Pugh, 71 Iowa, 162; Peckham v. Balch, 49 Mich. 179; Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104. Equity will not enforce a written agreement for sale of land which has been abandoned by parol by the party seeking performance. King v. Morford, 1 N. J. Eq. 274; Maxfield v. Terry, 4 Del. Ch. 618. A person who assents to the transaction is bound. Truesdail v. Ward, 24 Mich, 117; Peake v. Thomas, 39 Mich. 589; 2 Pars. Cont. 191. A covenant warranty of title was not equivalent to a covenant for further assurance. Krumbaar v. Burt, 2 Wash. C. C. 406; Bouv. Law Dict. title, Covenant; 1 Pom. Eq. SS 63, 424, 378-384. Every bill must show that the complainant has a right to the relief demanded. 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. 360. Substantially the same case must be proved as that stated upon the record. 2 Dan. Ch. Pl. & Pr. 1037 and cases cited; Cox v. Cox, 26 Pa. 375; Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 Mich. 463; Tilden v. Streeter, 45 Mich. 541; Piatt v. Vattier, 34 U. S. 9 Pet. 405 (9:173); [128] Texas v. Hardenberg, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 68 (19:839). Messrs. T. L. Chadbourne and L. H. Boutelle, for appellees: There is an enforceable trust against Helen Moore in favor of complainants. Irvine v. Irvine, 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 617 (19:800); Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 52 U. S. 11 How. 323, 326 (13: 703);_ House v. McCormick, 57 N. Y. 321; Bush v. Person, 59 U. S. 18 How. 82 (15: 273); Smith v. Williams, 44 Mich. 242; De Wolf v. Haydn, 24 Ill. 525; Tefft v. Munson, 57 N. Y. 97; Smith v. Baker, 1 Younge & C. Ch. 223; Chew v. Barnet, 11 Serg. & R. 389; Way v. Arnold, 18 Ga. 181; Goodson v. Beacham, 24 Ga. 150. The Statute of Frauds of Michigan, excepts estates and trusts in real estate by act, operation or implication of law. Huxley v. Rice, 40 Mich. 73; Byrne v. Rood, 54 Mich. 67; Barber v. Milner, 43 Mich. 248; Patton v. Chamberlain, 44 Mich. 5; Newman v. Nellis, 97 N. Y. 285. The deed executed by McDonald and McKay to Moore and deposited with Viele was a compliance with the Statute of Frauds. Urann v. Coates, 109 Mass. 581; Hart v. Carroll, 85 Pa. 508; Parrill v. McKinley, 9 Gratt. 1; Bowles v. Woodson, 6 Gratt. 78; Jenkins v. Harrison, 66 Ala. 352. Moore could have obtained the title had he chosen so to do. Fry, Spec. Perf. 2d. Am. ed. § 702. As to the covenant of warranty, the rule is universal that no right of action arises under it except after an eviction or something which is equivalent. for Monroe and his heirs one half of the interest conveyed to her, namely, one sixth of the whole. "Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court of equity, properly includes all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. And courts of equity will not only interfere in cases of fraud to set aside acts done, but they will also, if acts have by fraud been prevented from being done by the parties, interfere and treat the case exactly as if the acts had been done." 1 Story, Eq.Jur. § 187. Whenever the legal title to property is obtained through means or under circumstances "which render it unconscientious for the holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest, equity impresses a constructive trust on the property thus acquired in favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled to the same, although he may never, perhaps, have had any legal estate therein; and a court of equity has jurisdiction to reach the property either in the hands of the original wrong doer, or in the hands of any subsequent holder, until a purchaser of it in good faith and without notice acquires a higher right and takes the property relieved from the trust." Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 1053. In Hurley v. Rice, 40 Mich. 82, it is said: "It is the settled doctrine of the court that where the conveyance is obtained for ends which it regards as fraudulent, or under circumstances it considers as fraudulent or op Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 52 U. S. 11 How.pressive, by intent or immediate consequence, 297, 325 (13: 703). The allegation of offer to perform is merely formal. Jenkins v. Harrison, 66 Ala. 352. An oral agreement to establish rights in land at variance with the muniments of title must be clearly and satisfactorily proved. Mundy v. Foster, 31 Mich. 313; Shakespeare v. Markham, 10 Hun, 311; Bowen v. Bowen, 2 Bradf. 336; Cox v. Cox, 26 Gratt. 305; Kent v. Lasley, 24 Wis. 654; McClellan v. Sanford, 26 Wis. 595; Harter v. Christoph, 32 Wis. 248; Kercheval v. Doty, 31 Wis. 491; Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449; Lavassar v. Washburne, 50 Wis. 200; Howland v. Blake, 97 U. S. 626 (24: 1028). the party deriving title under it will be converted into a trustee in case that construction is needful for the purpose of administering adequate relief; and the setting up the Statute of Frauds by a party guilty of the fraud or mistake, in order to bar the court from effective interference with his wrong doing, will not hinder it from forcing on his conscience this character as a means to baffle his injustice or its effects." The fraud of which Moore was guilty was in preventing the conveyance to himself, which would have inured to Monroe, and in obtaining it to his wife, so as to reap the benefit which belonged to his grantee. Mrs. Moore stands in her husband's shoes, and by accepting with knowledge is to be treated as a party to his fraud and profiting by it, or Laches cannot be imputed to infants. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court: Had the conveyance of McDonald and McKay, lodged in Viele's hands, been actually delivered to Moore, no question would have arisen; but that deed having been suppressed or lost, when Moore subsequently induced McDonald and McKay to convey to his wife, for the avowed purpose of avoiding the deed he had given Monroe, Moore's wife being fully advised of the purpose and paying no consideration for the conveyance, the transaction must be regarded in equity as if McDonald and McKay bad conveyed to Moore and Moore had conveyed to his wife, she holding in trust the fraud and to profit by it, and is hence to be held, as he could have been, a trustee er maleficio. Nor do we see that the Statute of Frauds can be invoked as a defense. The fact that McDonald and McKay could not have been compelled to convey to Moore, because of the want of written evidence of their agreement to do so, does not entitle Mrs. Moore to object that they were not legally bound to do what they were morally, they having kept their faith with Moore by conveying under his directions. If McDonald and McKay had violated their agreement with Moore, and in furtherance of such violation had conveyed to a stranger, such grantee might have defended, even though cognizant of the verbal agreement of McDonald and McKay to convey to Moore; [129] |