Argument for Appellants. process of law, and a taking thereof for public use without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." The relief asked was a decree enjoining the city, its agents and officers, from interfering with the building of the dock, and that upon the final hearing of the cause, it be adjudged and decreed that under the acts of Congress the plaintiffs have the right by virtue of the permission granted by the Secretary of War to build the dock on the lines shown by the plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers, and that the city of Chicago has no right, power or authority to interfere therewith. Mr. S. A. Lynde and Mr. Warren B. Wilson for appellants. I. The United States, in its survey and plat of the channel of this river and in its improvement of the river under the acts of Congress of August 2, 1882, and July 5, 1884, has fixed and established the lines of the channel of the river and of the docks that might be constructed thereon. II. By the terms and provisions of the deeds which Congress required to be made to the United States by the owners of the land fronting on this river, as a condition for the expenditure of the moneys appropriated for the improvement of the river, the shore and dock lines as established and fixed by the government survey, are to be taken for all purposes as the true meander lines of this stream; and, under the deed which was made to the United States pursuant to this provision of the act of Congress, aforesaid, by Columbus R. Cummings, and under the acts of Congress of August 2, 1882, and of July 5, 1884, referring to the improvement of this river, the appellants are entitled as the owners of these premises to build their proposed dock on the line shown by the plan attached to the permit that issued to them by the Secretary of War, which is within the line which has been established by the United States as the. dock line of these premises and which has been fixed and made the meander line of this stream. As riparian owners the appellants had the right to build their dock, subject only to the public easement for the purpose of navigation. Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; Chicago Argument for Appellants. v. Laflin, 49 Illinois, 172; Chicago v. McGinn, 51 Illinois, 266; Chicago v. Van Ingen, 152 Illinois, 624. III. Congress has taken jurisdiction over this river as one of the navigable waters of the United States, and has improved it and made it navigable and available for commerce, and has directed and caused the channel and dock lines of the river to be defined and established. Its jurisdiction over this river for the purpose of navigation and the protection thereof, and its power to control the building of docks or other structures in this river is, when exercised, supreme; and neither the State of Illinois nor the city of Chicago, its agent, has any power to interfere with or prevent the erection of any dock or structure which Congress has authorized to be built in this river. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat, 1; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling etc. Bridge Co., 13 Howard, 518, 566; S. C., 18 Howard, 421, 460; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 724; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S. 379, 387; Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470, 475, 479; Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 1; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1. As to power of Congress to determine what shall or shall not be deemed in law an obstruction to navigation, Pennsyl vania v. Wheeling etc. Bridge Co., 18 Howard, 421, 460; In re Clinton Bridge, 10 Wall. 454; South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4; North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co. v. United States, 88 Fed. Rep. 675. A State has no power to interfere with erection of any structure in navigable waters authorized by Congress. Decker v. B. & N. Y. R. Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 723; Stockton v. B. & N. Y. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 9; Penn. R. Co. v. N. Y. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 129. On question as to police power of State, in addition to authorities above cited, see also County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 699; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 683; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288. IV. Under the provisions of section 10 of the act of March 3, 1899, the Secretary of War was empowered by Congress to approve and permit the erection of docks in navigable rivers of Argument for Appellants. the United States on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers; and the permit which was issued to the appellants by the Secretary of War to rebuild their dock in front of these premises on the plan attached thereto, which was approved by the Chief of Engineers gave them full right and authority under said act of Congress to build said dock in accordance with said permit, and the city of Chicago had no power or authority to interfere with or prevent them from building this dock, and could not lawfully stop its construction. The appellants base their claim of right to build this dock without interference from the city of Chicago on two grounds: 1. On the acts of August 2, 1882, and July 5, 1884, and the provision of the deed from Cummings to the United States, that this line, which has been established by the United States, shall be taken as the "true meandered” line of this stream. 2. On the act of March 3, 1899, and the permit, which the Secretary of War has issued to them thereunder. This authority from the Secretary of War is given by and under the act of March 3, 1899, and is paramount, and excludes any state or municipal control of this same matter. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S. 379; United States v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 5 Bissell, 410; Federal Cases No. 15,778; United States v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 5 Bissell, 410; Federal Cases, No. 15,779; Willamette Bridge Co. v. Iatch, 125 U. S. 1; United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U. S. 211, 217; United States v. Ormsby, 74 Fed. Rep. 207; United States v. City of Moline, 82 Fed. Rep. 592. The delegation of power to the Secretary of War by the act of 1899 to issue this permit is valid. In addition to authorities last above cited, see Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U. S. 385; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649; L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. State of Ohio, 165 U. S. 365. V. The right to build this structure upon their premises within the dock line established by the United States and under the permit issued to them under the said act of Congress is a property right vested in the appellants which is conceded to be Argument for Appellees. of greater value than $2000, and the action of the city of Chicago in preventing the building of said dock by the appellants is a taking of their property without due process of law and a taking thereof for public use without just compensation in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Charles M. Walker and Mr. Henry Schofield for appellees. I. The Circuit Court, as a Federal court, had no jurisdiction. If the statement of the claim, or demand, in each bill does not, in and of itself, show, that the claim, or demand, arises under the Constitution, or laws, of the United States, the fact that the defendant filed a demurrer cannot aid the statement to that end. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454; Houston & Texas Central Rd. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 78, and cases cited; New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S. 411, 424, 431. The jurisdiction cannot rest on section 629, subdivision "sixteenth," of the Revised Statutes, because said section, if in force, has no application. II. Even if the Circuit Court, as a Federal court, did have jurisdiction in these cases, this court has no jurisdiction, because section 6 of the Court of Appeals Act vests the appellate jurisdiction in these cases in the Court of Appeals exclusively. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court could not rest on the ground that the suits arise under the Constitution of the United States, because the attempt to draw in question the validity of an ordinance of the city of Chicago is wholly abortive, neither the ordinance itself being set forth, nor any statute of the State authorizing the passage of the ordinance being set forth, in any way whatever. The State of Illinois cannot be convicted of violating the Fourteenth Amendment without allegation, or proof, approximating, at least, to a certainty. No reason is perceived why the rule stated in Yazoo & Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 41, 48, on error to a state court, is not applicable. A municipal ordinance is not a state act, unless passed under legislative authority. Hamilton Gas Light Argument for Appellees. Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U. S. 258, 265-266. This court has no jurisdiction under section 5 of the Court of Appeals Act. Curtis' Jurisdiction of U. S. Courts, 2d ed. pp. 67-73. The cases are "cases other than those provided for" in section 5 of the Court of Appeals Act; and the act of March 3, 1899, under sections 10 and 12 of which these cases arise, being a criminal law, section 6 of the Court of Appeals Act makes the judgment of the Court of Appeals final. II. The court below, as a court of equity, had no jurisdiction because the remedy at law is entirely adequate. That is, the bills do not show that it is not. And also a court of equity will not generally stop the enforcement of a penal police ordinance. People v. Canal Board of New York, 55 N. Y. 390; Davis v. American Society for Preventing Cruelty to Animals, 75 N. Y. 362; Poyer v. Village of Des Plaines, 123 Illinois, 111; 1 Foster's Fed. Practice, 2d ed. sec. 215; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 166; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 531; Osborne v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 147 U. S. 248, 258. IV. Complainants should have joined in one bill, as, at best, they held a joint permit under section 10 of the act of March 3, 1899. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 234, 238. One is not a party, though named in the pleadings, unless he is brought in by process, or appears. Terry v. Com. Bank, 92 U. S. 454; May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall. 217. .on. V. Complainants do not own the land they intend to build It is conceded that it is established law in the State of Illinois, that a conveyance of land calling for running water as a boundary carries title to submerged land to the middle of such running water, whether the water be navigable or not. Notwithstanding the decision of the majority of the judges in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371 (1890), the rule is different where the conveyance calls for still water, ponds or lakes, navigable or not, for a boundary. Fuller v. Shedd. 161 Illinois, 462 (1896). The descriptions in the bill call for a fixed boundary or for a definite extent of land. In McCormick v. Huse, 78 Illinois, 363, the extent of land, or quantity of land, conveyed controlled. In Brophy v. Richeson, 137 Indiana, 114, meander |