Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

perpetrator never crosses the line into the State wherein the crime is consummated or committed.

If the decision is correct, then the insufficiency of the Constitution must be confessed, in this instance, and amendment resorted to.

The decision of the court below and the argument of the defendant in error is based upon a narrow construction of the preposition "from" as used in the Constitution, but see Streep v. United States, 160 U. S. 128, as to what a fugitive from justice is. It is immaterial whether the crime has been detected or not, or what the secret intent of the culprit may be; he becomes a fugitive from justice when he avoids the demands of justice. And he flees "from" the justice of the State when he avoids the justice of the State. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80; In re Cook, 49 Fed. Rep. 833; 146 U. S. 183; Regina v. Jacobia, 46 Law Times, New Series, 595.

IV. Reason for a broad construction. In Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, a broad and comprehensive construction following the intent and purpose of the Constitution was declared; and the policy of surrendering all fugitives from justice, no matter what might be the character of the crime, nor where nor how it was committed, was indicated.

It was one of the necessities of the occasion that the Constitution should be drafted in general language. "The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence." Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheaton, 326.

V. No right of asylum. It has also been the policy of the United States Supreme Court to adopt such a construction as would really establish justice and insure domestic tranquillity, provide for common defence and promote the general welfare. The uniform tendency of the decisions has been to place the doctrine of interstate rendition on the broadest possible basis. In the case of foreign extradition the courts have followed the treaties in the interest of peace and national honor. They have construed those treaties strictly because the treaty conditions required it, because the nation was bound in honor to

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

observe the terms of the treaties; but wherever an attempt has been made to limit the terms of the constitutional provision, with reference to interstate rendition, the court has steadily set its face against a strict construction. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 715; Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S., 542; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642.

is

"If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it well-settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 188.

VI. The constitutional provision should not be weakened and made only half effective by this narrow construction of the phrase "from which." The decision of the court below is a long step backwards, and is an adoption of the policy of strict construction. It is adopting a rule of construction which, if followed as to all the other provisions of the Constitution, would have weakened that charter to the point of uselessness.

VII. It is not the policy of the law to screen criminals from the legal consequences of their crimes. Courts should not, by strained construction, establish asylums for fugitive criminals. If the laws of a State have been violated and crime committed, the wrong-doer should be punished. He should be surrendered by the authorities in whose jurisdiction he has sought refuge to the demanding State for trial. It would be a monstrous doctrine that would make New York State an inviolable sanctuary for criminals who perpetrate their offences by false tokens, fraudulent paper or representations communicated by mail or innocent agents. Such a decision would afford to "bunco men," "green-goods dealers" and commercial swindlers a haven of refuge within this State and would be a security to them in plying their games and frauds. Safe within this State they could plan and carry into effect their criminal purposes, plunder the merchants, banks and tradesmen of other States.

There is no place in the law of interstate rendition for the doctrine that actual presence in the demanding State at the

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

time of the commission of the offence charged shall be conditio sine qua non. Frauds are attempted and committed by and through "endless chains of letters," advertisements of "getrich-quick” schemes, sure methods of stock trading, betting on horse races and like schemes. แ Community of interest" in trade and manufactures, with its attendant consolidation of interests widely scattered, opens a vast field for fraudulent operations. Such consolidations permit of the incorporation of companies in different States, false credit ratings, the fraudulent use of commercial paper and an ample opportunity to commit larceny by means of unwary and innocent clerks and agents. Is New York State to be made the haven of all those swindlers?

VIII. One offending against the laws of the United States may be sent to any part of the country. There is no reason why the court should be so tender of the feelings of the criminal. So far as offences against the laws of the United States are concerned, a man may be transported from Maine to California, or from Oregon to Florida and tried for crimes committed, even though he was the width of the continent from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Sec. 731 Rev. Stat. U. S.; Horner v. Unite! Stutes, 143 U. S. 207; In re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257.

Reference was made in argument to the question, often disputed, where an indictment for murder shall be tried, when a person mortally wounded in one jurisdiction afterwards dies in another jurisdiction? Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Massachusetts, 1, and authorities there cited; The Queen v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63; 11 Am. Law Review, 615; State v. Bowen, 16 Kansas, 475; United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey, 498. But there the original unlawful act is not only done by the offender, but reaches the person at whom it is aimed, in one jurisdiction, and it is the subsequent effect only which takes place in another jurisdiction. We have no occasion now to consider such a case beyond observing that before the Declaration of Independence provision had been made by statute, both in England and Ireland, for trying such cases in either jurisdiction, and was never supposed to be inconsistent in principle with the

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

provision of Magna Charta (c. 14), for trial by a jury of the vicinage. (1 East P. C. 366; 1 Gabbett's Crim. Law, 501.) It is universally admitted that when a shot fired in one jurisdiction strikes a person in another jurisdiction, the offender may be tried where the shot takes effect, and the only doubt is whether he can be tried where the shot is fired. Rex v. Coombes, 1 Leach (4th ed.) 388; United States v. Davis, 2 Sumner, 482; People v. Adams, 3 Denio, 190, 207, and 1 N. Y. 173, 176, 179; The Queen v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 233, 234; Rev. Stat. sec. 731.

When an offence is committed by means of a communication through the post office, the sender has sometimes, as appears by the cases cited for the petitioner, been held to be punishable at the place where he mails the letter. United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384; United States v. Bickford, 4 Blatchford, 337; Rex v. Williams, 2 Campbell, 506; The King v. Burdett, 3 B. & Ald. 717, and 4 B. & Ald. 95; Perkin's Case, 2 Lewin, 150; Regina v. Cooke, 1 Fost. & Finl. 64; The Queen v. Holmes, 12 Q. B. D. 23; S. C., 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 343. But it does not follow that he is not punishable at the place where the letter is received by the person to whom it is addressed; and it is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that he may be tried and punished at that place, whether the unlawfulness of the communication through the post office consists in its being a threatening letter, The King v. Girdwood, 1 Leach, 142; S. C., 2 East P. C. 1120; Esser's Case, 2 East P. C. 1125; or a libel, The King v. Johnson, 7 East, 65; S. C., 3 J. P. Smith, 94; The King v. Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 95, 136, 150, 170, 184; Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304; In re Buell, 3 Dillon, 116, 122; or a false pretence or fraudulent representation, Regina v. Leech, Dearsley, 642; S. C., 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 100; The Queen v. Rogers, 3 Q. B. D. 28; S. C., 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 22; People v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. 509; People v. Adams, 3 Denio, 190, and 1 N. Y. 173; Foute v. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.), 712; In re Palliser, 136 U. S. 265.

All throughout this country there are many cities, large and small, and villages on opposite sides of state boundaries, some separated by a river and others only by an imaginary boundary

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

line. A person may shoot and maim or kill another across the line, or hurl a lighted missile across the boundary and commit arson, send an innocent messenger and commit larceny by pretenses, or commit larceny by the use of the telephone or telegraph or mail, and be absolutely exempt from the trial and punishment in the State wherein the crime was committed, when, if the same person, by the same means, offended against the laws of the United States, he could be surrendered and sent into the other State or district for trial and punishment. Can it be possible that an invisible line of demarcation shall be regarded as an unsurmountable barrier against the just demands of the neighboring State, so far as crimes against the laws of the State are concerned, when, as to offences against the United States, the width of the continent is no protection ?

IX. Tennessee is the State having jurisdiction of the crime. The crime charged in the indictments herein was the crime of grand larceny and false pretenses. The defendant in error could have "committed the crime within the State" of Tennessee, although never physically present within the State. Adams v. People, 1 N. Y. 173; State v. Grady, 34 Connecticut, 118; Commonwealth v. White, 123 Massachusetts, 430; Commonwealth v. Smith, 93 Massachusetts, 243; Lindsey v. Smith, 38 Ohio St. 507; United States v. Davis, 2 Sumner, 482; Regina v. Barrett, 22 Eng. Law & Eq. 611; Regina v. Brisac, 4 East, 164; State v. Chapin, 17 Arkansas, 565; State v. Morrow, 40 S. C. 211; Noyes v. State, 41 N. J. L. 418; Simpson v. State, 92 Georgia, 41; Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 12 S. W. Rep. 309.

"When the commission of an offence commenced without this State is consummated within its boundaries, the person committing the offence is liable to punishment therefor in this State, although he was out of the State at the commission of the offence charged; if he consummated it in this State through the intervention of an innocent or guilty agent, or by any other means proceeding directly from himself, and in such a case the jurisdiction is in the county in which the offence was consummated, unless otherwise provided by law." Sec. 5801, M. & V. Code, Tennessee.

X. The plaintiff in error returned only paper he had. There