1640 June 1. The second session of the Irish Parliament. THE IRISH PARLIAMENT. 455 Before Charles could resolve to take one course or another even worse news than that which had reached him from Edinburgh was speeding across the Irish Channel. The Parliament of Ireland met for its second session on June 1. The enthusiasm, real or factitious, with which the subsidies had been granted in March had long since died away. Strafford was no longer in Dublin to warn and to encourage. Nor was the situation the same in June as it had been three months before. Not only was there a difference between the time of payment and the time of promise, but there was no longer reason to believe that the Irish who supported the King would be on the winning side. Nor was the House of Commons quite the same as it had been in March. The balance in an Irish House of Commons was easily shifted. Care had been taken that neither the Roman Catholic members nor the independent Protestant members should form a majority. By means of the knot of civilian and military officials the Government could convert either of these minorities into a majority, and it was, therefore, in the interest of both parties to court the good-will of that Government which could do so much to serve them or to injure them. For the moment, however, this source of authority was no longer available. Wandesford, the new Lord Deputy, who held office. under the Lord Lieutenant, was an honourable and loyal man, but he was not a Strafford. Even if he had been all that Strafford was, it is doubtful whether success would have been within his reach. Many of the official members were absent from their posts, actively employed in raising troops and in preparing for the coming campaign.1 Protestants and Roman Catholics might be at issue on many points, but they were agreed in disliking to pay large modo che si potesse con li Scozzesi, e veder poi a suo tempo di ridurgli à perfetta obbedienza coll' armi.' He goes on to say that, in spite of the King's irritation about the news from Scotland, 'nondimeno credesi che egli voglia per hora con l'arte più che con la forza procurare di ridurre a qualche quiete le cose.' Rossetti to Barberini, June, R. O. Tran scripts. Carte's Ormond, i. 99. Objections to the mode of levying subsidies. sums of money. In 1634 the Lord Deputy had bethought himself of a new way of collecting the supplies voted. He and his council came to the conclusion that each subsidy ought to be worth a certain sum, and this sum was then distributed amongst the counties, each county being left to assess its own share upon its inhabitants. This precedent had been followed by Wandesford. The June 13. Commons now drew up a declaration, in which they Declaration alleged that each man's property should be rated to pay a certain proportion, whether the whole sum came up to the Deputy's expectations or not. The first subsidy voted might be gathered in as Wandesford had proposed, but the others must be collected 'in a moderate Parliamentary way.' To this demand Wandesford was forced to give his consent, and the Houses were then prorogued till October.2 of the Commons. The Irish army. In spite of this rebuff Wandesford was still hopeful. The full value of the first subsidy would now be paid. The army, which was waiting for supplies, would be able to rendezvous at Carrickfergus by the end of July. By that time Strafford would be sufficiently recovered to cross the sea, and with him as its leader the long-expected blow would at last be struck. The pecuniary loss to the Irish Treasury was even greater than the Lord Deputy anticipated. The first subsidy, indeed, collected on Strafford's plan brought in 46,000l. The second and third subsidies together brought in only half that sum. The fourth subsidy was never col Small value of the subsidies. lected at all.3 It was as well that it should be so. Strafford's plan deserved Irish Commons' Journals, i. 146. 2 In a subsequent petition of the Commons (S. P. Ireland, Bundle cclxxxvi.) it is said that estates were valued at the tenth part, and that they then paid 4s. in the pound in lands and 2s. 8d. in goods, and that this was higher than the rates used in England. This helps us to understand how a subsidy of nominally 45. in the pound was borne. Wandesford to Ormond, June 7, 10, 12, 30, Carte MSS. i. fol. 203, 206, 209, 211. Radcliffe to Conway, July 4, S. P. Ireland, Bundle cclxxxvi. 1640 EFFORTS TO FIND MONEY 157 to fail. To call upon Ireland, poor as she was, to bear a burden out of all proportion to that which England had ever consented to bear, was to make a demand beyond the bounds of reason. Nor was it fair upon Ireland to place her thus in the forefront of the battle. Victorious or vanquished, she would but bring down upon herself the hatred of her more powerful neighbour. French loans. Whilst Ireland was drawing back and Scotland was menacing, the English Government was in desperate straits for money. Proposed Early in June an agent of Cottington's offered the Genoese and most advantageous conditions to the French Government in return for a loan, and at the same time an effort was made to obtain a similar advance from the financiers of Genoa. Neither attempt was successful. Richelieu had no wish to help Charles out of his difficulties, and the Genoese were hardly likely to be satisfied with any security which the English Government had in its power to give.' Another plan was to squeeze money out of the unfortunate Catholics. Orders were given to arrest all Catholics. the priests who were to be found, as well as such of the laity as frequented the chapels of the Catholic ambassadors. The Queen's influence, however, was once more brought to bear upon her husband, and these proceedings were stopped on the understanding that the Catholics would follow the precedent of 1639 by making a voluntary contribution towards the expenses of the war.2 Attempt to get money from the Alarming news began to pour into Whitehall from those who were entrusted with the military preparations. There had Condition of always been a strong belief at Court that the oppothe army. sition to the King was for the most part confined to the upper classes-at all events amongst the rural population. The theory was not entirely without foundation. 1 Memorandum, June, S. P. Dom. cccclviii. 75. Montreuil's despatch, June 4, Bibl. Nat. Fr. 15,995, fol. 93. Giustinian's despatches, June Ven. Transcripts. R. O. * Rossetti to Barberini, June, R. O. Transcripts. Puritanism had no deep root in the minds of the agricultural poor. Country gentlemen and small freeholders might be averse to Laudian innovations in the Church and to unparliamentary exactions in the State, but the labourers and the small handicraftsmen of the country-side cared very little about the matter. They wanted to be let alone that they might be allowed to earn their daily bread in peace. It was the great mistake of the Government to imagine that this passive submission could be easily converted into active loyalty, and that it was possible to pass over the opposition of the intelligent classes, because those classes were of necessity only a minority of the whole population. The moment the carters, the blacksmiths, and the labourers were ordered to put on a uniform and to march far away from their cottages and their families, they would be full of dissatisfaction with the Government which tore them from their homes to expose them to danger, and perhaps to death, for a cause which inspired them with no interest whatever. Something of this feeling is sometimes manifested in modern armies whenever the reserves are called out for actual But in modern armies the feeling is always shortlived. Enthusiasm for the cause at stake, military habits created early in life, and, above all, the influence of a body of officers accustomed to command, and of comrades accustomed to obey, combine to create the military habit of discipline and obedience which has been for a time put off amidst the cares and emulation of civil life. To Charles's army all this was lacking. There was no enthusiasm whatever. In the new-levied ranks there were none but raw recruits, and the alienation of the country gentlemen made it impossible to appoint men whose local influence would inspire confidence, and in some way redeem their want of military knowledge. Officers who had served in Holland or Germany were mingled with officers who had never served at all. Scarcely one of either class had any knowledge of the men whom they were designed to lead. Fresh from Court they arrived to take the command of companies in which every soldier was in a state of irritation at having to serve at all, and in which not a single soldier had any reason to hold them in the slightest respect. Even in the preceding war. 1640 STATE OF THE ARMY. 159 year something of this inconvenience had been felt. But in 1639 the bulk of the army had been drawn from the trained bands of the counties north of the Humber, who were consequently under the orders of the gentlemen of their own shires. In 1640 the trained bands were not called out at all, and the northern counties were excused from a service to which they had contributed so much in the preceding summer. The pressed men of the shires south of the Humber, who formed the army of 1640, were both more indifferent to the chances of a Scottish invasion, which was not likely to reach their own homes, and were themselves drawn from a lower class. Distrust of Nor did the danger end here. The sixteenth century had left behind it as a legacy an indelible, if somewhat unintelligent, hatred of the Roman Catholic Church. With few exceptions, high and low were actuated by a common feeling of abhorrence. Charles, indeed, had himself a firm determination never to acknowledge the Papal claims; but in his dread of Puritan ascendency, he fancied that he could trust the Catholics, and that he could trust very few others. Even before the Short Parliament Rossetti boasted that many Catholics were placed in military commands from which Pu. ritans were strictly excluded.' Charles forgot that such an arrangement would loosen still more the ties of discipline, already loose enough; and that the commentary which he had thus given upon his employment of an Irish army was likely to increase, if possible, the bitterness which that imprudent measure had caused. It is possible that if pay had been constant, such seeds of Inischief might, not without much difficulty, have been eradicated. But the financial troubles of the Government Want of pay. made themselves felt everywhere. When at last, early in June, the men started on the march for the rendezvous at Selby, it was often with a feeling of doubt whether the money due for their services would ever really be paid. Tales of disorder at once began to pour in from every side. In Wiltshire a company roved about stealing poultry and |