1639

FINANCIAL DISTRESS.

25

chance of finding pay for the army lay in that general contribution which had been demanded in April. The Council had long ceased to be sanguine of a favourable reply. "Hitherto," wrote Windebank, "we have very cold answers, which, though they be not direct refusals, are almost as ill; for they bring us no relief nor no hope of it. Some petty sums, and those very few, have been offered. So that my lords begin to apprehend this will be of little consideration, and to use compulsory means in these distempered times my lords are very tender, and apprehend it may be of dangerous consequence." 1

It was hard to say what answer could be made to this. By leaving just claims unpaid, and by anticipating the revenue to the extent of about 150,000l., the army had hitherto been kept on foot, though its expenditure after the late reinforcements might be approximately reckoned at the rate of 750,000l. a year. As to the general contribution of which Windebank spoke so despondingly, it was found at the end of July, when money ceased to come in, to have amounted in all to 50,000%.. Of The general this 15,000l. were produced by the sale of the Mascontribution. tership cf the Rolls to Sir Charles Cæsar. Of the remaining 35,000l., 2,200l. came from a nobleman too sickly to follow the King in person, and 24,3957. were paid by the clergy, the class of all others most deeply interested in the King's success, and most amenable to pressure from above. The whole amount contributed by the laity of England barely exceeded 8,400/., and the greater part even of this was provided by judges and other legal officials, who were almost as amenable to pressure as the clergy. The unofficial contributions certainly did not exceed 3,000l., if indeed they reached anything like that sum.3

One source of supply, indeed, was still open. The Queen

Windebank to the King, May 24, Clar. S. P. ii. 46.

2 I have no absolute evidence of this; but I find that Uvedale, the Treasurer of the Army, paid into the exchequer a sum of 15,207%. 75. on March 30. Two days after we learn from Garrard of Cæsar's payment. Unless there had been something to conceal, Uvedale would have kept this money in his own hands, and it does not appear how it reached him.

Breviates of the Receipt.

had urged the Catholics to testify their gratitude by a donation The Catholic to the King in his time of need. She did not find contribution. them in a liberal mood. They counted the reduced fines which they were still forced to pay, as so much injustice, and they had some suspicion that the Puritans might after all get the upper hand. Walter Montague, too, who was employed as the Queen's agent in the matter, was not much more popular with the old Catholic families than hot-headed converts usually are with those whose religion is inherited from their ancestors. Yet a demand made by the Queen was hardly to be rejected, and, after a long discussion, the Catholics agreed to present the King with 10,000l. at Midsummer, and a similar sum at Michaelmas. Such a sum would not support the army much

Proposed ladies' contribution.

more than a week. Another plan of the Queen's did not achieve even this amount of success. She proposed that the ladies of England should combine to present the King with a substantial token of their regard.2 Either the ladies took no great interest in the Royal cause, or their purses were too much under the control of their husbands to open readily. No money reached the King from this quarter.

June 4.

In this stress the King wrote to his Council in The City to London to send him 10,000l. at once, and to require be applied to for a loan. the Lord Mayor and Aldermen to provide a loan, as a matter in which his Majesty would take no denial.3

Con's letters are full of this affair. Compare Rushworth, ii. 820. The letter printed at p. 821, as a letter from the Pope to his Nuncio, is an evident forgery, as it states that the Catholics had been offering men Jan. 22, for the Northern expedition, which is untrue. Rossetti, writing on 1641 (R. O. Transcripts), says that a forged letter, said to be brought by him to Toby Matthew, was printed about this time, and I suspect that this is the one.

2 Rossingham's News-Letters, Add. MSS. 11,045, fol. 9.

Feb. 1,

• Windebank to the King, June 8. The King's letter is not preserved, but it seems to have reached London on the 6th, and so to have been written on the 2nd. According to Salvetti, orders were given to levy ten or twelve thousand men (Salvetti's News-Letter, June 1); but this is

24

1639

Kelso.

THE MARCH TO KELSO.

27

Charles's power of making use of the army which he found it so difficult to maintain was soon to be brought June 2. to the test. On the 3rd news came into the camp June 3. The Scots at that a considerable Scottish force had established itself at Kelso-an indication that the Scots considered themselves released by Arundel's raid upon Dunse from any obligation to keep within the limit of ten miles from the Border which had been imposed upon them by the King. Orders were therefore given to Holland to take with him 3,000 foot and 300 horse to drive them out.

The day was hot and dusty, and the infantry straggled along weary and footsore. Yet their officers believed that, inexperienced as they were, they would have acquitted themselves well if they had come to blows.

Holland's march to

That Kelso. day no opportunity was given them to display their courage. Riding hastily forward at the head of his horse, Holland found himself face to face with a Scottish force advancing to meet him. His men perhaps exaggerated the numbers of the enemy as six, eight, or even ten thousand, and it was averred by some that an additional force of 3,000 Highlanders was lying in ambush armed with bows and arrows.2

doubtless only the echo of the false rumour which Windebank was to give out. See p. 17.

1 Dymock to Windebank, July 5, S. P. Dom. ccccxxv. 21.

* Account of the Campaign, Bodl. Lib. Rawlinson MSS. B 210. Aston, who after the cessation of hostilities visited Leslie's camp on Dunse Law, was startled by the look of the Highlanders there, 'whose fantastic habit caused much gazing by such as have not seen them heretofore. They were all, or most part of them, well-timbered men, tall and active, apparclled in blue woollen waistcoats and blue bonnets, a pair of bases of plaid and stockings of the same, and a pair of pumps on their feet, a mantle of plaid cast over the left shoulder and under the right arme, a pocket before for the knapsack, and a pair of dirks on either side the pocket. They are left to their own election for their weapons. Some carry only a sword and targe, others muskets, and the greater part, bow and arrow, with a quiver to hold about six shafts, made of the mane of a goat or colt, with the hair hanging on, and fastened by some belt or suchlike so as it appears almost a tail to them. These were about 1,000, and had bagpipes-for the most part- for their warlike instruments. The Lord

Holland at first proposed to fall back on the infantry, and to make the attack with both arms. But he soon discovered that he was far outnumbered, and preferred to send a trumpeter to the Scots to ask them what they were doing within the ten miles' limit. The Scots asked him scornfully in return, what he

Holland's

retreat.

was doing in their country. He had better be gone,

or they would teach him the way. There was nothing

for it but to retreat to the camp beyond the Tweed.'

Holland was but a carpet knight, and contemporaries and posterity have combined in jeering him on his failure. Yet it may be doubted whether the most practised soldier would have acted otherwise. He was entrusted with a reconnaissance in force, and finding the enemy too strong to be prudently attacked, he brought his men back in safety.2 In any ordinary army such a proceeding would be taken as a matter of course. Charles's was not an ordinary army. It had nothing but its reputation to subsist on, and its reputation was not enough to endure even an apparent check.

Jure 3.

In fact, it was not merely the retreat which spread alarm in the camp. Men began to ask one another how it was that the Scots had been prepared to meet Holland's movements. A suspicion arose, which was probably justified by fact, that every

Buchanan was their leader. Their ensigns had strange devices and strange words, in a language unknown to me, whether their own or not I know not." Add. MSS. 28,566, fol. 23 b. In the edition of Nares' Glossary by Halliwell and Wright, bases' is explained as a kind of embroidered mantle which hung down from the middle to about the knees or lower, worn by knights on horseback.' This is practically a kilt, and if this interpretation is correct, the question of the late introduction of the kilt in the eighteenth century is settled in the negative. The use of the expression 'fantastic habit' points in the same direction.

Coke to Windebank, June 4; Mildmay to Windebank, June 4 ; Norgate to Read, June 5; Weckerlin to Conway, June 6, S. P. Dom. ccccxxiii. 21, 22, 29, 49.

2 Aston attributes the retreat to the military officers under Holland. "The Lieutenant-General Goring," he says, "and Commissary Wilmot persuaded my Lord Holland to retreat, which considerations and the King's command by letters to that purpose caused them to retire." Add. MSS. 28,566, fol. 22 b.

1639

June 4. Despondency in the camp.

DESPONDENCY IN THE CAMP.

29

movement of the English army was known to Leslie, whilst the manœuvres of the Scottish army were covered by a wall of impenetrable darkness. "The truth is," wrote Verney to his son, "we are betrayed in all our intelligence, and the King is still made to believe in at party that will come to him ; but I am confident he is mightily abused in it, for they are a people strangely united. . . . I think the King dares not stir out of his trenches. What counsels, he will take, or what he will do, I cannot divine; but if this army be lost that we have here, I believe the Scots may make their own conditions with England, and therefore I could wish that all my friends would arm themselves as soon as they could. We want money to exercise our army, and the strength we have here will only defend ourselves. I do not conceive it of force to do any harm to them, so we daily spend our money and our honour together."1

The day which witnessed Holland's retreat brought still more alarming tidings. Leslie, it was said, had broken up his Leslie breaks camp at Dunglas, and was in full march to the up his camp. Border. In hot haste a messenger was despatched to Hamilton, bidding him to desist from all warlike operations, and to come in person to Berwick to advise the King. His Majesty, he was told, was now resolved to keep on the defensive.2

Reluctance

lish nobility

to fight.

The resolution thus taken was not altogether voluntary. Before leaving him at Whitehall, Hamilton had warned Charles that Englishmen would not fight in this quarrel, and of the Eng Charles now ruefully acknowledged that the prediction had proved true.3 Above all, the English nobility had no wish to prolong the war. Even those who had no sympathy with Puritanism were deeply aggrieved by their systematic exclusion from all posts of influence, and they had no desire to aid the King to a triumph which would make the prospect of a Parliament more distant than ever. Others again were loth to strike a blow against the opponents of Episcopacy Sir E. Verney to R. Verney, June 4, Verney Papers, 243. 2 Vane to Hamilton, June 4 (misprinted July), Burnet, 139. Burnet, 140.