had long been in Pym's hands, and Vane himself was now put into the witness-box. Strafford, he said—and other witnesses bore him out- had advised an offensive war with Scotland. He asserted positively that Strafford had used the fatal words which were charged against him, or words to that effect.' 'Your Majesty, having tried all ways, and being refused, in this case of extreme necessity, and for the safety of your kingdom, you are loose and absolved from all rules of government. You are acquitted before God and man. You have an army in Ireland ; you may employ it to reduce this kingdom.' All attempts made by Strafford's friends amongst the peers to induce Vane to say whether this kingdom meant England or Scotland proved fruitless. The Lord Steward reminded the questioners that the witness had come to testify to the words spoken, not to interpret them. Maynard, who was one of the managers, sarcastically remarked that Vane was now asked 'whether this kingdom be this kingdom.' To all this Strafford was called on to reply. He justified his advice for an offensive war against the Scots by falling back on the old position that subjects who 'could not be brought by fair means to do their allegiance and duty to the King' might be compelled to do so. He plainly thought that this doctrine was as applicable to England as to Scotland. But he explained that he had always had confidence in the King that he would never ask anything but that which was lawful and just, and that it was a great offence 'to think that the King would use his prerogative otherwise than as befits a Christian and pious king.' The argument implied was that the King, having been refused the means needed for the protection of his subjects, was justified in doing all that power Denies that would admit to make good the deficiency. Strafford's reply. the Irish army was to have landed in England. He utterly denied that there had been any scheme to bring the Irish army to England. He brought witnesses to prove that his intention had been to land it near Ayr. Of the six councillors who had been present besides himself and Vane when the alleged words were spoken, Laud and Windebank were incapable of giving evidence. The 1 For Windebank's own statement see p. 124. It must be remembered that the Privy Councillors failed to remember a good deal more than the statements about the Irish army. 1641 STRAFFORD'S DEFENCE. 321 other four-Hamilton, Northumberland, Juxon, and Cottington -with one voice declared that they could not remember that Strafford had ever proposed to bring the Irish army to England, or indeed had said much else which Vane attributed to him. It is impossible to speak with absolute certainty on the matter, but it is not necessary to suppose that either Vane or his fellow-councillors were guilty of perjury. If it be accepted as the most probable explanation that the words were indeed spoken, but only as a suggestion of the best means of meeting a hypothetical rebellion which never came into actual existence, and which passed out of the minds both of him who spoke and of those who listened almost as soon as the consultation was at an end, it becomes perfectly intelligible that those words may have had no abiding-place in the recollection of any except the secretary who had taken them down at the time, and whose memory was sharpened, not only by his personal rivalry with the speaker, but by his perusal of the notes a short time before. the meeting of Parliament when he carried them to the King to be burnt. On the other hand, the theory that Vane had spitefully invented the words appears to be negatived by the fact that the King had recently seen his paper of notes and had commanded them to be burnt. If those notes had not contained the incriminating words, Charles would surely have found some way of testifying his indignation at Vane's invention. Strafford's However this may have been, Strafford knew how to make good use of the advantage which he had gained. After pointing out that a single witness was insufficient to prove enunciation treason, he called evidence to show that he had of principle. always been desirous of a reconciliation between the King and his subjects in Parliament. "In case of absolute necessity," he then said, "and upon a foreign invasion of an enemy, when the enemy is either actually entered, or ready to enter, and when all other ordinary means fail, in this case there is a trust left by Almighty God in the King to employ the best and uttermost of his means for the preserving of himself and his people, which, under favour, he cannot take away from himself." At all events, he said, his words had been spoken in his capacity of a Privy Councillor, and it was the duty of a councillor to speak his mind according to his conscience. By the blessing of God he had learnt not to stand in fear of them who could kill the body, but of Him who could cast body and soul into eternal pain. He had but done the duty of his place in delivering his opinion, and such an opinion as this would not have made a heretic, much less a traitor. Let his judges remember that they were born to great and weighty employments in the kingdom. If he were to be adjudged a traitor for honestly delivering an opinion under oath of secrecy, he did not think any wise and noble person of fortune' would hereafter, 'upon such perilous and unsafe terms, adventure to be a Councillor to the King.' Impression produced. No wonder Strafford's speech told upon the peers. No wonder that it told upon others as well. If the design of bringing over the Irish army were disproved, as it seemed to have been, there remained a violent and ruinous advocacy of the Royal prerogative which it was imperatively necessary to make impossible in the future, but which drew its strength from at least one side of the practical working of the institutions of the country during more than a century. Not a few of those present felt that such an argument as Strafford's could not be lightly disregarded. Monstrous as his conception of the constitution was, it was hardly one to be treated as punishable by death. Even from the benches on which the Commons were sitting, a loud hum of admiration was heard as the prisoner resumed his seat.1 answer. The main burden of the reply fell on Whitelocke; and Whitelocke, diligent lawyer as he was, was hardly the man to Whitelocke's cope with Strafford. He did his best to support Vane's evidence, and he argued that Strafford's counsel had been no mere utterance of opinion, but had proceeded from a settled design to subvert the laws and 'to set a difference between the King and his people.' Yet, when all had been said, it was evident that Strafford's chance of escape stood higher at the end of the day than it had done in the morning. 'D'Ewes's Diary, Harl. MSS. clxiii. 9. 1641 ment. THE COMMONS ALARMED. 323 So at least, it can hardly be doubted, thought the peers. For nine whole hours the lion-hearted man had been standing Adjourn. at bay, unaided, against the best forensic talent of the time. Whitelocke had been followed by Maynard, and Maynard had been followed by Glyn. No wonder that Strafford felt exhausted at the close of that stupendous effort. It was impossible, he said, for him to endure such another day without a little time to repair his wasted energy. The Commons did not venture to oppose so reasonable a request, and one day's respite was allowed him. Divergence The Irish disbanded. To the Lords the question of Strafford's guilt or innocence naturally presented itself as in the main a matter of judicial consideration. To the Commons the escape of between the Strafford would appear no mere miscarriage of Houses. justice. It would bring with it a pressing and overwhelming danger. Whether it were true or not that Strafford had planned to bring the Irish army into England the summer before, there could be no doubt that the same Irish army not army was still kept on foot, though there was no enemy against which it could be called on to contend. Both Houses had asked the King to disband it, but the joint petition had been left without a word of reply. In Strafford's interests Charles could not have committed a more grievous error. It is not likely that he had formed a deliberate intention of bringing the Irish army over to disperse the English Parliament. It was not in his character ever to form deliberate intentions except when they were to take shape in merely passive endurance. It was, however, unreasonable in him to expect that others should close their eyes to the plain tendency of his actions, simply because he foresaw nothing clearly himself. He wanted to make the most of every chance of the constitutional authority of the Lords, of the threatening presence of his soldiers in Ulster, and of the sympathies of the unpaid English army in the North. The unconscious duplicity of his mind was dragging him to his ruin, and he dragged with him. the servant, far nobler than himself, whom he most wished to save. : Charles could not even rule his own household. The mild The army in. disapprobation which he had expressed of Suckling's army plot went absolutely for nothing. The Queen, it would plot persisted seem, had made up her mind to force the hand of her sluggish spouse. Chudleigh was sent back to the North with instructions from Jermyn and Endymion Porter to urge the officers to accept Goring as their lieutenant-general, and to be ready to march southwards in case of need. Newcastle would be in Nottinghamshire with a thousand horse ready to take the command, and it was even added that the Prince of Wales would be there as well. Every Frenchman in London -and the number of French settlers was not inconsiderable— would rise at a given signal.' April 3. Meeting of the officers On April 3 Chudleigh convened a meeting of the officers at Boroughbridge. So strong was their feeling against Parliament, in consequence of its neglect of the army, that they were easily persuaded to write to Goring, expressing at Borough their readiness to obey him in the post to which they bridge. understood him to have been selected by the King himself. Chudleigh carried the letter to London on the 5th, and finding that Goring was no longer there, followed him to April 10. Goring at Portsmouth. Portsmouth. Goring took him round the walls, and told him that 'if there should be any mutiny in London, the Queen meant to come down thither for her safety, and that she had sent him down money to fortify it.' It was impossible that the Parliamentary leaders should long. remain in ignorance of what was passing in the North. Conyers and Astley, the actual commanders of the army, had no wish to be superseded by Goring, and they had all the dislike of professional soldiers to seeing the military force of the country dragged in the wake of a political faction. Conyers wrote to Conway to complain of Chudleigh's proceedings, and it is not likely that Conway kept the secret to himself.2 The first effect of the Pollard's examination, 'Chudleigh's examinations, May 10, 18. May 18, An Exact Collection, 220, 223. Chudleigh's examination, Aug. 13, D'Ewes's Diary, Harl. MSS. clxiv. 28. * Conyers to Conway, April 2, 6, 9, S. P. Dom. cccclxxix. 8, 13, 19. Chudleigh's Deposition, May 10, An Exact Collection, 220. |