gret of all who knew him; leaving behind him the character of an upright, enlightened, and humane judge, a patriotic citizen, and a bright ornament of the profession. Isque et oratorum in numero est habendus, et fuit reliquis rebus ornatus, atque elegans. RULE OF COURT. February Term, 1823. No cause will hereafter be heard, until a complete record shall be filed, containing in itself, without references aliunde, all the papers, exhibits, depositions, and other proceedings, which are necessary to the hearing in this Court. MEMORANDUM.-Mr. Justice TODD was absent, from indisposition, during the whole of this Term ; and Mr. Justice LIVINGSTON was absent, from the same cause, from Monday, the 24th of February, until the end of the Term. OF THE NAMES OF THE CASES REPORTED IN THIS VOLUME. A. Anderson, (Nicholas v.) [CHANCERY. LOCAL LAW.] Buel v. Van Ness, [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. PRACTICE.] B. 365 312 Childress v. Emory, [PRACTICE. PLEADING. JURISDICTION.] 642 Corporation of Washington v. Pratt, [LOCAL LAW.] 681 495 Emory, (Childress v.) [PRACTICE. PLEADING. JURISDIC 642 261 CAL LAW.] Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, [PROMISSORY NOTE. USURY. Lo The Frances and Eliza, [INSTANCE COURT. NON-INTER COURSE ACT.] G. Goldsborough v. Orr, [LOCAL LAW. COVENANT.] Gracie v. Palmer, [CHARTER-PARTY.] Gracie v. Palmer, [PRACTICE.] Greeley v. United States, [CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.] H. Haywood, (Siglar v.) [PRACTICE. PLEADING.] Hugh v. Higgs, [PRACTICE.] Hughes v. Union Insurance Company, [INSURance.] 339 398 217 605 699 257 675 697 294 Hunt v. Rousmanier, [CHANCERY. LETTER OF ATTORNEY.] 174 The Luminary, [INSTANCE COURT. REGISTRY ACT.] M. 495 543 407 The Mary Ann, [INSTANCE COURT. SLAVE TRADE ACT.] 380 McIntosh, (Jolinson r.) [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 543 N. La Nereyda, [PRIZE.] New-Haven, (Society v.) [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. CHARI- Nicholls v. Webb, [PROMISSORY NOTE. EVIDENCE.] 0. Orr, (Goldsborough v.) [LOCAL LAW. COVENANT.] P. Palmer (Gracie v.) [CHARTER-PARTY.] The Pitt, [INSTANCE COURT. NON-INTERCOURSE ACT.] R. 108 464 371 681 Rousmanier, (Hunt v.) [CHANCERY. LETTER OF ATTOR- S. The Sarah, [INSTANCE COURT. JURISDICTION.] 174 391 Siglar v. Haywood, [PRACTICE. PLEADING. Sexton v. Wheaton, [CHANCERY. POST-NUPTIAL SETTLE- 229 675 Sneed v. Wister, [PLEADING. LOCAL LAW.] 690 Society, &c. v. New-Haven, [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. CHA- 464 Spring v. S. C. Ins. Company, [CHANCERY. LIEN. ASSIGN 268 MENT.] U. Union Ins. Company, (Hughes v.) [INSURANCE.] 294 United States v. Wilson, [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. PRAC 253 TICE.] United States, (Greeley v.) [CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.] 339 ས. W. Van Ness, (Buel v.) [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. PRACTICE.] 312 Webb, (Nicholls v.) [PROMISSORY NOTE. EVIDENCE.] 326 Wheaton, (Sexton v.) [CHANCERY. POST-NUPTIAL SETTLE MENT.] Wilson, (United States v.) [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. PRAC TICE.] Wister, (Sneed v.) [PLEADING. LOCAL LAW.] Wormley v. Wormley, [CHANCERY. TRUST. JURISDIC TION.] 229 253 690 .421 REPORTS OF THE DECISIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. FEBRUARY TERM, 1823. [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. GREEN and Others v. BIDddle. The act of the State of Kentucky, of the 27th of February, 1797, concerning occupying claimants of land, whilst it was in force, was repugnant to the constitution of the United States, but it was repealed by a subsequent act of the 31st of January, 1812, to amend the said act; and the last mentioned act is also repugnant to the constitution of the United States, as being in violation of the compact between the States of Virginia and Kentucky, contained in the act of the legislature of Virginia, of the 18th of December, 1789, and incorporated into the constitution of Kentucky. By the common law, the statute law of Virginia, the principles of equity, and the civil law, the claimant of lands who succeeds in his suit, is entitled to an account of mesne profits, received by the occupant from some period prior to the judgment of eviction, or decree. At common law, whoever takes and holds possession of land, to which another has a better title, whether he be a bonæ fidei or a malæ fidei possessor, is liable to the true owner for all the rents and profits which he has received: but the disseisor, if he be a bonæ fidei occupant, may recoup the value of the meliorations made by him against the claim of damages. 1823. Green V. Biddle. Equity allows an account of rents and profits in all cases, from the time of the title accrued, (provided it does not exceed six years,) unless under special circumstances, as where the defendant had no notice of the plaintiff's title, nor had the deeds in which the plaintiff's title appeared in his custody, or where there has been laches in the plaintiff in not asserting his title, or where his title appeared by deeds in a stranger's custody; in all which, and other similar cases, the account is confined to the time of filing the bill. By the civil law, the exemption of the occupant from an account for rents and profits is strictly confined to the case of a bonæ fidei possessor, who not only supposes himself to be the true owner of the land, but who is ignorant that his title is contested by some other person claiming a better right. And such a possessor is entitled only to the fruits or profits which were produced by his own industry, and not even to those, unless they were consumed. Distinctions between these rules of the civil and common law, and of the Court of Chancery, and the provisions of the acts of Kentucky, concerning occupying claimants of land. The invalidity of a State law, as impairing the obligation of contracts, does not depend upon the extent of the change which the law effects in the contract. Any deviation from its terms, by postponing or accelerating the period of its performance, imposing conditions not expressed in the contract, or dispensing with the performance of those which are expressed, however minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon the contract, impairs its obligation. The compact of 1789, between Virginia and Kentucky, was valid under that provision of the constitution, which declares, that “no State shall, without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power :”—no particular mode, in which that consent must be given, having been prescribed by the constitution; and Congress having consented to the admission of Kentucky into the Union, as a sovereign State, upon the conditions mentioned in the compact. The compact is not invalid upon the ground of its surrendering rights of sovereignty, which are unalienable. This Court has authority to declare a State law unconstitutional, upon the ground of its impairing the obligation of a compact between different States of the Union. The prohibition of the constitution embraces all contracts, executed or executory, between private individuals, or a State and individuals, or corporations, or between the States themselves. THIS was a writ of right, brought in the Circuit |
