company (Acts 1891, p. 1169, § 9), provided that no subscription to the stock should be valid unless $10 per share was paid thereon at the time of subscription, and that the remaining installments should be paid within one month after a call for same, and that any purchaser of the stock should be subject to the same rules as the original owner.-HAMPTON & BRANCHVILLE RAILROAD & LUMBER Co. v. BANK OF CHARLESTON NAT. BANKING ASSN., S. Car., 26 S. E. Rep. 238.

27. CREDITORS' SUIT-Parties.-In a bill by a creditor of a decedent in the nature of a creditors' bill to marshal the assets of the estate to be applied in payment of debts, and to set aside voluntary conveyances by decedent as in fraud of creditors, it is proper to join as defendants the personal representative of decedent, and the several voluntary grantees, though they hold different parcels of land under separate conveyances. -SHEPPARD V. GREEN, S. Car., 26 8. E. Rep. 224.

28. COUNTY FUNDS-Bond of Depositary.-Section 730, Gen. St. 1894, provides that the bond of a depositary of county funds shall be made payable to the county. The bond in question was made payable to the "board of county commissioners:" Held, a mere irregularity, which did not invalidate the bond.-BOARD OF COMRS. OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY V. AMERICAN LOAN & TRUST CO., Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 704.

29. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Acts and Declarations of Co-conspirators.-In a criminal case, the acts and declarations of another than defendant, in defendant's absence, are admissible against defendant where there is evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to show a conspiracy between defendant and such other, sufficient to authorize the submission of the question of conspiracy to the jury.-HUNTER V. STATE, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 65.

30. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Confessions.-The fact that portions of a voluntary confession made by an accused out of court were not understood by the person to whom they were made, because made in a language with which he was unacquainted, render the entire confession inadmissible.-STATE V. BUSTER, Nev., 47 Pac. Rep. 194.

31. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Dying Declarations.- Contradictory statements by the deceased at the time of making a dying declaration are admissible as tending to impeach the declaration, whether competent as dy. ing declarations or not.-CARVER V. UNITED STATES, U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 228.

33. CRIMINAL LAW-Appeal.-An appeal from a conviction cannot, on accused's death, be prosecuted by the personal representative of the accused, though there is a judgment for costs, enforceable against the accused's estate.-STATE V. MARTIN, Oreg., 47 Pac. Rep. 196.

34. CRIMINAL LAW-Bribery-Defense.-In a prosecution of a sheriff for accepting a bribe for omitting to seize gambling devices, the sheriff cannot raise the constitutionality of the provisions of the statute authorizing the judicial officer to destroy the property seized.-NEWMAN V. PEOPLE, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 278.

35. CRIMINAL LAW-Competency of Jury.-Where pri. vate counsel for the State is retained in a prosecution, it is not terror to refuse to permit such counsel to be questioned as to what persons composed the committee by which he was employed, to show that some of the jurors were related to such persons, where the jurors testify that they did not know their names.MOORE V. STATE, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 356.

36. CRIMINAL LAW-Former Conviction.-Under Laws 1891, p. 97, § 3, providing that a conviction before any police or mayor's court in any city or town, or before

any justice, shall be a bar to any further prosecution for the same or any included offense before any mayor's police, or justice's court, such conviction is not a bar to an indictment for the same offense in the circuit court.-WILLIAMS v. STATE, Ark., 38 S. W. Rep. 337.

37. CRIMINAL LAW Former Jeopardy.-Defendant was tried on an information containing two counts. The first charged larceny of a heifer, the property of some person unknown. The jury were instructed that, "upon the first count, the State has failed to make out the ownership as in the information alleged, and therefore need not be considered by you. You are therefore instructed that you must acquit the defendant on the first count of the information." The court submitted the following form of verdict: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty, as charged in the informa tion, on the second count," etc. The jury failed to agree, and were discharged. The defendant was again put upon trial on both counts of the information, and found guilty on the first count: Held, that the plea of former jeopardy was good.-ROLAND V. PEOPLE, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 269.

38. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide by Poisoning.-Where deceased died in a convulsion soon after defendant ad. ministered what he claimed was a powder of corn starch, and strychnine was found in her stomach, and experts said she died of strychnine poison, though there was no evidence that strychnine was kept by defendant or deceased, from which it might be inferred that he administered it by mistake, yet, he having of fered proof of his general reputation for peace and good order, tending to raise a doubt as to the intent with which the act was done, if done by him, it was proper to instruct on manslaugnter.-STATE V. ELLSWORTH, Oreg., 47 Pac. Rep. 199.

39. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Self-defense.-Where the accused relies on the plea of self-defense, there is no greater burden on him to establish that plea, by affirmative evidence, than any other defense; but, if all the evidence raises in the minds of the jury a rea sonable doubt as to whether he acted in self-defense, he should be acquitted.-HENSON V. STATE, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 79.

40. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide - Self-defense.-On a trial for murder it was error to charge that defend. ant, in every case, must retreat to the wall before he is entitled to resort to self-defense.-RITCHEY V. PEOPLE, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 272.

41. CRIMINAL LAW-Slander. The addition of the words "or common" after the word "special," and be fore the word "fund," in a county warrant, does not change the legal effect of the instrument or constitute forgery; and hence to charge a person with so chang ing a warrant does not accuse him of forgery, so as to make the charge slander. EDWARDS V. HAVENER, Ark., 38 S. W. Rep. 342. 42. CRIMINAL LAW Witnesses. It is only where a witness can testify in a criminal case as to the res gest that the prosecution is required to place him on the stand when available. - PEOPLE V. GRANT, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 647.

44. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT- Abatement.-An action brought by one who has sustained personal in juries from the negligent or wrongful act of another, to recover for the resulting loss and suffering, does not abate by the death of the plaintiff, but will, under sections 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, survive, and may be prosecuted to final judgment in the name of the personal representative, notwithstanding the death may have resulted from the injuries.-MISSOURI PAC. RY. Co. v. BENNETT'S ESTATE, Kan., 47 Pac. ReD. 183.

45. DEED-Condition Subsequent.-A deed of general warranty to a railroad company contained a condition that, "In case said land shall cease to be used for railroad purposes, the same shall revert to the first par ties, their heirs and assigns:" Held, that the deed vested in the railroad company an estate on a condition subsequent, and not on a conditional limitation.MOUAT V. SEATTLE, L. S. & E. RY. Co., Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 233.

46. DEED-Delivery.-Plaintiff executed a deed to his children, leaving it with the justice who took the acknowledgment. The deed was sent to the recorder by the justice, but was recalled by the plaintiff before it was recorded. The grantees had no knowledge of the existence of the deed until about a year later, when plaintiff's wife without his knowledge or authority, gave it to one of the grantees, who had it recorded: Held, that there was no delivery of the deed by the grantor sufficient to render it operative.-O'CONNOR V. O'CONNER, Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 676.

47. DEEDS - Estate to Begin in Futuro. - An instru ment duly executed, wherein the grantor, in consideration of love and respect, and of assistance received and to be received, conveys lands therein described, reserving a life estate, the conveyance "to take effect after my death, and no sooner," is a deed passing an estate to commence in futuro. LESLIE V. MCKINNEY, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 378.

48. DEEDS - Parol Evidence - Ambiguities. - Parol evidence is inadmissible to show what acreage passed under a deed of the "west half" of a tract of land, as there is no ambiguity on the face of the deed. - OWEN V. HENDERSON, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 215.

49. DIVORCE-Suspension of Decree.-At the end of a decree of divorce, the court added: "This decree is, however, suspended until the costs are paid (except so far as to issue execution for costs), and then to be in full force and effect:" Held, that the attempted susFension was a nullity, and the decree operated as a dissolution of the marriage from the time it was ren. dered.-MICKLE V. STATE, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 66.

50. EASEMENT Sufficiency of Grant.-A contract reciting that in consideration that the grantees were erecting a sawmill near defendants' mill and a payment of cash, the defendants do "grant, bargain, sell, etc., to the parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns, forever," the undivided one-half of a railroad side track, "to the sole and only proper use, benefit, and behoof of the said parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns, forever," is a conveyance of a right of way appurtenant to the grantees' mill, and not a mere license.-KENT FURNITURE MANUFG. CO. v. LONG, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 657.

51. ELECTION CONTEST - Appeal. - Under Mill. & V. Code, § 1098, providing that the "circuit court hears and determines all contests of the election of sheriff," the court exercises judicial authority in such cases, and does not merely sit as a special tribunal, and thereby prevent appeals being taken to the supreme court.-MOORE V. SHARP, Tenn., 38 S. W. Rep. 411.

52. ELECTIONS-Nomination by Petition. After a petition of nomination of "Silver Party" candidates, which called for presidential electors who "will appear on the Democratic ticket," had been signed by a num. ber of voters, four of the Democratic electors resigned, and their places were filled by nominees of the Populist party; whereupon a new Silver party petition was prepared, which contained the names of all the Democratic electors, including the fusion candidates, and to this petition was attached the signatures which had been cut off from the original petition: Held, that the names so attached could not be considered in ascertaining whether the new petition had the requisite number of signers.-STATE V. LESUEUR, Mo., 38 S. W. Rep. 825.

33. EQUITY-BIll-Amendment.-If a bill in chancery sets out several claims for equitable relief, some of which are inequitable, and others deficient for want of

sufficient allegations, on demurrer thereto the bill should be dismissed as to the inequitable claims, and allowed to be amended as to such as are apparently equitable, but defectively stated.-MORGAN V. MORGAN, W. Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 294.

54. EQUITY — Jurisdiction - Injunction.-Equity has Jurisdiction by injunction, to prevent acts of irrepara. ble injury to land, even though there is controversy as to title between the parties, and, having jurisdiction on that ground, will go on to give full relief, though in so doing it be necessary to decide between two adverse title.-BETTMANN V. HARNESS, W. Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 271.

55. ESTOPPEL IN PAIS - Chattel Mortgage. - The fact that one of the joint owners of personalty levied on as the property of a third person, together with another person, and with the knowledge of the other owners, filed with the sheriff a joint claim to the property, does not of itself estop the owners from claiming title thereto.-STOSSEL V. VAN DE VANTER, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 221.

56. EVIDENCE Admissions against Interest.-In an action by a shipper against a railroad company to recover for a loss on a shipment to market by reason of delay, defendant is entitled to prove a statement made by plaintiff as to the amount he lost on the shipment. -TEXAS CENT. R. Co. v. FISHER, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 392.

57. EVIDENCE-Expressions of Pain.-In an action by a husband for his wife's personal injuries, on the is sue of the effect of the accident plaintiff may testify that his wife often complained of pain and weakness in her arm while doing her washing and other heavy work.-MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. Co. v. ZWIENER, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 375.

"Where a

58. EVIDENCE Secondary Evidence. written instrument is traced into the hands of a party, not within the State, secondary evidence is admissible to prove the contents of the instrument, and this without further showing that the original was lost or de stroyed. In such case no notice to produce is necessary, and a copy of the instrument is competent evi. dence." DWYER V. SALT LAKE CITY COPPER MANUFG. Co., Utah, 47 Pac. Rep. 311.

59. EXECUTION SALE-Redemption.-A redemptioner must redeem from another redemptioner on sale of real estate under execution, or on foreclosure of a mortgage by advertisement, within 60 days after the last preceding redemption, although a year has not yet expired since the day of sale.-STATE V. O'CONNER, N. Dak., 69 N. W. Rep. 692.

60. EXPERT TESTIMONY-Hypothetical. - Hypothetical questions to experts may be framed on an assump. tion of what the evidence tends to prove, where that assumption is within the probable or possible range of the evidence. - COURVOISIER V. RAYMOND, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 284.

61. FIXTURES-Chattels.-An agreement between the owner of land and a contractor who brings upon and annexes chattels thereto, that they shall remain personalty, and title thereto remain in the contractor till paid for, is valid, and will prevent the chattels from becoming fixtures, and as such subject to the lien of mortgages on the land, till paid for.-GERMAN SAVINGS & LOAN SOC. v. WEBER, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 224.

62. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Husband and Wife. -In an action by a husband's creditor, against the husband and his wife, to have a conveyance of land by him to his wife declared fraudulent as to creditors, and set aside, proof that the deed was made when the husband was insolvent raises a presumption that the deed is fraudulent, which, if not rebutted, will entitle plaintiff to judgment.-REDMON V. CHANDLEY, N. Car., 26 S. E. Rep. 255.

means of enforcing their claims, to the extent that the value of the property and of its use exceeds the amount of support actually furnished by the grantee in good faith.-HARRIS V. BRINK, Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 684.

64. GARNISHMENT — Joint Claim. - A joint claim is subject to garnishment, to the extent of the interest of a joint claimant, to satisfy his individual debt.MOORE V. GILMORE, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 239.

65. GUARANTY - Construction.-A contract of guaranty, guarantied the payment of all moneys collected by one V for account of the guarantees, and of all moneys which they might advance to V, and all indebtedness due or which might become due the guarantees in excess of the amount due V, under any agreement between the guarantees and V: Held, that the guaranty applied to all future modifications of the employment contract between the guarantee and V, and therefore a change in the contract would not relieve the guarantors of liability.-JOHN A. TOLMAN Co. v. GRIFFIN, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 645.

Surplus.

66. HOMESTEAD Sale on Execution Where a homestead was sold on execution issued on a judgment rendered before its occupancy as such, and which was a lien thereon, the surplus purchase money, after satisfaction of the execution, cannot be applied on another execution on a judgment rendered after the homestead right attached.-SIMPSON v. Biffle, Ark., 38 S. W. Rep. 345.

67. INSURANCE-Change of Interest-Mortgage.-The execution of a mortgage on the real estate on which the building insured is situated is not a change of interest, within the meaning of the condition in a policy declaring the policy forfeited "if any change other than the death of the insured take place in the interest, title, or possession of the subject of the insurance."-LAMPASAS HOTEL & PARK Co. v. PHOENIX INS. Co., Tex., 38 8. W. Rep. 361.

68. INSURANCE-Conditions of Policy.-A condition in a fire policy that, in the event of disagreement between the insured and the company as to the loss, it shall be ascertained by appraisers before suit can be maintained, though valid, does not bar a suit on the policy where no disagreement has arisen as to the amount of the loss.-AMERICAN FIRE INS. Co. v. STUART, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 395.

69. INSURANCE Misstatement of Fact by Assured.Under a provision of an insurance policy which requires the assured to submit to an examination under oath, misstatements of fact made by him on the examination after a loss do not avoid the policy, unless the insured knew them to be false, and made them with a fraudulent intent.-HUSTON V. STATE INS. CO., Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 674.

-

70. INSURANCE Waiver of Conditions.-An agent with authority to waive proofs of loss may also waive a provision requiring such waiver to be indorsed on the policy.-O'LEARY V. GERMAN AMERICAN INS. CO. OF NEW YORK, Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 686.

71. INTERPLEADER-When Lies.-A bill of interpleader in equity will not lie where a portion of the amount claimed by plaintiffs is in dispute.-SOUTHWESTERN TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE CO. V. BENSON, Ark., 38 S. W. Rep. 341.

72. INTERVENTION.-In an action by a mortgagee on a sheriff's bond for misconduct in a sale under the mortgage, the holder of a note secured by the same mortgage may intervene, under Code Civ. Proc. § 24, as a person "who has an interest in the matter of litigation."-MADDOX V. TEAGUE, Mont., 47 Pac. Rep. 209. 73. JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT- Vacating.-A judgment by default is attended with the same legal conse. quences, when considering the rules governing estoppel by judgment, as if there had been a verdict for plaintiff.-NORTHERN TRUST Co. v. CRYSTAL LAKE CEMETERY ASSN., Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 708.

74. JUDICIAL NOTICE - City Ordinances.-In prosecutions before municipal courts for violation of munic.

ipal ordinances, the ordinance violated need not be pleaded, as municipal courts take judicial notice of them.-EX PARTE DAVIS, Cal., 47 Pac. Rep. 258.

75. MANDAMUS-Judicial Discretion.-A writ of man damus does not lie to control or reverse the action of a court, board, or other inferior tribunal, or of an offi cer, where such action is one of discretion, judicial or quasi-judicial; but it does lie where such action is merely ministerial.-MARCUM V. BALLOT COMRS. OF LINCOLN, LOGAN, MINGO, AND WAYNE COUNTIES, W. Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 281.

76. MANDAMUS-Parties.-The State is not a necessary party to an application by a private citizen for a writ of mandamus to a public officer to enforce a private right.-LORD V. BATES, S. Car., 26 S. E. Rep. 213.

77. MARRIED WOMAN-Liability of Separate Estate.In a suit in equity to subject the separate estate of a married woman to the payment of her debts, where it appears that she owns personal and real estate, and the personalty is more than sufficient to pay the indebtedness, the personalty should first be subjected before resorting to the realty.-FITZGERALD V. PHELPS & BIGELOW WINDMILL Co., W. Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 315.

78. MASTER AND SERVANT-Dangerous Machinery.-A nonsuit was improperly granted in an action for injuries received in defendant's cotton mill, where there was evidence tending to show that defendant, knowing plaintiff to be inexperienced in mill work, failed to warn him that the machine at which he was working was dangerous, and that the danger was latent, in that & portion of the machine, not in full view, continued to run by its own momentum after the rest of the machinery had stopped.-HIGHTOWER V. BAMBERG COT. TON MILLS, S. Car., 26 S. E. Rep. 222.

79. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence.-Where a railroad company had furnished a safe switch, and had exercised the requisite care in selecting the conductor and brakeman whose duty it was to operate it, the company was not liable for an injury to an employee on one of its trains, caused by the negligence of a con. ductor in leaving open a switch that it was his duty, under the rules of the company, to see closed.-DEN VER & R. G. R. Co. v. SIPES, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 287. 80. MASTER AND SERVANT Safe Appliances.-An em ployer, who furnishes his servants with appliances in common and general use by others doing a similar work, is not liable for negligence, on the ground that better and safer appliances are obtainable.-SHADFORD V. ANN ARBOR ST. RY. Co., Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 661.

81. MASTER AND SERVANT Wages Extra Work.Where the employer directed the servant to perform extra work, under the belief that it fell within his em ployment, and the servant at the time expressed no indication that additional compensation would be expected, and for nearly two years afterwards receipted in full each month for his services, he cannot recover additional compensation for the extra services.FORSTER V. GREEN, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 647.

82. MECHANICS' LIEN - Judgment.-In a suit to en force a mechanic's lien, a personal judgment against the owner in favor of a subcontractor with whom no privity of contract was alleged is void, though the owner appeared and took part in the litigation.-HUME V. ROBINSON, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 271.

83. MORTGAGE-Bill to Foreclose.-Where a bill, in effect to foreclose a mortgage securing bonds equitably owned by complainant, lacks equity, because it does not aver that, at the time of its filing, the mortgage had matured, as, in fact, it had not, the defect cannot be cured by an amendment averring facts of a supplemental nature, not existing when the bill was filed.SCHEERER V. AGEE, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 81.

84. MORTGAGE - Foreclosure.-Where property has been reduced to money in the hands of a receiver, and a lien claimant is given an absolute decree for a liqui dated amount, and it is given priority over the only decree and judgment adjudicated prior to it, it is

final judgment, from which an appeal lies, though there are other claims which have not been adjudicated.-FISCHER V. HANNA, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 303.

85. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE Growing Crops.Growing crops pass, with the soil, to the purchaser at a mortgage sale, where there is no reservation or waiver of right to the crops at said sale. Nor does it vary the case because the tenant was not made a party to the foreclosure suit. The purchaser's rights are just the same as they would have been if the tenant had been made a party.-SKILTON V. HARREL, Kan., 47 Paè. Rep. 177.

$6. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE-Redemption.-Where A mortgage by its terms draws interest at the rate of of 5 1-2 per cent. per annum, and is foreclosed by advertisement, the real property thus sold may be legally redeemed by the mortgagor, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, as the case may be, by paying the sum of money for which the same was sold, together with interest on the same from the time of sale at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum.-EVANS V. RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST CO., Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 715. 87. MORTGAGE-Fraud.-Where creditors of the mort. gagor seek to have a mortgage set aside as a fraudu lent attempt to defeat their antecedent claims, the consideration for the mortgage having been admitted, they must at least, show that the mortgagor was financially embarrassed, and that the mortgagee knew it, or had knowledge of facts calculated to put him on inquiry.-RODEN V. ELLIS, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 71.

88. MORTGAGE NOTE-Maturity of Debt.-A note and a mortgage securing the same, when executed contemporaneously, are to be construed as constituting one contract, and the stipulations of the mortgage with reference to the maturity of the debt because of a fallure to pay interest when due will be given effect, so as to cause the note to become due and payable before the time expressed on its face. -EVANS V. BAKER, Kan., 47 Pac, Rep. 314.

59. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - Damage by Surface Water.-A city is not bound to furnish drains or sew. ers to relieve a lot of its surface water, whether its own or that flowing from other premises. A city is not liable for damages to a lot owner because change of grade of a street prevents surface water of the lot from flowing off. It is not different even if the surface water is, by reason of such change of grade, increased in quantity upon the lot, if not cast in a mass or body upon the premises. Nor is a city liable for mere sur. face water flowing from a street upon an adjoining lot. --JORDAN V. CITY OF BENWOOD, W. Va., 26 S. E. Rep.

966.

30. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Dangerous Sidewalks -Negligence.-One who, on a dark night, goes upon an elevated sidewalk, which he knows is guarded on one side only, and, instead of guiding himself by the rail. ing on that side, directs his course, as he has been accustomed, by what he supposes is a light in a neigh. boring house, but which proves to be another light, and, in consequence of his mistake falls off the unprotected side of the walk, cannot hold the city liable.CHURCH V. PRESIDENT, ETC., OF VILLAGE OF HOWARD CITY, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 651.

91. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Defective SidewalkContributory Negligence.-It is not contributory neg. ligence per se to use a sidewalk with knowledge of its defective condition, but such negligence is a question for the jury to determine from the evidence.-CITY OF HIGHLANDS V. RAINE, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 283.

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Indebtedness Beyond Constitutional Limit.-The issuing of new bonds, for the purpose of funding a like amount of outstanding bonds and warrants, does not create an "indebted. ness," within Const art. 13, § 6, limiting the amount of Indebtedness which a municipality may incur.-PALMER V. CITY OF HELENA, Mont., 47 Pac. Rep. 209.

33. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Personal Injury Claim -Limitations. Muskegon City Charter, tit. 6, § 20,

which provides, among other things, that "all claims for damages against the city growing out of the neg ligence or default of said city shall be presented to the common council of said city within six months after such claim shall arise, and any default thereof shall be forever barred," applies to claims for personal in juries.-DAVIDSON V. CITY OF MUSKEGON, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 670.

94. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Pleading.-A complaint against a municipal corporation for personal injuries is not demurrable because it is not verified, and because it fails to allege, in accordance with Code, § 757, that plaintiff presented her claim to the munici pal authorities to be audited and allowed, and that they had neglected to act on it, or had disallowed it.FRISBY V. TOWN OF MARSHALL, N. Car., 26 8. E. Rep. 251.

95. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Street Improvement. -Under a street improvement act which gave the board of supervisors authority to order the improve. ment of public streets only, an order of the board for the grading of a street which was for the greater part held in private ownership, was ineffectual to create a lien on any of the abutting lands, though some of the owners, prior to the order, had dedicated to the public the street in front of their premises.-SPAULDING V. WESSON, Cal., 47 Pac. Rep. 249.

96. NUISANCE-Obstructing Navigable Stream.-The owner of a steamboat cannot maintain an action for damages for the obstruction of a navigable river, on the ground that it prevented him from navigating it with his boat, his injury differing only in degree, and not in kind, from that of the general public.-JONES V. ST. PAUL, M. & M. RY. Co., Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 226.

97. PARTNERSHIP-Firm and Individual Creditors.An insolvent partnership may, as against firm creditors, by agreement of each partner, appropriate partnership assets to secure the individual debts of a partner, provided the amount of the individual debts secured does not exceed the share of the member in the firm assets.-BATCHELOR V. SANGER, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 359.

98. PARTNERSHIP Rights of Surviving Partner. — Where a surviving partner after the death of his copartner surrendered a leasehold interest hela by the firm, and took a new lease in his own name, with out a settlement and accounting of the partnership business, he is liable for the share of the deceased partner in the profits acquired under the new lease.BELL V. MCCOY, Mo., 38 S. W. Rep. 329.

99. PHYSICIAN-Application for Certificate to Prac tice. The State board of health cannot refuse a certifi cate authorizing an applicant to practice medicine in Missouri, on the ground that the medical college from which he was graduated had not complied with a reso lution of the board requiring every college, by a cer tain date, to furnish the board with a list of its matriculates and the basis of their matriculation, where it appears that the applicant was graduated before the college received notice of the resolution.- STATE V. LUTZ, Mo., 38 S. W. Rep. 323.

100. PLEDGE-Transfer-Bona Fide Purchaser.-The holder of a certificate of stock in a corporation, who signs a blank form of assignment thereon, expressing consideration, and including an irrevocable power of attorney authorizing a transfer of the stock on the books of the company, and delivers the certificate as collateral, is estopped to assert title thereto as against a bona fide purchaser from the pledgee.-NELSON V. OWEN, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 75.

101. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Authority of AgentSale. It is not within the apparent authority of a general agent, having the entire management of his principal's business, to bind him by a contract for the sale of chattels belonging to such business, to be paid for by credit of the purchase price upon an indebtedness due from the agent to the purchaser. The burden is upon the purchaser to show that the agent had such

authority. But where there is no question as to the good faith of either the agent or purchaser, and both the agent and principal are dead at the time of the trial, any circumstantial evidence fairly tending to es tablish the agent's authority is sufficient to make a prima facie case.-STEWART V. COWLES, Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 694.

102. PROCESS-Summons-Service.-Under Code Civ. Proc. § 744, subd. 4, providing for service of summons by reading it to defendant personally, or by leaving a copy at his place of residence, service by merely delivering a copy to defendant personally is void, and will not support a judgment. -SANFORD V. EDWARDS, Mont., 47 Pac. Rep, 212.

103. RAILROAD COMPANY Negligence Boarding Moving Train.-Under the statute of Illinois, forbid. ding any person to board a moving train, except in compliance with law, or by permission, under the law. ful rules and regulations of the company, a person in. jured while attempting to board a moving train within the State of Illinois cannot recover therefor unless it appears that be was acting in compliance with law, or by permission, under the lawful rules of the company. -YOUNG V. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. Co., Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 682.

104. RAILROADS-Farm Crossings.-Under Code 1892, § 3561, requiring railroad companies to "make and maintain" suitable crossings for plantation roads, a company has a reasonable time, after its suggestion of error on affirmance by the supreme court of a judg ment for the penalty for tearing up a crossing is disallowed, to replace the crossing.-ALABAMA & V. RY. CO. V. ODENEAL, Miss., 21 South. Rep. 52.

105. REPLEVIN-Breach of Contract.-A gas company, under a contract to place pipes in a building and furnish gas, has the right to remove its meter from the building on refusal of the owner to pay under such contract the cost of furnishing and laying the pipes, the same as for a breach of the contract by non-payment of a bill for gas, and may maintain replevin for it.-DETROIT GAS CO. v. MORETON TRUCK & STORAGE Co., Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 659.

106. SALE-Conditional Sale-Bona Fide Purchaser.Where a contract for the sale of personalty provides that title shall remain in the seller till the payment of the price, one who in good faith, and without notice, buys the property from the original purchaser, acquires no title thereto.-LANSING IRON & ENGINE WORKS V. WILBUR, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 667.

107. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Jurisdiction.-The jurisdiction of courts of equity in actions for the specific performance of contracts for the sale of lands is exclusive, and not dependent on the inadequacy of the legal remedy, whether the plaintiff is a vendor or pur. chaser.-HAMMOND V. FOREMAN, S. Car., 26 S. E. Rep.

212.

108. TAXATION

Exemptions Railroad Property.—

A statute exempting from taxation all property of a railroad company does not extend to property, not necessary for its business, which it acquires under authority of a subsequent statute containing no exemp tion clause.-FORD V. DELTA & PINE LAND CO., U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 230.

109. TAXATION-Municipal Benefits.-A city tax levied on lands within the corporate limits, but outside the range of municipal benefits, is not invalid, as a taking of property without just compensation.-FRACE V. CITY OF TACOMA, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 219.

110. TAXATION-Sale of Land for Taxes.-An owner of land who, though offering to pay the taxes thereon, which were refused by the treasurer, through mistake, on the ground that they had been previously paid, knew of the sale of the land for non-payment of such taxes before the expiration of the time for redemp tion, and failed to redeem, is guilty of negligence which will defeat his recovery in an action in equity, brought thereafter, to be allowed to redeem.-EASTON V. DOOLITTLE, Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 672.

111. TAX TITLE- Recovery of Land - Judgment.Though a tax deed is void, yet the court, in the judg ment for the owner for the recovery of the land, must make provisions for the payment to the purchaser of the taxes paid thereon by him.-CRISMAN V. JOHNSON, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 296.

112. TITLE INSURANCE POLICY-Construction.-Held, that the phrase, "Tenancy of the present occupants," stated in a title insurance policy as a defect in or ob jection to the title against which the insurer does not insure, must be construed as meaning the tenancy which arises through the occupation or temporary possession of the premises by those who are tenants in the popular sense in which the word "tenant" is used. The phrase does not include the claim of a person who, asserting ownership in fee as against the title insured, is in actual adverse possession at the time the policy is issued.-PLACE V. ST. PAUL TITLE INSURANCE & TRUST CO., Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 706.

113. TRUSTS Continuance of Former Business by Trustee. A trust deed which authorizes the trustee to continue the former business of the grantor, and to subject the trust property to the casualties incident thereto by which it may be lost or wasted or subjected to charges superior to those of the creditors secured, is void, as containing provisions adequate to the defeat of the object of the deed.-CATT V. WM. KNABE & Co. MANUFG. CO., Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 246.

114. TRUSTS Following Trust Fund.-A trust fund may be pursued by the beneficiaries, as long as the same can be identified, into any land or other form of investment made by the trustee, as the law raises an implied trust as to such property in their behalf.MARSHALL'S EXR. V. HALL, W. Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 800.

115. TRUSTS-Parol Proof.-Where a vendee conveyed the land to her son by warranty deed, that he might mortgage it for the purpose of raising money to pay the purchase price, but afterwards obtained the money by other means, the son became a trustee, holding the legal title solely for the benefit of the vendee.-HAWKINS V. WILLARD, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 365.

116. VENDOR AND PURCHASER.-Where notes given for the price of land reserve a vendor's lien, the paramount title to the land is in the vendee, as between him and third persons.-MINTER V. BURNETT, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 350.

117. VENDOR AND PURCHASER

Purchase Money.The fact that the title to an irrigating ditch, conveyed with land, failed, is not a defense to payment of pur chase money, where it is shown that the ditch at the time of the purchase was of no substantial value to the land.-BLANKS V. RIPLEY, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 376.