66. MASTER AND SERVANT-Assumption of Risk.-One who engages to manage a car, and continues in the employment, with knowledge of the character of the brake in use on it, and the manner of using it, with the danger from the use of it obvious, being injured thereby, cannot recover from the master on the ground that it was negligence not to use another kind of brake.-WINKLER V. ST. LOUIS BASKET & BOX Co., Mo., 38 S. W. Rep. 921.

67. MASTER AND SERVANT-Contributory Negligence. -In an action for death of a servant, a charge that no recovery could be had, though defendant was negli. gent, if deceased "did not exercise that ordinary care and diligence to prevent injury to himself that would be expected of an ordinarily prudent person," is not objectionable in not stating that a failure to use the care which would be used by an ordinary person under like circumstances would be contributory negli gence, or as eliminating from the case the doing by deceased of an act which an ordinarily prudent person would not do under the circumstances. - GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. Co. v. BONNET, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 813. 68. MASTER AND SERVANT - Fellow-servants.-Where an engineer stopped the train in order to go under the engine and repair a hot box, the negligence of the conductor in failing to flag a train following, so as to prevent injury to said engineer, was that of a fellow. servant; it appearing that, though the conductor controlled the movements of the train generally, he had no authority over the engineer in matters affecting the engine. INTERNATIONAL & G. N. R. Co. v. CULPEPPER, Tex. 38 S. W. Rep. 818.

Vice-princi

69. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence pal. Whether one of several employees of the same master is a vice-principal as to his co-employees, or whether all are fellow-servants, is not always a question of fact nor always a question of law. Generally it is a mixed question of law and fact, and to be determined in any case by the particular facts and circumstances in evidence in the case in which it is presented. The fact that one employee is vested with authority to hire and discharge a coemployee is not conclusive evidence that, as to such co-employee, he is a vice-principal; nor does it follow that one employee is not a vice-principal as to his coemployees because not vested with the authority to hire and discharge them.-UNION PAC. Rr. Co. v. DOYLE, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 43.

70. MECHANICS' LIENS.-Under a statute giving to one who furnishes any material, machinery, or fixtures for any improvement on land a lien on such improvement and the land on which it is situated, he has no lien for wrenches or belting furnished, in no way attached to the real estate, or a necessary part of machinery thus attached.-MEEK V. PARKER, Ark., 38 S. W. Rep. 900.

71. MECHANICS' LIENS-Contracts-Performance.-In order that the subcontractor may acquire a mechanic's lien, It is not necessary that his contract and his performance of the same should conform in all respects to the contract between the contractor and the owner; and in a case where brick furnished as aforesaid by the subcontractor, and used in the building, were in. ferior in quality to those called for by either contract, it is held that the owner had no defense against the llen except such as could have been interposed by the contractor against the claim for personal judgment against him.-WISCONSIN RED PRESSED BRICK CO. v. HOOD, Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 1092.

72. MECHANICS' LIENS-Proceedings to Perfect.-The sworn statement of a subcontractor for a mechanic's lien must contain a description of the premises on which the improvement was erected.-DREXEL RICHARDS, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 23.

V.

73. MORTGAGES Insurance.-A mortgagee, holding a fire policy providing that the loss, if any, should be payable to the mortgagee as his interest might appear, which was procured and paid for by the mortgagor, foreclosed his mortgage, and bid in the premises at the

sale for the full amount of his debt. Afterwards, but before the expiration of the time for redemption, the dwelling house covered by the mortgage and policy was injured by fire, and the insurance company paid the loss to the mortgagee. No redemption was made from the sale: Held, that the mortgagor could not recover of the mortgagee the amount so paid, but, if he had redeemed, he would have been entitled to have had the amount applied pro tanto on the redemption.CALSON V. PRESBYTERIAN BOARD OF RELIEF FOR DIS ABLED MINISTERS, Minn., 70 N. W. Rep. 3.

74. MORTGAGE-Tax Title.-The grantee of a mortgagor, who has covenanted to pay the taxes on the mortgaged premises, whether he is the immediate or remote grantee, or whether he gets his title by deed or through a second mortgage, is disqualified from ac quiring and holding a tax title to the mortgaged prem ises, as against the mortgagee.-AMERICAN BAPTIST MISSIONARY UNION V. HASTINGS, Minn., 69 N. W. Rep.

1078.

75. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE-Pleading-Assumption of Debt.-A complaint in foreclosure which alleges a sale of the premises, and an assumption by the vendee of the mortgage debt, but alleges that, though the deed was executed to such vendee, "your orator is advised" that he was acting as agent for another, but "of this your orator can make no positive statements, but can rely only on what he has been informed by others," will not sustain a decree that the alleged principal had assumed the mortgage debt, and was liable as pur chaser.-FISHER V. WHITE, Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 573.

76. MORTGAGE IN TRUST FOR PREFERRED CREDITORS. -Where one in embarrassed circumstances makes and delivers a chattel mortgage to a third person in trust for certain of his creditors, with the requirement that he shall sell the property at retail, and apply the proceeds to the claims of the preferred creditors until paid in full, and afterwards, with the consent of his other creditors, to continue to sell and apply the proceeds to their claims pro rata, and the property so mortgaged is largely in excess of the amount of the claims of the preferred creditors, the legal effect of such mortgage is to hinder and delay his other creditors, within the meaning of section 6344, Rev. St., and no action for damages can be maintained by the mort gagor against the trustee for a failure to execute the trust.-BRINKERHOFF V. TRACY, Ohio, 45 N. E. Rep.

1100.

-

77. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Assessment.-An ob jection that land assessed by lots for a public improve ment had never been laid out in lots may be taken in proceedings to obtain a judgment of sale after con firmation of the assessment, since in such case the confirmation is void.-PEOPLE V. EGGERS, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 1074.

78. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Contract - Fraud.Where a contract by a city is not induced by corruption of its officers by the other party, it can recover from the other party, on the ground of fraud, only on such proof as will authorize recovery by an individual.CITY OF TACOMA V. TACOMA LIGHT & WATER Co., Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 788.

79. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Defective SidewalksIce and Snow. -Where snow, accumulated on a walk from natural causes, becomes uneven, by travel, or where the walk is so constructed as to dam up melted snow flowing from adjoining land, and it freezes into ridges, a person injured thereon while using ordinary care may recover from the city, if it permitted soch condition to exist for an unreasonable time after the same became known to the authorities, or might have been known by reasonable care.-HUSTON V. CITY OF COUNCIL BLUFFS, Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 1130. 80. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Extension of Limits

Taxation. Where land adjoining a town is brought in by an extension of the limits, and is subdivided into lots, and a street is extended through them, a four acre lot, mostly unfit for cultivation, and on which the owner has built a house, and carries on the bus!

ness of a tailor, is town property, for purposes of tax. ation.-CITY OF LEBANON V. BEVILL, Ky., 38 S. W. Rep.

872.

81. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Issuance of BondsIllegality of Election.-An injunction restraining the officers of a municipal corporation from issuing bonds of the corporation, because of irregularity in the election authorizing them, does not preclude the right to issue the bonds upon a new election.-DANIELS V. LONG, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 1112.

82. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Taxing Non-resident Attorneys.-Under a charter authorizing the common conneil to raise annually, by taxes and assessments, such sums as they may deem necessary, and in such manner as they may deem expedient, the council may tax both resident and non-resident attorneys, who have their offices in the city, and practice their profession there.-CITY OF PETERSBURG V. COCKE, Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 576.

88. NEGLIGENCE-Evidence-Damages.-Where a gas company, in connecting a house with its main in a city, used a cracked elbow, which it was often called to repair, it was liable for injuries resulting from an explosion of gas leaking through such elbow, where it had failed to remove it, or to close the crack known to exist therein.-RICHMOND GAS CO. V. BAKER, Ind., 45 N. E. Bep. 1049.

84. NEGLIGENCE-Injury to Employee.-Where a partially loaded car was shunted on the track leading into a railroad repair shop, by employees working in the yard, with such force that it crashed through the closed doors of the shop, and killed an employee working inside, who could not see its approach, and it ap peared that the shunting of cars on such tracks toward the shops was a common practice, and the existence of a rule against it was in dispute, the question of whether the railroad company was negligent in falling to furnish the deceased a reasonably safe place to work was one for the jury.-DOING V. NEW YORK, 0). & W. BY. Co., N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 1028.

85. NEGLIGENCE Railroads Proximate Cause.Plaintiff alleged that he was repairing defendant's track; that the foreman sent an employee back to sig. nal an approaching train; that the signal was given, but the train was not stopped, owing to the engineer's negligence or the insufficiency of brakes; that, as the train approached, plaintiff stood aside to escape it; that, as it neared plaintiff, the fireman, to avoid danger which he properly apprehended, jumped from the engine, against plaintiff, and injured him: Held, that the alleged negligence of defendant was the proximate cause of the injury.-JACKSON V. GALVESTON, H. & 3. A. Rr. Co., Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 745.

86. NUISANCE Obstructing Navigable Stream.-A person engaged in the business of fishing in a navi. gable stream is specially damaged by the placing of an obstruction in such stream which interferes with the carrying on of his business, and may sue on behalf of himself and others similarly situated to enjoin such obstruction.-MORRIS V. GRAHAM, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep.

752.

87. NUISANCE-Obstruction of Alley Damages.-In an action for damages to plaintiff's lots, abutting on an alley, on which were two cottages, by closing one end of the alley for five years, it appeared that one cottage was rented, and the other was used by plaintiff's son, rent free. The court charged that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for deprivation of the reasonable use of the alley during the five years: Held, that the jury were not thereby authorized to go beyond compensation for loss in rental value, and, in the absence of a request by defendant for an instruction limiting recovery to such loss, the verdict would not be disturbed, where it was evident it was based on such diminution.-BANNON V. MURPHY, Ky., 38 S. W. Rep. 889.

interest, the contract providing that the amount to be paid therefor should be adjusted on the cost of the plant, as shown by defendant's vouchers. Both parties subsequently sold their interests to another: Held, that the sale did not relieve defendant from liability to account to complainant under the contract of purchase, and for the business done during the existence of the partnership. FEIGE V. BABCOCK, Mich., 70 N. W. Rep. 7.

89. PARTNERSHIP AND INDIVIDUAL CREDITORS-Estoppel.-A member of a banking firm engaged in an outside venture under a corporate name, owning practi cally all the stock himself. The corporation was indebted to the bank for money lent. The bank became insolvent, and the corporation went into a receiver's hands: Held that, as the owner of the corporation was a member of the bank, the latter was not entitled to share in the assets of the corporation until its other creditors had been paid,-POTTS v. SCHMUCKER, Md., 36 Atl. Rep. 592.

90. PLEADING-Duplicity-Municipal Corporations.In assumpsit against a town treasurer, a plea that the town had reached its debt limit when it contracted the debt in suit, and that there was no money in defend. ant's hands then, nor at any time since, with which the debt could have been paid, is not bad for duplicity, since the first allegation alone does not state a complete defense.-MCALEER V. ANGELL, R. I., 36 Atl. Rep. 588.

91. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Agent's Authority.-There is no presumption that a special agent of the insured to place and manage insurance has authority, after procuring and delivering policy, to surrender or discharge it.-JOHN R. DAVIS LUMBER CO. v. HOME INS. CO. OF NEW YORK, Wis., 70 N. W. Rep. 59.

92. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY - Fraud.-Defendant, a surety on a note, was discharged, where, after he had agreed to a renewal of the note, the payee and a second surety, with the fraudulent intention of making defendant alone responsible as between the sureties, induced defendant, who could neither read nor write, to sign by a mark a renewal note so drawn as to make him a principal, while the second surety signed as security merely.-HAMILTON V. WILLIAMS, Ky., 38 S. W. Rep. 851.

93. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Misfeasance Prior to the Execution of the Bond.-The sureties on a postmas. ter's bond are not liable for a shortage in his accounts occurring before the bond was given.-UNITED STATES V. VAN STEINBERG, U. S. D. C., E. D. (Iowa), 77 Fed. Rep. 860.

95. RAILROAD COMPANY-Condemnation Proceedings. -Railroad companies, being required by Rev. St. 1895, art. 4435, to place and keep" in repair that portion of their ways across which county roads may run, are not entitled, on condemnation of a strip for such a road, to recover, in addition to the market value of the land taken, the cost of grading, building cattle guards, and other expenses which the establishment of the road necessitates.-GULF, C. & S. F. RY. Co. v. MILAM COUNTY, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 747.

96. RECEIVER-Insufficient Showing.-A receiver will not be appointed, in an action to recover possession, on mere allegations that plaintiffs are the owners in fee and entitled to the possession, which defendants unlawfully withhold, to plaintiff's damage.-SENGFELDER V. HILL, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 757.

97. RES JUDICATA-Identity of Issues.-The conclusive character of a judgment extends only to identical issues, and they must be such not merely in name,

but in fact and in substance. If the vital issue of the latter litigation has been in truth already determined by an earlier judgment, it may not again be contested, but if it has not, if it is intrinsically and substantially an entirely different issue, even though capable of being described in similar language, or by a common form of expression, then the truth is not excluded, and the judgment no answer to the different issue.VILLAGE OF WAYZATA V. GREAT NORTHERN RY. Co., Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 1073.

98. SALE-Contract-Evidence of.-On an issue as to the sufficiency of a heating apparatus to properly warm a building, where it was claimed that its failure was due to the faulty construction of the building, evidence of the comparative results obtained from such plant and another subsequently placed in the same building is admissible.-KRAMER V. MESSNER, Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 1143.

99. SCHOOL DIRECTORS-Employment of Teacher.-A board of school directors can make a valid contract with a teacher for a term of school to begin in the next succeeding school year, and after the term of one of the directors has expired.-TAYLOR V. SCHOOL DIST. No. 7 OF CLALLAM COUNTY, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 758.

100. STATUTES-Enactment.-Where the report of a committee of conference on senate amendments to a bill first passed by the house is adopted in each branch by a majority vote taken by yeas and nays, and the names of those voting recorded on the journal, pursuant to Const. art. 4, § 32, the provision of section 31 that ne bill shall become a law unless, "on its final passage," the vote to be taken by yeas and nays, etc., and the names of the members voting be recorded on the journal, is satisfied.--BROWNING V. POWERS, Mo., 38 S. W. Rep. 943.

101. TAXATION-Migratory Stock Law.-Laws 1895, p. 105, ch. 61, providing that live stock driven into the State for the purpose of grazing after the first Monday in April in any year shall be assessed for taxes as if it had been in the county at the time of the annual assessment, is not unconstitutional, as discriminating between live stock and other property.-WRIGHT V. STINSON, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 761.

102. TAXATION-Personal Property.-The situs of personal property in the hands of a trustee under a will, for the purpose of taxation, is the domicile of the trustee.-CITY OF WALLA WALLA V. MOORE, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 753.

103. TAXATION OF NATIONAL BANK SHARES.-Under the restriction contained in Rev. St. U. S. § 5219, that the shares of stock in national banks shall not be taxed by a State at a greater rate than is assesse upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citi zens of such State, such shares are not taxable under the statute for the taxation of personal property generally; the owner of "other moneyed capital" invested in credits, whether by a corporation in which he is a stockholder, and which is assessed under Pol. Code Cal. § 3608, or by himself individually, being entitled by Id. § 3629, to a deduction from his assessment for debts due to bona fide residents of the State, while the owner of bank stock, which is property, and not a credit, cannot obtain such deduction. -MCHENRY V. DOWNER, Cal., 47 Pac. Rep. 779.

a

104. TRUST DEED Death of Grantor. Where grantor in a trust deed for creditors dies before the trust is executed, and there is a condition of affairs authorizing the appointment of an administrator, the authority of the trustee is terminated, and the district court has no jurisdiction to authorize the trustee to enforce the trust, though no administration is pending, and all the property belonging to the estate is embodied in the trust deed.-THAXTON V. SMITH, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 820.

105. USURY-Bank Discount.-A was indebted to B in a certain sum, and C in a further sum. The contract with C was usurious. A obtained a larger loan from B, and from its proceeds discharged both debts. C acted as the agent of B in examining the title and

drawing the instruments, and in paying the money; but C's debt was entirely separate from B's, and B was not aware that the additional money borrowed from him was to be used in satisfying C's usurious loan: Held, that the last transaction was not tainted by the usury inherent in the debt to C.-STEEN V. STRETCH, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 48.

106. VENDOR AND PURCHASER - Fraudulent Repre sentations.-A purchaser of real estate has a right to rely upon the representations of his vendor touching the quality and location of the property, and the char acter of the improvements thereon, whenever the facts concerning which such representations are made are not within the knowledge of the purchaser.-MULLEN V. KINSEY, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 18.

107. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Fraudulent Represen tations. As a general rule, a misrepresentation which embodies matter of law is one upon which a party cannot rely, as all parties are presumed or bound to know the law; but where it is as to the law of another State, or its effect, it is not within the rule, and may be fraudulent, and ignorance of the law may be pleaded by the one to whom the misrepresentation is made.WOOD V. ROEDER, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 21.

108. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Sale-Rescission.-One cannot rescind a contract for purchase of land merely because the vendor was unable, owing to refusal of a tenant to vacate, to deliver possession till seven or eight days after the time stipulated, such delay being unimportant, and being used merely as an excuse in aid of a desire to rescind.-ARMSTRONG V. BREEN, Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 1125.

109. WATERS-Irrigation-Public Lands.-The act of congress of March 3, 1891, regrading irrigating reservoirs, canals, and ditches on the public domain, ap plies only to public land which was vacant and unoc cupied at the time of its passage, and does not authorize one proceeding under its provisions to inter fere with the possessory rights of settlers, though without title, acquired before its passage. - NIPPEL V. FORKER, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 766.

110. WATER RIGHTS - Injunction. The fact that a riparian owner who has purchased a right to a certain number of cubic feet of water per minute constantly wastes part of the water so purchased does not entitle an upper owner, who took subject to the purchase, to withhold a part of the other's water equal to the amount which the other wastes. - HOME ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER CO. V. GLOBE TISSUE PAPER CO., Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 1108.

111. WILLS-Presumption of Revocation.-Where it is established that testatrix executed a valid will, and left it with a notary, the presumption of revocation arising from the fact that it could not be found after her death, and from the evidence of the notary that she had it in her possession last, is rebutted by the frequent declarations of testatrix, up to within three days of her death, that the will was with the notary, and warrants its establishment as a lost will.-IN RE STEINKE'S WILL, Wis., 70 N. W. Rep. 61.

112. WILLS-Presumption of Testamentary Capacity. -Where the formal execution of a will is proved, and the subscribing witnesses testify to the proper age and sanity of the testator, the law presumes that he was possessed of testamentary capacity; and, without substantial evidence to the contrary, the court should not submit the issue to a jury. - MCFADIN V. CATRON, Mo.. 38 S. W. Rep. 932.

113. WILLS-Substitution of Unprobated Will-Limita tions. A proceeding to substitute a will not probated for one probated involves a contest of the latter, and must be brought within the three years after the offering thereof for probate given by Rev. St. 1894, § 2766 (Rev. St. 1881, § 2596), for contest thereof, notwithstand ing the former will has been concealed, and section 301 (section 300) provides that a cause of action which has been concealed may be prosecuted within the period of limitation after its discovery. - BARTLETT V. MANOR, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 1060.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MARCH 26, 1897.

The decision in the case of Curren v. Galen, by the New York Court of Appeals, is one of much importance and without doubt will attract attention far beyond the limits of the State in which it was rendered. Involved in the case was the question as to the right of freedom of labor. Of late years the determination of questions of this character by the courts have been rendered necessary by the action of labor organizations. In the case referred to, the New York court holds that if the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen be to hamper or to restrict that freedom, and through contracts or arrangements with employers to coerce other workingmen to become members of the organization and to come under its rules and conditions, under the penalty of the loss of their positions and of deprivation of employment, their purpose is unlawful. It seems that plaintiff, who was an engineer by trade, brought suit against the defendants for having conspired to injure him by taking away his means of earning a livelihood and preventing him from obtaining employment. The defendants were members of an organization known as the Brewery Workingmen's Local Assembly of the Knights of Labor, which aimed to control the acts of its members in relation to the brewing trade. The plaintiff alleged that in 1890 two of the defendants threatened that unless he would join the organization referred to and subject himself to its rules and regulations, they would obtain his discharge from the employment in which he then was, and would make it impossible for him to obtain employment in the city of Rochester or elsewhere. Upon his refusal the defendants made complaint to his employers, forced them to discharge him, and otherwise endeavored to prevent him earning a livelihood in his trade.

In their answer the defendants admitted the fact of the existence of the organization and that it assumed to control the acts of its members, but set up the fact of the existence in the city of Rochester of a body known as the Ale Brewers' Association, and

of an agreement between that association and the local assembly referred to, to the effect that all employees of the brewery companies belonging to the association should be members of the local assembly, and that no employee should work for a longer period than four weeks without becoming a member. They further alleged that the plaintiff had been retained in the employment of one of the brewing companies for more than four weeks after he had been notified of the provisions of the agreement requiring him to be a member of the local assembly; that they requested him to become a member, and that upon his refusal to comply they, acting as a committee appointed for the purpose, notified the officers of the brewing company of his refusal to become a member, and that they did this solely in pursuance of the agreement mentioned. The plaintiff demurred to this defense on the ground that it was insufficient in law. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the court below, sustaining the de

murrer.

The court said in its opinion that in the general consideration of the subject it must be presumed that the organization or the cooperation of working men is not against any public policy, but that the social principle which justifies such organizations is departed from when they are so extended in their operation as either to intend or to accomplish injury to others. The effectuation of such a purpose, the court said, would conflict with that principle of public policy which prohibits monopolies and exclusive privileges, for it would tend to deprive the public of the services of men in useful employments and capacities. Every citizen, the court continued, is deeply interested in the strict maintenance of the constitutional right freely to pursue a lawful vocation, under conditions equal as to all, and to enjoy the fruits of his labor without the imposition of any conditions not required for the general welfare of the community, and the sympathies or the fellowfeeling which as a social principle, underlies the association of workingmen for their common benefit are not consistent with a purpose to oppress the individual who prefers, by single effort, to gain his livelihood.

In conclusion, the court said that while it did not intend to intimate that the organiza

tion of the local assembly in question by the workingmen in the Rochester breweries was not perfectly lawful in its general purposes and methods, yet, that so far as a purpose appeared from the defense set up to the complaint that no employee of a brewery company should be allowed to work for a longer period than four weeks without becoming a member of the Workingmen's Local Assembly, and that a contract between the local assembly and the Ale Brewers' Association should be availed of to compel the discharge of the independent employee, it was in effect a threat to keep persons from working at the particular trade, and to procure their dismissal from employment, and that while it might be true, as argued, that the contract was entered into on the part of the Ale Brewers' Association with the object of avoiding disputes and conflicts with the workingmen's organization, that feature and such an intention could not aid the defense, nor legalize a plan of compelling workingmen not in affiliation with the organization to join it, at the peril of being deprived of their employment and of the means of making a livelihood.

Upon this subject see the recent decision of Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N. E. Rep. 1077, 43 Cent. L. J. 457, 464, wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds that the maintenance of a patrol of two men in front of plaintiff's premises, in furtherance of a conspiracy to prevent, whether by threats and intimidations or by persuasion and social pressure, any workman from entering into, or continuing in his employment, would be enjoined.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

CARRIERS OF LIVE STOCK LIMITATION OF LIABILITY-REASONABLENESS.-The Supreme Court of Illinois, reversing the Appellate Court, holds, in Baxter v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 45 N. E. Rep. 1003, that a provision, in a contract for the carriage of live stock, that the shipper, as a condition precedent to recovery of damages for injury to said stock, will give notice in writing of his claim to some officer of the carrier or its nearest station agent, before said stock is removed from the place of delivery, and before it is mingled with other stock, is void, for

unreasonableness, where the contract limits the company's liability to damages sustained on its own line, and the destination of the stock was on another line, several hundred miles beyond the terminus of defendant's line, and defendant had no station agent or officer at or near the place of destination. The court cites with approval Smither v. Railroad Co. (Tenn.), 6 S. W. Rep. 209, and Cates v. Railroad Co., 41 Ill. App. 607. The case of Sprague v. Railroad Co., 34 Kan. 347, holding contra, is distinguished.

ASSIGNMENT-VERDICT FOR TORT.-It is de cided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Kent v. Chapel, 70 N. W. Rep. 2, that under Gen. St. 1894, § 5171, providing that after a verdict of a jury or report of a referee in any action for a wrong, such action shall not abate by the death of any party, a verdict in an action for a wrongful personal injury is assignable. The court says that "in Hunt v. Conrad, 47 Minn. 557, 50 N. W. Rep. 614, it was held that a right to recover damages for a personal tort was a mere personal right, and not assignable, even after verdict, and before judgment. This decis ion seems to have been based upon what was considered by the court principles of the common law, and its attention was evidently not called to Gen. St. 1878, ch. 66, § 41 (Gen. St. 1894, § 5171), which, in part, reads as follows: 'After a verdict of a jury, decision or finding of a court or report of a referee in any action for a wrong, such action shall not abate by the death of any party.' The legal effect of this statute is not discussed or adverted to in Hunt v. Conrad, and, even if sound in enunciating the common-law doctrine, it is inapplicable to the statute which we have quoted, and which is the same as Gen. St. 1894, § 5171. In the later case of Cooper v. Railway Co., 55 Minn. 134, 56 N. W. Rep. 588, it was held that, where the party dies after the rendition of a verdict in an action brought to recover for personal injuries sustained through the carelessness or negligence of the defendant. the action does not abate, but may be con tinued by or against the personal representatives of the deceased, under the provision of the statute which we have above quoted The language used in our statute is subtantially that in Wait, Code N. Y. § 121