session and title, either legal or equitable, during the life of the donor, it is a testamentary disposition, good only if made and proved as a will. This statement of the law is, we think, correctly deduced from the judgments of the highest courts in England and in this country."

But, it may be asked, what acts are equivalent to, or may be held a sufficient substitute for, actual delivery? In the Otis-Beckwith Case a valid trust was created. The policy was assigned to the trustee, the trustee notified, and he accepted the trust, and the written evidence of his acceptance was preserved with the policy, a copy of the assignment was given to the insurance company, and the assignment was noted on its books, and it was there said that the donor had done all that he could do to complete the transfer. It could not, however, be so said in the case at bar. Whether viewed as an attempted assignment or creation of a trust, it was incomplete. He complied with the condition of the policy requiring the assignment to be in writing and indorsed on the policy, but, though he was informed by the "special notice" indorsed on the company's form of assignment which he used that duplicates or certified copies of assignments may be sent to the company, to be noted and filed for the purpose of reference and information," he took no step in this direction towards the completion of the transfer. For the purpose of the argument, we regard it as immaterial that the policy did not, in any of its conditions, undertake to make the validity of any assignment of it depend on notice thereof to the company. It must be borne in mind that (not regarding the act as of a testamentary character) he was undertaking to make an assignment of the policy as a gift, and at the same time, whether for convenience or other reasons, to retain it in his possession. By all the authorities, to make the gift a valid one, he should, if he retained the policy, have performed such other acts looking to the completion of the gift as in cases of actual delivery as would, under the circumstances, have been equivalent to, or a substitute for, such actual delivery. But he did nothing more than execute the written assignment, have it witnessed, and attach it to the policy. It is true, it appears from the testimony that he said he had talked the matter over with his sisters, the petitioners, and it was understood by them, but such loose statements as these cannot be regarded as equivalent to a delivery of the policy or assignments to, and an acceptance thereof by, them; nor can the mere fact that Curtis, who was an agent of the company, witnessed the assignments, and furnished blanks of the company therefor, be held equivalent to the sending of copies of such assignments to the company, and an entry of the same upon its books, or that Williams so regarded these facts. To notify the debtor party to a non-negotiable written contract in the manner made known by him as satisfactory, might, in the absence of the delivery of the assigned contract to the donee, well be regarded

by a court of equity as one of the most important steps in the transfer, in determining whether, by the acts of the parties, an equivalent of or substitute for actual delivery appeared. Considering the alleged gift as a gift inter vivos, it was still revocable by the donor; and, being revocable, it was incomplete at the time of his death; and, as the courts cannot complete an imperfect gift, the subject of it vested, with the rest of his chattels, in his administratrix. Nor does the evidence show that Williams created a trust or constituted himself the trustee of the petitioners, and so held possession of the policies for them. That he might have done so is beside the question. It is sufficient that he did not do so, and we find no evidence in the record that he made the attempt. From a mere imperfect gift a trust cannot be deduced. Badgley v. Votrein, 68 Ill. 25. Suppose the policies had been endowment policies, payable during the life of Williams to himself, would it be contended that a suit could have been maintained against him by the petitioners upon the evidence in this record for the policies or the proceed after their collection? And, if not against him, then why, in this case, against his administratrix? The most that can be said, we think, is that Williams intended to make a gift of the proceeds of these policies, or perhaps the policies themselves, to the petitioners, and took certain steps to accomplish his purpose, but left the matter incomplete. It cannot be determined from the evidence whether he retained the policies and assignments in his possession, and refrained from all acts showing an intent to deliver them, and to thus complete the gifts, in order that he might, if he thought advisable, change his mind, and act as future exigencies might require, or whether he was mistaken in the law, and supposed that he had done all that was required to make the gifts complete. But in either case, the petitioners are without remedy. The judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the decree of the circuit court is affirmed. Judgment reversed.

NOTE.-Recent Cases on Subject of Delivery Necessary to Constitute Valid Gift Inter Vivos.-In New Jersey, the delivery of a certificate of stock, without actual transfer or a written assignment or power to transfer, although accompanied with words of gift, does not constitute a valid gift inter vivos. Matthews v. Hoagland (N. J.), 21 Atl. Rep. 1054. A gift of the key of a safe-deposit vault containing securities to the plaintiff by an intestate in his life-time, telling him where they were deposited, and declaring his intention to give him the bonds, constituted a valid gift and delivery. Pink v. Church, 14 N. Y. S. 337. The hiring of a piano by a father for the use of his daughter, with an understanding between them that he should purchase it and it should then become her property, and its subsequent purchase by him, do not vest with her the title to the piano, without any delivery or transfer from her father. Nasse v. Thomas, 39 Mo. App. 178. The parol gift of a claim, evidenced by a note, and the mortgage securing the same, cannot be sustained where there is a mere delivery of the mortgage, but not of the note. McHugh v. O'Connor (Ala.), 9 South. Rep. 165. To constitute a valid gift

inter vivos, there must be such a transfer of the subject-matter as will pass the donor's title at once to the donee: absolutely and irrevocably divesting the former of, and investing the latter with, all of the donor's right or title therein, and control and dominion thereof. Matthews v. Hoagland (N. J.), 21 Atl. Rep. 1054. A valid gift of non-negotiable securities, in recognition of services for which the donor had promised to pay, may be effected by delivery to the donee, accompanied by the statement that they could be of use to her after the donor was gone, though there is no formal written transfer. Commonwealth v. Crompton (Pa.), 20 Atl. Rep. 417, 137 Pa. St. 138, 26 W. N. C. 475. The delivery of a savings bank deposit book was sufficient to vest the possession and the title in the donee; and the delivery is not rendered ineffectual by a by-law of the bank requiring an order or power of attorney from the depositor to enable a stranger to draw the depositor's money, as the gift of the book made the donee the owner of the deposits. Ridden v. Thrall (N. Y.), 26 N. E. Rep. 627, 125 N. Y. 572. A gift of a chattel capable of delivery, although made per verba de præsenti by a donor, and assented to by the donee, and such assent communicated to the donor, does not pass the property in the chattel without delivery. Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q. B. Div. 57. To give validity to a gift, there must be such a de livery of the subject thereof as works an immediate change in the dominion of the property. Gartside v. Pahlman, 45 Mo. App. 160. Plaintiff's mother directed her husband to give plaintiff $500 out of the money which he had collected for land sold by her. Plaintiff having no use for the money at the time, her father gave her his note therefor. Held, that this was a valid claim against his estate; it not being necessary that the money should have first been delivered to plaintiff, and then redelivered to her father. Reynolds' Admrs. v. Reynolds (Ky.), 18 S. W. Rep. 517. In a proceeding to charge a daughter with the value of a slave as an advancement, it appeared that in 1859, when she was seven years of age, her father made to her a deed of gift to a slave girl nine years old; that the daughter lived with her father until her marriage, ten years thereafter; that the slave lived in his household until she voluntarily left, after the close of the civil war; that the deed was signed by the father, and attested by three witnesses and a few days thereafter personally acknowledged by him and caused to be registered; that the daughter had no trustee or guardian other than her father. Held, that this constituted a delivery of the slave to the daughter. Davis v. Garrett (Tenn.), 18 S. W. Rep. 113. A father whose assets were about $80,000, and his liabilities less than $10,000, gave to a minor son a half interest in a note, which was worth about $2,000. The name of the son and that of another child were written on the note, which was then handed to the mother to keep. The father collected the interest and principal when due. Held, that the delivery was sufficient to perfect the gift. Second Nat. Bank v. Morrill & Houston Iron-Works (Wis.), 50 N. W. Rep. 503. Where a father gives money deposited in bank to his infant son, the gift will not be defeated by the failure of the father to deliver to the son the pass-book evidencing the gift, the father, as natural guardian, being the proper custodian of such book during the infancy of the son. Beaver v. Beaver, 16 N. Y. S. 476, 62 Hun, 194. A donor directed the teller of a bank in which she had money to pass a certain amount to the credit of each of three nieces, requesting that the bank books be so made that the donees could not draw the money during her life-time. He entered upon the pass

books, "only Mrs. C has power to draw." One of the donees accompanied her, and signed her name in the signature book, and the others, on being told of the gift by the donor sent their names to the bank to be entered therein, the donor's name was also entered therein, and the word "trustee" written after it, and she retained the pass-books until her death. Held, that the transaction constituted a valid gift in ter vivos. Appeal of Buckingham, 22 Atl. Rep. 509, 60 Conn. 143. H opened an account with a savings bank, as follows: "H, for her daughter Kate." Afterwards she changed it to "H or sister J," so that J might draw the money, H died January 22d, J died a week after, and the bank book was found among the effects of E, another sister of H, who dies about a week after J, and with whom J resided at the time of her death. Held sufficient to justify a finding of a delivery of the bank book by H to J, and that J's administratrix was entitled to the deposit. Hannon v. Sheehan (City Ct. N. Y.), 19 N. Y. S. 698. Where persons who are entitled to money in the hands of a third person assign all their interest therein by writ ten instrument under seal, and deliver the assignment to the assignee, there is a valid gift and tranfer, without an actual delivery of the money. Matson v. Abbey (Sup.), 24 N. Y. S. 284. Household furniture, the property of the claimant's father, was in the possession of her husband, in a house where the husband resided with her. The father, being at the time with her in a room where some of the furniture was, verbally gave the furniture to her by words of present gift, and went away from the house, leaving her in the room. There was no manual delivery of the furniture to her, and after the gift the furniture remained in the house, where she and her husband continued to live. Held, that there had been such a change of possession from the claimant's husband to herself, consequent upon the gift, as was sufficient to effectuate it. Kilpin v. Ratley (1892), 1 Q. B. 582. Decedent deposited bonds and coupons with a bank, and took a writing, signed by the cashier, acknowledging their receipt, and that they were to be sold, and the proceeds placed to her credit." Held, that a delivery of the receipt, with an indorsement thereon, signed by decedent, requesting the cashier to "let" plaintiff "have the amount of the within bill," and with the intention to pass title thereto, constituted a valid gift of the money due from the bank. Crook v. First Nat. Bank (Wis.), 52 N. W. Rep. 1131, 83 Wis. 31. A man deposited bis own money in a bank, taking a certificate of deposit payable to the order of a woman with whom he was on friendly terms, though there was no relationship or engagement of marriage between them. He told no one about the deposit, and kept the certificate in his own possession until his death, eight months later. Held, that title did not pass to the payee of the certificate, since the evidence did not show either an intent to make a gift or a delivery of the subject of the gift. Telford v. Patton (Ill. Sup.), 33 N. E. Rep. 1119, 43 Ill. App. 151, reversed. Where notes are indorsed by the owner, placed in a pocketbook, and the packet marked with the names of the donees, a delivery to one of the donees is sufficient, though he at once returns the packet to the donor to keep for the present. Brandon v. Dawson, 51 Mo. App. 237. Where deeds of gift are drawn at the positive direc tion of the grantor, read over to him by the notary, signed and acknowledged by him, and by his order, and in his presence, given to the husband of one of the two grantees, and thereafter the grantor never indicates any wish to retract them, the delivery is sufficient. Hamilton v. Armstrong (Mo. Sup.), 25 S.

W. Rep. 545. A written assignment, under seal, of money in the hands of a third person, delivered to the assignee, constitutes a valid gift and acceptance of the money. Matson v. Abbey (N. Y. App.), 36 N. E. Rep. 11, 141 N. Y. 179. In replevin to recover a piano, evidence that plaintiff gave the piano to defendant, that he subsequently directed her to remove it from his house, and that she did so, warrants a verdict that the piano was delivered under the gift. Phenix v. Gilfillan, 47 Ill. App. 220. A father, desirous of making an antemortem settlement of all his notes, and bonds on his children delivered the property to a son, with direction to divide it equally among the children. All the notes and bonds regarded as solv. ent were accordingly distributed among the children, and the balance was by mutual consent of the children left in the son's hands for collection and subsequent distribution. Held that, by thus exercising

signified an acceptance of the gift, but constituted the son their agent for the collection and distribution of the balance, thus completing the delivery to them of the undistributed portion, and that, therefore, the death of the father before final distribution did not defeat the gift, nor revoke the son's authority to collect and distribute. Martin v. McCullough (Ind. Sup.), 34 N. E. Rep. 819. A testator bequeathed to his son $2,000 in trust for his daughter, but afterwards he purchased a $2,000 mortgage, and caused the assignment to be made to such daughter and recorded, but the papers were placed in the custody of the son to hold under the trust created by the will. The daughter subsequently gave testator, at his request, a writing which recited that she had received of him $2,000 (meaning the mortgage) in full of the legacy, which she released. Held, that there was a delivery of the mortgage to, and an acceptance by, the daughter. Brown v. Blackman, 25 N. Y. S. 15, 71 Hun, 356. An aged wife delivered to her husband certain money, saying that she did not expect to live very long, and desiring him to pay her funeral expenses, and keep the rest. At once he replaced, or had her replace, it where it was, but there was no proof that she afterwards exercised dominion over it. She never fully regained her health thereafter. Held, that the evidence warranted a finding that there was a valid gift. Marsh v. Prentiss, 48 Ill. App. 74. A paper reciting that the signer gives certain property to another cannot operate as a present gift, it never having been delivered, but being in the donor's possession at time of death. Towzer v. Jackson, 30 Atl. Rep. 400, 164 Pa. St. 373, 35 W. N. C. 364. The delivery of a note, without indorsement, to a person, to be unconditionally delivered to another on the donor's death. is sufficient to constitute a valid gift inter vivos. Langworthy v. Crissey (Sup.), 31 N. Y. S. 85. The fact that a father deposited money in a savings bank in the name of his son, and took out a book in the latter's name, does not conclusively show a gift of the money to the son. Booth v. Bristol County Sav. Bank, 38 N. E. Rep. 1120, 162 Mass. 455. Where plaintiff, who lived with defendant, to whom he was bound, claimed certain chattels kept at their common home as a gift from defendant, and exercised control of the property, which defendant recog-, nized as belonging to plaintiff, the jury may properly find that the gift was delivered. Olson v. Gifford (Towa), 65 N. W. Rep. 294. A father declared his intention to make a gift to his son by having the son's debit to a firm, of which they were members, trans. ferred to the father's account, and instructed the book-keeper to make such transfer. The book-keeper

made a memorandum thereof, and showed it to the son, but had made no entry on the books of the transfer when the father died. Held, that the gift was complete. Maclay v. Robinson (Sup.), 36 N. Y. S. 530, 91 Hun, 630. Decedent, who had requested a justice of the peace to draw, for him, a deed to his niece for a portion of his farm, to take effect after decedent's death, refrained from doing so on the suggestion of the justice, and, instead, subsequently executed a bond, payable to the niece one year after date, with interest, and delivered it to the justice, to be delivered to the niece after his death, and told the niece to get the bond from the justice. Decedent, at the time of the delivery of the bond to the justice, on being told by the justice that the bond would draw interest during his life, to remedy such defect, directed the justice to mark the interest as paid each year. Held, that there was a sufficient delivery of the bond to render it, as a gift, a valid claim in in favor of the niece, against decedent's estate, from the time of his death. In re Wagoner's Estate, 34 Atl. Rep. 114, 174 Pa. St. 558. A deposit of money in bank to the credit of depositor's wife and himself, with a provision that either of them, or the survivor, is to draw it, imports a gift to the wife, in case she survives him, and a delivery of the pass-book to the wife is not necessary to perfect the gift. McElroy v. National Sav. Bank (Sup.), 40 N. Y. S. 340. A deposit of money in bank to the credit of the depositor or his wife, "or the survivor of them," operates as a gift to the wife, though she never had possession of the pass-book. McElroy v. Albany Sav. Bank (Sup.), 40 N. Y. S. 422.

CORRESPONDENCE.

JURY OF LESS THAN TWELVE. To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

a

In your issue of March 19, you refer to the Utah constitutional provision making eight persons legal jury and allowing three-fourths of the jurors to find a verdict in civil cases. In 1891, in vol. 34, p. 117, your JOURNAL also commented upon a provision of the constitution of Minnesota to the effect, that in civil cases three-fourths of a jury could find a verdict. In both articles you appear to regard the provision for a majority verdict as something novel, and theretofore untried. I wish to call your attention to the fact that the plan has been in practical operation in California ever since the year 1879. It was incorpo rated into the California constitution adopted in that year. It has worked satisfactorily in all respects, and there has never been a suggestion from any quarter of a return to the former method. The supreme court of this State has always recognized it as a valid constitutional provision.

LUCIEN SHAW.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

LEASE COVENANT TO REPAIR-DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS BY FIRE.

Wattles v. So. Omaha Ice and Coal Company, Supreme Court of Nebraska, 69 N. W. Rep. 785. The growing tendency exhibited of late by our courts to administer natural justice between suitors and to arrive at conclusions based on principles of honesty and

morality finds excellent illustration in the above case. The facts were briefly as follows: In November, 1894, the defendant had leased certain ice houses belonging to the plaintiff and situate along the river front. He covenanted to keep the leased premises in good repair, and at the end of the term to surrender their possession in as good condition as they were when he entered, natural decay, wear and tear alone excepted. During the term the buildings were destroyed and rendered entirely valueless by a "violent wind storm or hurricane." The lessor claimed that the above provisions of the lease amounted to a covenant to restore the buildings. In passing on this case the Supreme Court of Nebraska reviews the authorities very carefully and the decision may be taken as a fair index to the trend of judicial opinion on this mooted point.

In 1 Taylor on Land. and Ten. (8 Ed.) 357, the rule is stated as follows: "Where a tenant is under an express covenant to repair premises he is liable for any loss or damage they may sustain and must even rebuild in case of casualty by fire or otherwise." In 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 721, the rule is thus stated: "The alterations in the tenant's liability for repairs, produced by his executing a lease in which he makes an express covenant to repair, is so marked that he becomes liable for all losses and damage the premises may sustain, and must even rebuild in case of casualty by fire of otherwise." In Phillips v. Stevens, 16 Mass. 238 (1819), the lessee covenanted "that he would keep in repair, support and maintain the fences

and building, saving and excepting the natural decay of the same, as should be needful, at his own proper cost and charge, and at the end of the term would quietly surrender, leave and yield up, the premises in the same condition" they were at the date of his lease. The buildings on the leased premises were destroyed by fire, without the fault of the lessee, and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in construing the covenant in the lease, held it was a contract binding the covenantor to restore the burned buildings. The same conclusion on precisely similar states of facts was reached in the following cases, all of which seem to recognize the authority of Phillips v. Stevens; Beach v. Crane, 2 N. Y. 87; Polack v. Ploche, 35 Cal. 416; Ely v. Ely, 80 Ill. 532; Davis v. Ryan, 47 Iowa, 642.

...

In the case under consideration the court said that the decision in Phillips v. Stevens, relied upon by the courts in New York, California, Illinois and Iowa, seems to be based on the principle that when once a man "has by his own contract created a duty or charge upon himself he is bound to make it good notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it in his contract." "This principle," says the court, in what seems to be a perfectly just criticism, "is at best, only a rule of construction; at all times the intention of the parties should govern." "Repair," says the court, "means to restore an existing thing. Were the construction contended for in this case correct; had this entire tract of lands and buildings been swept away by a flood of the Missouri river the lessee would be liable for their value." (This was substantially the state of facts in Wait v. O'Neill, 76 Fed. Rep. 40 (1896), in which it was decided that the lessee was not liable.) "Before we impose any such risk on him, we must first find his assumption of it in clear and unmistakable language." The following are some of the authorities supporting the court's position: In the case of Pollard v. Schaffer, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 210, the defendant had covenanted to keep the demised prem

ises in good repair, and in excuse for not so doing pleaded that an alien enemy, to-wit, the British army, had invaded the city of Philadelphia, and committed the damage complained of. The court, in deciding that he was not liable for repairs, said, "A covenant to do this against the act of God or of the public enemy ought to be so clear and express that no other mean. ing could be put upon it." See, also, Levi v. Deyers, 51 Miss. 501; Warren v. Wagner, 75 Ala. 188; Howeth v. Anderson, 25 Tex. 557; Warner v. Hitchins, 5 Bush; Wainscot v. Silvers, 13 Ind. 497.

These cases all seem to point to the one conclusion, viz., that in order to bind a lessee to restore building destroyed by casualty beyond his control, a mere covenant in general terms to repair, or to return the premises in as good condition as they were at the beginning of the term, is not sufficient. There must be an actual covenant in express terms to that effect. It we admit, as we must, that the intention of the parties should be the controlling element in determining their liabilities [toward each other, this conclusion seems a just one, because it cannot be reasonably sup posed that there was at the execution of the lease, any intention that the lessee should be bound, in case of damages arising without his fault, through casualty, inevitable accident, or the act of God.-American Law Register & Review.

PREVENTION OF THE PUBLICATION OF PORTRAITS OF PERSONS.

We believe that the measure introduced in the legis. lature by Senator Ellsworth to prevent the publica tion of portraits or attempted portraits of individuals without their consent, aims at a very desirable reform, and that it is possible, though perhaps not very easy, to frame a workable law. The debate in the senate last week disclosed that the principal practical difficulty concerns the question of caricatures, not in tended for portraits pure and simple, but to point a moral or graphically present an argument. As re marked in an editorial in the Evening Post of March 5th, such cartoons are "allowable by prescription." They have been used with striking effect as expe dients of political agitation both in this country and England for many years. The services of Thomas Nast in the movement against the Tweed ring are still vividly remembered. And in later times, personal cartoons have undoubtedly materially influenced the results even of presidential elections. Sensible as we are of the great susceptibility to abuse of such method of appeal to the public, we do not believe that popu lar sentiment demands or could be brought to favor its absolute suppression. It must be remembered that a person so caricatured has a clear and substan tial remedy by an ordinary suit for libel if he chooses to exercise it.

The case is different where a portrait, or an alleged or attempted portrait, of a person is inserted in a periodical or other print, not with any didactic or satirical purpose, but merely to present his physiog nomy to the public. If the workmanship be inferior or slovenly, and the result be actually to hold the subject up to ridicule or contempt, it may be that a cause of action would lie and a substantial recovery could be had for libel. But broader than this consideration is the one that, whether the portrait be good or bad, the right of privacy is morally entitled to protection, and it is desirable to guard such right, by legislation permitting suit to be brought and recovery readily to be had for authorized publication even of true like nesses. This, of course, would not prevent the inser tion in papers of portraits of individuals in proper

cases. Experience of human nature shows that there is little difficulty in inducing the average man to consent that the light of his countenance be permitted to beam upon his appreciative and admiring country. men, whenever an editor of decent standing suggests that the veil of privacy be withdrawn. As a rule, in the better class of publications the consent of the subject is procured, and a photograph obtained from him as a basis for the lithographer's or engraver's art. Legislation of the kind proposed would tend to exelude the exhibition of mortifying snap-shots by newspaper artists, and enable the individual to control the time and manner of the appearance of his likeness. Undoubtedly the right now exists to enjoin the publication of the portrait of a living person. The difficulty is that often the first notice of the intention to publish is the actual appearance of the picture. If a cause of action for damages exists after publication, the recovery could scarcely be more than nominal where there is no caricature, but the intent was to present a bona fide portrait.

If any remedy be attempted it should take the form of a definite penalty, suable for by the person aggrieved. It would make the law practically nugatory to simply pronounce its infractions misdemeanors punishable by fine and to be prosecuted by district attorneys. The centers of the offending are the large cities and towns, where public prosecutors have always so much work of serious importance on hand that it could not be hoped that such comparatively petty infractions of law would be faithfully followed

up.

On the theory of protecting the right of privacy, therefore, the experiment seems worth trying of conferring the right to sue for a penalty for the publication of any pictorial representation of a person's face or form. The objection may be raised that a double and concurrent remedy would thereby be granted for such pictures as are libelous. But, as matter of fact, a large majority of caricatures and cartoons that are now printed are unquestionably libelous, and it is not probable that men in public life would be more apt to prosecute an action for a small penalty than they are to sue for heavy damages for defamation. And a new law as proposed would give persons wantonly dragged into publicity a means of redress, the exercise of which would tend to make the newspapers more careful and discriminating. The key to the sitnation is that it is the custom now to deliberately violate legal rights, the newspapers taking all risk. If a tangible means of redress existed in favor of everybody, such risk would be more cautiously run.-New York Law Journal.

ANIMAL DEFAMATION.

There is a good deal of amusement in the law books on the subject of defamation by likening one to a dumb beast. The latest authority on this point is to the effect that it is not necessarily libelous to call a man a hog. (There is a considerable class who esteem it no libel to call Shakespeare, Bacon.) Much depends on the context, for it may often appear that the charge was made only in a Pickwickian sense. In Urban v. Helmick, decided by the Supreme Court of Washington in July, 1896 (44 Pac. Rep. 747), it appeared that a publication referring to plaintiffs, who were hotel keepers, was as follows: "In some localities there are hogs, called 'business men,' that want it all. I believe in buying at home, and building up our own trade and town as much as possible; as the more business we do, the more money there is circulated at bome." It was held that the meaning attributed to

the word "hogs" by the article itself did not render the publication libelous per se. But in Wisconsin it has been actionable to call a man a hog. (Solverson v. Peterson, 64 Wis. 198, 54 Am. Rep. 607.) The exact charge there was that the plaintiff was "an enor mous swine, which lives on lame horses," i. e., the carrion of lame horses. The court quite warmly said: "How could a man be lower, meaner, or more filthy than to have the character, habits and ways of a swine?" "The plaintiff is compared with this low and filthy animal to indicate that he has fallen to the very lowest degree of human degradation, morally, intellectually, and physically. It was supposed that the prodigal had fallen to the very lowest condition, when he became the associate of swine, and lived upon the same food." No wonder that the plaintiff bristled up!

It will not answer to call one's neighbor "a frozen snake" (Hoare v. Silverlock, 12 Q. B. 624), for that plainly refers to the fable about ingratitude. "An itchy old toad" is quite objectionable. Vellers v. Mousley, 2 Wils. 403. So of "skunk" (Massuere v. Dickens, 70 Wis. 83 [although phrased in Latin] Pledger v. State); nor to compare a lawyer to a bull or a goose. Baker v. Morfue, 1 Sid. 327. Nor to charge that a woman had been bitten by a cat and thereafter acted like one, mewing and posing to catch mice, etc. (Stewart v. Swift, 76 Ga. 280); nor to call an editor "a mouse most magnanimous," or "a vermin small" (Child v. Horner, 30 Mass. 510); nor to call one "a black sheep" (McGregor v. Gregory, 11 M. & W. 287; Barnet v. Allen, 3 H. & N. 381); nor to call a schoolmistress a "dirty slut" (Wilson v. Runyon, Wright, 651); nor a man "a thieving son of a bitch" (Reynolds v. Ross, 42 Ind. 387); nor "a thieving puppy" (Pierson v. Steorbz, Morris [Iowa], 136); nor a broker a "lame duck" (Morris v. Langdale, 2 B. & P. 284); nor a detective officer in making an arrest, "a big brute" (O'Shaughnessy v. Morning Journ. Assn., 71 Hun, 47); nor an insurance company a "wild-cat company" (Delaware etc. Ins. Co. v. Croasdale, 6 Hourt. 181); nor a "scalper" a "whelp." Mauget v. O'Neill, 51 Mo. App. 35.

On the other hand, in old England it was safe to call a justice "a logger-headed, a slouch-headed, and bursen-bellied hound" (1 Keb. 629), or an inn-keeper a "caterpillar." Vin. Abr. "Act for Words," U. a. 34. And so, in the celebrated case of Tom Fenn's beer, it was held not actionable to say, that if the defendant should give his mare a peck of malt, and let her drink water, she would produce naturally as good beer as his. Fenn v. Dixe, 1 Rolle, Abr. 58.

In modern America it has been held not actionable to call a woman "a bitch" (Skrinck v. Kollman, 50 Ind. 336; K. v. H., 20 Wis. 239), "although a very coarse and ruffianly expression," yet not equivalent to "prostitute."

In the celebrated Mezzara Case (2 C. H. Recorder, 113) it was held libelous for an artist to append asses' ears to a portrait of a legal gentleman who sat to him and would not pay for the work.-Green Bag.