mons on the citizen of Texas.-T. & H. SMITH & CO. V. TABER, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 156. 53. HABEAS CORPUS-Jurisdiction of Federal Courts. -Where the requisite citizenship appears upon the face of a bill in a federal court, the jurisdiction of the court cannot, in a collateral proceeding by habeas corpus by one who was not a party to the bill, be attacked by evidence dehors the record.-EX PARTE LENNON, U. S. S. C., 17 8. C. Rep. 658. 54. HOMESTEAD Contiguous Tracts.-Two tracts which corner, and on one of which the owner has his home, may be claimed as a homestead, where they together do not exceed the statutory area and value, and the owner has no other land.-CLEMENTS V. Craw. FORD COUNTY BANK, Ark., 40 S. W. Rep. 182. 55. HUSBAND AND WIFE.-A wife cannot join with her husband, or sue in her own name for the care, attendance upon, and nursing of a sick boarder of her husband, in his household, though the services were her own exclusively.-GARRETSON V. APPLETON, N. J., 37 Atl. Rep. 150. 56. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Actions - Desertion.-Gen. St. 1894, § 5165, provides that "when a husband has deserted his family the wife may prosecute or defend in his name any action which he might have prosecuted or defended, and shall have the same powers and rights therein as he might have had:" Held, that this law is constitutional.-ALLEN V. MINNESOTA LOAN & TRUST CO., Minn., 70 N. W. Rep. 800. 57. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Mortgage of Wife's Chattels -Ratification.-Ratification by wife of a chattel mortgage on her separate property, executed only by the husband, is not shown by evidence that the wife gave to the husband money which he used in paying one month's interest, without showing the wife's knowl edge of his purpose to so use it, or her intent to thereby ratify the mortgage, which she had persistently refused to sign or recognize.-PRALL V. RICHARDS, Colo., 48 Pac. Rep. 668. 58. HUSBAND AND WIFE Wife's Interest in Homestead. Under the California laws the wife has an interest in the homestead which requires a considera. tion for her agreement to convey or incumber it, and therefore her mortgage of the homestead to secure an antecedent debt of the husband is not binding on her. -CALIFORNIA FRUIT TRANSP. Co. v. ANDERSON, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Cal.), 79 Fed. Rep. 404. 59. INJUNCTION Practice. Though rule to show cause why injunction should not issue may be granted, in emergency cases, on bill not sworn to as to all the facts, and supported by affidavits which do not contain strictly legal evidence as to some of the facts, complainant cannot, on return of the rule, stand on them alone.-THOMPSON V. OCEAN CITY R. Co., N. J., 37 Atl. Rep. 129. 60. INSURANCE - Certificate of Authority.-Burn's Rev. St. 1894, § 4915 (Rev. St. 1881, § 3765), forbidding an agent of "any insurance company incorporated by any other State" than Indiana to transact insurance business without a certificate of authority, applies only to incorporated companies.-STATE V. CAMPBELL, Ind., 46 N. E. Rep. 944. 61. INSURANCE Construction of Policy.-A carrier whose bills of lading for cotton exempted it from liability for loss by fire placed the cotton in the yards of a compress company, where it was destroyed by accidental fire: Held, that the carrier was entitled to recover on a policy insuring it against loss by fire on cotton for which it had issued bills of lading, "and for which they (it) shall be liable," while in compress yards; the words quoted referring to liability in general.-GERMANIA INS. Co. v. ANDERSON, Tex., 40 N. W. Rep. 200. simple.-HAIDER V. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS. CO., Minn., 70 N. W. Rep. 805. 63. INSURANCE Standard Policy.-A fire insurance policy issued under Laws 1891, ch. 195 (Standard Policy Act), which was adjudged unconstitutional after the issuance of the policy, should be construed as a policy formulated by the parties, not as one prescribed by the State.-FLATLEY V. PHOENIX INS. Co., Wis., 70 N. W. Rep. 829. 64. INSURANCE-Warranty-Title.-Until the death of the husband, leaving her surviving, the wife has no claim on realty owned by him in fee and conveyed by him alone after the marriage; and hence the husband's grantee becomes "absolute owner" of the property, within the meaning of a question in an application for insurance thereon, the answer to which was made a warranty.-OHIO FARMERS' INS. Co. v. BEVIS, Ind., 46 N. E. Rep. 928. 65. INTERVENTION.-In a suit by the receiver of a corporation against a bank to recover certain secur. ities, a claim of an adverse interest in a note among the securities, which claimant alleged he had been induced to execute to the corporation on fraudulent representations, and which he had rescinded before the receiver was appointed, and had demanded a surrender of, entitled claimants to intervene, within Comp. Laws, § 4886, providing that any person may intervene who has an interest in the matter in litigation, or an adverse interest against both parties.TAYLOR V. BANK OF VOLGA, S. Dak., 70 N. W. Rep. 834. 66. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Insufficiency of Bond.Under 3 How. Ann. St. § 2283d, which provides that, if a person required to pay a tax as a liquor dealer shall engage in the business "without having made, executed, and delivered the bond required by this act, such person shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," where the bond is insufficient by reason of one of the sureties being disqualified, though it was given in good faith, is sufficient in form and has been approved by the municipal authorities, he is subject to criminal prosecution.-WOLCOTT v. BURLINGAME, Mich., 70 N. W. Rep. 831. 67. INTOXICATING LIQUOR-Retrospectiveness.-Acts 1895, p. 248, § 4 (Nicholson Law), requiring saloons to be located on a ground floor, and so arranged that the interior may be seen from the street, and forbidding the obstruction of the view of the room during hours and days when sales are prohibited, is not retrospective as to persons doing business under licenses issued prior to its taking effect, since it applies only to the conduct of the business. and to such conduct only after it went into effect.-NELSON V. STATE, Ind., 46 N. E. Rep. 941. 68. JUDGMENTS-Collateral Attack.-One whose land was sold on execution to satisfy a judgment of the circuit court assessing benefits in a condemnation proceeding could not, in an action to quiet title, attack the title of the purchaser on the ground of irregularities in said proceeding not going to the jurisdiction.LOVETT V. RUSSELL, Mo., 40 S. W. Rep. 123. 69. LANDLORD AND TENANT- Lease - Modification.The lessee of a mine notified the lessor that he would be compelled to shut down the mine if he had to continue to pay the royalty named in the lease, because of extra ¡difficulty in mining. It was then agreed, in order to prevent a forfeiture of the lease, and to secure the lessor a royalty from the mine, that a less royalty should be paid, and the reduced royalty was paid as agreed for several years: Held, that there was a consideration for the modification.-SARGENT V. ROBERTSON, Ind., 46 N. E. Rep. 925. 70. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Negligence.-A landlord who, at the request of his tenant, undertakes to put on a new roof, is liable for injury to the tenant from the negligent conduct of the work, the same as though he was bound by the lease to do the work.-WERTHEIMER V. SAUNDERS, Wis., 70 N. W. Rep. 824. 71. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Tenancy.-Where a lease of a store building was for one year and as much longer as the lessees should remain in business, and the lessees held over after the expiration of the year, a tenancy from year to year was not created, and they could terminate the lease at any time.-HARTY V. HARRIS, N. Car., 27 S. E. Rep. 90. 72. LIMITATIONS Railroad Receivers.-Suit commenced against the H. & T. C. "Railway" Co. arrests the running of limitations in favor of the H. & T. C. "Railroad" Co., which purchased the franchises of the first-named corporation, and permitted its line to be operated under the former name, said "railway" company practically passing out of existence.-HOUS. TON & T. C. RY. Co. v. MCFADDEN, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 216. 73. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS Trustee of Insolvent Corporation.-Under section 91 of the Code of Procedure, an action by the receiver of a corporation against one of its trustees to compel him to account for property of the corporation, wasted and lost through his misconduct, is barred at the expiration of six years from the commission of the wrongful acts; the proviso of subdivision 6, that the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the ag. grieved party of the facts, does not apply, since the cause of action resting upon the liability of the trustee to make good the loss is cognizable as well at law as in equity.-MASON V. HENRY, N. Y., 46 N. E. Rep. 837. 74. MARRIED WOMEN-Suretyship.-Under Act June 8, 1893, § 2 (Purd. Dig. p. 1299, pl. 24), declaring that a married woman may not become accommodation indorser, maker, guarantor, or surety for another, a married woman is incapacitated to enter into one of the prohibited contracts, and hence she cannot bind herself as surety, though the debt be contracted by her principal for the benefit of her separate estate.WILTBANK V. TOBLER, Penn., 37 Atl. Rep. 188. 75. MASTER AND SERVANT-Assumption of Risk.-Evi. dence considered, and held that, upon the most favorable view of it for the plaintiff, it conclusively shows that he voluntarily and knowingly assumed the risk of using a certain box, handed to him by the defendant's superintendent, to stand upon in order to reach a wire which they were repairing.-SOUTAR V. MINNEAPOLIS INTERNATIONAL ELECTRIC CO., Minn., 70 N. W. Rep. 796. 76. MASTER AND SERVANT Contract of Employment -Statute of Frauds.-A written contract whereby a firm hired an employee for five years being within the statute of frauds, the joint liability of the partners for the payment of the agreed wages cannot be changed by parol evidence of a subsequent oral agreement that each partner should pay one-half only.-HANSon v. GUNDERSON, Wis., 70 N. W. Rep. 827. 77. MASTER AND SERVANT Negligence.-Where it was customary for the head brakeman on a freight train to ride in the cab of the engine when his duties did not require him to be upon the cars, which was not objected to nor forbidden by any rule of the company, the fact that he was so riding at the time the train was wrecked, by reason of the defective condition of the track, and he was killed, did not show that he was not at his proper post of duty, or that he was guilty of contributory negligence.-TEXAS & P. RY. Co. V. MAGRILL, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 188. Submaterial 78. MECHANICS' LIENS Contractor man.-One who agrees to sell machinery to be deliv. ered free on board cars at his factory, and set up by the buyer, is not a "contractor" for the furnishing thereof, so as to entitle the person from whom he subsequently buys the machinery, and who delivers it to him, to a mechanic's lien as a "subcontractor," under Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 7255, but is a material-man.CAULFIELD V. POLK, Ind., 46 N. E. Rep. 932. 79. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Statement of Claim.-A statement of account of materials furnished, giving the items and prices, and alleging that they were furnished between certain dates, the last of which is within four months of the date of filing, but which fails to give the dates on which the separate items were furnished, is a substantial compliance with Rev, St. 1889, § 6709, requiring the filing of a just and true account on which a mechanic's lien is claimed.-MITCHELL V. PLANINGMILL CO. V. ALLISON, Mo., 40 S. W. Rep. 118. 80. MORTGAGE Assumption of Debt by Grantee.-A mortgagee may sue at law in his own name to recover the mortgage debt from a grantee of the premises who assumed in his deed to pay said debt.-STARBIrd v. CRANSTON, Colo., 48 Pac. Rep. 652. 81. MORTGAGE - Deed Absolute.-A deed by an administrator, of lands of the estate, to secure loans made to him individually,-he charging himself, as administrator, with the price,-is not, as to the administrator's creditors, a mortgage, since on defeasance the land would not revert to him.-GORRELL V. ALSPAUGH, N. Car., 27 S. E. Rep. 85. 82. MORTGAGE-Deed of Trust Sale.-Where a creditor, having two deeds of trust on the same property, securing different debts, enforces first the junior lien, he, by proceeding to foreclose the senior lien, opens up the mortgagor's equity of redemption, to the extent, at least, that he has a right to have the sale go on, so that he may get the benefit of anything the property sells for in excess of the debt secured by the senior deed of trust; and the creditor cannot stop the sale by canceling the note evidencing the debt.-COLER V. BARTH, Colo., 48 Pac. Rep. 656. 83. MORTGAGES-Subrogation.-Where the purchaser in a land contract, who had paid the price, deposited the contract with a bank which he owed, and with it an instrument stating that the contract was deposited to secure all indebtedness against him, the instrument created an equitable mortgage of the land described in the contract.-HACKETT V. WATTS, Mo., 40 S. W. Rep. 113. 84. MORTGAGE-Transfer of Property Parcels.Where a mortgagor, by recorded deed, conveys part of the tract to one who assumes the entire mortgage debt, and then conveys the balance free from the in cumbrance, the first parcel, even in the hands of a subsequent grantee, who agrees only to pay a propor tionate part of the debt, is primarily liable for the whole amount; and the mortgagee may first resort thereto, reserving the balance of the tract as a sepa rate fund to satisfy a later indebtedness secured on that part alone.-SKINNER V. HARKER, Colo., 48 Pac. Rep. 648. 85. MORTGAGES-Validity.-A recorded mortgage expressed to cover future advances has priority over subsequent conveyances and incumbrances.-WILLIS V. SANGER, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 229. 86. MORTGAGE OF HOMESTEAD Validity.-Under Const. art. 16, providing that no incumbrance, as against the homestead, shall be valid, except for the purchase money, or improvements thereon, a mortgage on a homestead is not rendered valid though the husband and the wife declare that the premises actu ally occupied by them are not their homestead.BUILDING & LOAN ASSN. OF DAKOTA V. GUILLEMENT, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 225. 87. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Streets-Dedication.Where a town plat lays off land into blocks and lots, with spaces between the blocks that appear to form no part of them or the lots, but indicate spaces for streets and avenues, and the blocks and lots are sold with reference to plat, the presumption is that the spaces between the blocks are dedicated to the public use as streets and avenues.-PORTER V. CARPENTER, Fla., 21 South. Rep. 788. 88. NEGLIGENCE.-An employee in a restaurant picked up a gasoline lamp, which had become improperly ig nited, to carry it outside. While proceeding to the door, he was severely burned, and threw the lamp. causing it to explode: Held, that his employer was not liable as for culpable negligence, to a third person injured by such explosion. - DONAHUE V. KELLY, Penn., 37 Atl. Rep. 186. 89. NEGLIGENCE - Independent Contractor.-Where it appeared that defendant advertised balloon ascensions at the park, by a person employed by it, and that a pole used to sustain the balloon while being inflated fell on deceased when the balloon was released, because no warning was given that the poles would fall at such time, and the people were allowed to gather near them, even if the person employed by defendant was an independent contractor, defendant was not relieved of liability.-RICHMOND & M. RY. Co. v. MOORE'S ADME., Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 70. 90. NEGLIGENCE-Proximate Cause.-If a horse-car driver was negligent in attempting to cross a steam railroad in front of an approaching train, resulting in injury to a passenger who jumped from the car in a reasonable effort to avoid injury from the expected collision, the fact that the negligence of the gateman in lowering the gate between the horses and the car united in producing the result does not absolve the horse-car company from liability.-WASHINGTON & G. B. Co. v. HICKEY, U. S. S. C., 17 8. C. Rep. 661. 91. PARTNERSHIP-Contracts.-In an action on a note, a defense that the note was given in pursuance of an oral contract whereby plaintiff agreed that, if defend. ant would give his notes for plaintiff's stock of goods, he would assure him credit, and become his partner, and contribute one of the notes, was not objectionable as seeking to vary by parol the terms of the note.HENRY V. MCCARDELL, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 172. 92. PARTNERSHIP Dissolution - Equitable Relief.One partner may sue the other in covenant, without an account stated, the partnership articles being under seal, and a covenant or agreement in them being violated, so that there is no necessity for equitable relief.-GUSDORFF V. SCHLEISNER, Md., 37 Atl. Rep. 170. 93. PLEADING - Inconsistent Defenses.-Defendant may join with a defense of rescission for fraud of the contract sued on, and a counterclaim for payments made under the contract, a second counterclaim for damages for breach of the contract by plaintiff; Rev. St. § 2657, permitting him to set forth as many defenses and counterclaims as he may have.-SOUTH MILWAUKEE BOULEVARD HEIGHTS CO. V. HARTE, Wis., 70 N. W. Rep. 821. 94. PLEADING - Service of Summons.-A motion to set aside the service of a summons does not extend the statutory time within which to answer.-GARVIE V. GREENE, S. Dak., 70 N. W. Rep. 847. 95. POWER OF ATTORNEY-Revocation.-The demand by the principal for the return of a written power under which an attorney in fact was acting, and its surrender and withdrawal without any explanatory words or further instructions, must be held to be a revoca. tion of the power.-KELLY V. BRENNAN, N. J., 37 Atl. Rep. 137. 96. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Termination. -Mere authority to sell land and collect payments does not authorize the agent, after deed had been given, and purchase money notes had been sent the vendor, to take new notes in substitution, though the agent erroneously supposed the first notes had miscarried in the mails.-HILL V. BESS, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 202. 97. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Officers-County Treas. urer. The sureties on a bond conditioned that a county treasurer would, among other things, render just and true accounts, cannot deny the correctness of the accounts rendered by him though they had no notice thereof, and hence are estopped to contend that money which the treasurer reported as on hand was in fact lost before the execution of the bond.-COE V. NASH, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 225. warning signal that a train is approaching his cross ing. The question is to be determined on general legal principles, whether, under all the circumstances, reasonable care required the giving of such a signal. -CZECH V. GREAT NORTHERN RY. Co., Minn., 70 N. W. Rep. 791. 99. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Injury.-Where a statute makes railroad companies liable for death caused by the gross negligence of their servants, a charge which, after defining ordinary negligence, authorizes a recov. ery in case deceased was killed by the "negligence" of defendant's servants, without anywhere requiring proof of gross negligence, is erroneous.-GULF, W. T. & P. RY. Co. v. LETSCH, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 181. 100. RAILROAD COMPANY-Injury to Car Coupler-Assumption of Risk.-One who continues to attempt to couple cars after seeing a rail projecting from the front of the approaching car assumes the risk; so that he cannot recover for injury which he would not have received but for the projection of the rail, though the facts that it was loaded on the car at an angle, instead of parallel, with the sides of the car, and that the floor of the approaching car was lower than that of the other car, which he did not know, combined with the projection to produce the injury.-ELY V. SAN ANTONIO & A. P. RY. Co., Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 174. 101. RAILROAD COMPANY-Negligent Killing of Dog.Under Const. art. 17, § 12, and Sand. & H. Dig. § 6349, making railroads "responsible for all damages to property done or caused by the running of trains," a railroad company is liable for the negligent killing of a dog by one of its trains.-ST. LOUIS, S. W. RY. Co. v. STANFIELD, Ark., 40 S. W. Rep. 126. 102. RAILROAD COMPANY-Right of Way in Street.The granting by a municipal corporation to a railroad company of a right of way along a street does not deprive the public of the right to also use the street as a highway, and the rights of each therein must be exercised with due regard to the rights of the other.-ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. Co. v. NEELY, Ark., 40 S. W. Rep. 130. 103. RAILROAD COMPANY Street Railways - Negli. gence. The court will not declare, as a matter of law, that a motoneer in charge of a car on an electric street railway, who propels it at the rate of about 12 miles an hour over a street crossing adjacent to a large public school building, when the street is filled with children just leaving school, who fails to ring the bell nearer to the crossing than 150 feet, and who neglects to keep watch of the track ahead of him, is not guilty of gross and wanton negligence.-CONSOLIDATED CITY & C. P. RY. Co. v. CARLSON, Kan., 48 Pac. Rep. 635. 104. RAILROAD MORTGAGES-Priority of Judgment.A judgment against a railroad company for a death loss occurring in the operation of the road cannot be regarded as a necessary operating expense, and is not entitled to priority of payment over a mortgage upon that ground.-NEW YORK SECURITY & TRUST Co. v. LOUISVILLE, & E. ST. L. C. R. Co., U. S. C. C., D. (Ind.), 79 Fed. Rep. 386. 105. RECEIVERS - Property Subject to Tax Lien.Where property coming into the hands of a receiver is subject to a lien for taxes, for the enforcement of which no specific remedy is provided by statute, the chancery court of which the receiver is an officer, has jurisdiction, by reason of his possession of the property, to provide payment of the taxes, as a preferred claim, out of the proceeds of the property.-DURYEE V. UNITED STATES CREDIT-SYSTEM Co., N. J., 37 Atl. Rep. 155. 106. SALE-Conditional Sale-Statute of Frauds.-A conditional sale of personal property, by which the title is reversed in the seller until the purchase money is paid, is embraced within the statute and will be void as to creditors and purchasers for a valuable consideration after the expiration of two years' possession on the part of the purchaser, unless such sale be declared in writing, and recorded as provided by the statute.HUDNALL V. PAINE, Fla., 21 South. Rep. 791. 107. SALE ON CREDIT-Fraud by Buyer.-A purchase of goods, with the intention not to pay for them, is a fraud which will entitle the seller to avoid the sale, though there were no false representations or pretenses.-BUGG V. WERTHEIMER-SCHWARTZ SHOE CO., Ark., 40 S. W. Rep. 134. 108. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE —— Sale of Land-Parol Authority.-Equity will specifically enforce a sale of lands by an agent under parol authorization, where there has been a payment of the purchase money, and a surrender of the possession to the purchasers.-RoVELSKY V. SCHEUER, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 785. 109. STATUTES-Subjects and Titles of Acts.-Where the subject of an amendatory act is not embraced in its title, the fact that the original act was passed be. fore the adoption of the constitution, when the title was of no significance in determining the validity of an act, does not render the amendatory act constitutional.-IN RE SENATE BILL NO. 23, Colo., 48 Pac. Rep. 647. 110. SUNDAY-Filing Garnishment Proceedings.-The filing of a garnishment bond and affidavit in a pending suit on Sunday, the writ not being issued until Monday, is not inhibited by Rev. St. 1895, art. 1180, providing that "no suit shall be commenced," nor "process be issued or served," on Sunday, "except in case of attachment," since not only is it not within the terms of the statute, but, being a species of attachment, is within the exception.-SCHOW V. CITY NAT. BANK OF GATESVILLE, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 166. 111. TAXATION OF RAILROAD-Assessment.-In assessing for taxation the real estate of a railroad company within a town, consisting of a portion of its line, with tracks, sidings, stations, etc., the valuation thereof cannot legally be based upon the cost, rentals, and earnings of the whole railroad, but the just and reasonable rule of valuation of such real estate is to fix its value at a sum not exceeding the cost of reproduc. ing it. PEOPLE V. CLAPP, N. Y., 46 N. E. Rep. 842. 112. TENANTS IN COMMON-Contribution.-A tenant in common made a loan, giving mortgage security on the entire property, and at his direction the mortgagee paid out of the loan a prior mortgage on the property, both supposing the mortgagor was owner: Held, that the mortgagor was entitled to contribution, and to subrogation to the mortgage paid off; aud that the second mortgagee succeeded to this right of subroga. tion. HAVERFORD LOAN & BUILDING ASSN. OF PHILA DELPHIA V. DOUGHERTY, Penn., 37 Atl. Rep. 179. 113. TENANTS IN COMMON — Waste.-A tenant in com. mon may sue his cotenant for waste. Code, § 627.HINSON V. HINSON, N. Car., 27 S. E. Rep. 80. 114. TRIAL-Instruction.-An instruction which from its form of expression is liable to be construed by the jury as assuming the proof of a material fact in controversy is misleading. - MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. Co. of TEXAS V. WILLIAMS, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 161. 115. TRUST DEED-Preferred Creditors.-A debtor determined to make special provision for particular creditors by a trust deed of part of his property. On consultation with his attorney, he was informed that the effect of such deed would be to destroy his busi. ness, and determined, after making such trust deed, to make a general assignment. He made his trust deed, as originally proposed, and shortly thereafter executed the assignment: Held, that the trust deed was not invalidated thereby. - POLLOCK V. SYKES, Miss., 21 South. Rep. 780. 116. TRUST-Resulting Trust.-A promise on the part of a father that, if a verbal lien claimed by his daughter on two certain lots should be released, he would have two other lots conveyed to her, will not establish a trust in such two lots on failure of the father so to convey.-BUNDREN V. LEHR AGRICULTURAL Co., Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 205. 117. TRUST-Resulting Trust Payments for Wife.When the husband and wife both make payments to meet the dues of building association stock standing In the name of the wife, the presumption is that his payments were gifts to her, and a resulting trust in favor of the husband because of his payments will not arise until this presumption is rebutted by evidence sufficient to establish such a trust. - BACON V. DEVIN. NEY, N. J., 37 Atl. Rep. 144. 118. TRUST - Statute of Frauds. -An agreement, on purchase of land under execution, that the purchaser would hold the land as trustee, subject to reconvey. ance to the execution debtor on payment of the balance of the judgment, is not void because oral. BROWN V. JACKSON, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 162. 119. USURY.-A landowner obtained a loan, with the proceeds of which a judgment on vendor's lien notes was paid, and the judgment was assigned to the lender, who was subrogated to the rights of plaintiff therein, and the borrower gave a mortgage of the land to se cure the loan: Held, that the fact that the loan was usurious did not destroy the force and validity of the judgment; and this although it was intended that the judgment should be extinguished by the loan transac tion. HENNESSY V. CLOUGH, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 157. 120. USURY-Commissions. When one negotiates a loan through a third party with a money lender, and the latter bona fide lends the money at a legal rate of interest, the contract is not made usurious merely be. cause the intermediary charges the borrower with a heavy commission; the intermediary having no legal or established connection with the lender, as agent.BEST V. BRITISH & AMERICAN MORTG. CO., U. S. C. C., E. D. (N. Car.), 79 Fed. Rep. 401. 121. USURY Compound Interest.-Civ. Code, § 1919, authorizing parties to contract that, on default of prompt payment of interest, it shall become part of the principal, and bear the same rate of interest, inhibits a contract for compound interest at a higher rate than the principal bears, though such interest is to run independently of the principal. -YNDART V. DEN, Cal., 48 Pac. Rep. 618. 122. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Vendor's Lien.-Where the maker of negotiable vendor's lien notes before their maturity gives the vendor duplicate notes, and a trust deed securing them, on the statement by the vendor that the originals are lost, the vendor's lien of an innocent purchaser for value of the original notes is not lost by the payment of the duplicate notes by the vendee.-DEGENHART V. SHORT, Tex., 40 S. W. Rep. 150. 123. WAREHOUSEMAN Conversion. Where a warehouseman receives grain on deposit from the owner, to be mingled with other grain in a common receptacle, from which sales are made, the warehouseman keeping at all times sufficient grain of like kind and quality for the depositor, and ready for delivery to him upon demand, the contract is one of bailment. -BAKER V. BORN, Ind., 46 N. E. Rep. 930. 124. WATER COURSES-Riparian Rights. The owner of property on the bank of a water course has a right to build barriers and confine the waters to the channel of the stream, but he cannot build and maintain a structure which will change the channel or project the waters against or upon the property of others, in such a way as will result in substantial injury to such prop erty.-PARKER V. CITY OF ATCHISON, Kan., 48 Pac. Rep. 632. 125. WILLS Rights of Devisees. D, by the sixth clause of his will, devised certain real estate to "my aunt, C, and my cousins [naming seven persons]; each to take an equal share therein." There was no refer ence elsewhere in the will to the devisees, or the estate devised to them, though it appeared by evidence outside of the will that they composed one family. The will contained residuary clauses which prevented intestacy in case of lapse: Held, that the devisees took distributively, as tenants in common, and not as a class, with the right of survivorship, and, accordingly that, upon the death of two of the devisees before the testator, the devises to them lapsed. - MOFFETT V ELMENDORF, N. Y., 46 N. E. Rep. 845. Central Law Journal. ST. LOUIS, MO., JUNE 11, 1897. In 1889 the legislature of Missouri passed an act making debts due for labor preferred claims against the property of the employer when seized by creditors or when his business has been placed in the hands of a receiver or trustee, and which requires servants to present their claims under oath to the officer or court holding such property, within ten days after its seizure on execution or attachment, or within thirty days after taking by the receiver or trustee, and directs payment first of such claims from the proceeds of the property unless exceptions to their allowance shall be filed, in which case the claimants shall be required to reduce their claims to judgment. The validity of the act has been recently passed upon by the supreme court of that State. Hennig v. Staed, 40 S. W. Rep. 95. It was contended by those opposed to its enforcement that it is obnoxious to the section of the constitution which provides "that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law," in that it authorizes the court or officer in charge of the property of an insolvent debtor to pay labor claims without notice to parties interested therein and without giving them a hearing or an opportunity to be heard. While the court concurred with the general contention that no one can be deprived of his property without an opportunity to be heard, a principle which is fundamental, and that taking the property of an employer to pay the claims of his employees upon their mere sworn statement without notice and without giving him an opportunity to contest their correctness, would certainly be taking their property without due process, yet that in order to secure to the debtor an opportunity to be heard, they declared, that it is not essential that the proceedings should be according to the course of the common law. It is competent for the legislature to prescribe a summary and inexpensive proceeding for enforcing such claims, and in the case of laborers whose services have enhanced the value of the property of their employer, whose demands are small and who live and support their families upon the wages earned, it is especially just that some manner of proceeding should be provided by which they can secure their rights promptly and without having to resort to the slow and expensive procedure provided by the general law. By this statute, in the view of the supreme court, the legislature undertook to accomplish that purpose. The statute gives a preference to laborers only after the property of the employer has gone into the hands of the court, an officer of the court, or a trustee, for the purpose of being subjected or applied to the payment of his debts. The statute impresses upon the property a priority in the nature of a lien, in favor of the laborers. The property is in the hands of the court, the officer, or trustee for administration. The proceeding of the claimant, as provided, is against the property, rather than the creditor. After the seizure or transfer of the property, others besides the owner have interests in it. It would in many cases be almost, if not altogether, impracticable, to give each interested party personal notice of the claim. In such a case a substituted notice to all persons interested may be provided. The legislature has a large discretion in respect to the manner of giving such notices; and where a kind of notice has been provided, by which it is reasonably probable that the party interested will be appraised of what is contemplated, and an opportunity afforded him to defend, courts should not pronounce the proceedings illegal. A substituted service is provided by statute for many such cases, generally in the form of & notice, published in the public journals, or posted, as the statute may direct; the mode being chosen with a view to bring it home, if possible, to the knowledge of the party to be affected, and to give him an opportunity to appear and defend. The right of the legislature to prescribe such notice, and to give it effect as process, rests upon the necessity of the case, and has been long recognized and acted upon. As supporting such service the court called attention to In re Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y. 199; Jones v. Driskill, 94 Mo. 19, and Cooley Const. Lim. 497. The statute provides: "Any such laborer or servant desiring to enforce his or her claim for wages under this chapter, shall present a statement under oath, showing the amount due after allowing all just credits |