early and generally adopted both in England and in this country. Coughlin v. State, 144 Ill. 140; U. S. v. Barber, 21 D. C. 456; U. S. v. Schneider, 21 D. C. 381. Owing to the rapid diffusion of news at the present time by the railroads, the newspapers and the telegraph, it was found necessary to abandon this rule; otherwise in the case of atrocious crimes, or others, which excited the interest of the public generally, it would be almost impossible to secure a jury, while the intelligent would be excluded as jurors. Baker v. State, 88 Wis. 140; U. S. v. Barber, 21 D. C. 456. Some courts still hold, that one who has formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, even though based on rumor, which would require evidence for its removal, is incompetent as a juror. Vance v. State, 56 Ark. 402; People v. Shufelt, 61 Mich. 237; State v. Rutter, 13 Wash. 203. A mere impression was not considered to be an opinion. State v. Murphy. 9 Wash. 204. When such opinion is unqualified or unconditional, or of a fixed and positive nature, no matter from what source derived, all courts exclude the holder thereof from the jury box. Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 261; State v. Snodgrass, 52 Kan. 174; Washington v. Com., 86 Va. 405; Haugen v. Chicago, etc. R. R., 3 S. Dak. 394; Trial of Aaron Burr, vol. 1, p. 416; Hinkle v. State, 94 Ga. 595; Oliver v. State, 34 Fla. 203; People v. Thacker (Mich., 1896), 66 N. W. Rep. 562; Coughlin v. State, 144 I. 140. Where, however, such opinions are based on rumors or hearsay, and are not positive or fixed, and will readily yield to evidence, the courts generally consider them not to be a disqualification for jury serv. ice. Hinkle v. State, 94 Ga. 595; Trial of Aaron Burr, supra; People v. O'Neill (Mich. Dec. 1895), 65 N. W. Rep. 540; U. S. v. Barber, 21 D. C. 456; State v. Kelly, 28 Oreg. 225; Trotter v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1896), 36 S. W. Rep. 278; Adams v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1895), 33 S. W. Rep. 354; People v. Collins, 105 Cal. 504; State v. De Graff, 113 N. C. 688; Com. v. Crosswise, 156 Pa. St. 304; State v. Punshon, 133 Mo. 44. Where such opinion is based on newspaper accounts or upon conversations, which the party believes to be true, it works a disqualification. State v. Wlicox, 11 Wash. 215; State v. Murphy, 9 Wash. 204. The possession of an opinion on the guilt or innocence of the accused, prima facie disqualifies its holder from service on the jury, and the burden is on the State to show that it is not a disqualification (Vance v. State, 56 Ark. 402): any doubt on the subject should be solved in favor of the defendant. Washington v. Com., 86 Va. 405. One who has heard or read the evidence in a case is incompetent to serve as a juror therein. State v. Taylor, 134 Mo. 109; Wade v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1895), 32 S. W. Rep. 772.

Statutes. Many States have passed statutes relative to the subject under discussion. In many States it is left to the court to decide after an examination of the party, whether his opinion, formed from news. paper reports or from hearsay, is of such a nature as to disqualify him from jury service. State v. Duffy, 124 Mo. 1; Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 261; Coughlin v. State, 144 III. 140; People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 227; People v. Thiede, 11 Utah, 241; Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430; Green v. State, 72 Miss. 522; Lewis v. State, 137 Ind. 344; State v. Tom, 8 Oreg. 177; State v. Field, 89 Iowa, 34; State v. Foster, 91 Iowa, 164; State v. Cunningham, 100 Mo. 382. Some statutes disqualify parties who have formed an opinion on the subject from conversations with witnesses of the transactions, or from reading reports of their testimony or from hearing them testify. Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 261,

1895; Trotter v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1896), 36 S. W. Rep. 278. Where the statute provided that a party, who had formed or expressed an opinion on the issue or any material fact to be tried, was incompetent to be a juror, it was held, that impressions or opinions. not of a fixed and positive character, do not disqual ify, if such person appears free from bias or prejudice and has a mind open to a fair consideration of the evidence. State v. Treadwell, 54 Kan. 507, 518. In South Carolina the action of the trial court in accept ing a juror seems not to be reviewable in the appel late court. State v. McIntosh, 39 S. C. 97; State v. Merriman, 34 S. C. 16. Where there are statutes re posing such discretion in trial courts, their decisions as to the competency or incompetency of ju rors will never be reversed unless they are plainly wrong (State v. Church, 6 S. Dak. 89: Lewis v. State, 137 Ind. 344; Haugen v. Chicago, etc. R. R., & S. Dak. 394; Baker v. State, 88 Wis. 140; Howell v. State, 4 Ind. App. 148; Com. v. Crosswise, 156 Pa. St. 304; Gavlitz v. State, 71 Md. 293), and all doubts will be resolved in favor of the finding of the trial court. State v. Cunningham, 100 Mo. 382. A juror was se cepted, who has formed an opinion on the case, bad read an account of the facts, and had received from the father of the deceased a narrative of the circum stances. The appellate court considered such action to be an extreme application of the discretion allowed a trial court, yet refused to order a reversal on that ground alone. Goins v. State, 4 Ohio St. 457.

Constitutionality of Statutes. - Such statutes have been assailed as invading the constitutional guaran tees of a fair and impartial trial, and that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty without due pro cess of law. These laws have been upheld as prescrib ing the mode for obtaining impartial juries and as not taking away any rights. Green v. State, 72 Miss. 522; Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 261; Spies v. Ill., 123 C. S. 131, 170. Where such a statute was held to be unconstitutional, it was claimed that such decision was due to the fact that the law did not provide that the court should be satisfied as to the facts before the party could be accepted as a juror. Coughlin v. State, 144 Ill. 140. It was considered that such statutes were intended for cases where it is almost impossible to secure juries, and should only then be used. State v. Church, 6 S. Dak. 89. S. S. MERRILL St. Louis, Mo.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

He had just been sentenced to thirty days for steal ing and eating two apples. "Fifteen days," said one of the bystanders in the court room, "for stealing a apple? That's a high price."

"That's nothing," said another, "Adam took only one and was condemned to hard labor for life." "I haven't any case," said the client, "but I hav money."

"How much?" asked the lawyer. "Fifty thousand dollars," was the reply. "Phew! you have the best case I ever heard of. It see that you'll never go to prison with that sum said the lawyer, cheerfully. And he didn't-be went without a dollar.

Smith-"Is young Flywedge practicing law?" William-"I think not. He was called to the bar. but I think he is practicing economy."

675.

3. ASSUMPSIT-Promise-Pleading.-In assumpsit on a fire Insurance policy the declaration set forth the pol icy, showing a contract by which the loss was "to be paid sixty days after proof" thereof: Held that, on general demurrer, this was a sufficient allegation of the promise to pay.-POWERS V. NEW ENGLAND FIRE INS. Co., Vt., 38 Atl. Rep. 148.

4. BILLS AND NOTES-Interest.-A promissory note payable on a certain time after date, with interest at the rate of 9 per cent. until paid, carries interest at that rate after the maturity of the note as well as before.-AUGUSTA NAT. BANK v. HEWINS, Me., 38 Atl. Rep. 156.

5. BILLS AND NOTES - Promissory Note - Failure of Consideration.-The maker of a promissory note given in payment for stock in a national bank, and immediately transferred by indorsement to said bank by the payee, cannot resist payment of the note, in the hands of a receiver of the bank, on a plea of failure of consideration because of the insolvency of the bank, where the payee has fu ly indemnified him against loss.-HETTINGER V. MEYERS, U. S. C. C., D. (Kan.), 81 Fed. Rep. 805.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Self-incriminating Testimony-Waiver.-If one, fully cognizant of his constitutional right to remain silent in respect to matters tending to incriminate himself, abandons it, whether under compulsion or otherwise, and essays to speak under oath, he must speak the truth, and may be prosecuted for perjury if he does not; but, before this principle can be invoked, it must appear that the witness' abandonment of his rights was knowingly and understandingly made, and that no undue advantage has been taken of an ignorant witness in the course of an inquisitorial examination.-UNITED STATES V. BELL, U.S. C. C., W. D. (Tenn.), 81 Fed. Rep. 830.

7. CONTRACT - Abandonment - Recovery.-Plaintiff contracted to erect a building for defendant, to be completed by August 1, 1894, and he performed labor thereon until October 28, 1894, when he voluntarily abandoned work. All the services and materials were furnished in fulfillment of the contract, apart from which no agreement for service or materials were made. Plaintiff lost his right to a lien on the premises by failure to comply with the statutory requirements; Held, that plaintiff, by voluntary abandonment of the contract, lost his right to recover the value of his serv. ices and the material used.-MARCHANT v. HAYES, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 840.

8. CONTRACTS-Consideration.-A nephew who made a trip at his uncle's request, could not recover the expenses thereof from the uncle's estate, in view of the confidential relations that had existed between them, where there was no agreement by the uncle to pay such expenses.-MULDRICK V. GALBRAITH, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 886.

10. COUNTY BONDS Constitutional Requirement.— The provision of Const. Tex. art. 11, § 7, that "no debt for any purpose shall ever be incurred in any manner by any city or county, unless provision is made at the time of creating the same for levying and collecting a sufficient tax to pay the interest thereon and provide at least two per cent. as a sinking fund," applies to all cities and counties, and is not restricted to counties and cities bordering on the Gulf coast, which, by the preceding sentence of that section, are authorized to levy and collect a tax for the construction of sea walls, breakwaters, or other sanitary purposes, and to create a debt therefor, and issue bonds in evidence thereof.-WADE V. TRAVIS COUNTY, TEX., U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 81 Fed. Rep. 742.

11. CREDITORS' BILL Lien of Garnishment.-The remedy by creditors' bill is not super-eded by gar. nishee process and proceedings supplementary to judgment.-MATLOCK V. BABB, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 873. SUITS 12. CREDITORS' Equity Jurisdiction.-The right to prosecute in a court of equity a creditors' bill, to uncover assets fraudulently conveyed, and to compel an accounting, was not superseded by the garnish. ment and attachment laws, since a legislative intention that it should be so superseded does not appear, and in the absence of such intent the jurisdiction of equity is not abrogated by the creation of a new legal remedy.-SABIN V. ANDERSON, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 870. 13. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE- Dying Declarations.-Defendant and W were brought into the presence of deceased, then in extremis, and about to make a dying declaration to the district attorney. W spoke to deceased in Chinese, and the district attorney asked deceased what W said, and he answered, "You better not tell him:" Held, that the answer formed no part of the dying declaration,-PEOPLE V. WONG CHUEY, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 833.

14. CRIMINAL LAW-Argument of Counsel.-Where a defendant in a criminal case testifies as a witness therein on his own behalf, and his testimony conflicts with that of a witness for the prosecution, it is not improper for the prosecuting attorney in his closing argument to the jury to remark that: "The State's witness is entirely disinterested, but that is not the case with the defendant. He stands here charged with crime, and it is his interest to screen himself."-MALOY V. STATE, Fla., 22 South. Rep. 719.

15. CRIMINAL LAW - Assault with Intent to Rape.-In proof of an assault with intent to rape, the mother of prosecutrix may testify as to her manner and appearance, and the condition of her person, shortly after the

alleged assault, and to the fact that she made a dis closure.-STATE V. SARGENT, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep 899.

16. CRIMINAL LAW - Bawdyhouse - Evidence.-General reputation of the house as a house of prostitution is not competent or sufficient to sustain a conviction. The prosecution is not required to show particular acts of lewdness or prostitution in the house. It is competent for the prosecution to show that the house is resorted to by people of both sexes who are reputed to be of lewd and lascivious character. From evidence of the general reputation of the inmates and persons who resort thereto, as being of lewd and lascivious character, the law will infer that such characters resort thereto for lewd and immoral purposes, and that the house is a bawdyhouse.-NELSON V. TERRITORY, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 920.

17. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide.-In a trial for murder, an instruction that "in determining as to whether defendant is guilty of the offense charged" the jury must consider the facts and circumstances detailed in evidence from defendant's standpoint, as they reasonably appeared to him at the time, and not from any other standpoint, was properly refused, as it is only where the homicide is justified on the ground of self defense, and where defendant is to judge as to the danger in which he is placed at the time, that the facts and circumstances which constitute the danger are to be viewed from defendant's standpoint.-WATKINS V. UNITED STATES, I. T., 41 S. W. Rep. 1044.

Gaming and Gambling

18. CRIMINAL PRACTICE House. Where a statute fully defines the offense that it creates, it is ordinarily sufficient for an indictment to charge the defendant with all the acts within the statutory definition, substantially in the words of the statute, without further expansion. Section 2644 of the Revised Statutes, prohibiting the keeping of a table, room, house, or other place for the purpose of gaming or gambling, held to fall within this rule, and to so define the offense that it creates as that an indictment charging such offense substantially in its language will be sufficient.-MCBRIDE V. STATE, Fla., 22 South. Rep. 711.

19. EVIDENCE-Incompetent Employee-Evidence of Reputation. In an action against a railroad company for injuries received in a collision caused by the gross negligence of a telegraph operator, after the plaintiff has introduced evidence tending to show that the operator was not a fit man for the place, evidence offered by the defendant that the general reputation of the operator as a telegraph operator was good is admissible.-BALTIMORE & O. R. Co. v. CAMP, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 81 Fed. Rep. 807.

20. EVIDENCE - Photograph.-A photograph, like a plan or other picture, if its correctness be proved, may be used in a trial before a jury to illustrate the evidence in the case.-STATE V. HERSOM, Me., 38 Atl. Rep. 160.

21. FEDERAL COURTS Jurisdiction-Ancillary Proceeding.-A bill in equity filled in the circuit court against the parties to an action at law, which has proceeded to judgment in said court, to enjoin the enforcement of such judgment, and for permission to the complainant to intervene in said action and set up a defense, is ancillary to the original action, so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, and may be maintained without regard to diversity of citizenship. -MCDONALD V. SELIGMAN, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Cal.), 81 Fed. Rep. 753.

22. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE Voluntary Convey. ances. Neither a grantor nor his heirs can impeach a conveyance as voluntary unless at the time the conveyance was executed the grantor was in such a state of mental weakness as to be incapable of fully understanding the nature and effect of the transaction.CARNAGIE V. DIVEN, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 891.

23. GIFTS-Conditions-Delivery.-A person about to undergo a surgical operation, the result of which was uncertain, transferred all her property to defendant, the real estate being conveyed by deed in due form,

and the personal property, consisting of furniture, notes, clothing, etc., being transferred by a bill of sale, but no physical change in possession taking place. The intention was that the property should be used for the donor's benefit, and remain in her possession during her life, and in the event of her death from the operation, defendant was to distribute it according to the directions of an unsigned written memorandum: Held, the donor having retained possession, and the right to expend as much of the personalty as she might need during her life, that the transaction was void as a gift.-KNIGHT V. TRIPP, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 838.

24. HOMESTEAD- Mortgage Prior to Patent.-Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4 of the home stead act (12 Stat. 393), a mortgage executed upon land after the homestead entry man has made final proof and received final certificate therefor is valid, and such mortgage may be enforced by foreclosure and sale of the land.-FARISS V. DEMING INV. Co., Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 926.

25. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Support.-Since equity has jurisdiction to decree alimony to a wife, though no divorce is sought, it has jurisdiction also when the husband applies for support from the wife, in view of the fact that Civ. Code, §§ 155, 176, provide that has band and wife contract towards each other "obliga tions of mutual support," and that the wife must sup. port the husband if he is rendered unable to do so by infirmity. LIVINGSTON V. SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 836.

25. HUSBAND AND WIFE - Transfers - Fraud.-The wife of the owner of real and personal property val ued at several thousand dollars testified that she had helped to earn the property, which was in her husband's name, and that in the spring or fall of 1892 they entered into an agreement to divide the property, she to take the personalty, and he the land. No written transfer was made, nor was there any delivery of pos session; and the husband continued to manage the personalty, paying taxes thereon, and disposing of portions of it, without accounting to the wife: Held, the husband having testified flatly to the contrary, that the wife's testimony was insufficient to show a sale or transfer. -PERKINS v. MCCULLOUGH, Oreg., Pac. Rep. 862.

27. INJUNCTION BY TAXPAYER.-A taxpayer, though entitled to maintain suit in his own name to enjoin misapplication of funds of a municipal corporation, cannot likewise sue to recover its funds already mis appropriated.-BROWNFIELD V. HOUSER, Oreg., 49 Pac

Rep. 844.

28. INJUNCTION-Violation-Contempt.-One who is s party to a decree enjoining him from diverting cer tain water is guilty of contempt if his tenant, by bie direction, perform acts of diversion.-STATE V. LAVERY, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 852.

29. INSURANCE-Incumbrances.-Although a fire insurance policy contains a clause avoiding the policy if the subject of the insurance be or become incum bered by mortgage, yet, if it is issued with knowledge by the company of an existing incumbrance on the property, a new incumbrance, made for the purpose of discharging the existing one, will not avoid the policy.-KOSHLAND V. HOME MUT. INS. Co., Oreg., Pac. Rep. 864.

30. INSURANCE-Incumbrances.-A condition render ing an insurance policy vold by an increase of the har ard is not violated by giving a mortgage in order to discharge incumbrances on the property of which the insurer had knowledge when the insurance was el fected.-KOSHLAND V. FIRE ASSN. OF PHILADELPHIA, Oreg., 40 Pac. Rep. 865.

31. INSURANCE-Misrepresentation and Concealment. -The failure of insured to disclose in his application the existence of incumbrances on the property, if not asked as to incumbrances by the agent of the com pany who filled out the application, will not avoid the

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34. LIBEL Newspaper Articles as Evidence.-In a suit for libel, an article published in a widely-circulated newspaper, containing a statement of facts upon which the defendant subsequently predicates the libelous publication, if shown to have been seen, read, and believed to be true by the defendant, is proper to be admitted in evidence, not in rebuttal of the plaintiff's evidence disproving the truth of such newspaper article, nor as affirmative evidence of the truth of the statements therein made, but only in mitigation of damages, for the purpose of showing that the libelous words were used upon probable grounds of suspicion calculated at the time to Impress the belief of their truth, and that they were not published with the malicious purpose of falsely and wantonly destroying character.-HOEY V. FLETCHER, Fla., 22 South. Rep.

716.

35. MANDAMUS-License-Board of Health.-Mandamus will not issue to an officer to require the doing of a thing that has already been done, although the person in whose favor the act was performed may have been entitled to the performance of it upon other grounds than those upon which it was performed; and where It appears, under the indefinite allegations of an alternative writ, that a person claiming the right to be licensed as a practicing physician has already been granted this license by the officer whose duty it would be, in a proper case, to issue it, this is held as an additional reason for refusing the writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of such license.-WEEDEN V. ARNOLD, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 916.

86. MASTER AND SERVANT-Contract of Employment -Construction.-A contract between a corporation and a workman who has received injuries while in its serv. ice, that he shall be paid a given rate of wages per month, and shall render such services as he can, without any stipulation as to duration, is not an undertaking to pay such workman an annuity during the remainder of his life, but a contract of employment by the month, which may be terminated by either party at the end of any month.-TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & RAILROAD CO. V. PIERCE, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Cir. cult, 81 Fed. Rep. 814.

87. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Defective StreetsContributory Negligence.-The streets, including the sidewalks, of the cities of this territory are dedicated to the public use, and, if an abutting proprietor or occupant makes an excavation in the sidewalk, for the convenience and advantage of his adjacent property, it is an invasion and appropriation, to that extent, of a public user and, having made the appropriation, he cannot, by reason of it, create a cause of action in his own favor against the city, notwithstanding the fact that the city may itself have been at fault and negli. gent in contributing to the cause of the injury complained of. Such an excavation by an abutting pro. prietor, resulting in injury to him, is contributory negligence.-CITY OF GUTHRIE V. NIX, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 918.

38. NEGLIGENCE-Owner of Vessel-Liability to Stevedore.-An employee of a company of stevedores un

loading a vessel may maintain an action for damages against the owners of the vessel for injuries received by reason of stepping on the cover of a manhole on the deck which the owners had carelessly and negli. gently permitted to become defective, out of repair, and unsafe.-CLIFFE V. PACIFIC MAIL S. S. Co., U. S. C. C., N. D. (Cal.), 81 Fed. Rep. 809.

39. NEW TRIAL-Verdict against Evidence.-Though a trial judge may exhibit his dissatisfaction with a ver. dict by setting it aside as "against the evidence," and in such case his dissatisfaction cannot be questioned, if there was evidence pro and con considered by the jury and by him in setting it aside, such dissatisfaction must be as to the finding on an issue, and not merely with a finding as to the amount of recovery; and he cannot set aside a verdict in an action of tort, on motion of the successful party, on the ground of Inadequacy, unless it appears to be the result of passion, prejudice, corruption, unaccountable caprice, or other improper influences.-JENKINS V. HANKINS, Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 1028.

40. OFFICE AND Officers-City Treasurer-Warrants. -Under charter provisions requiring the city treas. urer to receive and safely keep all moneys of the city coming into his hands, and pay the same out on war. rants and orders signed by the mayor and recorder, it is not his duty, and he therefore cannot be compelled, to make a partial payment on a warrant, though he is directed to do so by the city council.-STATE V. GRANT, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 855.

41. PARTNERSHIP-What Constitutes.-One who owns a share in the assets of a firm, and has a one-third interest in the profits of the continued conduct of the business, but who is excluded from any control in such business, is not in partnership with such firm, as between the parties.-WORMSER V. LINDAUER, N. Mex., 49 Pac. Rep. 896.

42. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Authority.-An agent of a non-resident loan company negotiated a loan and was named trustee in the deed given to secure the loan. He continued to be the company's agent for the transaction of all its business where the loan was made, and was collecting its money, and loaning its funds: Held, that he had authority, even as against the company, to declare money secured by said trust deed to be due, and to sell the lands under such deed, and to make deeds to the purchaser, and to receive the money paid by him. EDINBURGH AMERICAN LAND MORTG. Co. v. BRIGGS, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 1036.

43. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Authority to make Negotiable Notes.-The authority of an agent with power to execute negotiable instruments is confined to the making of such paper in the legitimate business of the principal, or for his benefit, and does not extend to the making of a note in his principal's name for the benefit of, or as security for, a third person. - BOORD V. STRAUSS, Fla., 22 South. Rep. 713.

44. RAILROAD COMPANY. A statute which provides that, in case of the refusal of a (railroad) corporation or its agents to take and transport any passenger or property as provided in the preceding section, or in case of the neglect or refusal of such corporation or its agents to discharge or deliver passengers or property at the regularly appointed places under the laws which regulate common carriers, such corporation shall pay to the party aggrieved all damages which shall be sustained thereby, with costs of action, imposes no duty upon the railroad company to erect stations or warehouses for receiving and delivering freight. - CHADDICK V. LINDSAY, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 940.

45. RAILROAD COMPANY- Fires-Negligence.-A railroad company allowed inflammable material to collect upon its right of way. It was discovered to be ignited within five minutes after a freight train passed. The fire spread, burning property of an adjoining owner. It was shown that fire could not have originated from smoldering embers in the ground: Held, sufficient to

raise a presumption that the fire was started by the negligence of the company, which it was the duty of the company to rebut.-RICHMOND V. MCNEILL, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 880.

46. RAILROAD COMPANY-Omission of Signals at CrossIng. Under Mill. & V. Code Tenn. § 1298, requiring overseers of public roads to erect a sign at each railroad crossing, and providing that "no engine driver shall be compelled to blow the whistle or ring the bell at any crossing unless it is so designated," the servants In charge of a train are not required to give a warning of any kind of the approach of a train to a crossing not so designated.-SOUTHERN RY. Co. v. ELDER, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 81 Fed. Rep. 791.

47. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railroads - Accident at Crossing. A driver of a vehicle, before attempting to cross an electric street-railway track at a street intersection, is not bound at his peril to know that a collision will not occur, and need only make such observation and acquire such information as would convince a reasonably prudent man, in a like situation, that the passage could be made in safety. — SAUNDERS V. CITY & SUBURBAN R. Co., Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 1031. 48. RAILROAD MORTGAGES Claims for Purchase Money of Right of Way. Railroad mortgage bond. holders, who, by virtue of a future-acquired property clause in their mortgage, obtain an interest in or lien upon lands condemned for the use of the company, hold subject to the claim of the prior owner for the purchase money. - CENTRAL TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK V. LOUISVILLE, ST. L. & T. RY. Co., U. S. C. C., D. (Ky.), 81 Fed. Rep. 772.

49. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Diverse Citizenship - Cor. porations. - Where neither party resides in the State where suit is brought, and the sum in dispute exceeds $2,000, defendant may have the suit removed to the Cir. cuit Court of the United States in a district where neither party resides, under Act March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 552) §§ 1, 2, as amended and corrected by Act Aug. 13, 1888 (25 Stat. 433), providing that where the sum in dis. pute exceeds $2,000 a non-resident defendant may have the suit removed to the Circuit Court of the United States, if the parties are citizens of different States, notwithstanding the further provision of section 1 that such suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either plaintiff or defendant, since such further provision was enacted solely for the benefit of defendant, who may waive it.-KOSHLAND V. NATIONAL FIRE INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 846.

50. SALES-Assumpsit.-When goods are sold, to be delivered at a place named at a future time, and before delivery they are accidentally lost or destroyed, the loss falls upon the buyer if at the time of the loss the title had passed to him; otherwise the seller must bear the loss.-DUDLEY V. POLAND PAPER Co., Me., 2 Atl. Rep. 157.

38

51. SALES-Rescission for Fraud-Tender of Price.-A seller who received notes of third parties as part of the price cannot, on the ground that the notes are worthless, excuse his failure to return or tender them before rescission of the sale. - CROSSEN V. MURPHY, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 858.

52. SHERIFF — Assault on Prisoner.-It is the duty of the sheriff to safely keep and protect the prisoners in his charge from unlawful injury, and, if unlawful assaults are made upon such prisoners in the county jail by others who are confined therein, the sheriff will be responsible in an action for damages to the prisoner suffering the injury, if the sheriff and his deputies or jailer in his employment, or deputed by him, are aware of the contemplated assault, and do not use every reasonable means to prevent it. Such neglect on the part of either the sheriff, deputies, or jailer is a failure to "faithfully perform" the duty of sheriff.HIXON V. CUPP, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 927.

53. TAXATION Assessment - Listing.-The law presumes that a taxing officer on whom is imposed a specific duty has regularly performed his duty, and that the proceeding in the required respect was reg.

ularly performed; and in an attack made against the levy and collection of the usual and ordinary taxes on the ground that the assessment list was not taken by the required officer it will be presumed that the listing was regularly done, until the contrary clearly appears. -PENTECOST V. STILES, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 921.

54. TAXATION-Cattle-Situs.-While it may be stated, as a general proposition of law, that personal prop erty has no situs except that of the domicile of the owner, yet this doctrine yields wherever it is applied to the taxation of personal property.-PRAIRIE CATTLE Co. v. WILLIAMSON, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 937.

55. TRESPASS QUARE CLAUSUM - Right of Way.-Defendant in an action of trespass on the freehold need not plead or prove his defense of right of way by ne cessity, when such right is conceded by plaintiff.JENNE V. PIPER, Vt., 38 Atl. Rep. 147.

56. TRIAL - Misconduct of Jury. Conversation be tween jurymen in the jury box is not of itself miscon duct, and, unless it be shown to have improper refer ence to the evidence or merits of the case, and be prejudicial to defendant, it will not work a reversal.PEOPLE V. KRAMER, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 842.

57. TRIAL Remarks of Court. Where the circumstances in proof in a case are of such a character as to make the proper finding upon the material issue in the case dependent upon the untrammeled determination of the jury upon various hypotheses of fact, it is error for the judge to make the following remarks to the jury, for the purpose of correcting the argument of law to the jury by counsel in the cause, viz.: "The jury must obey the instructions of the court, and if you dis obey the instructions of the court you will be guilty of contempt of court, and the court can punish you." There should be nothing in the intercourse of the judge with the jury having the least appearance of duress or coercion.-PRICE V. CARTER, Fla., 22 South. Rep. 715.

58. TRUSTS Evidence.-The books of account of an absconding probate judge, showing that certain funds in his hands as trustee were used to purchase certain notes, are admissible to prove that fact, even although not admissible to show that subsequent holders had notice of the fiduciary capacity in which the Judge ac quired them.-FREEMAN V. BAILEY, S. Car., 27 8. E. Rep. 686.

59. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Specific Performance.To justify the court sitting in equity to compel specific performance, and compel a defendant to make a conveyance, the plaintiff must show that he has a clear title to the conveyance prayed for. A doubtful or con tingent title is not sufficient; it must be a complete and perfected title.-GLIDDEN V. KORTER, Me., 38 Atl. Rep. 159.

60. WATERS-Irrigating Rights.-A prior appropriator of water of a certain stream cannot so increase bis demands and use of the water as to deprive a subsequent appropriator of his rights acquired before such in creased demands and use.-BECKER V. MARBLE CREEK IRR. CO., Utah, 49 Pac. Rep. 892.

61. WATERS Water Rights - Appropriation. - One who has several years heretofore filed notice that he claimed an appropriation of a certain amount of water for agricultural purposes, but has made no additional or other use of the water than he had prior to that time, can claim no additional rights by reason thereof. -SMYTH V. NEAL, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 850.

62. WITNESS - Husband and Wife-Confidential Com munications.-Code Civ. Proc. § 1881, subd. 1. provides that neither husband nor wife can be examined, with out the consent of the other, "as to any communica tion made by one to the other during the marriage, but this exception does not apply to a civil action of proceeding by one against the other, nor to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other:" Held, that this rule of evidence applies to all criminal actions except those for crimes committed by either husband or wife against the other.~PEOPLE V. WARNEB, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 841.