prive the unsuccessful party of his property without due process of
law, within the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 103.
4. The act of the legislature of Massachusetts of June 1, 1867, c. 308, to
enable the city of Boston to abate a nuisance, and for the preservation
of the public health in said city, and which provided for the taking
of certain private lands therein, and for their improvement, filling up,
and complete draining, so as to abate an existing nuisance and pre-
serve the health of the city, and which further provided for the pay-
ment of the cost of the lots so taken through judicial proceedings, was
within the constitutional power of the legislature of that State, and
the fee in said lands, when acquired by the city, passed to it under the
act, and the previous owners ceased to have any interest in them, but
were only entitled to reasonable compensation, to be ascertained in
the manner provided by the act. Sweet v. Rechel, 380.
5. It is within the power of Congress to provide, for persons convicted of
conspiracy to do a criminal act, a punishment more severe than that pro-
vided for persons committing such act. Clune v. United States, 590.
6. The provision in § 3959 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri that pris-
oners convicted two or more times of committing offences punishable
by imprisonment in the penitentiary, shall be punished with increased
severity for the later offences, does not in any way conflict with the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Moore v. Missouri, 673.
7. A State may provide that persons who have been before convicted of
crime may suffer severer punishment for subsequent offences than for
a first offence against the law, and that a different punishment for the
same offence may be inflicted under particular circumstances, provided
it is dealt out to all alike who are similarly situated. Ib.
8. No question which could be regarded as a Federal question having
been raised at his trial, the prisoner was not subjected to an unconstitu-
tional ruling in not being allowed to have his case heard at large by
seven judges, instead of by three. Ib.
See TAXATION, 3;
TOWNSHIP, 2.
The parties to these suits having had extensive dealings founded upon
mutual agreements and arrangements respecting the manufacture of
and licenses to manufacture patented articles, and having had seri-
ous misunderstandings touching their accounts, came to an agree-
ment whereby the Thorn Company, in consideration of the sum of
$10,000 paid to it by the Washburn and Moen Company, released and
discharged the latter from all claims and demands of every kind and
nature whatsoever, which it had or could have against that company
for and on account of any moneys, properties, or valuable things
which the Washburn Company had received from any persons in
settlement for damages or profits accruing to it, on account of infringe-
ments committed upon any letters patent, and also on account of any
moneys which it had received by way of bonuses or premiums paid
to it by parties receiving licenses from it; and discharged and
released the Washburn Company from any obligation to account to
the Thorn Company for any sums which it might thereafter receive
in settlement of claims for damages for infringements prior to the
date of that agreement, or for moneys which it should thereafter
receive for bonuses or premiums for licenses. The parties worked
under this agreement for several years, the Washburn Company pay-
ing and the Thorn Company receiving, without objection, from time
to time considerable sums as royalties, etc., due thereunder, the
Washburn Company settling with parties from whom the royalties
were due, sometimes receiving cash in full, sometimes notes, and
sometimes compromising on receipt of a lesser sum. After the lapse
of about eight years the Thorn Company filed its bill in equity to set
aside the agreement and the settlements made under it, claiming that
it was entitled to a much larger sum than it had received; and the
Washburn Company in its answer denied this claim and filed a cross-
bill claiming to recover from the Thorn Company large sums which
it had been obliged to yield to licensees in compromising settlements
with them. Held, (1) That the agreement released the Washburn
Company from claims for damages due at its date, but received subse-
quent thereto, and from claims for royalties due on its own products,
or products of its licensees sold prior to its date; (2) that under the
circumstances disclosed it was not open to the Thorn Company to
claim that $10,000 was not a sufficient consideration for such release;
(3) that the Thorn Company, by receiving, for so long a period, roy-
alties as accruing and receipting for them as collected without chal-
lenging the accounts rendered, and by its delay in setting up claims
for moneys received by the Washburn Company before the date of
the agreement, and its delay in contesting settlements and compro-
mises made by that company, must be deemed to have acquiesced in
the construction put upon the contract by the Washburn Company,
and to have assented to its settlements with licensees; and that the
evidence showed no want of diligence or good faith by the latter com-
pany in this respect; (4) that the Washburn Company was not
entitled to recover the sums claimed in its cross-bill. Thorn Wire
Hedge Co. v. Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Co., 423.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
See RAILROAD.
CORPORATION.
See JURISDICTION, B;
TOWNSHIP, 1, 2.
1. A request to instruct a verdict for the defendant should be disregarded
when the evidence is conflicting. White v. Van Horn, 3.
2. A request to charge may be disregarded when the court has already
fully instructed the jury on the point. Ib.
3. The court should refuse to charge upon a purely hypothetical state-
ment of facts, calculated to mislead the jury. lb.
4. An objection to one of a number of charges is unavailable when the
charge, taken as a whole, fairly states the question which the jury
is to decide by preponderance of proof. Ib.
1. An instruction on the trial of a person indicted for murder, whereby
the verdict of guilty of murder or manslaughter turns alone upon an
inquiry as to the way in which the killing was done, is held to be re-
versible error. Brown v. United States, 100.
2. The court committed no error in charging that the fact that the man
killed was a white man might be shown by the statement of the
defendant taken in connection with other facts and circumstances.
Isaacs v. United States, 487.
3. It is not error in Utah to proceed to trial of a person accused of murder
before the filing of the transcript of the preliminary examination had
.under the Compiled Laws of Utah, § 4883. Thiede v. Utah Territory,
4. The provision in Rev. Stat. § 1033, that the defendant in a capital case
is entitled to have delivered to him at least two entire days before the
trial a copy of the indictment and a list of the witnesses to be pro-
duced on the trial does not control the practice and procedure of the
local courts of Utah. Ib.
5. In Utah a juror in a capital case who states on his voir dire that he had
read an account of the homicide in the newspaper and formed some
impression touching it, but that he could lay that aside and try the
case fairly and impartially on the evidence, is not subject to challenge
for cause. Ib.
6. A juror is not subject to challenge for cause in a criminal proceeding
against a saloon keeper for homicide, who states on his voir dire that
he has a prejudice against the business of saloon keeping, but none
against the defendant, whom he does not know. Ib.
7. When the relations between a defendant, charged with murdering his
wife and the wife are to be settled, not by direct and positive but by
circumstantial evidence, any circumstance which tends to throw light
thereon may be fairly admitted in evidence. lb.
8. Deliberation and premeditation to commit crime need not exist in the
criminal's mind for any fixed period before the commission of the
act. lb.
9. An indictment for murder in the Eastern District of Texas which al-
leges that the accused and the deceased were not Indians nor citizens
of the Indian Territory is sufficient, without the further allegation
that they were not citizens of any Indian tribe or nation.
10. When a verdict is general upon all the counts in an indictment, suffi-
cient in form, it must stand if any one of the counts was sustained
by competent testimony. Goode v. United States, 663.
11. In an indictment under Rev. Stat. § 5467, against a letter carrier
charged with secreting, embezzling, or destroying a letter containing
postage stamps, the fact that the letter was a decoy is no defence.
lb.
12. A letter addressed to a fictitious person, known to be such, is a letter
within the meaning of the statute, and for the purposes of Rev. Stat.
§§ 5467 and 5469 a letter which bears the outward semblance of a gen-
uine communication, and comes into the possession of the employé in
the regular course of his official business, is a writing or document
within the meaning of the statute. Ib.
13. Where a general verdict of guilty is rendered, an objection taken to
evidence admissible under one, or a part, of the counts, is untenable.
14. The term "branch post office," as employed in those sections, includes
every place within such office where letters are kept in the regular
course of business, for reception, stamping, assorting, or delivery. Ib.
15. It being shown, in this case, that the branch post office in which the
offence was alleged to have been committed was known as the Rox-
bury station of the Boston post office, that it had been used as such
for years, and that it was a post office de facto, it was unnecessary to
show that it had been regularly established as such by law. Ib.
16. The consolidation of several indictments against different persons
growing out of the same transaction, and the trial of all at the same
time and by the same jury, if not excepted to at the time, cannot be
objected to after verdict. Bucklin v. United States (No. 2), 682.
17. The indictment in this case, in every substantial particular, states an
offence against the laws of the United States. Ib.
18. An instruction, on the trial of several defendants indicted separately
for offences growing out of the same transaction, that, while they
might find a verdict of guilty as to all the defendants, or find some
guilty and some not guilty, they could not find a verdict as to some
and disagree as to others, contains prejudicial error which may be
taken advantage of by a defendant who is found guilty and convicted.
Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5 to 8;
HABEAS CORpus, 1;
JURISDICTION, A, 18, 19;
1. Goods arriving at the port of New York August 7, 1894, entered at the
custom house and duties paid August 8, 1894, and the entry liquidated
as entered at the custom house August 28, 1894, on which day the
tariff act of August, 1894, became a law without the signature of the
President, were subject to duty under the act of October 1, 1890, and
not to duty under the act of August 28, 1894. United States v. Burr,
78.
2. The provision in § 1 of the tariff act of 1894, which took effect August
28 of that year, that from and after the first day of August, 1894,
there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon articles imported from
foreign countries the rates of duty prescribed by that act, does not
apply to transactions completed when the act became a law. 1b.
3. The third question from the Circuit Court of Appeals is too general and
need not be answered. Ib.
4. Lentils and white medium beans in a dry state, both mature and ordi-
narily used for food, though sometimes sold for seed, imported into
New York in the years 1887 and 1888, were properly classified by the
collector as vegetables under paragraph 286 of Schedule G of the act
of March 3, 1883, c. 121, and as such were subject to a duty of ten per
cent ad valorem. Sonn v. Magone, 417.
5. Maddock v. Magone, 152 U. S. 368, affirmed to the point that "in con-
struing a tariff act, when it is claimed that the commercial use of a
word or phrase in it differs from the ordinary signification of such
word or phrase, in order that the former prevail over the latter it must
appear that the commercial designation is the result of established
usage in commerce and trade, and that at the time of the passage of
the act that usage was definite, uniform, and general, and not partial,
local, or personal." Ib.
6. Whether the lentils and beans were properly classified by the collector
was a matter for the court to decide. Ib.
7. The plaintiffs in error imported into the port of New York in Novem-
ber, 1888, a quantity of wool which had been scoured; which was then
put upon a comb from which it came in long lengths known as slivers
or slubbing; which was then put through a process called gilling,
which formed the slivers into a less number of slivers of greater thick-
ness; and which was then taken into the drawing room and finished,
from whence it came out in the form of round balls called tops. The
collector first classed the goods as waste, and fixed the duty at ten
cents a pound under the act of March 3, 1883, c. 121, 22 Stat. 488,
which duty was paid; but subsequently the collector imposed on the
whole importation, under the same act, a duty of ten cents a pound as
wool of the first class, costing under thirty cents per pound in the un-
washed condition; then trebled that duty, because imported scoured;
and then doubled the result upon the ground that the tops had been
changed in their character or condition for the purpose of evading the
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