142. State of Minnesota v. Armour, 118 Minn. 128, 136 N. W. 565 (1912).

Short Weight.

KNOWLEDGE OR INTENT. Knowledge or intent need not be alleged in the indictment or proved at the trial, in a prosecution brought under a short weight statute silent as to knowledge or intent.

REPRESENTATION. It is essential to liability under a statute prohibiting the selling of less of a quantity than is represented, that there be an actual misrepresentation as to the weight of the commodity sold. A seller must be allowed to prove, if he can, that the representation made to the buyer

was true.

SALE BY GROSS WEIGHT, ALLOWABILITY. The purpose of a statute penalizing the selling of less than the quantity represented is to prevent misrepresentation of quantity. Such a statute does not prevent a vendor and vendee from making a special contract for the sale of a commodity, such as wrapped meat, by gross weight.

143. State of Minnesota ex rel Stone v. Eck, 121 Minn. 202, 141 N. W. 106 (1913).

Public Weighing Ordinance.

MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY. A city has power, under stautory authority to require, by ordinance, that coal for sale be weighed by the city weighmaster. DISCRIMINATION. An ordinance which requires coal and certain other commodities to be weighed by the city weighmaster, and exempts from such weighing sales under a certain weight, is not unreasonable or discriminatory.

PURPOSE OF ORDINANCE. The purpose of a public weighing ordinance is to prohibit fraud, and to provide a method by which the purchasers of commodities may be protected against short weight sales.

144. State of Minnesota v. People's Ice Co., 124 Minn. 307, 144 N. W. 962 (1914).

Short Weight.

KNOWLEDGE OR INTENT. Knowledge or intent need not be alleged in the indictment or proved at the trial, in a prosecution brought under a short weight statute silent as to knowledge or intent.

LIABILITY OF CORPORATION FOR Acts of AgeNTS. Under a short weight statute silent as to knowledge or intent, a corporation is criminally liable for the acts of its agents.

A corporation is liable for its agent giving short weight even though the corporation had no knowledge of such sale and has instructed employees to give full weight.

TITLE OF STATUTES. Scope of title of weights and measures act. The Title of the State Weights and Measures Act reads: "An act creating a department of weights and measures, to be under the jurisdiction of the Railroad and Warchouse Commission, defining its duties and powers and providing penalties for interfering therewith." This title is broad enough to cover the provision of the act which penalizes the selling of less of a quantity than is represented.

SINGLENESS OF SUBJECT MATTER OF STATUTES. Purpose of constitutional provision. The purpose of a constitutional provision that "no law

shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, is to prevent combining in one act, for logrolling or other improper purposes, matters pertaining to diverse and unconnected subjects; to provide for apprising the legislature and the public, through the title of the act, of the general subject matter with which it deals; and to secure a separate consideration of each distinct legislative measure.

Liberal construction of constitutional provisions. A constitutional provision, requiring statutes to embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the one title, is to be construed liberally. All doubts are to be resolved in favor of the sufficiency of the title of an act adopted by the legislature.

145. St. Anthony & Dakota Elevator Co. v. Great Northern Railway Co., 127 Minn. 299, 149 N. W. 471 (1914).

State Weighing of Grain.

Records of Weighmaster.

Competent evidence. The records in the office of the State weighmaster, made pursuant to rules established by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, are competent evidence of the facts recorded therein.

Notations of condition of cars. The rules of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission require state weighers, at the time of weighing loaded cars, to make and enter in the record, notations as to the condition of the cars. Such notations so entered become a proper part of the record.

Admissibility in evidence of copies. Copies of the State weighmaster's records are not admissible in evidence unless duly authenticated. However, such authentication may be waived.

146. State of Minnesota v. Washed Sand and Gravel Co., 136 Minn. 361, 162 N. W. 451 (1917).

Short Weight.

KNOWLEDGE OR INTENT. Where a short weight ordinance contains such words as "knowingly" or "intentionally," knowledge or intent are essential elements of the offense, and must be alleged in the indictment and proved at the trial. If kowledge or intent are not alleged and proved, there can be no conviction.

147. State of Minnesota v. Grant Co., 158 Minn. 334, 197 N. W. 738 (1924).

Short Weight.

"OFFER TO SELL" DEFINED. An "offer to sell" less than the quantity represented means the same as an attempt to sell, and does not require a formal acceptance, as in contract law. Thus, where coal was intercepted while in the process of delivery to customers who had placed orders, there was an "offer" to sell within the meaning of the short weight statute.

KNOWLEDGE OR INTENT. Where a short weight statute does not contain such words as "knowingly" or "intentionally," knowledge or intent are not necessary elements of the offense. Therefore, knowledge or intent need not be alleged in the indictment, or proved at the trial.

CARELESSNESS IN WEIGHING. Carelessness in weighing (for example, guessing the weight of coal in each compartment of a coal truck), is no defense in a short weight prosecution.

Minnesota, Mississippi

43

148. State of Minnesota v. Inland Coal & Dock Co., 208 Minn. 216, 293 N. W. 611 (1940).

State Weighing of Coal in Carload Lots.

FEES NOT RECOVERABLE, WHEN. A statute, relating to the State weighing of carload lots of coal, excepted from its provisions coal shipped for one's "own use or consumption." The statutory exception applies to a shipper who transports cars of his own coal, from his own dock, to his own yards where it is unloaded and resold in smaller lots to the public. The legislature did not intend to except only coal which the shipper intended to burn. Under such circumstances, the State is not entitled to recover fees for weighing such coal.

149. State of Minnesota v. Houston, 210 Minn. 379, 298 N. W. 358 (1941).

Egg Ordinance.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCE. The Minneapolis ordinance establishing grades for retail sale of eggs according to weight and condition is reasonable and constitutional.

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF STATE AND CITY. A municipality, if it has properly delegated authority, and if it legislates consistently with State law, may make an act an offense against the city, even though such act is, by statute, an offense against the State.

REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. Presumption of reasonableness. When a city ordinance is within the grant of power conferred on a city, the presumption is that the ordinance is reasonable, unless an unreasonableness appears on its face.

Power of courts. Courts have no power to declare a city ordinance void as being unreasonable, unless the unreasonableness is so clear, manifest, and undoubted as to amount to an arbitrary exercise of the power vested in the city.

MISSISSIPPI

150. Gaines v. Coates, 51 Miss. 335 (1875).

Public Weighing Ordinance.

CONSTITUTIONALITY. An ordinance requiring certain commodities to be weighed by a public weigher, for a fee, before being sold, is constitutional, and does not restrain trade.

PUBLIC WEIGHER, InterferenCE WITH, BY PRIVATE WEIGHER. A corporation, not having been given by its charter exclusive weighing privileges, may be enjoined from weighing cotton for the public, to the exclusion of the city weigher.

151. Miller v. Winston County Union Warehouse Co., 94 Miss. 348, 47 So. 501 (1908).

Public Weigher Statute.

RIGHTS OF PRIVATE WEIGHER. An act creating the office of county weigher for Winston County, provided as follows: "Nothing herein contained shall be construed as to prevent any one from withholding his cotton from said cotton weigher, and said cotton weigher shall not be entitled to

fees on cotton not weighed by him." Under this law, the county weigher could not restrain a warehouse company from weighing, for a fee, cotton received in the course of its business. The county weigher could not recover fees for cotton not weighed by him.

152. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Butterfield Lumber Co., 95 Miss. 540, 49 So. 179 (1909).

Evidence.

OF

Books of Weigher, ADMISSIBILITY. A weigher's books cannot be introduced in evidence unless proved to be correct by the testimony of the weigher himself, or by other evidence showing that the entries are accurate.

MISSOURI

(See also Cases US 4, 10, and Fed 19 herein)

153. Green v. Moffet, 22 Mo. 529 (1856).

Weights and Measures in Contracts.

HEMP, STATUTORY Ton GovernS CONTRACTS. Evidence that by custom or usage a ton of hemp consists of 2,240 pounds, instead of the statutory ton of 2,000 pounds, is not admissible in the interpretation of contracts for sale of hemp by the "ton". The parties may otherwise agree, but when they do not, the statutory weight governs.

154. Clifton v. Sparks, 82 Mo. 115 (1884).

Agreement to Weigh on Seller's Scales.

WARRANTY OF CORRECTNESS OF SCALES. Under a contract whereby goods are to be weighed on the vendor's scales, the vendor impliedly warrants that his scales are correct. If they are not, he must return to the buyer so much of the money received by reason of excessive weights, even though there was no pretense of actual fraud on the part of the vendor.

155. Campbell v. Clark, 44 Mo. App. 249 (1891).

Weights and Measures in Contracts.

DEVIATION FROM STATUTORY RULE BY MISTAKE. Where parties agreed to a rule of measurement of brick walls different than the rule provided by a statute, which rule they overlooked, a mistake of law occurred, and there could be no recovery of money paid.

RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID UNDER MISTAKE OF LAW. Money paid with a full knowledge of the facts, but under a mistake of the law, cannot be recovered in the absence of fraud, imposition, undue influence, and the like

156. City of Lamar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App. 507 (1894).

Public Weighing.

MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY. A city of the fourth class has power, under statute, to establish and regulate markets and scales, appoint a weighmaster, and require certain commodities for sale to be weighed by such weighmaster.

REGULATION OF ARTICLES NOT SOLD IN THE CITY. A city cannot require that products be weighed on the public scales where such products are not to be sold or offered for sale within the limits of the city. Such a provision is unreasonable and void.

ORDINANCE VOID IN PART. The valid sections of an ordinance will stand, if a void section can be rejected without changing the intent of the ordinance.

ReasonablenesS OF ORDINANCES. An ordinance may be declared void if it is oppressive, unequal, unjust, or altogether unreasonable. However, a clear case must be made before the courts will interfere on the ground of unreasonableness. Where there is doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the validity of the ordinance.

157. Sylvester Coal Co. v. City of St. Louis, 130 Mo. 323, 32 S. W. 649 (1895).

Regulation of Retail Coal Dealers.

VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE. An ordinance requiring retail coal dealers to furnish official weight certificates to consumers, the blank certificates to be purchased from the city, is valid under city charter authorizing the city to provide for weighing of coal and to regulate and tax retailers.

PURPOSE OF ORDINANCE. The purpose of an ordinance regulating retail coal dealers is to protect the citizens from being imposed upon by false weights and measures.

WISDOM OF ORDINANCE. Whether the mayor and assembly have selected the best means to accomplish the purpose of an ordinance is not a matter for the courts to determine.

158. City of St. Charles v. Elsner, 155 Mo. 671, 56 S. W. 291 (1900).

Public Weighing Ordinance.

MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY. Implied power to maintain city scales. The power granted by statute to a city of the third class to provide for the weighing of coal and to fix the fees therefor, necessarily implies the power to maintain public scales.

Fees. A city of the third class has power by statute to regulate the business of a coal dealer by requiring his coal to be weighed, for a fee, on the public scales. Such charge is not limited to the actual expense of maintaining the scales.

DISCRIMINATION. An ordinance requiring certain commodities to be weighed on the city scales is not discriminatory because sales under a certain. weight are excluded from its provisions. Such a classification is reasonable. 159. City of Springfield v. Starke and Jones, 93 Mo. App. 70 (1902). Testing of Devices.

FEES FOR TESTING. Invalidity of ordinance. An ordinance is unreasonable which compels every merchant in a city to pay fees twice a year for the testing and sealing of the weights and measures used in his business, when no such power has been expressly granted to the city.

Municipal authority. A city of the third class has no power to exact a fee for the testing and sealing of commercial weights and measures.