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lished in one volume of about 450 pages, 360 of which consist of text with foot notes, the remaining pages being used for the table of contents, table of cited cases and the index. In its typography the book in no wise falls short of the excellent standard that has been hitherto maintained by the publishers; the print is clear and agreeable to the eye, and an almost complete absence of errors testifies to the thoroughness and care of the proof-reading. In this work Judge Gillet has done much more than simply add another to the already long list of works on evidence. As indieated by the title, he has endeavored to illumine what may be called the borderland or frontier of the domain of evidence. While the paths through these outlying regions have been much traveled and much fought over, there has been no adequate effort in the past to systematize them, or to take a comprehensive view of them. Herein the author has done much original and valuable service. Especially true is this of his chapter entitled Collateral Evidence. Under this he treats, among others, the vexed question, which in a trial is so often provocative of heated debate, how far, if at all, shall proof be admitted of similar or dissimilar facts as tending to show the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue. After giving a concise statement of the general rules with their underlying reasons, he considers elaborately some of the leading illustrations, devoting several sections each to the topics, collateral crimes, other defects in negligence cases, prior injuries at the same place, experiments, prior habits and conduct, subsequent precautions, and the inspection of persons and places. Ten sections are given to a treatment of the questions affecting the credibility of wit nesses. The subject of admissions and confessions is covered by two chapters that are remarkable for the accuracy and clearness with which that broad subject has been condensed. Under the head of declarations the author states the rule requiring the best evidence to be produced, and treats of the principle exceptions which the practical administration of the law has forced upon the salutary rule. Among others are considered matters of public concern, ancient documents, declarations against interest, entries made in the ordinary course of business. The subjects of Dying Declarations, Expert and Opinion Evidence, Hearsay, and the doctrine of Res Gestæ are elaborately treated each in a separate chapter. All of the text is supported by the citation of the latest and best considered authorities. The fact that there are more than 3,100 decided cases in addition to text books, shows diligence in the author, but the discriminating quality of his work is to be appreciated only from an examination of the cases and a comparison of the text. Subjected to such a test the work will not suffer in the estimation of the critic, but will add to the already enviable reputation of the author as an eminent jurist. W. P. F.

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HUMORS OF THE LAW.

In a murder case in one of the wire grass counties of Virginia, there had been some difficulty in completing the panel. After eleven had been sworn in, there came up a lank, cadaverous-looking fellow, with pantaloons fastened by a single suspender. The judge said: "Juror, look upon the prisoner. Prisoner, look upon the juror." He scanned the prisoner intently, and turning to the udge said: "Yes jedge, I think he's guilty."

After hearing argument in a case a rural justice said: "I'm sorter mixed on this here matter, an' I'll preserve my decision."

"About what time, jedge," said the lawyer, "will you dish out them preserves?"

"Thar's no tellin'," replied his honor. "I've got a sight o' plowin' tew do, an' erbout ten acres to fence in. Jest take the pris'ner ter jail till fall!"

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1. ATTACHMENT - - Appearance - Commencement of Action.-Where a defendant appears in court, and moves to dissolve the attachment on the merits of the proceedings, such as the insufficiency of the attachment affidavit, he enters a general appearance in the case, and thereby waives all objections to the service on him in said case, and to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.-RAYMOND V. NIX, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 1110.

2. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS-By-laws.-The by-laws, rules, and regulations of a beneficial association, whether referred to or not, form part of the contract made by a member in joining.-HASS V. MUTUAL RELIEF ASSN. OF PETALUNA, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 1056.

3. CONTEMPT-Judgment.-A judgment or order of court that a defendant stand committed to the county jail until the further order of the court, for a contempt in refusing to obey a previous order requiring him to surrender certain promissory notes adjudged to be the property of another, is illegal, and void for uncertainty as to the duration of the punishment, and will not justify the imprisonment.-TAYLOR V. NEWBLOCK, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 1114.

4. CONTRACT-Alteration.-Plaintiff, by written agree. ment, licensed defendant company to use certain machines in consideration of paying royalty, and defend. ant gave bond, with sureties, conditioned for the performance of the contract. Afterwards the president of defendant company interlined in the contract a provision as to the time of delivery of the machines, which was accepted and acquiesced in by plaintiff: Held, that this interlineation was an alteration of the contract so far as the sureties in the bond were concerned. -UNITED STATES GLASS CO. v. WEST VIRGINIA FLINT BOTTLE CO., U. S. C. C., D. (W. Va.), 81 Fed. Rep. 993. 5. CONTRACTS-Construction-Arbitration Clause.-A contract for the construction of buildings provided that, if alterations were made in the plans, "the value of the work added or omitted shall be computed by the architects, and the amount so ascertained shall be added to, or deducted from, the contract price. In the case of dissent from such award by either party hereto the valuation of the work added or omitted shall be referred to three disinterested arbitrators, the decision of any two of whom shall be final and binding:" Held, an agreement to submit certain definite controversies to arbitration, and hence it was legal and binding.WEGGNER V. GREENSTINE, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 179. 6. CONTRACT-Statute of Frauds.-Where defendant received a letter from plaintiff, stating that a third person stated that defendant would pay for lumber furnished him by plaintiff, and requested defendant to advise plaintiff if such were not the fact, and defendant made no reply, but verbally promised to pay for the lumber after plaintiff delivered it to said third person, defendant is not bound, as the contract, being one to answer for the debt of another, was not in writ ing, as required by 2 How. Ann. St. § 6185, subd. 2.FULLER & RICE LUMBER & MANUFACTURING Co. v. HOUSEMAN, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 187.

7. CONTRACTS-Validity-Restraint of Trade.-Where the seller of stock in an ice company doing an ice busi. ness at P agreed with the purchaser not to engage in the ice business at P, nor adjacent thereto, at any time, the agreement was not an unreasonable restraint of trade, and void as against public policy.-UP RIVER ICE Co. V. DENLER, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 157.

8. CORPORATIONS-Powers-Authority of Officers.-A treasurer of a manufacturing corporation has no authority, by virtue of his office alone, to indorse its note for discount of sale.-BLAKE V. DOMESTIC MANUFG. CO., N. J., 38 Atl. Rep. 241.

9. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Assault With Intent to Murder. On a trial for an assault with intent to murder, it was shown that defendant shot a man, and that two police officers went to defendant's saloon to watch him, while the sergeant was getting information about the shooting; that defendant knew that he was to be arrested, because he was questioned by the officers; that the sergeant, having learned that defendant did the shooting, afterwards came in, and ordered defendant's arrest without a warrant, and that defendant then fired on the officers, and wounded one of them: Held, that evidence of the first shooting was properly admitted, as tending to prove the motive with which defendant fired on the officers.-PEOPLE V. WILSON, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 1054.

10. EVIDENCE-Admissions in Court.-Admissions of parties in open court that their claims have been paid and their liens satisfied form evidence of an extremely satisfactory character.-LITTLE V. SLEMP, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 808.

11. EVIDENCE-Parol Evidence.-Where written instruments do not purport to contain the entire agree ment between the parties thereto, nor to have been intended as a complete statement or performance of the whole contract, and such papers were executed in pur. suance of a parol agreement, and in part performance thereof, parol evidence of the verbal agreement is admissible in all cases where such evidence is consistent with, and not contrary to, such written instruments. -CHAMBERLAIN V. LESLEY, Fla., 22 South. Rep. 736.

12. FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS-Conflicting Juris diction. When the State court has acquired jurisdiction in a case, entered judgment, and is proceeding to its enforcement, the appointment of a receiver by the United States court to the defendant corporation cannot devest the jurisdiction of the State court, and stay the execution issued to enforce the judgment.-LAKE BISTENEAU LUMBER CO. V. MIMMS, La., 22 South. Rep. 730.

13. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Part Performance.-How. Ann. St. § 5569, provides that when a grant shall be made to one person, and the consideration therefor shall be paid by another, no use or trust shall result in favor of the latter, but that the title shall vest in the person named as alienee. Section 6183 provides that nothing in the chapter shall abridge the powers of the court of chancery to compel specific performance of agreements in cases of part performance: Held that, where a husband purchased land in his wife's name, with the parol agreement that it was to be occupied as a home by them so long as each should live, and the wife devised the property to others, section 6183 did not apply, and the husband was precluded by section 5569 from enforcing the trust against the devisees.CHAPMAN V. CHAPMAN, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 131.

14. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Waiver.-The defense of the statute of frauds, to be effective against an oral contract, must be urged when such contract is attempted to be proved.-PIKE V. PIKE, Vt., 38 Atl. Rep.

265.

15. HABEAS CORPUS-Grounds of Remedy.-Where it is conceded, in a habeas corpus proceeding, that the commitment emanated from a court of competent au thority, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and person, the only question is whether the process is void for illegality.-EX PARTE TICE, Oreg., 49 Pac. Rep. 1038.

16. HOMESTEAD Acquisition Mortgages. Act March 13, 1895, changing the method of selecting a homestead, did not repeal 2 Hills' Ann. Code, § 481, providing that the selection may be made at any time before sale. Where separate property of the husband was impressed with the homestead, and was afterwards mortgaged by him without the wife's consent, the wife might have the mortgage declared void, under 2 Hill's Ann. Code, § 483, providing that, "nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the owner of a homestead from voluntarily mortgag ing the same," and that "no mortgage shall be valid against the wife of the mortgagor, unless she shall sign and acknowledge the same;" and this whether or not the wife was precluded by 1 Hill's Ann. Code, § 1404, from selecting a homestead from the husband's separate property.-ANDERSON V. STADLMANN, Wash., 49 Pac. Rep. 1070.

17. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Antenuptial Agreements.An antenuptial agreement provided that the property of the intended wife should remain in her, and that she might dispose of the same "by deed, grant, bargain, sale, gift, desire, will, or otherwise, as she (might) de sire, without the consent" of the prospective husband: Held, that the word "desire" was a mistake for "devise," and that the word "will" was used in its technical sense.-COOK V. ADAMS, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 605. 18. INTERSTATE COMMERCE Original PackageLiquors.-An original package, within the meaning of the law of interstate commerce, is the package deliv. ered by the importer to the carrier at the initial point of shipment, in the exact condition in which it was shipped. In the case of liquors in bottles, if the bottles are shipped singly, each is an original package, but if a number are fastened together, and marked, or are packed in a box, barrel, crate, or other receptacle, such bundle, box, barrel, crate, or receptacle constitutes the original package.-GUCKENHEIMER V. SELLERS, U. S. C. C., D. (S. Car.), 81 Fed. Rep. 997.

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set-off) executed by plaintiff and another jointly, where the other maker is dead.-MCCARTHY V. SLEIGHT, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 165.

20. JOINT TRESPASSERS-Authority of Agent.-An attorney for a plaintiff in execution placed in the hands of a constable the execution, and in the hands of an agent a chattel mortgage lease, and the three took possession of the entire stock of goods of the defendant in execution. The amount of the mortgage was tendered to each of them. The non-exempt property was sold under the execution before the hour adver. tised, and the three set apart and held the exempt property under the mortgage: Held, that a joint action could be maintained against them, as they were joint trespassers.-WEINSKAWSKI V. WISNER, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 177.

21. JUDGMENT-Jurisdiction.-When an action in the circuit court to recover the possession of land situated in another district is joined with an action for rents, issues, and profits of the land, that part of the judg. ment rendered for the value of the rents is within the jurisdiction of the court, and is valid.-HEALEY V. HUMPHREY, U. S. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 81 Fed. Rep. 990.

22. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Estate from Year to Year-Holding Over.-A landlord who allowed a tenant for years by lease to hold over for a year and one month, and accepted monthly payments of rent for the time, sufficiently recognized the tenant as such; and the latter thereafter held as a tenant from year to year, although he had paid only eleven months' rent after the expiration of the lease.-AMSDEN V. ATWOOD, Vt., 38 Atl. Rep. 263.

28. LIFE INSURANCE-Cancellation of Policy.-Where the beneficiary under a life insurance policy, which had lapsed, except for its paid up value, procured its re-instatement through false and fraudulent representations, equity may compel the surrender and decree the cancellation thereof, and enjoin an action at law thereon, though the alleged fraud might defeat such action at law. -JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. Co. v. DICK, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 179.

24. MANDAMUS-Teacher's Salary - Remedy at Law.Mandamus to compel the payment of the salary specified is not the proper remedy of a school teacher for the enforcement of a contract of employment where it is claimed that such teacher was discharged for sufficient cause, as the law affords a plain, direct, and adequate remedy in its ordinary course, if such discharge was wrongful.- COFFIN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF DETROIT, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 156.

25. MASTER AND SERVANT - Defective Appliances.-If a brakeman is aware, on entering the railroad's em. ploy, that he will be constantly obliged to perform the dangerous task of coupling together mismatched couplers, and continues in the service, and frequently performs that task, without making complaint to the master, or making request that the danger be lessened, he assumes the risk.-MCDONALD'S ADMR. V. NORFOLK & W. R. Co., Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 821.

26. MECHANIC'S LIEN Statement for Lien.-Under Pub. Acts 1891, No. 179, § 4, requiring original contractors to furnish the owner of the building a statement under oath of the number and names of the subcontractors or laborers under them, and of the persons furnishing materials, with the amount due each, and providing that until such statement is furnished the contractor shall have no right of action and lien on account of the contract, such statement is a prerequisite to the right to enforce a lien.-WILTSIE V. HARVEY, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 134.

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ceeds upon said mortgage; said sales subject to the advice and consent of said B:" Held, that the deeds and agreement back constituted C trustee of the lands in W for the benefit of B.-A. P. COOK Co. v. BELL, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 174.

28. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE-Subordinate Interests -Adverse Title.-A complaint for mortgage foreclosure alleged that defendant C (not the mortgagor) "claims some interest in or title to said property inconsistent with the rights of plaintiff, and that the lien of plaintiff is prior to any lien of said C against the said described lots, or either of them." C moved to strike out the phrase "inconsistent with the rights of plaintiff," as presenting an issue of adverse title: Held, that plaintiff intended to allege merely that the interest of C, whatever it might be, was subordinate to that of plaintiff.-KIZER V. CAUFIELD, Wash., 49 Pac. Rep. 1064.

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29. MORTGAGE-Foreign Corporations ContractsValidity.-A person became a stockholder of a foreign building and loan association, and applied for a loan before the passage of the statute prescribing terms upon which foreign corporations might do business in the State. After such enactment, and without the association's having complied therewith, the loan was made, and a mortgage given as security: Held that, conceding that the borrower had acquired a vested right to the loan, and that the association had become obligated to make it, before the statute was passed, the making of the loan and the giving of the mortgage were not merely a winding up of unfinished business, and accordingly the mortgage was illegal and unenforceable.-NEW YORK NAT. BUILDING & LOAN ASSN. V. CANNON, Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 1055.

30. MORTGAGES-Foreclosure-Venue.-An action by a mortgagor to recover of a mortgagee for an unau. thorized sale of the mortgaged premises for an alleged breach of condition, when in fact no breach had been made, is a transitory action.-ROGERS V. BARNES, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 602.

31. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Public Improvements -Negligence.-If a town, in exercising its authority to improve a street, fails to do the work in a proper and skillful manner, a common-law liability arises for all damages not necessarily incidental to the work, and chargeable to the unskillful and improper mode of executing it.-POWELL V. TOWN OF WYTHEVILLE, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 805.

32. NEGLIGENCE.-In an action by a fireman to recover for injuries by a collision, where the evidence showed that plaintiff was asked by the engineer if he could see a switch which they were approaching, and he reported that he could not, and that it was impossible to see it because of the very heavy snowstorm raging at the time, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the fireman was negligent in not seeing the signal for the switch.-FAIRMAN V. BOSTON & A. R. Co., Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 613.

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38. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Limitations.-The statute of limitations does not commence to run against claims for funds of the principal in the hands of the agent until a demand is made.-EWERS V. WHITE'S ESTATE, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 184.

39. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Powers-Evidence.-Upon the question of authority of an agent to act for his principal in making a contract with a purchaser of goods, evidence is admissible to show that the agent made contracts for his principal with other pur chasers.-H. C. MAHRT Co. v. HYMAN-HALL CO., Wash., 49 Pac. Rep. 1063.

40. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Rights and Liabilities of Co sureties. If one of the sureties on a guardian's bond obtains from the guardian the ward's money for his own use, as in payment of a debt owing him by the guardian personally, and such fact causes the guardian to default, as between such surety and his co-surety, the former is liable for the entire sum defaulted, especially where he has indemnified himself; and this whether or not the latter knew, when he became surety, that the former had received the money, and acquiesced therein. - PILE V. MCCOY, Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 1053.

41. PROCESS Service-Non-resident Corporations.Under Pub. Acts 1895, No. 61, providing that "suits may be commenced at law or in equity in the circuit court where the plaintiff resides against any corporation not organized under the laws of this State, in all cases where the cause of action arose in the State of Michigan, by service upon any officer or agent of the corpo. ration," etc., service on the traveling salesman of a Massachusetts corporation, through whose agency its business was done in Michigan, was good. RYERSON V. STEERE, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 131.

42. RAILROAD COMPANY-Occupancy of Street.-Where a railroad company, without condemnation proceed. ings, builds its road in the street, after a license from the city so to do, subject to the rights of adjacent owners, an abutting owner may recover the amount of damages accruing year by year, though he did not own the property when the railroad was built, and no rights against the railroad were assigned by the one who did then own it. - HOFFMAN V. FLINT & P. M. R. Co., Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 167.

43. RELEASE AND DISCHARGE-Settlement of Claim.Where relator, an employee of the board of health, presented a bill for extra services, which was allowed, and for which he gave a receipt, it was a settlement of all his claims for such services prior to that time where he neither did nor said anything to indicate that this was to be a partial payment, or that he had any other claim.-GOODSON V. BOARD OF HEALTH OF CITY OF DETROIT, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 185.

44. REMOVAL OF CAUSES Non-resident DefendantJurisdiction.-A suit commenced in a State court, by a British subject, against a non-resident corporation, to recover $20,000 damages for personal injuries, is removable to the circuit court on the application of the defendant.-STALKER V. PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR CO., U. S. C. C., S. D. (Cal.), 81 Fed. Rep. 989.

45. TAXATION-Deeds-Limitation.-Pol. Code, § 3788, as amended in 1885, provided what should be done with deeds to the lands sold to the State for delinquent taxes, how the lands should again become subject to

entry and sale, and closed with the general provision that "In all cases where land has been heretofore sold for delinquent taxes the deed therefor must be made within one year and three months after this act takes effect, and, unless so made, the purchaser shall be deemed to have relinquished all his rights under such sale:" Held, that the limitation did not apply to the State.-Z. RUSS & SONS Co. v. CRICHTON, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 1043.

46. VENDOR AND PURCHASER - Equity.-Where there is a material deficiency in the amount of land men. tioned in a deed, and neither grantor nor grantee knew of it, a case of mutual mistake is made, against which a court of equity will, at the instance of the grantee, give relief by a decree for the value of the deficiency.-HULL v. WATTS, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 829.

47. VENDOR AND PURCHASER- Title Waiver of ObJections. A company purchased lands with notice that trees growing thereon had been previously sold to another, though no mention of the fact was made in its deed, and without objection it paid part of the price in cash, and gave two notes for the balance. The first note it paid, and it obtained an extension on the other, and paid part of it. When pressed for final pay. ment, it demanded an abatement of the price on certain grounds, but not until after suit brought, five years after sale, did it claim an abatement on account of not having received the trees with the land: Held, that it had waived any right to abatement on such ground.-SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA MINERAL LAND CO. V. CHASE, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 826.

48. WATERS-Riparian Rights-Navigable Waters.-A person cannot anchor his boat in the shallow waters between an island, owned by a riparian proprietor, and the channel of a navigable stream, and engage in shooting wild fowl from such boat, with the aid of decoys anchored in such waters, against the protests of such proprietor. HALL V. ALFORD, Mich., 72 N. W.

Rep. 137.

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50. WILLS Power of Disposition. - A will made a residuary devise to a sister for life, "to be disposed of at her discretion; at her decease to go to my nearest of kin:" Held, that the sister's power of disposition was limited to transfer during life, and not by will.-KENISTON V. MAYHEW, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 612.

51. WILLS Rule in Shelly's Case.-Testator gave all his estate to his wife and two daughters, absolutely, share and share alike, and then declared that, if his daughters should marry, his will and desire was that the property given to them should not in any instance be liable for the debts of their husbands, but should descend from his daughters to "their children;" and that, should either of his "children before mentioned" die without a child, the property given to it should descend to that which may be living, "in the manner above specified:" Held, that the devises to the daughters did not fall within the rule in Shelley's Case. -COLLINS V. WILLIAMS, Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 1056.

52. WILLS-Vesting of Estates.-A will provided, "On the decease of my son D the principal sum held in trust for him shall be paid to his son D, if then living; and, in case of his previous decease, the trustees shall pay over said principal sum to my daughter and to my other sons, to be equally divided among them:" Held, that the interests of the sons and daughters of testatrix other than D in the remainder after the life estate vested on the death of testatrix, and not on the death of the grandson D. SHAW V. ECKLEY, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 609.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., OCTOBER 29, 1897.

case.

He announced that, in his opinion, the rule does not apply in two classes of cases: First. Where a person willfully inflicts an injury upon a woman with child, knowing her to be such, and for the purpose of inflicting an injury upon her unborn child, The Chicago Legal News calls attention to whereby such child suffers permanent injuries; a novel case which recently came before the and second, where a mother or other person Superior Court of Cook County. The peti-contracts, upon a valuable consideration for, tion alleged, in substance, that the mother of plaintiff, several days before his birth in regular course of nature, contracted with the defendant hospital that the latter would, for a compensation then and there agreed on, shelter, attend, treat, during confinement and care for her and her child, then en ventre sa mere, during the period of childbirth and convalescence thereafter; that in pursuance of said agreement the mother of plaintiff paid said compensation and was received and accepted by said defendant at its hospital, by reason whereof it became the duty of said defendant to use due care and diligence for the safety and welfare of the plaintiff; that the defendant, by its agents and servants, placed the mother of plaintiff in an elevator for the purpose of carrying her and the plaintiff en ventre sa mere to an upper floor of the hospital for shelter, care and treatment, and so negligently and unskillfully conducted and operated said elevator as to permanently injure the plaintiff in the manner therein more fully described. The case was heard on demurrer to the declaration, the question raised being as to whether a child, after it is born, has a right of action for injuries sustained by it while en ventre sa mere; or, in other words, whether a child unborn is a person in being, so as to be entitled after its birth to maintain such an action. Only two cases on the subject were brought to the attention of the court: Dietrich v. Inhabitants, 138 Mass. 14, and Walker v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 23 L. R. (Ireland) 69, 32 Cent. L. J. 197. In both of these cases it was substantially held that a child unborn was not a person in esse" so as to enable it to sue for injuries received while en ventre sa mere, and that a contrary rule, from the difficulties of proof and other considerations, would be attended with danger. It seems, however, that the Illinois judge while approving of this doctrine held that it does not apply to the facts of this

in reference to, or on behalf of the child en ventre sa mere, for care and attention, or otherwise for the benefit or safety of the child, or of both the mother and child, where the duty arises out of contract and from the relative situation and circumstances of the parties at the time of the occurrence of the acts of negligence. The fact, says the court, that the plaintiff en ventre sa mere was in the elevator, and known to be by the defendant, in itself might not be sufficient to cast a duty upon the defendant to use due care and diligence toward the plaintiff, but where, in addition, such duty is imposed upon defendant by its own contract, based upon a valuable consideration, should not the plaintiff after his birth be permitted to maintain this action. for the breach of the duty? The court was of the opinion that it should, and that the plaintiff in his declaration has stated a good cause of action, and was entitled to maintain it.

At the time of its rendition we neglected to call attention to an important Connecticut case, wherein was involved the question of the power of a State legislature to provide for the destruction of trees affected by a distemper or contagious disease. The case is State v. Main, 37 Atl. Rep. 80, in which the court held valid a statute of Connecticut authorizing a public official, after inspection of trees alleged to be diseased, to order their destruction by the owner and to make the latter liable for disobedience of such order. The court very sensibly held that the owner was entitled to a jury trial as to the existence of the distemper or disease in his trees, but that the question of the constitutionality of the law permitting destruction of diseased trees was one for a court and not for a jury. The court also upheld the power of a court to take judicial notice of the nature of an infection or disease upon which a legislature has assumed to base an exercise of police power.

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