Remission of additional duties.
The here involved statute (sec. 489), when dissected, requires that
a person seeking remission must prove that the act of undervaluation
was without any intent (a) to defraud the revenue of the United
States; (b) to conceal or misrepresent the facts of the case; (c) to
deceive the appraiser as to the value of the merchandise. Each of
these three elements must be established by "satisfactory evidence."
United States v. W. J. Westerfield (1930) .......
The rule is thoroughly established that a mere categorical declara-
tion by one seeking relief under section 489 that he had no intention
of doing any of the three things, may not be accepted as of itself con-
stituting "satisfactory evidence" within the meaning of the statute.
To obtain the benefit of the remission statute petitioner must show
more than lack of knowledge. Ib.
The trial court erred in holding that mere carelessness of importing
company's secretary and bookkeeper was sufficient to absolve it from
intention to conceal or misrepresent the facts in the case or to deceive
the appraiser as to the true value of the merchandise.
v. Pacific Coast Feather Company, etc. (1930)- - -.
Held that importer failed to present any substantial evidence to
rebut the presumption that the customs officials properly discharged
their duty. United States v. Henry W. Peabody & Co. (1930).
In order to rebut the presumption that a public official is presumed
to discharge his duties in accordance with the law and regulations
governing his employment, it is incumbent upon importer to prove
by competent evidence that such presumption is erroneous.
Shells.
Certain imported shells having a quarter inch of their periphery
ground away to produce a smooth even edge (the grinding being un-
necessary to put the shells in a marketable state) are properly classi-
fiable as shells manufactured under paragraph 1538, rather than free
of duty under paragraph 1738. August Bentkamp v. United States (1930)-
A mere advance in value per se would not exclude the shells from
paragraph 1738; the advance in value must result because the shells
were "sawed, cut, flaked, polished, or otherwise manufactured." Ib.
It may be properly inferred from the evidence that the imported
shells have been increased in value from the natural state by the
grinding. Ib.
As a necessary corollary to his burden of proving that the shells are
properly classifiable under paragraph 1738, appellant must prove, inter
alia, that they have not been advanced in value. He may not avoid
this by remaining mute on the point and then challenging the Gov-
ernment's voluntary attempt to affirmatively prove an increase in
value. Ib.
The term "or otherwise manufactured" in the exclusion clause of
paragraph 1738 held to include all operations which are ejusdem
generis with "sawing, cutting, flaking, and polishing" unless there is
evidence of Congressional intent to the contrary. Ib.
Since the meaning of a tariff term is presumed to be the same as its
common or dictionary meaning, the words "ground" or "polished,"
while not necessarily synonymous, are so very closely related in mean-
ing that it would clearly result in very anomalous circumstances to
hold that shells polished, as by an emery wheel, are excluded from the
free list, whereas shells ground in a like manner are not so excluded.
A construction resulting in such an anomaly is generally looked upon
as contrary to the legislative intent. For this reason, shells ground
are ejusdem generis with shells "sawed, cut, flaked [or] polished."
Hence they are "otherwise manufactured" within the purview of the
exclusion clause of paragraph 1738. Ib.
The purpose of Presidential Proclamation No. 2708, a result of
Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of May 22, 1946, was temporary
action not to wholly supplant Shingles Quota Act of 1940 but to sup-
plement it with duty-free status for additional shingles which other-
wise would be duitable during the time the proclamation was in force.
Border Brokerage Co. v. United States (1930) ....
Language and intent of legislation contemplate President required
to act but once in establishment of quota, and having done so, the act
itself provided for the fixing of annual quota and imposition of duty
for quantities in excess of quota. Ib.
Merchandise, invoiced as "silver sheets," held properly duitable
as materials of metal suitable for use in the manufacture of jewelry,
rather than as articles composed wholly or in chief value of silver,
or free of duty as silver bullion, as claimed by importer. The record
does not show the merchandise to be not suitable for use in the manu-
facture of jewelry. United States v. Zoltan Erdosi (1930) --
Speed indicators and accessory tips.
The evidence definitely establishes that the accessory tips are not
merely surplus or extraneous parts which have an occasional, casual,
or optional use, but are detachable or adjustable constituent parts of
the respective speed indicators which are indispensable to the per-
formance of the manifold operations for which the imported indicators
were designed. Under such circumstances, the indicators and acces-
sory tips therefor must be regarded as entíreties. George Scherr Co.,
Inc. v. United States (1930)_
By reason of the cutting and shaping processes to which the material
was subjected (in accordance with a blue print specification) prior to its
importation, it was removed from the category of lumber and became a
manufacture of wood dedicated to a definite and specific use and pos-
sessing a character and name completely different from the material
out of which it was made. C. J. Tower & Sons v. United States (1930).
Substantial evidence defined. (See Reappraisement.)
Ultimate and evidentiary facts distinguished. (See Reappraisement.)
Value, dutiable.
1. Foreign value.—Foreign value is not the price to wholesalers but
the price in the usual wholesale quantities. United States v. Fisher
Scientific Comvany (1930) _ _.
This court is confined to review of question of law in reappraisement
cases. Ib.
II. Export value. In so far as the dutiable charges to importer are
concerned, it is immaterial whether or not the value of the merchandise
is $2 per kilogram on the net weight of the cheese alone, plus $2 per
kilogram of inedible covering, or whether the entire weight of the
cheese plus the inedible covering is valued at $2 per kilogram. Uddo
& Taormina Co. v. United States (1930)--
III. United States value.-Sales and offers of sales for future
delivery properly may be taken into consideration in determining
United States value "in cases where the facts and circumstances
show that such procedure is followed in the ordinary course of trade,
and other requisite statutory elements are present." E. H. Corrigan v.
United States (1930)..
IV. Cost of production.-The "profit which ordinarily is added" held
to be that profit derived from the greater quantity of sales which, in the
instant case, consisted of sales made to wholesalers. United States
v. International Expediters, Inc., etc. (1930) - -
The record here presented indicates that Congress understood the
term "clean content," as used in paragraph 1102 (b), to be the com-
mercial yield obtained from wool in the grease after it had been sub-
jected to cleansing. Held, therefore, that clean content in that
paragraph must be the wool from which all the weight of the grease
and foreign material has been removed, including the wool fibers which
are unavoidably and irrevocably lost. United States v. Fred Whittaker
Company, Inc. (1930) -
Wool in the grease—Continued
The "visual method" of estimating clean content, by which price is
fixed, is still the usual method of buying and selling raw wool. Ib.
Long continued administrative practice, such as present here, is not
conclusive upon the court, but it should carry considerable weight, at
least sufficient to dissipate any doubt concerning the approval by
Congress of such practice as is shown by the term "clean content" in
the 1930 act, as it appeared in the act of 1922. Ib.
Based upon evidence in the case, the lower court properly concluded
that the importation of greasy wool is not Cordova wool, nor sorted, or
matchings therefrom within the provisions of paragraph 1101 (a), as
amended, but is a mixture of Argentina wools, consisting of pieces of
various types from various provinces or districts and recognized as
"off-sorts" taken from different parts of fleeces. The wool is properly
dutiable under paragraph 1102 (b) as wool in the grease at 34 cents per
pound of clean content. W. N. Proctor Company v. United States
(1930)___
While this court has the power to review the findings of the United
States Customs Court upon issues of fact, such findings will not be
disturbed, especially where they turn upon the intelligence and credi-
bility of witnesses, unless such findings are without evidence to support
them, or are clearly contrary to the weight of such evidence.
Under the state of facts disclosed by the record, there can be no doubt
that the samples drawn from the six individual drums by the customs
officials contained wool grease properly so classifiable suitable for
medicinal use under paragraph 52, Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.
Robinson-Wagner Co., Inc. v. United States (1930) --
It appears in the record that wool grease similar in all respects to
that which was taken from the drums by the Government is bought
and sold in great quantities as adeps lanae and suitable for medicinal
use. Ib.
There is no authority under circumstances similar to those admitted
to exist in this case which affords the Government the right to presume
that the bottle of whiskey, admittedly missing, was stolen, and that the
burden of proving the contrary is on importer, United States v. R. C.
Williams & Co., Inc. (1930)..
The court regards the store keeper-gauger's report showing that the
missing bottle constituted a re-gauge of the merchandise prior to
withdrawal and that the internal revenue tax should not have been
levied thereon. Ib.
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