Ogden v. Saunders. 12 W.

ment. The plea is obviously founded on the idea that the statute of the State of the contract was generally pleadable in any other State, a doctrine that will not bear argument.

The remaining error assigned has regard to the sum for which the judgment is entered, it being for a greater amount than the nominal amount of the bills of exchange on which the suit was brought, and which are found by the verdict.

There has been a defect of explanation on this subject; but from the best information afforded us, we consider the amount for which judgment is entered, as made up of principal, interest, and damages, and the latter as being legally incident to the finding of the bills of exchange, and their non-payment, and assessed by the court under a local practice consonant with that by which the amount of written contracts is determined, by reference to the prothonotary, in many other of our courts. We, therefore, see no error in it. The judgment below will, therefore, be affirmed.

And the purport of this adjudication, as I understand it, is, that as between citizens of the same State, a discharge of a bank[369] rupt by the laws of that State, is valid as it affects posterior contracts; that as against creditors, citizens of other States, it is invalid as to all contracts.

The propositions which I have endeavored to maintain in the opinion which I have delivered are these:

1. That the power given to the United States to pass bankrupt laws is not exclusive.

2. That the fair and ordinary exercise of that power by the States does not necessarily involve a violation of the obligation of contracts, multi fortiori of posterior contracts.

3. But when, in the exercise of that power, the States pass beyond their own limits, and the rights of their own citizens, and act upon the rights of citizens of other States, there arises a conflict of sovereign power, and a collision with the judicial powers granted to the United States, which renders the exercise of such a power incompatible with the rights of other States, and with the, constitution of the United States.

Mr. Justice WASHINGTON, Mr. Justice THOMPSON, and Mr. Justice TRIMBLE, dissented.

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL, Mr. Justice DUVALL, and Mr. Justice STORY, assented to the judgment, which was entered for the defendant in error. Judgment affirmed.1

12 W. 370; 5 P. 1; 6 P. 348, 635; 8 P. 88; 9 P. 329; 12 P. 657, 14 P. 67; 5 H. 295, 554; 6 H. 301; 10 H. 395; 17 H. 322; 19 H. 393.

In the case of Shaw v. Robbins, the judgment below was reversed. This was an

Mason v. Haile. 12 W.

MASON V. HAILE.

12 W. 370.

Under a bond to remain a true prisoner until lawfully discharged, a discharge under a resolve of the legislature, passed in conformity with an ancient usage thus to relieve from imprisonment, is a lawful discharge, and does not impair the obligation of the contract.

THIS was an action of debt, brought in the circuit court of Rhode Island, upon two several bonds given by the defendant, Haile, to the plaintiff, Mason, and one Bates, whom the plaintiff survives, one of which bonds was executed on the 14th, and the other on the 29th of March, 1814.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Webster and Bliss, for the plaintiff.

Whipple and Wheaton, for the defendant.

THOMPSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

[ * 374 ]

The question in this case arises upon the following certificate of a division of opinion of the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island: "This cause came on to be heard, and was argued by counsel on both sides, and thereupon the following question occurred, namely, whether, upon the amended pleas in this case, severally pleaded to the first

*

and second counts of the plaintiff's declaration, and to [375] which there are demurrers, and joinders in demurrer, the

defendant is entitled to judgment, on the ground that the matters set forth therein, on the part of the defendant, are sufficient to bar the action; or whether the plaintiff is entitled, upon said demurrers and joinders, to judgment? Upon which question the court was divided in opinion."

action on several bills of exchange, drawn by the plaintiff on the defendant, payable to plaintiff's order, and by the defendant duly accepted. At the time of the transaction the plaintiff was a citizen of Massachusetts, resident in that State, and the defendant a citizen of New York, and there resident. The action was brought in a state court, in Ohio, and the defendant relied on a discharge, obtained in New York, under the provisions of the insolvent laws of that State. The highest court of law in Ohio gave judgment for the defendant; and the cause was brought before this court by a writ of error.

Mr. Justice JOHNSON. This is a contract between a citizen of New York and a citizen of Massachusetts. It only differs from Ogden v. Saunders in this particular, that the action was brought in a state court; not the court of New York, but the court of another State. We think the decision in the case of Ogden v. Saunders applies to this, and must govern its decision. The judgment below, therefore, must be reversed, and the cause remanded for such further proceedings as the law may require.

Mason v. Haile. 12 W.

It is not understood by this court, that any question as to the sufficiency of the pleas, in point of form, is drawn under 'examination, but simply whether, upon the merits, the matter thereby set up is sufficient to bar the action. The action is founded upon two several bonds, given by the defendant to the plaintiff, and one Bates, whom the plaintiff survives, one dated the 14th, and the other the 29th of March, 1814. The condition in both bonds is the same, except as to dates and sums, and is as follows: "The condition of the above obligation is such, that if the above bounden Nathan Haile, now a prisoner in the state's jail, in Providence, within the county of Providence, at the suit of said Mason and Bates, do, and shall from henceforth continue to be a true prisoner, in the custody, guard, and safe-keeping of Andrew Waterman, keeper of said prison, and in the custody, guard, and safe-keeping of his deputy, officers, and servants, or some one of them, within the limits of said prison, until he shall be lawfully discharged, without committing any manner of escape or escapes during the time of restraint, then this obligation to be void, or else to remain in full force and virtue."

The defence set up by the pleas, to show there has been no breach of the condition of the bond, is substantially, that in June, 1814, after giving the bond in question, the defendant presented a petition to the legislature of Rhode Island, praying relief, and the benefit of the Insolvent Act of 1756; and that, in the mean time, all proceedings against his person and estate, for the collection of debts, might be stayed, and he be liberated from jail, on giving bonds to return in case his petition should not be granted. Upon this petition, the legislature, in February, 1816, passed the following resolution: "On the petition of Nathan Haile, praying, for the reasons therein

stated, that the benefit of an act, entitled, an act for the [376] relief of insolvent debtors, passed in the year* 1756, be extended to him, voted that said petition be continued until the next session of this assembly; and that, in the mean time, all proceedings against the said Haile, on account of his debts, be stayed; and that the said Haile be liberated from his present imprisonment, in the jail, in the county of Providence, on his giving sufficient bond to the sheriff of the county, conditioned to return to jail in case said petition is not granted." The defendant, after the passing of this resolution, gave the bond required by it, and on the 28th of the same month was discharged from imprisonment, and has ever since been at large, out of the custody of the sheriff. In February, 1816, the legislature, upon a due hearing, granted the prayer of the defendant, and passed the following resolution: "On the petition of Nathan Haile, of Foster, praying, for the reasons therein stated, that

Mason v. Haile. 12 W.

the benefit of an act, passed in June, 1756, for the relief of insolvent debtors may be extended to him, voted that the prayer of the said petition be, and the same is hereby granted." By the granting of the prayer of the petition, the condition of the second bond given to the sheriff was complied with, and the bond became extinguished. The defendant afterwards proceeded to take the benefit of the insolvent act revived in his favor, according to the statute provisions, and received in due form from the proper court, a judgment, "that he should be, and thereby was fully discharged of and from all debts, contracts, and demands, of every name, nature, and kind, outstanding against him, debts due to the State aforesaid, or to the United States excepted, and from all imprisonment, arrest, and restraint of his person therefor." The insolvent act of 1756 is not considered in force as a general and permanent law; but the legislature of Rhode Island has been in the constant habit of entertaining petitions like the present, and has by the general law of 1798, now in force, prescribed the mode by which such petitions are to be regulated; and, in case of granting the prayer of the petition, the course is to pass an act or resolution, giving the benefit of the act of 1756 to the petitioner, and thus, in effect, reviving it for his particular benefit. So that the mode pursued to obtain the discharge of the defendant, as set out in the pleas, was according to the established course * of proceeding in cases of insolvency, and in con- [*377] formity to the laws of Rhode Island, by which the defendant was discharged from all his contracts, and from imprisonment. The effect of this discharge upon the original judgment against Haile is not now drawn in question. The only inquiry is, whether he has violated the condition of his bonds of March, 1814, by going at large, under the authority and sanction of the resolutions of the legislature as before stated. His bond required him to remain a true prisoner, until he should be lawfully discharged, without committing any manner of escape during the time of restraint. The bond is not that he shall remain a true prisoner until the debt shall be paid. Nor is there any thing upon the face of the bond, or if we look out of it to the known and established laws and usages in that State calling for such a construction. A lawful discharge, in its general signification, will extend to and be satisfied by any discharge obtained under the legislative authority of the State. And it is not unreasonable to consider such prison bonds as given subject to the ordinary and well known practice in Rhode Island, for the legislature to entertain petitions in the manner pursued by the defendant, to obtain the benefit of the insolvent act of 1756, in the manner in which these petitions are received and proceeded upon, as prescribed

Mason v. Haile. 12 W.

by the act of 1798. And, indeed, this cannot strictly be considered a private contract between the parties, but rather as a statute engagement, imposed by an act of the legislature, and as a part of the process under which the defendant was held as a prisoner. And with the full knowledge of this regulation and practice, it is hardly to be presumed that such discharges were not understood to be lawful discharges. And the same remarks will apply to the term escape, in the bond, which can mean no more than a departure from the limits without lawful authority. Suppose the legislature, after the execution of this bond, had enlarged the jail limits? It surely would not have been an escape for the defendant to have availed himself of the enlarged limits, and gone beyond his former bounds. And yet, if the limits prescribed at the time the bond was executed, are

to govern the effect and operation of the bond, it would be [*378] an escape. Such bonds may well be considered as an * enlargement of the prison limits, and a mere modification of the imprisonment, according to the provisions of the laws of Rhode Island.

Can it be doubted but the legislature of the States, so far as relates to their own process, have a right to abolish imprisonment for debt altogether, and that such law might extend to present, as well as future imprisonment? We are not aware that such a power in the States has ever been questioned. And if such a general law would be valid under the constitution of the United States, where is the prohibition to be found that denies to the State of Rhode Island the right of applying the same remedy to individual cases? This is a measure which must be regulated by the views of policy and expediency entertained by the state legislatures. Such laws act merely upon the remedy, and that in part only. They do not take away the entire remedy, but only so far as imprisonment forms a part of such remedy. The doctrine of this court in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 W. 200, applies with full force to the present case. "Imprisonment of the debtor," say the court, "may be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be allowed as a means for inducing him to perform it. But a State may refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold it altogether, and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and simply to release the prisoner, does not impair its obligation."

In whatever light, therefore, the question is viewed, no breach of the condition of the bond, according to its true sense and interpretation, has been committed. The liberation of the defendant from confinement, on his giving bond to the sheriff to return to jail in case his petition for a discharge should not be granted, was sanctioned