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be and the same is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 1. No building, place or lot where junk, rags, old rope, papers, bagging, old iron, brass, copper, tin, empty bottles, slush or lead are bought, sold or stored shall be hereafter used, established or maintained within the territory within the city of Detroit described as all that portion of the city of Detroit bounded on the west by Beaubien street, on the east by Russell street, on the south by Gratiot avenue, and on the north by alley north of and parallel with Napoleon street; also all that portion of the city of Detroit lying north of the alley north of and parallel with Napoleon street and between the boundary lines of the third ward to the northerly city limits; also all that portion of the city of Detroit lying north of the alley north of and parallel with Napoleon street and between the boundary lines of the fifth ward to the northerly city limits: Provided that this ordinance shall not be construed to apply to any junkshop now being conducted or maintained within the territory herein described.""

It is conceded that the common council has plenary power for the purpose of licensing and regulating the persons engaged in the business of buying and selling old junk, and that such reasonable regulations as the council may see fit to adopt are not open to judicial investigation. It is insisted that, by the provision of the charter above quoted, no power was given to regulate the storage of junk, and therefore this ordinance is invalid. We do not agree with this contention. The rule relied upon by respondent, that the powers which may be exercised by municipal corporations are all derived from the legislature and must be found (a) in the express words of the grant, or (b) necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted, and (c) powers which are essential and indispensable to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, has always been recognized by this court (Taylor v. Railway Co., 80 Mich. 82), and that an ordinance cannot exceed the limit prescribed by the charter. The charge in the first complaint is that the defendant unlawfully kept "a place for the storage of junk commonly called a junk

yard." The words of the charter and of the ordinance must be taken as used with reference to the business designated. A junk dealer is not a warehouseman. He buys old junk from the owner or from the junk gatherer, and keeps the same in his yard or place of business until sales can be made. The charter contains express power to regulate and license the keepers of junkshops, and to regulate the buying and selling of old junk. The power to regulate has been given a broad signification by the court. To regulate means:

"To adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing principles or laws." 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), p. 243 et seq.

The storing or keeping of old junk which this ordinance aims to regulate is necessarily incident to the business of buying and selling junk.

Respondent's second contention is that this ordinance is unreasonable, and therefore invalid. This is not the usual ordinance enacted under charter powers for the purpose of the regulation of a certain trade or occupation as upon a first reading would appear. This ordinance is not one providing for the confinement of a class of business within a certain restricted territory easily supervised by the authorities. Nor does it propose to exclude all of a certain class from certain territory as did the ordinance under consideration in Churchill v. Detroit Common Council, 153 Mich. 93. It is an ordinance prescribing a certain restricted locality in which a certain class of business shall not be established or maintained, with a proviso "that this ordinance shall not be construed to apply to any junkshop now being conducted or maintained. within the territory herein described." There is therefore an express prohibition against disturbing those already established in this district, and it appears in the return of respondent, to which there is no denial entered, that the traffic in junk has become centralized within the restricted locality. The validity of the ordinance is not

defended as an exercise of the police powers of the municipality in the interests of the public health. Relator cites and relies upon the decisions of this court relative to the right to regulate this class of business. See City of Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670 (32 L. R. A. 116). This case, as well as the Churchill Case, supra, upheld the reasonable exercise of the authority conferred by the legislature, and both cases rest upon the proposition that such classes of business especially require police supervision. In the Braudy Case the question of restricted locality was not before the court; but this court held, where the question was squarely raised, in the Churchill Case, that the power to regulate authorized a municipality to restrict such business to certain localities. We cannot say in the ordinance before us that there is expressed any intent, by the reasonable exercise of the police powers, to regulate and control the junk business, by prohibiting its maintenance within the limited territory where it is now centralized and permitting it everywhere else in the city. The language of the court in both the cases cited indicates that from the nature of this business, and the persons who deal with those engaged in it, police supervision is necessary, and can be better maintained by license and restriction of the territory occupied. We agree most heartily with such decisions, but in our examination of the case before us are unable to convince ourselves that this ordinance can be held to be within these decisions. In the first place, it is not restrictive as to where the business may be maintained, and no reason appears why those not already established there should be prohibited from the district created. Those engaged in this business now centralized in the prohibited territory are not disturbed, although engaged in the same business and under the same kind of license. All others must keep away from this district, and scatter where they please over miles of territory. By what reasonable exercise of delegated power may such discrimination be upheld? If a power is conferred, but the mode of its exercise is not

prescribed, then the ordinance passed in pursuance thereof must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid. People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 293 (2 L. R. A. 721), citing 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.), § 328. It follows that all individuals of a certain class within a municipality under its legislation must be treated alike and without discrimination. This right is not granted by this ordinance.

Our conclusion is that this ordinance is both unreasonable and unlawfully discriminating. It is therefore unconstitutional and void. Tugman v. City of Chicago, 78 Ill. 405.

The action of the recorder's court is sustained. The writ of mandamus is therefore denied.

BLAIR, C. J., and GRANT, MONTGOMERY, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred.

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Testator owned a farm equipped with the usual amount of personal property necessary for its proper management, and also some money, notes and mortgages. By the terms of his will he gave to his wife the use, control and income for life of all his real and personal estate, and by a later provision gave to his children "all the loose money which I now have outstanding, such as notes and mortgages," etc. Held, that it was the manifest intent of testator to give to the wife the use of the farm and the personal property thereon, and to the children the property described in the later provision; since, in the construction of wills, the real intent and meaning of the testator must, if possible, be given effect, and all the different clauses considered and, so far as possible, harmonized.

Appeal from Macomb; Tappan, J., presiding. Submitted February 17, 1909. (Docket No. 39.) Decided April 24, 1909.

Bill by John Gloede, administrator de bonis non of the estate of Dorothea Schreiber, deceased, against John Rautenberg, executor of the last will and testament of Frederick Schreiber, deceased, for a construction of said will. From the decree rendered, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Jay Fuller, for complainant.

Spier & Dusse, for defendant.

MOORE, J. Frederick Schreiber died on the 20th day of February, 1905, testate, leaving a widow and nine children. He left a will which was admitted to probate, and the defendant was the executor thereof. The other defendants are the sons and daughters of testator. The deceased left a farm on which he lived for many years, and personal property consisting of notes, mortgages, and land contract interests. The estate inventoried $10,951.13; about one-half the value being real estate. The will was drawn by a justice of the peace not accustomed to drawing wills. After the will was admitted to probate, the executor refused to give to the widow any part of the income from the personal property, claiming that all the personal property belonged to the children named in the will, free from any claim for income on behalf of the widow. She then filed her bill of complaint praying for a construction of the will as to the question whether or not she was entitled to the use and control of all the personal estate during her natural life. After the filing of the bill of complaint, and before the hearing, the widow died intestate. This suit was revived by John Gloede, administrator.

The circuit judge construed the will as follows:

"It is my conclusion that these several sections made the

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