In such a scheme the sounds of the diphthongs would be determined by combining as closely as possible the sounds of the two elements of which each is composed. No one can maintain that the sounds thus produced were precisely and uniformly given to these characters at any point in the progress of Greek literature. It is even probable from the numerous and puzzling peculiarities of diphthongs as to their origin in Greek and as to their sound in other languages where we have knowledge of it, that the ancient Greeks gave different sounds to these combinations in some cases from those that on this plan we should adopt. Still as we cannot now ascertain what those sounds were, and as our object in studying the language is purely scientific and educational, it is best to follow the indications given by the scientific study of language, as we did in the case of the simple vowels. On such a plan the sounds of the diphthongs would be as follows:

a like i in high, with perhaps a little clearer sound of a at the beginning.

av like ou in round.

E like ei in rein.

Eu like you.

o like oi in point, o sounding like au in aught.

ou like oo in boot.

It will be noticed that the only variation here from the sounds usually given to the diphthongs in what is miscalled the continental system of pronunciation, is in ε, which is sounded usually like a. Thus the word eivat would be pronounced on this system aenai, not ainai. In favor of such a change it may be urged that it is in accord with the principle of combining the sounds which the two elements have separately, and that it gives a clear distinction among all the diphthongs by removing the only remaining case of confusion. It is true this sound approaches very closely to that of ŋ, but a sufficient clearness in the vanishing i sound in the diphthong will distinguish them. The reason of their likeness is that both are compounded sounds and of nearly the same elements. The old principle of Erasmus, whether suggested at first in joke or not, whether afterwards retracted by its author or not, seems to be a just principle on scientific grounds,—to give each

element some effect in the combination. The test word proposed by some writers, Πειραιεί, dative singular of Πειραιεύς, is as easily uttered and as euphonious on one system as on the other.

In the pronunciation of the consonants, so far as those of Sanskrit and Greek coincide, the sounds of the former should be applied to the latter, on the ground that they were, so far as we can ascertain, the original consonant sound of Aryan language. This rule would give to B, y, d, the sounds of the English b, g hard, and d. If however it could be shown on on good evidence of real antiquity that in the classical period these sonant checks or mutes had already passed into the corresponding sonant fricatives, then we would admit so far the historical argument and give them these sounds.

believe has not yet been done.

That we

With regard to the aspirates also there is difficulty. Did they have in Greek at any time the sounds they have in Sanskrit, p'ha, k'ha, t'ha, or had they already in Homeric time or earlier passed over to the modern fricative sounds, ph, ch guttural, and th? This question must apparently be settled by arguments drawn from the phenomena of the language. Into that discussion we do not propose here to enter, but only to suggest the scheme best fitted for our educational use of the language. In such a scheme the aspirates would have their usual sounds, the same in general which their representatives have in the modern European languages, o like for ph, 9 like th surd, and x like the German ch alter i Until the historical argument for a change to the earlier sounds of the aspirates is made out more clearly than it seems to be now, it is better to adhere in practice to this system. In such a scheme 2 would have the sound of dz, not of z alone. This appears to be required by the phonetic facts of the language. And so should have a distinct ks sound, as it has in modern Greek, whether at the beginning or end of a syllable. There is too much carelessness in this respect among teachers. it the sound of z at the beginning of a word. As consonants there is no difference and there need be no further discussion.

Many allow

to the other

ARTICLE III.-TAINE'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART IN THE NETHERLANDS.

The Philosophy of Art in the Netherlands. By H. TAINE. Translated by J. DURAND. New York, Leypoldt & Holt. 1871. 16mo, pp. 190.

THEY who have recognized the peculiar charm of M. Taine's previous contributions to art-literature, will welcome this little volume, which, we infer, is the precursor of a more full and detailed analysis of Dutch Art.

There is a certain breadth and impastic vigor--if the term is admissible in the style of M. Taine, that is wonderfully captivating. It is sensuous, but nevertheless eminently suggestive; it conveys a pleasing sense of that ease and mastery which are the result of ripe reflection and intelligent sympathy with his subject. We yield our faculties willingly, to be "breathed " by this more than half-pagan, vigorous thinker; while, over a few half-obliterated facts of history, he throws a peculiar light of his own which calls them into forcible relief and meaning. It is in the cool reflection of after-thought that we question the moral basis of this unique mind, which, in his analyses of those profound religious motives that underlie art, life, and character, preserves an impassive coldness and reserve, that are in strong contrast with the passionate sympathy and coloring which he bestows upon, to quote his own words, "the fascinating dream of a sensuous and full-blown existence * * frankly pagan."

In this respect we have in M. Taine, qualities of mind and temperament notably opposed to opposite tendencies in Mr. Ruskin, and which, we think, furnish a healthful offset to the, not altogether satisfactory, analysis of art which we have in the works of the latter.

These two authors, so opposite in their views, their feelings, and sympathies, are equally true and just in their respective aims, and, within their limits, in their apprehension of the

subject. Mr. Ruskin affects the subjective, moral aspect, the influences, and motives of art; while M. Taine is more concerned with its objective phase, its sensuous, positive characteristics, and its physical causes and relations. Either view, in itself, is but a partial, and therefore incomplete conception of the catholic wholeness of a subject which has its objective and subjec tive phases, and which may not be regarded as limited in its expression to either of these motives, but is equally capable, with full dignity and justness, of recognizing and following both. It is, consequently, through the combined or blended. views of these two vigorous and truth-searching minds, that a more just and whole conception of art may be formed; for in this connection the deficiencies which they individually exhibit are properly counterbalanced.

The descriptive powers of M. Taine are unrivalled. He has the faculty of translating into words the most subtle and varied action of form and color, whether of nature or art, with a precision and sensuous charm of expression that seem to sweep the chords of our sensibilities like some passionate melody under the touch of a master. His backgrounds possess the very atmosphere of life, evanescent, palpitating, varying in their motive with the character of that which they so charmingly relieve; and into them he seems gladly to retire, under their sensuous hold upon his sympathies, as if escaping from something less congenial, or less in harmony with his introspective thought. His sense of color is that of a Venetian painter. There are some descriptive passages in his works on Italian art-as, for instance, the approach to Venice, or the Roman Campagna-which have all the fullness and richness of a painting by Paul Veronese. And in the little book which we have now under consideration, his sketches of scenery are most vivid and truthful and awaken the liveliest recollections of Dutch and Belgic landscape. It is, therefore, with more than ordinary sympathy that he approaches the art of Rubens; so pagan, sensuous, and grand, in its volume and scope. "Never," he exclaims, "did artistic sympathy clasp nature in such an open and universal embrace." But in contrasting his art with that of Titian, M. Taine seems not to recognize that Rubens was a colorist, while Titian was a tonist, and consequently their art

doest not admit of comparison. Rubens seems most fittingly to respond to Taine's own sensibility, and in interpreting his art he is no less eloquent than just. In many respects no writer has more thoroughly rendered the true spirit, the broad and catholic nature of art, or more justly determined its relations and its influences, than M. Taine. He approaches it with the artistic sense and sympathies of a painter; and in his delineation of character and traits, he seizes upon essentials with the eye of the consummate artist who never disregards his limited means or their judicious economies. In this, the latest of his works, "The Philosophy of Art in the Netherlands," M. Taine gives us a racy and just view of the habits, peculiarities, and general character of the Netherlands people; and exhibits their art as the natural outgrowth, or blossom, of their civilization. In the first of the two main divisions of his work, under "Permanent Causes," he divides mankind into two groups, which, he says, "have been, and still are, the principal factors of modern civilization; on the one hand, the Latin or Latinized people—the Italians, French, Spanish, and Portuguese, and on the other, the Germanic people-the Belgians, Dutch, Germans, Danes, Swedes, Norwegians, English, Scotch, and Americans. In the Latin group the Italians are undeniably the best artists; in the Germanic group they are indisputably the Flemings and the Dutch. In studying, accordingly, the history of art along with these two races, we are studying the history of modern art with its greatest and most opposite representatives."

He then considers "the common characteristics of the Germanic race, and the differences by which it is opposed to the Latin race." In this he is impartial, just, and discriminating. Speaking of the temperament of the latter, he describes it as "coveting keen emotions," and incapable of being happy with moderate ones. "They are like people who, accustomed to eating oranges, throw away carrots and turnips; and yet it is carrots and turnips, and other equally insipid vegetables, which make up our ordinary diet." He closes his remarks on the vivacity and excitability of the French people, thus "Success in life depends on knowing how to be patient, how to endure drudgery, how to unmake and remake, how to recom