CALIFORNIA WATER STORAGE DISTRICT ACT.

1. TITLE SUBJECTS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF. - The California Water Storage District Act (Stats. 1921, p. 1727) does not violate the provisions of section 24, article IV of the constitution in embrac ing more than one subject.-Tarpey v. McClure, 593.

2. REPEAL OF ACT OF 1915.-The provision of said act for the repeal of the act of 1915 and the acts amendatory thereof is not foreign to the subject matter of the former act, and does not constitute a different subject as the history of the legislation shows that the present act had its origin in the act of 1915 and the repeal of the latter is merely a natural and proper incident to the present enactment.-Id.

3. TITLE SUBJECTS EMBRACED IN ACT. The California Water Storage District Act cannot fairly be said to embrace any subject not expressed in its title, with the possible exception of the provisions for dissolution contained in section 65, the failure of which section would in no way affect the remaining provisions of the act.-Id.

4. LOCAL AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS. Said act cannot be said to be local and special in that it provides for the initiation of proceedings, either by petition signed by the holders of a majority in value of the lands within the proposed district, or by not less than five hundred land owners representing not less than ten per cent in value of the land; neither can it be said that this provision violates section 21 of article I of the constitution, in that it grants to one class of citizens privileges or immunities which upon the same terms are not granted to all, or that it violates the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, in that it denies to certain persons equal protection of the law. Id.

5. CONSTRUCTION OF ACT.-The contention that, in the provision of said act that the district "may include the major portion of the land constituted within two or more of the district agencies of the state," the word "may" should be construed to mean "must,” cannot be maintained.-Id.

6. SPECIAL LEGISLATION.-It cannot be held that said act is special because there is another act in effect which covers the same field of legislation, nor because it provides that an affidavit shall be sufficient evidence of the genuineness of signatures to the petition.

Id.

7. CREATION OF DISTRICT LEGISLATIVE ACT-DELEGATION OF POWER. The creation of a water storage district is a legislative act, the purpose of which may not be delegated by the legislature to an executive or judicial officer.-Id.

8. CONDITIONS FOR ORGANIZATION DETERMINATION OF FACT.- The legislature may enact conditions, upon the performance of which

CALIFORNIA WATER STORAGE DISTRICT ACT (Continued).

a water storage district shall be regarded as organized with the powers mentioned and described in the act; and it may intrust the doing of the act or the determination of the fact, upon which those conditions depend, to some other agency.-Id.

9. POWER OF LEGISLATURE-CONFERRING DISCRETION ON ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER.-The legislature may, without violating any rule or principle of the constitution, confer upon an administrative officer a large measure of discretion, provided the exercise thereof is controlled and guided by rules prescribed therefor.-Id.

10. DELEGATION OF POWER. The provision in section 1 of said act authorizing the state engineer to employ such engineers, attorneys, and other assistants as he may deem necessary, and to fix their compensation, does not contravene section 1 of article IV of the constitution, as they are not officers but mere enployees and the discretion as to the number to be employed is not unguided.—Id.

11. FEASIBILITY OF PROJECT-DETERMINATION OF ENGINEER.-The provision of section 5 of said act that the engineer "shall ascertain and determine the practicability, feasibility and utility of the proposed project" is not an attempted delegation of legislative or judicial power.—Id.

12. COST OF EMPLOYEES-LEVY OF TAXES DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER-VOID PROVISION.-The provision of said act that the engineer may employ all necessary engineers, attorneys and assistants and that the cost thereof shall be deemed a part of the expense of said project, and that he "may require the same to be paid by the proponents of said district, or he may issue warrants therefor," to pay which the directors are required to levy an assessment, amounts to such a delegation of legislative power as is prohibited by the constitution and is void, but this does not render the act unworkable, because the engineer may require the necessary cost of investigations to be paid by the proponents of the project. Id.

13. ESTABLISHING BOUNDARIES OF DISTRICT- POWER OF ENGINEER.Section 6 of said act does not vest in the engineer the arbitrary power to make such changes in the boundaries of the proposed district, or in the location and character of the proposed works therein, as he may see fit, which power would be unlawful.-Id. 14. DIVISIONS OF DISTRICT.-The provisions of said act for the division of the district into five to eleven divisions, "possessing the same general character of water rights or interests," and for the establishment of "a convenient number" of election precincts, does not confer arbitrary authority, but a controlled and guided discretion depending upon the facts ascertained.-Id.

CALIFORNIA WATER STORAGE DISTRICT ACT (Continued). 15. LEVYING OF ASSESSMENTS-DUE PROCESS.-The contention that the provisions of section 16 of said act, for the levy of assessments at a flat rate per acre upon all the lands of the district to defray the general expenses of the district, prior to any hearings on the question of benefits, require the taking of private property without due process of law, cannot be maintained.-Id.

16. DETERMINATION OF BENEFITS-TIME-RULE.-The general rule on said subject is that a hearing as to benefits must be provided at some time before the land is finally burdened by the assessment, but this rule is subject to the exception that when the legislature itself determines the boundaries of the district, either by describing them or by laying down a fixed rule by which they may be determined, the property owners affected are not entitled to a hearing, for they are conclusively presumed to have been heard through their representatives in the legislature.-Id. 17. LEVYING ASSESSMENTS HEARING AS TO BENEFITS-MODIFICATION OF ASSESSMENTS.-As to the provisions of section 19 of said act, for the levy of what may be called the main assessment, the contentions cannot be maintained that the act does not provide for a hearing as to benefits and does not specify the rules by which the board is to proceed in modifying or amending the assessment. It is not necessary that the notice of hearing shall expressly state that the assessment-roll has been filed in the office of the state engineer. The law requires that it must be so filed before the notice is given.-Id.

18. INCREASED ASSESSMENT - NOTICE.

The failure of said act to

specify the length of notice which must be given the property owners of the proposed increased assessment is not fatal.—Id. 19. SALE OF WATER AND HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER. Said act does not contemplate the sale of water or hydro-electric power to others than the inhabitants of the district, to whose uses it is dedicated (except as to a possible surplus thereof), and it does not appear, therefore, to provide for a taking of private prop erty for a private use.-Id.

20. ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS-POWER OF ENGINEER.

Said act is not

violative of sections 12 or 13 of article XI of the constitution, because the attempt to confer upon the engineer the power to issue warrants which should automatically result in the levy of assessments is nugatory. The adjustment board is given no power under the act to levy assessments, but merely to apportion them.

Id.

21. ELECTIONS-RIGHT TO VOTE.-Said act does not violate section 24 of article I, or section 1 of article II, of the constitution, in that it denies to any but land owners the right to vote at district elections. Id.

CALIFORNIA WATER STORAGE DISTRICT ACT (Continued). 22. JUDICIAL POWERS-STATE ENGINEER ADJUSTMENT BOARD.-The claims that said act confers judicial power upon the state engineer, that in the adjustment board it has attempted to create a court, and that this board is called upon to exercise judicial powers, cannot be sustained.-Id.

23. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT.-Said act is not unconstitutional in any of the provisions essential to its practical operation.-Id. 24. STATE ENGINEER-DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS.-The words "state engineer," wherever they appear in the Water Storage Act, should be held to refer to the "Department of Public Works and the appropriate officers thereof."-Id.

CERTIORARI.

PROVINCE OF RECORD.-The province of certiorari is to review the record of an inferior court, board, or tribunal, and to determine from the record whether such court, board, or tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. The reviewing board is bound by the record, which must be taken as true. If the contrary is the fact, it must be corrected by motion or suggestion to the court below. If the court had jurisdiction, and the recitals in the judgment or order are sufficient to sustain it, those recitals are conclusive.-Halpern v. Superior Court, 384.

See Contempt, 2; Courts, 3, 4; Workmen's Compensation Act, 16.

CITIES. See Municipal Corporations.

CIVIL SERVICE. See Municipal Corporations, 1-3.

CLAIM AND DELIVERY.

1. CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT-AUTOMOBILE-FORFEITURE-FINDINGS -EVIDENCE. In this action in claim and delivery to recover an automobile held by defendant under a conditional sale contract, the evidence does not support the finding that there was no forfeiture by defendant of his rights under the contract, entitling the plaintiff to maintain the action. Morrison v. Veach, 507. 2. CONTRACTS-DEFAULT - KNOWLEDGE-WAIVER.-There can be no waiver of a default unless the party against whom the waiver is claimed had knowledge of the default.-Id.

3. ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT - - PARTIES.-Under an assignment of a conditional sale contract for the sale of an automobile, together with all rights thereunder, for the purpose of recovery, the assignee is the legal owner of a cause of action to recover the automobile, based on a default of the purchaser, and is the proper party plaintiff in an action in claim and delivery to recover the

CLAIM AND DELIVERY (Continued).

automobile, the assignor retaining an equitable interest in the thing assigned.-Id.

COLLATERAL ATTACK. See Courts, 1.

COMMON CARRIERS.

1. INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE BUSINESS-CONTROL BY CONGRESS.Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the government of the one involves the control of the other, it is Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule.-Atchison etc. Ry. Co. et al. v. Railroad Commission, 214.

2. UNION TERMINAL DEPOT FACILITIES-RAILROADS LARGELY ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE-JURISDICTION-EFFECT OF AMENDMENT OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT.-Under the Esch-Cummings Act of February 28, 1920, amending the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, full power and authority over the matter of union terminal depot facilities of the railroads which are largely engaged in interstate commerce, has been vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission, and by virtue thereof the Railroad Commission of California has been divested of the power, authority and jurisdiction over that subject.-Id.

COMMON LAW. See Adoption, 1.

COMPENSATION. See Services, 1.

COMPROMISE. See Contracts, 17, 18.

CONDITIONS. See Appeal, 13.

CONSIDERATION. See Contracts, 17; Specific Performance, 1, 2.

CONSPIRACY.

PROOF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. — A conspiracy is almost always of necessity provable only by circumstantial evidence, that is to say, by inference reasonably deduced from facts proven, as the law recognizes the intrinsic difficulty of establishing a conspiracy by direct evidence; consequently the conspiracy complained of may oftentimes be inferred from the nature of the acts complained of, the individual and collective interest of the alleged conspirators, the situation and relation of the parties at the time of the commission of the act, and generally all of the circumstances preceding and attending the culmination of the claimed conspiracy.— Siemon v. Finkle, 611.