Escobar) to use ambiguous terms, which the hearer may take in another sense than he doth from whom they proceed. And propounding this question, is it lawful for him that sweareth in a just cause to use equivocal words, which he understands in a sense (which he concealeth) different from that in which those persons take it before whom the oath is made?" He answers affirmatively with Sanchez. And to make this more clear, he subjoins several instances, which are taken out of their most famous casuists, Lessius, Sanchez, &c. "A man being interrogated by a judge upon oath, whether he killed S. T. If he killed him in his own defence, he may deny it; making this mental reservation, that he did not wickedly murder him. If it be a probable opinion, that such an imposition upon goods is unjust, which enforceth the merchant to use false weights and measures: if he be asked afterwards by a judge, whether he used false weights and measures, he may deny it upon oath, making this reservation in his mind, that he did nothing unjustly. A priest being interrogated concerning such a sin, which he heard in confession, may answer, Yea; and (if need require) swear, that no such thing was confessed to him, meaning as a private man. Some necessary goods thou hidest, lest they should be swept away by thy creditors, and thou compelled to beg, r Cap. 7, p. 73. being asked before a judge, thou mayest swear that none are concealed by thee: making this mental reservation, which thou art obliged to à discover. An adulteress being demanded of her e husband, Whether she hath committed adultery, may swear negatively, conceiving in her mind another day than that on which she did commit it. One coming from a place falsely supposed to be infected with the plague, being asked, Whether he came thence, may swear that he did not; making this mental reservation, as from a pestilential place. If a man borrow a sum of money of another, and return it, but taketh no receipt under his hand, and be brought to his oath before a judge, whether he borrowed any money of him, he may lawfully swear, that he never received any money of him; understanding within himself, not so as to owe it, or that he is obliged to confess it," saith Filliucius.' And in the same question he lays down this general rule:" He that hath externally promised something, without an intention of promising, if he be asked, whether he promised, may upon oath deny it; making this mental reservation, not with a promise that obligeth him. And Quæst. 4. He propounds another way to avoid lying and perjury, much more secure than the former: and that is, when a man having said aloud, "I s Quæst. Mor. t Tom. ii. tr. 25, cap. 11, p. 107. swear that I have not done such a thing," he adds, whispering to himself, "this day." And if any be too thick-skulled to learn this art of making these mental reservations, they have invented a more easy way, viz. ordering and directing the intention aright. Escobar" lays down this general rule: "Promises oblige not when a man hath no intention to engage himself when he makes them." If a man falling into the hands of thieves, cannot be dismissed without an oath, that he will give them ten crowns, he is not obliged, except he did intend it at the time of swearing, saith Tolet." And Emanuel Sa positively affirms, "That he who sweareth to do this or that, is not obliged, if he did not intend by that oath to oblige himself." And Filliucius gives this reason for it, "Because it is the intention that regulates the quality of the action." These methods their casuists unanimously propound, by which all lies and perjuries may be justified. How destructive they are of all commerce, and human society, is most evident. 6. God commands us to make restitution of such goods as we have unjustly taken, or detained from others.-Luke xix. 8. And the ancients say, "That without restitution there can be no remission." But their casuists have found u Theol. Mor. tract. 3, exam. 3, p. 369. w Instruct. Sacerd. lib. iv. cap. 22, p. 195. out many expedients to dispense with this important duty. Medina, Lessius, and Filliucius mention twelve causes which excuse from restitution to which many more are added by other casuists. I will mention, and but mention a few of them. 1. "If a man hath done thee wrong without any ill intention, he is no wise obliged to make restitution," saith Escobar. 2. "Ignorance of what kind soever, either of the fact or of the law, is a sufficient excuse," saith the same casuist. And though, after some inquiry, he find it more probable, that the goods, whereof he is possessed, belong to another; yet he may lawfully keep them, saith Palaus, cited by Escobar. And he gives this reason; "Because possession preponderates all contrary reasons which are not demonstrative." Nay, though he be fully convinced that they are another man's goods; yet," if they be moveable after three years' enjoyment, and if immoveable, after ten years' possession, he is not obliged to make restitution," saith Filliucius. 3. When another man's goods are mingled with his own so Lessius. "A merchant (saith Escobar) who hath "if y Theol. Mor. tract. 3, exam. 2, cap. 2, p. 337. z Tract. 3, exam. 2, c. 4, p. 356. a Page 350. b Tom. 2, tract. 32, cap. 5, p. 242. c De Just. lib. ii. p. 172; Theol. Mor. tract. 3, exam. d received another man's money, and mingled it with his own, if he to whom the money appertained, demand it back again, he is not obliged to restore it," according to Vasquez. 4. Impossibility of doing it without lessening a man's retinue, and loss of honour and reputation: so Escobar, and Sa, who cites Soto, Arag. and Tolet. And Layman, lib. iii. tract. 2, p. 305. Navar Manual. Confess. cap. 17, p. 320, who gives several reasons for it. Filliucius, tom. ii. tract. 32, cap. 5, p. 243. 5. "When it is a greater disadvantage to the person that restores, than an advantage to the person wronged," saith Escobar, (who cites Tolet,) Sa, and Layman. 6. When his confessor doth not enjoin it. Escobar, tract. 3, exam. 2, p. 339. 7. When a man renounceth his estate. Escobars putting this question, "Whether a man that renounceth his estate, may with a good conscience retain so much as is necessary for himself and family to live in honour, or according to his quality? Answers with Lessius," "That he may do it." Now if we admit these excuses as just and lawful, (which none must question,) it is most clear that few, if any, will be liable to make restitution of those goods, which they are most unjustly possessed of. d Tract. 3, exam. 2, p. 241 and 356. Aphor. p. 143, lib. iii. p. 305. h Tract. 3, exam. 2, p. 459. |