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such currency in the last century. What is of even more significance, while adhering to what I have called elsewhere the third stage of the Anglo-American analytical formula, by taking as the test of positive law “efficient existence" (I, 69), he goes further, and is willing to include under the term “positive law” rules and standards which get their efficiency from other than purely judicial tribunals. His formula is: “The rules and principles recognized and applied by the State's authorities judicative and executive” (I, 75). Here we have, so far as I know, the first recognition in analytical jurisprudence of the rise of executive justice in England of to-day. Nor is this all. “Taking positive,” he says, “to indicate efficiency and importance, I should say that any rules of human conduct actually obtaining among any considerable number of human beings, in some manner connected or associated together, by virtue of human sanctions, might not improperly be called Positive Law” (I, 90). This should be compared with the chapter on investigation of living law in Professor Ehrlich’s “Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts.” If in the primitive community social control was effected through fas and boni mores as well as through ius, in other words, if religion and the internal discipline of the gens and the collegium played no less part once than that played by the law, we have to recognize that to-day, for example, the internal discipline of a labor union may be quite as effective an agency of social control as the law, and may actually supersede the law of the land in actual practice. While we need not use the term “positive law" for effective means of social control which lack the authority of the state, and, in the interest of critical terminology, probably ought not to do so, these are things which one who studies the law as a whole cannot affo to overlook and is significant that the exclusive attitude which was once the glory of the English analytical jurist is not maintained.

It is evident, then, that the author was qualified not only by learning and scholarship but by sympathy with the modern movement in jurisprudence to write a textbook of the science of law in English which should do for a period of legal growth what Austin did for a period of legal stability. Unhappily the demands of a system of education whereby one must prepare students to be examined by others along traditional lines have prevented anything more than occasional adumbrations of what the author might have done and we could wish he had done. The book is not one of which the ordinary student of jurisprudence can make much use, nor was it probably intended for him. The teacher, on the other hand, may read it profitably, and indeed should resort to it continually in connection with the application of the analytical method to the Roman law and the bearing of Roman legal institutions upon the questions debated by Austin and his critics. It is a book of reference which no teacher can afford to overlook.

One would hardly expect from the Cambridge University Press "Remington" for Runnington (İ, 105); “Spencer's" Equitable Jurisdiction for Spence's (I, 113); “Gerichtsgebranch(I, 123), and much more of that sort; and it is not flattering to American scholarship to read of “Prof. Thayer” for Albert S. Thayer, Esq., of New York (I, 110); "Mr. A. S. Thayer of Harvard” (I, 135); or “Professor A. S. Lowell” (I, 211).

R. P.

THE HISTORY AND PRESENT POSITION OF THE BILL OF LADING AS A Docu

MENT OF TITLE TO Goods (being the Yorke Prize Essay for the year 1913).
By W. P. Bennett, B.A., LL.B. Cambridge: University Press. 1914.

pp. viii, 101. This little book is a creditable attempt to state systematically the result of the English decisions on bills of lading as documents of title. Their effect as contracts with the carrier is not discussed. An appendix presents briefly the law of the United States, and such provisions of the Uniform Sales Act and of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act as vary from the common law are noted. A statement of the law of many of the countries of continental Europe and of South America, as well as the law of Japan, so far as the codes in those countries show their law, is also appended.

One who reads the body of the book, if he has in mind the purposes which merchants have attempted to accomplish by means of bills of lading, will be struck with the apparent desire of the courts to thwart these purposes wherever they seem to interfere with rules of the common law. The custom of merchants has not had such good fortune in the matter of bills of lading as in the matter of bills of exchange. The compromises which the courts have made have not always been harmonious, and Mr. Bennett does not wholly escape the imputation of believing inconsistent things at the same time because eminent judges have in different decisions authorized the inconsistency. On p. 49 he says: “It seems clear then that the property in goods at sea can be passed without the indorsement of a bill of lading.” On p. 17, however, he says: “It is probable that a bill of lading which does not contain some such words as 'or order' or 'or order or assigns,' or which is specially indorsed but without the addition of those words after the name of the indorsee, does not on indorsement or reindorsement pass such legal property in the goods as the indorser intended to pass to the indorsee by the contract between them.” It is hard to see, if the property can be passed without the indorsement of the bill of lading, why any particular form of bill of lading or of indorsement should be material for that purpose, when an intent to transfer the property is manifested. Indeed, the general conclusion of the author fortified by many statements in the decisions, seems to be, though he has nowhere distinctly formulated it, that apart from Factors Acts, the only importance of bills of lading is an inconclusive evidence of transactions which might equally well be carried out otherwise, a poor kind of security on which to advance yearly hundreds of millions of pounds and dollars.

S. W.

BOUVIER's Law DICTIONARY. Volumes I, II, and III. By John Bouvier.

Third Revision (eighth edition). By Francis Rawle. St. Paul: West

Publishing Company. 1914. pp. xix, 3504. True to its title, this revision of Bouvier's Law Dictionary is above all a “concise encyclopedia of the law.” Since the last revision, in 1897, the encyclopedic titles have been more fully developed and brought down to date, until now they contain in compact form a remarkably complete outline of the various branches of the law. In this field, of course, the work is not intended, and could not hope to supplant the encyclopedias and digests now accessible to the profession. But as a convenient guide to the fundamental principles of the law, it is sure to prove valuable to the practitioner as well as the student, especially because of the wealth of material which it makes readily available. Wellchosen cases are cited in support of the propositions of law, and for the first time the names of all cases cited are given, with citations to all series of reports. Frequent references to treatises and legal periodicals, moreover, make each title a valuable guide to the secondary authority on the subject. It is especially gratifying to note many citations to the leading articles and editorial comment of this Review.

The development of the encyclopedic side of the work, however, has in no respect interfered with its independent worth as a dictionary. On the contrary, several thousand new titles of this sort have been added, so that it now constitutes a compendium of legal terms from the various systems of law that for practical purposes appears to be complete. The many additions to this revision have been effected without such an enlargement of the work as to make it cumbersome. It now appears for the first time in three volumes, but they are executed in such a compact and serviceable form that convenient reference is assured. In fact, in every respect this revision maintains the excellence that has made Bouvier's the standard American dictionary of law.

S. P. G.

BENDER'S WAR REVENUE LAW, 1914. By the Publisher's Editorial Staff.

Albany, N. Y.: Matthew Bender and Company. 1914. Pp. xxviii, 181. The so-called War Revenue Law of 1914 is a reminder of two things: the perverse elasticity of our tariff, and the economic interdependence of world nations. To meet the deficiency in our revenue caused by the war in Europe, Congress has been compelled to impose as an emergency measure much the same taxes which would be imposed were the United States actually involved in the war. In fact, the Act of 1914 is in a large measure a reënactment of the Act of 1898, passed as an emergency measure during the Spanish War.

The present act is distinctly an emergency measure, and fixes December 31, 1915, as the date when the new taxes shall cease. It repeals nothing of the existing revenue laws, but adds much, and is bound to give rise to numerous vexing legal questions. The publication of an annotated text of the law for the convenience of practitioners is, therefore, entirely justifiable and proper. Bender's War Revenue Law is that and no more. With a preliminary historical introduction and an entirely inadequate description of the internal revenue laws in general, the book contains the full text of the act with copious annotations and citations from the authorities, including departmental rulings, which although, of course, not binding on the courts, are precedents for administrative action and therefore of interest. On the whole the book appears to be as much of an emergency measure as the act itself, and suffers equally from hasty construction; a convenient guide in practice, but of little or no use to the student.

THE DEAF. By Harry Best. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

1914. pp. xviii, 340. ESSENTIALS OF THE LAW. Vol. I. Blackstone. By Marshall D. Ewell.

Second Edition. Albany, N. Y.: Matthew Bender and Company.

1915. pp. xvi, 867. LEADING CASES IN CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By A. H. F. Lefroy.

Toronto: The Carswell Company, Ltd. 1914. pp. xxi, 112. NAVAL AND MILITARY DESPATCHES RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN THE WAR.

London: Darling and Son, Ltd. 1914. pp. 89. THE ILLEGALITY OF THE TRIAL OF JESUS. By Hon. John E. Richards. THE

LEGALITY OF THE TRIAL OF JESUS. By S. Srinivasa Aiyar. New Orleans:

Charles E. George. 1914. pp. 92. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL Courts. By John C. Rose.

Baltimore: King Brothers. 1915. pp. xxx, 406.

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JOHN
OHN CHIPMAN GRAY, Royall Professor Emeritus, died at

Boston on February 25, 1915. He was born at Brighton, July 14, 1839, the son of Horace and Sarah Russell (Gardner) Gray, and after attending the Boston Latin School he graduated from Harvard College in 1859 and from the Law School in 1861. He studied for a third year at the Law School, received his A.M. in 1862, and immediately enlisted in the army, remaining until the end of the war. During his service he was Second Lieutenant in the Fortyfirst Massachusetts Infantry and the Third Massachusetts Cavalry, aid to General Gordon, and Major and Judge Advocate General of United States Volunteers on the staffs of General Foster and General Gillmore.

After the war he came back to Boston and took up practice, forming a partnership with John C. Ropes, an old friend and classmate in the Law School. Later, by the addition of William Caleb Loring (now Mr. Justice Loring of the Supreme Judicial Court), the firm became Ropes, Gray and Loring; and at the time of Mr. Gray's death it included, under the name of Ropes, Gray, Boyden and Perkins, eight of his former pupils, among them his son Roland, who graduated with distinction from College in 1895 and the Law School in 1898.

“He married in 1873 Anna Lyman Mason, a granddaughter of Jeremiah Mason."

His teaching work at the Law School began in 1869, before Dean Langdell came from practice to the School. He was first appointed as lecturer, and this appointment was renewed in 1871 and again in 1872 and 1873. On March 18, 1875, he was made Story Professor of Law, and on November 12, 1883, Royall Professor of Law. He resigned on February 1, 1913, and became Royall Professor Emeritus. His term of service thus covered the whole development of the modern school, and every member of the present Faculty came under his instruction. He taught many subjects,Bankruptcy and the Law of the Federal Courts, Conflict of Laws, Evidence, Constitutional Law, all branches of the law of Property, and Jurisprudence.

'With Mr. Ropes he edited the American Law Review for several years beginning with its foundation in 1866.” Thereafter he published several treatises of distinguished excellence. The first edition of his "Restraints on the Alienation of Property" was published in 1883, the second in 1895. The “Rule against Perpetuities” had three editions, in 1886, 1906, and 1915. Each was carefully rewritten, the third during the last two years of Mr. Gray's life. "The Nature and Sources of the Law,” embodying the substance of lectures delivered at Harvard and Columbia, was published in 1909. He also published two editions of his collected “Cases on Property" in six volumes, beside articles in magazines and other writings.

His honors and responsibilities, public and private, were many. He was made Doctor of Laws by Yale in 1894, and Harvard in 1895; he was President of the Harvard Alumni Association; and he was a Trustee of the Museum of Fine Arts and of many great public and private trusts.

Mr. Gray's life had many sides. Two especially concern the Law School, - his work as a writer and a teacher.

His plans for writing were stated in a letter to a friend not long before his death, with characteristic modesty and grace of phrase:

"Some fifty years ago I determined that I would do two things; first, write a book on the Rule against Perpetuities, which should be a model text-book; and secondly, write something on analytical jurisprudence; and I have had these objects in mind ever since. Of course, the cares of the world and the deceitfulness of riches and the lust of other things have choked the 'word,' but they have not entirely destroyed it. I may say that I have pursued at eve what I pursued at morn."

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