the more thoroughly will they test the witness's ability to detect them.12 Many jurisdictions, however, for fear of collateral issues or unfairness, arbitrarily restrict the admission of specimens on the direct examination to those admitted to be genuine or those already in the case.13 This rule of thumb, imperfect even for direct examination, cannot be meant to apply to cross-examination. Collateral issues would be avoided by the use of specimens admitted to be false as well as those admitted to be true, while the papers already in the case necessarily afford only genuine signatures. So, even in courts so limiting the juxtaposition of signatures on the direct examination, no insurmountable legal obstacle exists to the full use of this test of the witness.14

RECENT CASES

ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL — SURVIVAL OF ACTION - BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE: SPECIAL DAMAGES. - In an action for breach of promise to marry, the plaintiff alleged as special damages that she gave up a business in which she was engaged, in consideration of the defendant's promise to marry her. Before the pleadings were delivered the defendant died. Held, that the action cannot be maintained against the executor. Quirk v. Thomas, 31 T. L. R. 237 (K. B.).

Lord Ellenborough's dictum that an action for breach of promise of marriage will survive against an executor if there are special damages has been widely repeated in the books. See Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 M. & S. 408, 411; Stebbins v. Palmer, 18 Mass. 71, 75. But what special damages will suffice for

12 Eccentric genuine signatures or genuine ones written especially for the occasion could be excluded here by the court as well as in direct examination.

13 The authorities on this point, which is largely governed by statute, are so diversified as to admit of no systematic classification. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 2008, 2016, n. Three rules, however, may be taken as typical. (1) Comparison is not permissible. Gibson v. Trowbridge Co., 96 Ala. 357, 11 So. 365; Kinney v. Flynn, 2 R. I. 319. (2) Only specimens admitted to be genuine or already otherwise in the case may be used for comparison. Macomber v. Scott, 10 Kan. 335; Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287. (3) Signatures are admissible for comparison if proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge. See n. 10, supra.

14 The authorities upon this point are extraordinarily confused. Though the case of the lay witness is in every respect more clear than that of the expert, it has been suggested that even where the test is allowed in the case of the expert, it cannot be applied to the lay witness. See Wilmington Savings Bank v. Waste, 76 Vt. 331, 336, 57 Atl. 241. But for the most part the question of whether the test is permissible is treated alike for both sorts of witnesses. See Page v. Homans, 14 Me. 478, 487; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 2014, 2015. In jurisdictions where extraneous specimens are provable for the purpose of the direct examination, the use of forged signatures in cross-examination has several times been allowed. Hoag v. Wright, 174 N. Y. 36, 66 N. E. 579; Browning v. Gosnell, 91 Ia. 448, 59 N. W. 340. But see Andrews v. Hayden's Adm'rs, 88 Ky. 455, 11 S. W. 428. But in those jurisdictions which do not allow the proof of extraneous specimens for the purposes of the direct examination, the decisions do not permit the proof of such specimens for impeachment. Gaunt v. Harkness, 53 Kan. 405. However, some of the jurisdictions which forbid the proving of extraneous specimens for the purpose of the cross-examination permit the test if made exclusively with unproven signatures and those employed in the direct examination. Johnston Harvester Co. v. Miller, 72 Mich. 265, 40 N. W. 429. Cf. Howard v. Patrick, 43 Mich. 121, 5 N. W. 84.

the purpose is much in doubt. It is clear that where in addition to the promise to marry there was a promise to give property to the plaintiff, breach of the latter promise will create a cause of action, which survives against the promisor's executor. See Finley v. Chirney, 20 Q. B. D. 494, 500. Perhaps this is what is meant by the common statement that the action will survive if the promise directly affects the plaintiff's property. See Hovey v. Page, 55 Me. 142, 145. Certainly pecuniary loss directly caused by the breach is not enough to make the action survive. Finley v. Chirney, supra. Indeed no case has been found in which a suit on a bare promise to marry survived the death of either party unless by force of a statute. Shuler v. Millsaps, 71 N. C. 297; Stewart v. Lee, 70 N. H. 181, 46 Atl. 31. The principal case strengthens the probability that the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" will not be encroached upon in this class of cases.

ACCRETION

RIGHT OF RIPARIAN OWNER TO ARTIFICIAL EXTENSIONS OF HIS BANK. - Two islands, owned by the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively, were separated by a navigable slough. The state built a dyke across the head of the slough, with the result that sandbars formed and gradually connected the islands. This process was greatly accelerated by the use of the slough as a dumping ground for sand dredged by the state from another channel. The plaintiff now sues to quiet title to that part which he claims as his proportionate share of the accretion. Held, that he is entitled to the relief sought. Gillihan v. Cieloha, 145 Pac. 1061 (Ore.).

It seems well settled that a riparian owner is entitled to accretions although they arise incidentally from the presence of a wharf, dyke, or other artificial condition. Tatum v. City of St. Louis, 125 Mo. 647, 28 S. W. 1002; Roberts v. Brooks, 78 Fed. 411, 415. Such structures, however, must not have been erected by the riparian owner himself with the object of causing the accretion. See Attorney-General v. Chambers, 4 DeG. & J. 55, 69. The principal case, admittedly presents an extraordinary example of accretion from artificial causes, for the extension was largely due to the notorious use of the slough as a dumping ground for sand dredged elsewhere by the state. But the court takes the position that as against everyone but the state, the plaintiff is entitled to this artificial addition to his banks. While there is little authority on the point, the result seems just enough. Certainly, the riparian owner would prevail against a wrongdoer who had made such a deposit in front of the uplands. Steers v. City of Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 51, 4 N. E. 7; City of Memphis v. Wait, 102 Tenn. 274, 52 S. W. 161. And in the principal case, where the state does not claim the new land, it is equitable to consider it accretion as between the rival owners and to divide it in such proportions as will best preserve their valuable water rights, especially as a possessory title upon public lands has been held sufficient to maintain the statutory suit to quiet title. Pralus v. Pacific G. & S. M. Co., 35 Cal. 30. Furthermore, it would be doubtful whether the state, having filled in the slough and made it useless for navigation, could thereafter assert title thereto. See Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 102, 125.

BANKRUPTCY - DISCHARGE EFFECT OF DISCHARGE ON SURETY'S CONTINGENT CLAIM TO INDEMNITY. - The principal obligor broke the contract prior to bankruptcy. After the discharge of the principal obligor, the surety paid the creditor, and now sues the principal for reimbursement. Held, that his recovery is barred by the discharge. Williams v. United States Fidelity, etc. Co., U. S. Sup. Ct. Off., No. 80 (Feb. 23, 1915.)

The present Bankruptcy Act, unlike its predecessor, does not provide specifically that contingent claims shall be provable. As a result the law on the point is in confusion. On principle it would be desirable to free the bankrupt from as many of his obligations as are susceptible of valuation, but some of

the federal courts, in seeming disregard of this policy, have held contingent claims never provable. In re Levy, 208 Fed. 479. Other decisions find warrant in the general spirit of the act for allowing contingent claims to be proved. In Re Caloris Mfg. Co., 179 Fed. 722. Cf. In re Scott Transfer Co., 216 Fed. 308; see 27 HARV. L. REV. 469. As yet, the Supreme Court has not been forced to decide the question, for in the only case involving the problem the claim was deemed incapable of liquidation. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340. In the principal case, the court holds that § 57 i, which allows the surety to prove in the creditor's name if the latter is remiss, amply protects the surety and justifies holding his claim discharged. This settles the matter satisfactorily as far as sureties are concerned, but unfortunately leaves the general question undecided, with no intimation, however, that in a proper case a contingent claim would be held not provable.

BANKRUPTCY - DISSOLUTION OF LIENS LIEN ACQUIRED WITHIN FOUR MONTHS ON PROPERTY FRAUDULENTLY CONVEYED. An insolvent made a conveyance which, under the state law, was fraudulent only as to existing creditors. Two years later these creditors brought suit to set the conveyance aside and attached the property. Within four months of this attachment the insolvent was petitioned into bankruptcy, and the attachment lien was preserved for the benefit of the estate under § 67 f of the Bankruptcy Act, which voids all liens obtained through legal proceedings within four months of the petition unless the court orders the lien preserved for the benefit of the estate. The property sold for less than the debts of the attaching creditors and they now claim the whole proceeds. Held, that the proceeds will be distributed among all the creditors of the estate. Globe Bank & Trust Co. of Paducah, Ky. v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288.

Under § 70 e of the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee can set aside a fraudulent conveyance which any creditor could set aside, even though no creditor has acted and the four months' period has elapsed. Thomas v. Roddy, 122 N. Y. App. Div. 851, 107 N. Y. Supp. 473. If the creditors have taken action in the state court and then bankruptcy intervenes within four months of their attachment of the property, their lien will be avoided under § 67 ƒ unless ordered preserved for the benefit of the estate. Clarke v. Larremore, 188 U. S. 486. If preserved, it becomes a part of the bankrupt's estate, and, although under the state law the existing creditors alone could have profited by setting aside the conveyance, all creditors must now share alike. First National Bank v. Staake, 202 U. S. 141. Nor can these creditors claim that their position in the state court created a priority granted by the state law and retained for them by § 64 b (5), for that section contemplates priorities of an entirely different nature, depending upon the furnishing of labor or materials and the like. See In re Laird, 109 Fed. 550; In re Bennett, 153 Fed. 673. Whether such an attachment levied after four months on property fraudulently conveyed would itself constitute an act of bankruptcy under § 3 a (3), as a preference suffered or permitted through legal proceedings, was not here before the court. Such would seem to be the result, however, if the property for this purpose can be considered as belonging to the bankrupt, and a creditor would then be able to derive no benefit whatever from his individual diligence in attaching the property at a time when the fraudulent conveyance itself has ceased to be available as an act of bankruptcy. See Wilson v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, 198.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS RIGHTS OF LESSEE OF PROPERTY EXEMPTED FROM TAXATION BY LEGISLATIVE CONTRACT. The charters of two railroads exempted them from taxation beyond one-half of one per cent of their annual incomes and authorized leases of the franchises. In pursuance of this authority and of a subsequent

act sanctioning the specific transaction, the railroads were leased to the plaintiff corporation with an option of perpetual renewal. The leased roads were then taxed to the plaintiff, the lessee, as owner of the fee, at more than onehalf of one per cent on their incomes. Held, that the tax will be enjoined as an impairment of the obligation of the contract to exempt. Wright v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., U. S. Sup. Ct. Off., No. 161 (March 22, 1915).

Alleged contracts of a state legislature exempting property from taxation are viewed with hostility by the courts, and will not be protected under the contract clause of the Constitution unless a legal obligation is conclusively established. Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. (U. S.) 300. The charters in the principal case meet this test and in fact had already been interpreted to constitute a binding contract with the lessor railroads. Wright v. Georgia R. & B. Co., 216 U. S. 420. But the hostility of the law toward limitations of this kind is so great that the exemption, even when established, does not follow the property into the hands of transferees of the contracting party unless the legislature clearly so intended. Rochester Ry. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U. S. 236; Getton v. University of the South, 208 U. S. 489. The principal case finds that such an intent is evidenced by the cumulative force of the peculiar facts surrounding this particular lease. It expressly negatives the implication that the fee would be exempt into whosesoever hands it might come, or that an interest less than the fee could not be taxed. The question is one of degree, which must be determined by the process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, and the principal case is significant only as establishing a datum in that process.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PERSONAL RIGHTS: CIVIL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS - LIBERTY TO CONTRACT: REGULATION OF HOURS OF LABOR. — A California statute forbade the employment of any woman in certain industrial and mercantile occupations for a longer period than eight hours in one day or forty-eight hours in one week. CAL. STAT., 1911, p. 437. A hotel proprietor was arrested for violating the statute by allowing a chambermaid in his employ to work nine hours in one day. He now attacks the validity of the statute by habeas corpus proceedings. Held, that the statute is constitutional. Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373.

This same statute was later so amended as to apply to women employed in hospitals, with the exception of graduate nurses. CAL. STAT., 1913, p. 713. A woman pharmacist employed in a hospital seeks to restrain its enforcement on the ground that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Held, that the statute is constitutional. Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U. S. 385.

These decisions establish the power of legislatures to shorten the hours of women's labor to a greater extent than some authorities had considered allowable. See Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454; FREUND, POLICE POWER, § 314. It has, however, become clearly established that a ten-hour day for women may be prescribed by statute. Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412; People v. Elerding, 254 Ill. 579, 98 N. E. 982; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383; Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N. W. 421; State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602, 70 Pac. 52. This slight additional restriction, in view of the conditions of modern industrial life, cannot be deemed so unreasonable as to exceed the police power of the state. State v. Somerville, 67 Wash. 638, 122 Pac. 324. Earnshaw v. Newman, 47 Chi. Leg. News, 281 (Sup. Ct., D. C.). For a discussion of the constitutional principles involved, see 21 HARV. L. REV. 495. The second case illustrates the somewhat unequal results of the necessarily imperfect fashion in which classes of occupations and employees must be defined by legislatures. Such legislative classifications, however far from perfect, will be upheld by the courts to the verge of caprice. See Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. But in legislation of this charac

ter, better results might be secured, it would seem, by delegating to administrative boards, similar to those now administering the minimum wage statutes in several states, the task of fixing the exact fields of industry to which the restrictions should apply. See 2 GEO. V, c. 2; WIS. LAWS, 1913, ch. 381; 4 Aм. LAB. LEG. REV. 13; 28 HARV. L. REV. 89.

TAXATION STAMP

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW POWERS OF LEGISLATURE: TAX ON BILL OF COSTS IN STATE COURT. - The United States War Revenue Act of October 22, 1914, on a fair construction, required a litigant in a state court to affix a revenue stamp to his bill of costs, and forbade the clerk of court to certify the bill before a stamp was attached. Held, that the provision is unconstitutional. Neldert v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., City Ct., N. Y., Feb. 9, 1915 (not yet reported).

Congress may not impede the states in the exercise of their reserved governmental powers, one of which is the administration of justice. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 113; Bettman v. Warwick, 108 Fed. 46. Although a tax, the financial burden of which falls directly or indirectly on the state, is the usual mode in which this has been attempted, embarrassments of every description are equally obnoxious to the Constitution. Jones v. Keep, 19 Wis. 369; see McNally v. Field, 119 Fed. 445, 447. So the tax in the principal case, although it comes out of the litigant's pocket, is objectionable because payment of it is made a condition precedent to execution of the state court's judgment. It has been suggested that the litigant might be held personally liable for the tax, even though the state court's process could not be obstructed to enforce payment. See Downer, J., diss., in Jones v. Keep, supra, 388. But it is submitted that such a tax on the privilege of seeking justice in the state tribunals would likewise contravene the right of the state to administer justice on its own terms among those who resort to its courts.

CONTRIBUTION SHIFTING OF CRIMINAL PENALTY TO ONE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE. - The plaintiffs, moneylenders, hired the defendants to address envelopes to persons whose names appeared in a certain handbook, but to omit minors. The defendants carelessly included a minor among the addressees, and the plaintiffs innocently sent him a circular. The plaintiffs were convicted of the statutory misdemeanor of sending a moneylender's circular to an infant without reasonable grounds to believe him of full age. This is an action to recover the amount of the fine and costs. Held, that only nominal damages are recoverable. R. Leslie (Ltd.) v. Reliable Advertising and Addressing Agency (Ltd.), [1915] 1 K. B. 652.

For a discussion of the novel question of whether one who has suffered a criminal penalty may recover its amount in damages from the one who was responsible for his committing the crime, see NOTES, p. 687.

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CORPORATIONS - STOCKHOLDERS: RIGHTS INCIDENT TO MEMBERSHIP RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER OF SHARES IN AGREEMENT OF ASSOCIATION. Under a Massachusetts statute which provided that any restrictions on the transfer of stock should be set forth in the agreement of association, it was provided in the agreement and noted on the certificates that none of the shares should be transferred without consent of three-fourths of the capital stock. The defendants acquired stock without complying with this requirement, and now claim to be stockholders and hence qualified to act as directors, on the ground that the restriction is void. Held, that the restriction is valid. Longyear v. Hardman, 219 Mass. 405, 106 N. E. 1012.

Corporations, like other associations of individuals, often find it expedient for various reasons to limit the admission of new members. While this is usually accomplished by placing restrictions on the transfer of the stock, the