1806. Fox υ. "ministrators, and guardians, may, by leave and direction of the "Orphan's Court, put out their minor's money to interest: but "if no person can be found to take it, who will give good secu"rity, they shall only be responsible for the principal." By the WILCOCKS same law sec. 6. "they shall only be liable to pay interest on the แ surplusage of the estate remaining in their hands, when the "accounts of their administration are, or ought to be, settled be"fore the Orphan's Court or register." It is therefore the duty of executors, administrators, and guardians, not to let money remain unemployed in their hands: and by fair implication from the words of this act of Assembly, if they do through negligence suffer it to remain unemployed, they are responsible for interest: much more so if they use the money for their own purposes. As the law expressly declares that they are only liable to pay interest on the balance in their hands, when the administration accounts are or ought to be settled, it should seem that they are not liable to interest during twelve months from the death of the intestate, since that period is reckoned reasonable for the settlement of those accounts. To lay down rules, by which it may be ascertained in every case, whether administrators shall pay interest on balances in their hands, is impossible; because every case depends on its own circumstances. But I think it may be established as a principle, that interest is payable, where the administrator has been guilty of neglect in not putting out money, or where he has made use of it himself. (a) Both the act of Assembly and the principles of universal reason concur in this; and it is agreeable to the authorities cited from the law of England, and the civil law. Still it remains to be decided by the facts in each case, whether the principle is applicable. As to the auditors, no law has been shewn, which satisfies me, that they have power to call for the oath of the administrator as to the use he has made of the money, or to demand the production of his books. At the same time I cannot help remarking, that the administrator should reflect well before he declines the offer of his adversary, to appeal to his own books: because it lies on him, to shew what has been done with the money; and unless he does shew it, in a satisfactory manner, he leaves himself open to the conclusion, of having used it for his own purposes. (a) Vide Granberry's Executor v. Granberry, 1 Wash. 246. 1806. Fox The Court having given their opinion on the point of law submitted to them by the exceptions, it remains for the parties to determine, whether they will acquiesce in the report of WILCOCKS the auditors, (men certainly of excellent character and experience in business) or proceed to a further investigation of the V. accounts. YEATES J. and SMITH J. were not present at the argument, nor at the delivery of the court's opinion. CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. The Commonwealth against BOYER. THE 1807. Friday, An indict ment for ten dollar directors and ted States, &c. laid to be HE defendant was tried before TILGHMAN C. J. and SMITH J. at a court of Oyer and Terminer, holden by the February Judges of the Supreme Court in the county of Philadelphia, in 20th. January 1807, under the following indictment: "The grand "inquest, &c. &c. do present that Nicholas Boyer, late of the stealing two county aforesaid, yeoman, on the first day of May in the year notes of the "of our Lord 1806, with force and arms at the county aforesaid President, “in a certain lane near the highway, in and upon one John company of "Duffey, in the peace of God and the commonwealth then the bank Uni" and there being, feloniously did make an assault, and him the is bad. They "said John Duffey in bodily fear and danger of his life in the should be "lane aforesaid, then and there feloniously did put, and two ten promissory “dollar notes of the President directors and company of the notes for the “bank of the United States; one ten dollar note of the President money. “directors and company of the bank of North America; one five Qu. Whether "dollar note of the President directors and company of the bank ment is bad of Pennsylvania, and one three dollar note of the Philadelphia for laying “bank, being altogether of the value of thirty eight dollars, of as "the goods and chattels of the said John Duffey, from the per- and chattels and against the will of the said John Duffey in the lane aforesaid, then and there feloniously and violently did steal, "take, and carry away, contrary to the form of the act of Assem แ son VOL. I. 2 C payment of an indict bank notes the goods of the prose cutor. 1807. "ly in such case made and provided, and against the peace and Common- "dignity of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania." He was wealth acquitted of the robbery, and found guilty of the larceny; and a motion was made in arrest of judgment upon two grounds: υ. BOYER. . 1. Because the indictment did not pursue the act of Assembly in describing the property alleged to have been stolen; and the property described was not the subject of larceny at common law. 2. Because the indictment laid the property alleged to have been stolen, to be the goods and chattels of John Duffey. It was argued on the 16th and 18th of February, by Meredith and S. Levy for the defendant, and by the Attorney general for the commonwealth. The act of Assembly upon which the indictment was founded, was passed on the 15th April 1790, and the 5th section is as follows: "Robbery or larceny of obligations or bonds, bills obli"gatory, bills of exchange, promissory notes for the payment of "money, lottery tickets, paper bills of credit, certificates grant"ed by or under the authority of this commonwealth, or of all "or any of the United States of America, shall be punished in "the same manner as robbery or larceny of any goods or chat"tels." 2 St. Laws. 804. For the defendant it was contended, that the property described in the indictment did not appear to be such whereof a larceny could be committed; for it was not stated that they were promissory notes for the payment of money. A note of the President directors and company of the bank of the United States, is not necessarily such a promissory note; because it may in fact contain no promise or engagement whatever, and in addition to this, may have already been paid and cancelled. Where the words of a statute are descriptive of the nature of the offence, there it is necessary to specify in the particular words of such statute; Rex v. Pemberton; (a) and the court will not, by a forced intendment, support an indictment which is defective in the description of the crime, since they are restrained by the same principle which limits the operation of penal statutes to (a) 2 Burr. 1027. tases within their letter. The notes are also laid in this indictment to be of the bank of the United States &c. The effect of this language in vulgar use is not a question for the court, but on the contrary its legal import; and this evidently is, that the notes were the property of the bank; which leaves it still more doubtful whether they were promissory notes for the payment of money. Craven's case, 2 East Cr. Law 601. is in point. He was indicted upon the stat. 2 Geo. 2. c. 25. for stealing a certain note commonly called a bank note; and all the Judges on reference to them, held the indictment ill, as in describing the property stolen, it did not follow any of the descriptions of property in the statute. The indictment states the notes to be of the goods and chattels of Duffey. In the case of the King v. Sadi and Morris, (a) it was determined by all the judges to be improper to lay bank notes to be chattels, though they were also of opinion that that word might be rejected as surplusage, if the indictment were in other respects sufficient. In that case they were laid to be the "property and chattels" of S. S.; but here if "goods and chat"tels" are rejected, the indictment is gone. There is no accessary after the fact for receiving money; because money is not goods and chattels within the acts which make it felony to receive goods and chattels, knowing them to have been stolen. Guy's case (b), Morris's case (c), Dean's case (d). For the commonwealth it was said that no other certainty was required in an indictment, than what is called by Lord Coke "certainty to a certain intent in general," and not in every par ticular. No other description of the offence is necessary, than such as will inform the defendant what crime he is called to answer, as will appear to warrant the jury in their conclusion of guilty or not guilty upon the premises delivered to them, and as will so define the crime to the court that they may apply the legal punishment. Rex v. Horn. (e) Can there be a question upon the face of this indictment, what crime the defendant is called to answer? Is not a note of the President directors and company of the bank of the United States, in the strictest sense a note drawn by that incorporation? For if this preposition indi |