should like to have been at the next table when, perchance, these two gentlemen might have sat down together and discussed America over a cut of roast mutton, a boiled potato, and a spoonful of peas for each, with a mug of stout and no napkin. I would forgive the newspaper reporter all his sins, against me at any rate, if only he could have been there and reported that conversation. Much would have been said that was true, doubtless; much would have been kindly. Much, also, would have been "curious"; nor do I imagine it would have been wanting in "distinction." At the very least it would have been "interesting."

ners.

I have noticed a remarkable characteristic of many Englishmen, the readiness with which, at little and unaccustomed things, they fall into that state which is expressed by the word "aghast." It is chiefly with respect to affairs of personal life, in which they behold a difference of manIts first symptom is paralysis; then follows reasoning, from their own stupefaction, subjectively. Because the effect on them is great they magnify the cause. I meet my friend the Englishman one fine day in summer, and say to him, cheerily, "Very warm to-day. A good day for your annual bath." Straightway he is struck "aghast"; and thus he communes with himself: "Yes, quite so; but that is a very extraordinary expression; warm-yes; bath, yes, I know; but annual bath; what can he mean? He cannot think I bathe but once a year: he has seen the bath-tub which I always carry with my luggage. He had a kindly and genial smile when he said it. I really am not prepared to believe he meant to insult me. But how curious! I have it! It must be that there are many Americans who bathe only once a year. But, if so, how can they keep clean? It is very, very extraordinary. The Americans are a remarkable people; but their manner of address seems to me to be rather infelicitous, don't you know. And they have not yet learned how to live; if they had they would not postpone their bath so long. No, the Americans may have done measurably well in solving the political problem, but it must be allowed on all hands that they have not solved the human problem."

Mr. Spencer, however, is very different from the Englishman of the previous paragraph. He is far too thorough an observer to let his judgment of real conditions be determined by minor and adventitious circumstances. He is by

no means an obtuse or narrow man. His opinions respecting America were much more correct and substantial than those of Mr. Matthew Arnold. The latter never could get below the surface. His mind was critical, but not synthetic or constructive. With him, manners made the man; and there were no manners save his own. He was lacking in "lucidity." But Mr. Spencer's vision was wide, and his insight keen. He saw things in their true proportions, and his criticisms upon our country were received with respect and thankfulness.

It was in February, 1886, that I last saw Mr. Spencer. He had perceptibly aged, and appeared feeble. I did not tarry long, for I fancied conversation wearied him. As he took my hand at parting, he said, mournfully, "Tell Youmans you have seen me, that I have not much strength left, and I shall never see him again." What he had in mind was his own decease; but Prof. Youmans passed on to the majority before him. Since that day, we have reports of a long illness, from which he has partially recovered. There is small likelihood that the "System of Synthetic Philosophy" will ever be completed, but Mr. Spencer's energy is great and he will work as long as work is possible.

Turning, now, from the author to his productions, the first thing to be said-and it should be distinctly understood as incontrovertible is that Herbert Spencer is the father of the modern philosophy of evolution. The impression still exists that Darwin is entitled to that honor. This is a mistake, which the application of the term "Darwinism" to that philosophy has helped to perpetuate. The "Origin of Species" was first published in November, 1859. Mr. Spencer's Psychology, it will be remembered, appeared in 1857. This last was preceded by several essays outlining the doctrine of evolution, the earliest of which dates from 1852. To one of these, "The Development Hypothesis," Mr. Darwin refers in the Introduction to the "Origin of Species." But the "Principles of Psychology," which is an integral part of Mr. Spencer's philosophy, and which exhibits the doctrine of evolution as it stands to-day, had been published two years before Darwin's first great work appeared.

This, however, is by no means all. In its subject-matter Evolution is not "Darwinism," but a natural law of much broader scope. The former shows that, universally through

out nature, change is governed by a principle according to which there is a course of integration of forces from indefiniteness, simplicity, and homogeneity in their relations, to definiteness, complexity, and heterogeneity. When evolution, proceeding in this way, ceases, a reverse movement of dissolution begins. This law applies to inorganic and organic nature alike. Darwin's Natural Selection is an expression of the manner in which evolution accomplishes the development of vegetal and animal life, showing how species are formed, distributed, modified, perpetuated and destroyed.

It will thus be seen that, while Mr. Spencer thought out and presented the whole philosophy of evolution, Darwin's work was special and limited. That it was a great work I am certainly not disposed to deny, but I think we ought to understand exactly what it was. It cannot better be expressed than in an estimate by Geo. J. Romanes, published in Nature. "The few general facts out of which the theory of evolution by natural selection is formed, namely, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, and heredity, were all previously well-known facts. . . . But the greatness of Mr. Darwin, as the reformer of biology, is not to be estimated by the fact that he conceived the idea of natural selection; his claim to everlasting memory rests upon the many years of devoted labor whereby he tested this idea in all conceivable ways amassing facts from every department of science, balancing evidence with the soundest judgment, shirking no difficulty, and at last astonishing the world as with a revelation by publishing the completed proof of evolution. . . . In the chapter of accidents, therefore, it is a singularly fortunate co-incidence that Mr. Darwin was the man to whom the idea of natural selection occurred; for although, in a generation or two, the truth of evolution might have become more and more forced upon the belief of science, and with it the acceptance of natural selection as an operating cause, in our own generation this could only have been accomplished in the way that it was accomplished; we required one such exceptional mind as that of Darwin, to focus the facts and show the method."

Mr. Spencer's practical philosophy has been pretty fully set forth in his "Data of Ethics," and in his various essays. In ethics he holds that conduct should be estimated and governed by the rule of the highest utility, but believes that an ideal social state, involving an ideal development of

character, should always be kept before the mind as a standard, to furnish that "counsel of perfection" which his opponent, Green, urges as necessary though from an entirely different point of view. This ideal morality is likely to be realized in the course of evolution, but until there is reached such a state of society as to make it practicable we must also recognize a code of relative ethics by which to conform our actions to our circumstances, and aid, so far as those circumstances will allow, the progress of mankind to the most perfect conditions. This code will involve a varying compromise between egoism and altruism. Mr. Spencer thinks the antagonism between these two will eventually disappear, because the working of social forces must inevitably produce the result that men will increasingly find their happiness in the welfare of others. Their egoistic gratifications will become sympathetic. Their highest selfish delight will merely be the lust of making other people delighted. In a word, individual happiness will only be complete in the social happiness. Mr. Spencer is surely right in this view. We never can wholly eliminate self-regarding ends. Our own action must ultimately be directed to securing our own pleasure and preventing pain to ourselves. But it is quite possible for us to so form our characters that our highest pleasure is the pleasure and welfare of others; and in the measure that this is completely achieved is the conciliation between egoism and altruism perfected.

Our author's political philosophy is as radically individualistic as that of William von Humboldt. He believes in the minimum of government, and is uncompromisingly opposed to all the socialistic tendencies of the time. With the militant regimes of continental Europe he has no sympathy, and in the industrial combinations that seek to build up strong organizations for the purposes of domination and dictation he beholds an equally pernicious despotism. Mr. Spencer would no doubt be a Mugwump in politics anywhere. He would not support political machines, nor would he favor concentration or centralization of power. He carries to an extreme the laissez-faire doctrine. With him society is always "a growth, not a manufacture," and he deems that attempts at regulation beyond the necessities of security are obstructive of social progress, because they interfere with the natural growth which is the thing needed,

and which can only proceed from the exercise of individual spontaneity and freedom.

This principle has been misapplied in one important particular, as it seems to me. Mr. Spencer's views of the limitation of the functions of government lead him to the notion that the State should have nothing to do with education, which, he thinks, should be accomplished entirely by private agency. Schools maintained by the public, and regulated by governmental administration, should be done away with. The fundamental mistake here is an error of omission. Those who hold these ideas fail to perceive that education is necessary as a measure of security. Though they may see that the root of all evil lies in the character of men, they do not appreciate that mere negative prohibition is not enough to secure that free and full development of individuals upon which they lay so much stress. There must be placed over human beings, in early life, such a discipline of the will and of the intellect as to develop the social in opposition to the selfish disposition. This is by far the most certain means of preserving the peace. And if the ideal of the perfect State be a community where there is little or no government, such an ideal can only be realized by the creation of a predominantly altruistic character in individuals. How, then, are we justified in saying, when we allow that government exists for the purpose of securing people in their freedom, that we ought to neglect those means which are evidently the most efficient for the desired end? For security's sake, therefore, the State ought to have a care for education, and maintain a system of public instruction and discipline.

There is little to find fault with in Mr. Spencer's notions of the general course which education ought to take. He asks the question, What knowledge is of most worth? and answers it according to a broad view of utilities. Those things which are directly necessary to self-preservation come first: then those indirectly ministering to this end, and to the full development of human nature. Physical, intellectual and moral education all have their place in proper proportions. The treatise on "Education" probably has been more widely read than any other of Mr. Spencer's writings, and it is likely to be regarded as a classic on that subject for a long time to come. It subordinates the æsthetic to