Real Alternatives, Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Choice

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Springer Science & Business Media, 1998 M04 30 - 198 páginas
In the `Preliminary Dissertation' of his Theodicy, Leibniz declares himself an apologist for the compatibilist doctrines of original sin, election and reprobation propounded by the theologians of the Augsburg Confession. According to those theologians, man's actions are determined but man retains the power to act otherwise and therefore is responsible for his actions. Savage argues that Leibniz, in formulating his apology, availed himself of both his doctrine of possible worlds and his finite-infinite analysis distinction (the latter being applied within the former). Savage challenges the dogma that Leibniz's metaphysical principles entail that individuals are powerless to act otherwise and that God cannot conceive of them acting otherwise. He argues that interpreters deduce the dogma from those principles with the aid of dubious extra-textual premises, for example, that a Leibnizian individual has only one complete concept or cannot be persons other than the person it actually is.
 

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Contenido

Complete Concepts and Counterfactuals
20
Complete Concepts and Counterfactuals
27
Complete Concepts and Leibnizs Metaphysics of Substance
29
What Makes Accidents Essential?
33
Counterfactual Semantics Roughly Speaking
38
Notes to Chapter One
45
Deliberations and Counterfactuals
50
Counterfactual Identity and Creaturely Deliberation
54
Leibniz and Creatio ex Nihilo
103
An Alternative reading of Leibniz on Creatio ex Nihilo
108
Potential Beings as Eternal Truths
111
the Dependence of Potential Beings on Gods Mind
118
Perception and Relative Creation
123
Notes to Chapter Four
127
Perceptual Incompossibility
132
Perceptual Incompatibility
137

The Freedom of Creatures and Gods Ideas
62
Private Miracles?
65
Limited Privacy
72
Notes to Chapter Two
73
Personal and Metaphysical Identity
78
Introduction Two Counterfactual Identity and Indiscernibility
83
The Identity of Indiscernibles
84
Personhoods and Identity
91
Notes to Chapter Three
96
Compossibility and Creation
99
Perceptual Incompatibility
142
Notes to Chapter Five
147
Infinite Analysis and Counterfactuals
149
Hypothetical Necessity and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
150
Infinite Analysis And Counterfactual Truth
160
Notes to Chapter Six
172
Conclusion
175
Abbreviations
183
Texts and Translations
185
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Página 16 - God, he says, either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is...
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