A JOINT RESOLUTION ADMITTING GEORGE A. HUNTLEY Serial 6 MAY 17, JUNE 3 AND 27, 1921 STATEMENTS OF W. W. CHALMERS, JOHN L. CABLE, RILEY J. WILSON, JOHN E. RAKER, AND A PAPER ON "Some Vexatious Questions Relating to Nationality," by Fred K. Nielsen NATURALIZATION OF INDIVIDUALS BY SPECIAL ACTS OF CONGRESS. COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Tuesday, May 17, 1921. The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. Albert Johnson (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. The meeting this morning was called for the purpose of considering House joint resolution 79, introduced by Representative Chalmers, which reads as follows: [H. J. Res. 79, Sixty-seventh Congress, first session.] JOINT RESOLUTION Admitting George A. Huntley to the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States. Whereas George A. Huntley was born in Bristol, England, in 1865, but emigrated to this country and received his medical education in this country in the Universities of Vermont, New York, and Harvard, and has established permanent residence in this country; and Whereas said George A. Huntley joined the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society in 1897, and from then until 1914 was stationed in Hanyang, China, where he was well known to many officers of the American Consular Service; and Whereas said George A. Huntley's sympathies and interests have been with the United States for many years, so that it has been a matter of keen regret to him and his family that they have been unable to live long enough in the United States to become naturalized; and Whereas said George A. Huntley and family have for many years done their utmost to uphold American ideals and promote American interests in China, and hope to continue so to do, but would be greatly aided in this if they were granted American citizenship: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That George A. Huntley be, and he is hereby, admitted to all the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States. Mr. RAKER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to raise an objection to the consideration of this bill, not to be acted upon now by the committee, but on its final action, on the ground that it is not within the power of Congress to grant a special bill naturalizing any individual. The CHAIRMAN. We will debate that when you are ready. Mr. RAKER. I do not want to debate it. I just want to put my objection before the committee, and let it be pending when the committee takes up the bill. Under the Constitution of the United States, Section VIII, we find the following provision: SEC. VIII. The Congress shall have power * 4. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization. The whole matter, then, will come up before the committee and before the House, on which I will submit authorities and other mat 157 ters to follow in the proceedings later, and I do this not because it is this case but because of the desire by many individuals to receive a special act of Congress, and to have the matter determined as far as Congress will for the future guidance of the committee. My theory simply is that the Constitution has established the power of Congress, and has defined that power by saying Congress can establish an uniform rule for naturalization, but it has not given it the power to naturalize by a special act individuals separate and distinct from the uniform rule that they should enact. The CHAIRMAN. Having raised that point, you do not care to have a bill sent to the floor of the House for a decision to be reached there, do you? Mr. RAKER. Well, I think the committee can, in the first place, dispose of it, and if we should report adversely on the bill, then the party would have the right, under the rule on an adverse report, to call it up and have the House pass on it, and of course Congress might do anything. It is then up to Congress to determine whether or not these acts are within its power as defined by the Constitution. That has been called to my attention, but I felt it my duty to call it to the attention of the committee first, and then when the matter comes up in the House at any time later to specifically call it to the attention of the House. Whereas it might not be a sufficient objection to prevent its consideration, still it will call it to the attention of the House, so that they may act upon it in one way or the other, and then the matter will eventually get into the courts for final adjudication. The CHAIRMAN. Now, then, Congress having granted naturalization in special cases in the past, do you contend that Congress has no right to grant a later naturalization in a special case? Mr. RAKER. My. contention is this, Mr. Chairman, that the power of Congress is limited by that provision of the Constitution. That is specific in that it must be a uniform rule. They have now exhausted their power by adopting a uniform rule for the naturalization of citizens, and the method and mode of that naturalization, and they can not legally, by special act of Congress, naturalize a person. In the case of Ex parte Frank Knowles (5 Calif., 300) the Supreme Court of California, speaking with reference to this constitutional provision, used the following language: That the States, if they choose to exercise the power as an original one, must abide by the rule which Congress makes, there can not be the slightest difference of opinion. The power given to Congress was, according to my apprehension, intended to provide a rule for the action of the States, and not a rule for the action of the Federal Government. Else why was the term "uniform" made to quality "rule"? If it was designed simply to give the power of making citizens to Congress, simpler modes of expression might have been used, and ought to have been required, and surely there would have been no use for the term uniform." Why should the rule be uniform, unless more than one had to exercise the rule? It certainly could not have been imagined that Congress would have made a rule for its own action, or the action of its own officers, which could have operated without uniformity. 66 In other words, Congress has to make a uniform rule for the naturalization of all people. Now, they have made that rule, and they exhausted their power when they did it, and they are prohibited by the Constitution from acting on special cases by naturalizing people themselves. Mr. Box. If they act on cases which do not come within the rule, do they not destroy uniformity? Mr. RAKER. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Concerning certain cases in which naturalization has been granted by Congress, which amounted to repatriation, do you think those were without the power of Congress? Mr. RAKER. Well, that is a uniform rule; that does not designate anyone. It is a uniform rule as to naturalization applying to every one that comes within that class. Congress says that those who have expatriated themselves and done certain things, and then others that come within a certain specified rule-that all people of that class, by doing certain things, can become citizens of the United States. The CHAIRMAN. Since I have been in Congress I remember three cases. One was the case of Mrs. Slidel, of Louisiana, the widow of the Confederate emissary, who was restored to citizenship by an act of Congress, and then in recent years we restored Mrs. Mumm to citizenship, and then there was the Chicago case, Mrs. DeHaven-Alten, the granddaughter of Admiral Decatur. Mr. RAKER. Now, I find this, Mr. Chairman, upon investigation, and I will just let it go in the record. The Library of Congress was only able to find two cases, although there are some of the late ones. The first is House joint resolution 238, Fifty-fifth Congress, second session, "To readmit Nellie Grant Sartoris to the character and privilege of a citizen of the United States" (30 Stat. L., 1496), May 18, 1898. The second is Senate bill 3419, Sixty-third Congress, first session, "Admitting to citizenship and fully naturalizing George Edward Lerrigo, of the city of Topeka, in the State of Kansas" (38 Stat. L., 1476). February 23, 1915. Then it shows the action taken. Then there is the case of Joseph Beech, act of February 20, 1917, Senate joint resolution 208 (39 Stat. L., pt. 2, p. 1495); Senate joint resolution 208, Senate Report No. 1037 passed the Senate at page 3062; passed the House at page 3431; private resolution 5. Then there is the case of Augusta Louise De Haven-Alten, Senate resolution 134; debated and passed the Senate at page 1818; House Report No. 619; debated in House, pages 5106-5111; Senate concurs in House amendment; private resolution 21, Sixty-sixth Congress. Then there is the case of Frances S. Mumm, Senate joint resolution 90; debated and passed the Senate at page 6429; House Report No. 363; debated and passed the House at pages 6678-6680; private resolution 1. The CHAIRMAN. How about the Slidell case? Mr. RAKER. That is all I could find. The CHAIRMAN. The Slidell case was passed about three Congresses ago. Mrs. Slidell, Mrs. Mumm, and Mrs. De Haven were women who were American born, but married aliens. Then there was the Lerrigo case. He was British born. That case was somewhat similar to this one, except that Lerrigo thought he had been naturalized through his father. Mr. RAKER. It just seems to me that it is worthy of the deep attention of the House. |