The exception of mineral lands in the grants made by Congress are held to apply only to such lands as were at the time of the grant known to be so valuable for minerals as to justify the expenditure of labor or money for their extraction. United States v. Plowman, 216 U. S. 372, p. 374. Prior to this enactment any public lands not excepted by law because of their valuable mineral deposits, salt, or salines in general were not subject to disposal otherwise than under the preemption and homestead laws until after a public cash offering. Jones v. Aztec Land & Cattle Co., 34 L. D. 115, p. 116. The question as to whether lands within a timberland entry embraces land of known mineral character must be determined at the date of the purchase and on the subsequent developments. Chormicle v. Hiller, 26 L. D. 9, p. 14. This statute mentions both classes of minerals, and the metalliferous and nonmetalliferous are associated together and placed upon an equality, and both are necessarily included in the term mining claim. Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 25 L. D. 233, p. 240. Land embraced in a patent issued on a timber and stone entry is not subject to entry under the mining laws, nothwithstanding the fact that the area so patented was embraced in valid and subsisting mining locations at the date of such timber and stone entry, and at that date known to be chiefly valuable for mineral, though the patent under the timber and stone entry might be vacated for fraud. Robbins, In re, 42 L. D. 481, p. 484. C. SHOWING AS TO MINERAL CHARACTER OF LAND. The rights limited by this act and by the amended act can not defeat or impair any bona fide claim under any law of the United States, nor authorize the sale of any mining claim, but an application for purchase must show that the land applied for contains no mining or other improvements except of a certain designated kind. Manners Construction Co. v. Rees, 31 L. D. 408, p. 410. Where it is not shown that prospecting had resulted in the finding of mineral of such character and value as to justify the expenditure of money and labor in extracting it, nor that the indications of mineral were such that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the expenditure of his labor and means with a reasonable prospect of success in developing a mine, and in the absence of a showing that the land is mineral in character, the fact that mining locations made were abandoned after improvements had been made thereon raises a presumption that the land does not contain mineral in paying quantities. Andrew v. Stuart, 31 L. D. 264, p. 265. Old excavations or unoccupied cabins upon abandoned mineral locations are not such mining or other improvements as except the land on which they are located from purchase under the provision of this act and the amendment. Andrew v. Stuart, 31 L. D. 264, p. 265. See Chormicle v. Hiller, 26 L. D. 9. This act must be given a reasonable construction, and where it appears that a mineral location is based upon a discovery, within its limits, of a vein or lode of quartz-bearing copper and gold, and located in a mineralized belt, and where some considerable work has been done on the claim and the indications are such as would justify a man of ordinary prudence in expending time and labor in developing the same with a reasonable expectation of finding a valuable mine, this constitutes a mining claim within the meaning of the proviso of this act. Michie v. Gothberg, 30 L. D. 407, p. 409. The proviso of this act which says that nothing contained herein shall authorize the sale of any mining claim previous to entry and purchase of a 40-acre tract of land chiefly valuable for stone will not be permitted to include a mining location thereon having for its basis the discovery within its limits of a vein or lode of quartz bearing copper and gold and where the making of such location, the sinking of a cut or shaft in compliance with the statute of Wyoming, and the discovery of a lode or vein of mineral thereon were all prior to the date of the application to purchase and where the intervening time between the date of such location and the filing of the application to purchase was not sufficient to afford the mineral locator a reasonable opportunity to develop his claim and to ascertain the certainty and extent or value of the mineral deposit thereon. Michie v. Gothberg, 30 L. D. 407, p. 409. It seems that under this statute abandoned mining claims are subject to entry, notwithstanding the presence of abandoned mining improvements, if the land on which they are situated is not segregated by an existing location of entry. Chormicle v. Hiller, 26 L. D. 9, p. 14. No general rule can be given as to what will give notice of mineral character to parties seeking to enter under mineral laws land which at one time may have been regarded as mineral, and worked for mineral deposits, and the fact that such lands may have been at some former time worked for mineral will not defeat an entry under this statute, which is otherwise legal. Chormicle v. Hiller, 26 L. D. 9, p. 14. Where a reasonable opportunity for the development of mineral actually discovered and located has not been given between the time of the mineral location and an application to purchase under this act, a reasonable opportunity should be given for the development of mineral. Purtle v. Steffee, 31 L. D. 400, p. 403. See Michie v. Gothberg, 30 L. D. 407. While the statute provides that the applicant must show that such timber land contains no mining or other improvements, yet this is not intended to include as mining improvements old excavations made with a view to mining, as Congress only intended to include mining improvements upon mining claims that were alive and subsisting at the time. Chormicle v. Hiller, 26 L. D. 9, p. 14. d. SHOWING AS TO GOOD FAITH. An applicant under this statute must file with the register a statement under oath to the effect that he, in good faith, is making the purchase for his own exclusive use and benefit and not directly or indirectly for another, and 60 days' notice of the application is required, and an entry is not made until all of the requirements of the act have been complied with. United States v. Bryan, 29 L. D. 149, p. 151. See Shepherd v. Bird, 17 L. D. 82. United States v. Bailey, 17 L. D. 468. United States v. Searles, 19 L. D. 258, p. 265. Under this act deception in the final proof can not be established as tending to show fraudulent motive in the original application. United States v. Kettenbach, 175 Fed. 463, p. 467. e. REGULATIONS AS TO SHOWING OF CHARACTER OF LAND. The regulations require an applicant for a timber and stone entry to state under oath that he is well acquainted with the character of the land, with all the legal subdivisions thereof, and that there is not to his knowledge any vein or lode of quartz or other rock in place bearing mineral or deposits of coal or any placer cement, gravel, or other valuable mineral deposit, and that no portion of the land is claimed for mining purposes, nor has any part been worked for mineral during any part of the year, and that the land is essentially nonmineral, and that his application is not made for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining title to mineral lands. Bigelow, In re, 20 L. D. 6, p. 7. There is no authority by which the department may extend the time in which proof and payment may be made for land offered under this act and the amendment thereto. True, In re, 26 L. D. 529. f. VERIFICATION BY OATH OF APPLICANT-BASIS OF KNOWledge. This section requires statements to be verified by the oath of the applicant before the register or receiver of the land office within the district where the land is situated. United States v. Eddy, 134 Fed. 114, p. 119. An applicant for the purchase of timber lands under this statute must show by affidavit that it is unfit for cultivation and valuable chiefly for timber, and such affidavit may be predicated upon information and belief, and is not required to be made upon a personal investigation or inspection of the land. Hoover v. Salling, 110 Fed. 43, p. 46. Reversing Hoover v. Salling, 102 Fed. 716, p. 719. This section does not require the applicant for land to show in his sworn statement that he has personally examined the land applied for and that from his personal knowledge it is unfit for cultivation, uninhabited, and valuable chiefly for its timber. Robnett v. United States, 169 Fed. 778, p. 781. Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425. The courts take judicial notice of the qualifications of a receiver of a land office to administer oaths. United States v. Eddy, 134 Fed. 114, p. 119. g. QUANTITY OF LAND PURCHASABLE. This act provides that timber lands may be sold to citizens in quantities not exceeding 160 acres to any one person or association of persons, and a person can not justify the cutting of timber on the public domain by claiming he had purchased more than 160 acres. Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273, p. 276. h. NOTICE-POSTING AND PUBLISHING. Section 3 provides that upon filing the statement mentioned in the prior section the local land officer must post notice of the application and the applicant must publish a copy of such notice, and at the expiration of 60 days on proof of publication of certain enumerated facts the applicant shall, upon payment of the required amount, be entitled to a patent, but this section omits the requirement of any statement regarding a speculative purpose on the part of the applicant, his bona fides, and his intention to acquire the land for himself alone, and he is not required to reiterate at the final hearing his purpose in acquiring title to the land, and this follows under the elementary rule that the inclusion of one is the exclusion of others and the reexacting of a portion only of the requirements is equivalent to an express declaration that none of the requirements can be exacted. Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, p. 459. See Robnett v. United States, 169 Fed. 778, p. 781. United States v. Kettenbach, 175 Fed. 463, p. 468. The purpose of posting and publishing notice as required by section 3 is to give notice of application to purchase and an opportunity for adverse claimants to assert their claim. Chormicle v. Hiller, 26 L. D. 9, p. 15. i. ENTRY BASED ON FALSE AFFIDAVIT EFFECT. A decision of the Secretary of the Interior directing certain entries under this act to be passed to patent is not conclusive where such decision is based upon ex parte affidavits of the entryman which were false, and known to be so by the agent and representative of the patentee, and where it also appears that one of the special agents making the investigation as to the entries was corrupted by the agent of the patentee. United States v. Smith, 181 Fed. 545, p. 552. j. VERIFICATION-PERJURY-EFFECT. By this act a purchaser of surveyed public lands in California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, valued chiefly for stone, must swear in his application that he does not seek to purchase the same on speculation, but in good faith for his own exclusive use and benefit, and that he has not, directly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract with another by which the title he may acquire is to inure to such other person. Any false swearing in tnis respect subjects the purchaser to all the penalties of perjury and forfeits the purchase price of the lands. Hawley v. Diller, 178 U. S. 476, p. 484. An applicant who swears falsely is subject to the penalties of perjury and may be required to forfeit the money paid for the land, and all rights and title thereto, and the rule as to forfeiture applies to the original entryman and to the transferees of such entryman. United States v. Miller, 14 L. D. 617, p. 619. The facts stated in a verified application for a land entry under this act must not only be true when made, but must also be true when the land is paid for, and the certificate of purchase or the receiver's receipt issued that the person entering the land is not then under agreement, either express or implied, to convey such land to another. United States v. Brace, 149 Fed. 869, p. 873. In a charge of false swearing under this section it is necessary to allege that the act of swearing falsely was wil!fully done. United States v. Eddy, 134 Fed. 114, p. 116. A person who induces another to make a verified application for the purchase of timberlands under this act, and to make a false oath at the time of the final entry as to the good faith of such applicant, is guilty of subornation of perjury. United States v. Brace, 149 Fed. 869, p. 871. See United States v. Budd, 144 U. S. 154. k. REGISTER TO FURNISH FINAL PROOF OF NOTICE-PUBLICATION. Under this act the register is required to furnish a stone applicant a copy of the finalproof notice, but the applicant himself shall cause such notice to be published for the necessary length of time in the proper newspaper, but an applicant is not in default for failure to submit proof when he had no knowledge that such notice had been given. Wells, In re, 33 L. D. 365. 1. CONSPIRACY TO PURCHASE-EFFECT. An agreement to acquire title to timberland by procuring persons to make application for the land under this act, and the procuring of a large number of persons pursuant to the agreement to make application for entries, the entire expenses being paid by the parties to the agreement, and each applicant to be paid a certain stated amount for his trouble, is sufficient to show that all such entries were fraudulent, and that one of the applicants took the land for his own use and benefit, even though no express agreement was made with the several applicants that the entries should be made for the use and benefit of another. United States v. Smith, 181 Fed. 545, p. 549. The crime of conspiracy is consummated when the false swearing in the application for the land under the timber and stone act was done, and the prohibition of the statute applies only to the condition of things existing at that time; and affidavits subsequently filed in the Land Department, though false, are not admissible to show motive at the time of the application. Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425. Dwinnell v. United States, 186 Fed. 754, p. 759. In an indictment for conspiracy under this statute it is immaterial that the precise piece or pieces of land to be acquired should have been agreed upon by the alleged conspirators at the time of the formation of the conspiracy, and it is not essential that the identity of the persons to be suborned, or the particular time and place of the subornation, be alleged. Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425. Gwinnell v. United States, 186 Fed. 754, p. 758. The failure or inability of the United States to prove in a criminal case that the defendant had been guilty of a crime under this act neither forfeits its right of property in the timber cut or its right to maintain a civil suit to recover the value of such property. Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178, p. 189. m. PRIOR AGREEMENT OF APPLICANT TO SELL-EFFECT. This act does not in any respect limit the dominion which the purchaser has over land after it is purchased from the Government, or restrict the power of alienation, but it only denounces any prior agreement or understanding, and the acting for another in the purchase. United States v. Budd, 144 U. S. 154, p. 163. Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425. United States v. Brace, 149 Fed. 869, p. 874. United States v. Barber Lumber Co., 172 Fed. 948. United States v. Kettenbach, 175 Fed. 463. United States v. Wells, 192 Fed. 870, p. 873. United States v. Kettenbach, 208 Fed. 209, p. 214. This statute prohibits a prior agreement to the effect that the title or any part thereof which the purchaser should acquire should be conveyed to another, and does not |