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Stone is regarded in law as mineral, and this term now includes that which is quarried as well as that which is obtained from mines.

Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Soderberg, 104 Fed. 425, p. 429.
Griffin v. Fellows, 81 Pa. St. 114.
Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N. J. Eq. 128.
Railway Co. v. Checkley, L. R. 4 Eq. 19.
Rosse v. Wainman, 14 Mees. & W.859.
Micklethwait v. Winter, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 526.
Hext v. Gill, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 699.
Jamieson v. Railway Co., 6 Scott. L. R. 188.
Attorney General v. Granite Co., 35 Weekly Rep. 617.

Lands more valuable for deposits of stone, or whatever is recognized as mineral, than for agriculture is mineral.

Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Soderberg, 104 Fed. 425, p. 427.
Maxwell v. Brierly, 10 C. L. 0. 50.
McGlenn v. Wienbroeer, 15 L. D. 370, p.

373. The various acts of Congress relating to mineral lands indicate that Congress intended to include in that term lands chiefly valuable for building stone of superior quality for building and homestead purposes.

Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Soderberg, 104 Fed. 425.

Mountain land covered with granite cliffs and rocks, the value of which is in the quarry in the face of the cliff, is mineral land and may be entered as a placer claim.

Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Soderberg, 104 Fed. 425, p. 427.
Bennett, In re, 3 L. D. 116.
Van Doren v. Plested, 16 L. D. 508.
Gibson, In re, 21 L. D. 327, p. 329.
Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 25 L. D. 233.
Meiklejohn v. Hyde, 42 L. D. 144, p. 147.

3. KINDS OF STONE INCLUDED.

Lands valuable for deposits of granite are mineral and may be located as placer mining claims.

Meiklejohn v. Hyde, 42 L. D. 144, p. 146.
Lands valuable solely or chiefly for granite quarries are mineral lands.
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U. S. 526.
Meiklejohn v. Hyde, 42 L. D. 144, p. 145.
Limestone valuable for mining purposes may be located.
Morrill v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 30 L. D. 475.
Meiklejohn v. Hyde, 42 L. D. 144, p. 147.

Lands more valuable for lime made from the deposits of limestone than for agriculture may be patented under the mining laws.

Gentry, In re, 9 C. L. 0. 5.
Land valuable for marble is enterable under placer mining laws.
Pacific Coast Min. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 25 L. D. 233.
Henderson v. Fulton, 35 L. D. 652.
Meiklejohn v. Hyde, 42 L. D. 144, p. 147.

Under this act land containing valuable deposits of stone used for special purposes may be entered as a placer claim.

McGlenn v. Wienbroeer, 15 L. D. 370, p. 374.
Tam v. Storey, 16 L. D. 282.
Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 25 L. D. 233, p. 241.

Lands containing valuable deposits of granite, enterable under this statute as placer mining claims, are not subject to forest lieu selection under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat. 36).

Meiklejohn v. Hyde, 42 L. D. 144, p. 148.

Where a part of a tract for which patent is sought under this act contains no valuable stone subject to a placer location, such part of the tract will be excluded from entry.

Ferrell v. Hoge, 29 L. D. 12, p. 15.

Lands chiefly valuable for stone applies only to deposits of stone of special or peculiar value for structural work, such as the erection of buildings and such other recognized commercial uses as will demand and secure the profitable extraction and marketing of the product; and the act has no application to the vast deposits of lowgrade rock possessing no special or peculiar value for structural purposes, and used only for rough work in the immediate vicinity.

Stanislaus Electric Power Co., In re, 41 L. D. 655, p. 660.
See Conlin v. Kelly, 12 L. D. 1.

4. KINDS OF STONE NOT INCLUDED.

The vast deposits of low-grade rock in the public domain which possess no special or peculiar value for structural building purposes is not subject to disposition either under the placer mining laws or under this act.

Stanislaus Electric Power Co., In re, 41 L. D. 655, p. 660.

Lands containing a valuable deposit of shale rock that may be used for building purposes or for the construction of roads and streets and the foundation of houses are not mineral within the meaning of the mining laws.

Hughes v. Florida, 42 L. D. 401, p. 403.
See Davis v. Gibson, 38 L. D. 265, p. 266.

Land containing a deposit of gravel and sand not recognized by standard authorities as mineral, though used for general building purposes, is not subject to location as mineral land.

Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 L. D. 310, p. 313.
Hughes v. Florida, 42 L. D. 401, p. 404.

Stone of such character as may be used in building foundations, fences, abutments, or other rough work is widely distributed throughout all the States of the Union; and it can not be contended that land from which stone is removed by a farmer in the course of his agricultural operations and which he may utilize in constructing fences or in rough work upon his farm, is mineral land, or that his farm is a mine within the meaning of the general mining laws or of this act.

Stanislaus Electric Power Co., In re, 41 L. D. 655, p. 660.

5. GRANTS FOR SCHOOL PURPOSES.

Lands valuable for building stone were not excepted under this act from a grant to a State for school purposes.

South Dakota Vermont Stone Co., In re, 16 L. D. 263.
Hughes v. Florida, 42 L. D. 401, p. 404.

6. RAILROAD GRANTS DO NOT INCLUDE.

Lands valuable only on account of the stone deposits contained therein do not pass to the Northern Pacific Railroad Co. under its grant, but are subject to placer entry under the mining laws.

Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Soderberg, 104 Fed. 425, p. 428.
Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 25 L. D. 233.

7. ENTRYMAN'S POWER TO SELL. While this amendment prohibits an entryman from entering land ostensibly for himself but in reality for another, yet it does not prohibit him from selling the claim to another after he had complied with the requirements as to his original application but before the final proof and hearing.

Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, p. 460.
United States v. Biggs, 211 Ú. S. 507, p. 521.
Followed in United States v. Sullenberger, 211 U. S. 522.

United States v. Freeman, 211 U. S. 525.

C. CUTTING TIMBER.

1. CRIMINAL LIABILITY.

A person may be convicted for cutting timber on public lands where the evidence fails to show that such lands were chiefly valuable for minerals, and where he did not cut the timber in the exercise of the privilege conferred by the act of June 3, 1878, and where he kept no books containing a description of the kind and amount of timber cut and of the land from whence it was taken, as required by the regulation of the Interior Department.

Stubbs v. United States, 111 Fed. 366, p. 368.

In an application for a placer patent under this act the good faith of the applicant and the use to which he has devoted or intends to devote the land is a proper element for consideration as incidental to and throwing some light upon the real value and character of the land sought.

Stanislaus Electric Power Co., In re, 41 L. D. 655, p. 659.

D. OIL LANDS LOCATED AS PLACER CLAIMS. See Oil lands, 29 Stat. 526, p. 1043.

Persons authorized to enter land under the mining laws may locate oil land under this act as placer mining claims, notwithstanding the more recent statute of February 11, 1897 (29 Stat. 526), particularly authorizing such locations, and notwithstanding the adverse hearings of the Land Department to the effect that oil lands could not be located as placer claims under this act.

Producers' Oil Co. v. Hanszen (La.), 61 So. 754, p. 759.
Rives v. Gulf Refining Co. (La.), 62 So. 623, p. 629.

33 STAT. 706, FEBRUARY 8, 1905.

USE OF STONE IN PUBLIC WORKS. AN ACT Authorizing the use of earth, stone, and timber on the public lands and

forest reserves of the United States in the construction of works under the national irrigation law.

Be it enacted, etc., That in carrying out the provisions of the national irrigation law, approved June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 388), and in constructing works thereunder, the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to use and to permit the use by those engaged in the construction of works under said law, under rules and regulations to be prescribed by him, such earth, stone, and timber from the public lands of the United States as may be required in the construction of such works, and the Secretary of Agriculture is hereby authorized to permit the use of earth, stone, and timber from the forest reserves of the United States for the same purpose, under rules and regulations to be prescribed by him.

TIMBER CUTTING FOR MINING PURPOSES.

4 STAT. 472, MARCH 2, 1831.

CUTTING TIMBER ON MINERAL LANDS-MINING PURPOSES.

AN ACT To provide for the punishment of offenses committed in cutting, destroying, or removing live oak and other timber or trees reserved for naval purposes.

Be it enacted, etc., That if any person or persons shall cut, or cause or procure to be cut, or aid, assist, or be employed in cutting, or shall wantonly destroy, or cause or procure to be wantonly destroyed, or aid, assist, or be employed in wantonly destroying, any live oak or red cedar tree or trees, or other timber standing, growing, or being on any lands of the United States which, in pursuance of any law passed or hereafter to be passed, shall have been reserved or purchased for the use of the United States, for supplying or furnishing therefrom timber for the Navy of the United States; or if any person or persons shall remove, or cause or procure to be removed, or aid, or assist, or be employed in removing, from any such lands which shall have been reserved or purchased as aforesaid, any live oak or red cedar tree or trees, or other timber, unless duly authorized so to do by order, in writing, of a competent officer and for the use of the Navy of the United States; or if any person or persons shall cut, or cause or procure to be cut, or aid, or assist, or be employed in cutting, any live oak or red cedar tree or trees or other timber on, or shall remove, or cause or procure to be removed, or aid, or assist, or be employed in removing, any live oak or red cedar trees or other timber, from any other lands of the United States, acquired, or hereafter to be acquired, with intent to export, dispose of, use, or employ the same in any manner whatsoever, other than for the use of the Navy of the United States; every such person or persons so offending, on conviction thereof before any court having competent jurisdiction, shall, for every such offense, pay a fine not less than triple the value of the tree or trees or timber so cut, destroyed, or removed, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding 12 months.

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1. CONSTRUED WITH LATER ACTS- CUTTING PERMISSIBLE.
2. TIMBER CUTTING ON MINING CLAIMS.

1. CONSTRUED WITII LATER ACTS

CUTTING PERMISSIBLE.

Congress did not authorize the occupation of the public lands for the purpose of agriculture and mining without intending to so modify the operation of the timber act as to permit the occupants thereunder to cut and remove the timber upon their

respective claims so far as the same was necessary for the purpose for which it was occupied, and to that extent this act is repealed by the preemption, homestead, and mining acts.

United States v. Nelson, 27 Fed. Cas. 86.

This statute must be construed in connection with the subsequent acts relating to preemption, homestead, and mining laws, that confer the right of occupation of limited quantities of the public lands upon settlers and miners for agricultural and mining purposes, and are in fact laws upon the same subject.

United States v. Nelson, 27 Fed. Cas. 86.

2. TIMBER CUTTING ON MINING CLAIMS.

As no proof is required as to the amount of mineral deposit in land as a condition on which a mining claim may be located the only security against the law being used as a cover to strip the public lands of their valuable timber is to limit the right of the locator of a mining claim to the use of such timber thereon as is necessary to the actual working of the claim.

United States v. Nelson, 27 Fed. Cas. 86.

In determining whether the locator of a placer mining claim is cutting the timber thereon in good faith and for actual mining purposes, the fact that he has occupied the claim for a period of six years as land containing valuable mineral deposits without availing himself of his right to purchase it at the normal price of $2.50 per acre is not to be overlooked, and especially if it is in a region where the timber is scarce and valuable.

United States v. Nelson, 27 Fed. Cas. 86.

The removal of timber from a mining claim to be justified should proceed with equal pace with the mining operations, and the owner of a claim who desires to go further or faster, and for any reason appropriates the timber to his own use in advance of his mining operations, can only do so safely by paying the purchase price of the land.

United States v. Nelson, 27 Fed. Cas. 86.

Where a locator of a placer mining claim removes and disposes of acres of timber in advance of his mining operations for no better reason than that it is better for the purpose of mining to remove the timber so far in advance of the work as to give opportunity for the stumps to rot, he is in law speculating in United States timber rather than mining for the precious metals.

United States v. Nelson, 27 Fed. Cas. 86.

20 STAT. 88, 1 SUPP. R. S. 166, JUNE 3, 1878.

REMOVING TIMBER FOR MINING PURPOSES.

AN ACT Authorizing the citizens of Colorado, Nevada, and the Territories to use

timber for mining purposes. Be it enacted, etc., That all citizens of the United States and other persons, bona fide residents of the State of Colorado, or Nevada, or either of the Territories of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, Dakota, Idaho, or Montana, and all other mineral districts of the United States, shall be, and are hereby, authorized and permitted to fell and remove, for building, agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes any timber or other trees growing or being on the public lands, said lands being mineral, and not subject to entry under existing laws of the United States, except for mineral entry, in either

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