through such readjusted end line. But otherwise extralateral rights are not interfered with.18

The leading case on this situation is the Richmond, etc., Co. vs. Eureka, etc., Co., 103 U. S., 839, which involved the same.

SURFACE CONTACT QUARTZITE AND LIMESTONE

FIG. 83. Map of claims, etc., in Richmond, etc., Co. vs. Eureka, etc., Co. from the decision. properties as the famous Eureka case we have already cited under the definition of a vein. The situation of the claims is shown in Fig. 83. As a compromise of disputes and threatened litigation,

18 Bunker Hill, etc., Co. vs. Empire State, etc., Co., 108 Fed., 189, 109 Fed., 538; Empire State, etc., Co. vs. Bunker Hill, etc., Co., 114 Fed., 417, 121 Fed., 973.

mutual conveyances had been exchanged between the parties fixing the line C-X-W as a compromise boundary between the contesting claims. The dispute arose over the ownership of the ore in the Potts Chamber found on the vein on its dip; and the court decided that this compromise line extends on the extralateral rights on the dip as well as directly beneath the surface, and that, as the vertical plane through this compromise line bisected the Potts Chamber, the ore on the one side belonged to the one party and that on the other side belonged to the other party. 19

The same question was again before the United States Supreme Court in the case of Kennedy, etc., Co. vs. Argonaut, etc., Co., 189 U. S. 1. The situation of the properties is shown in Fig. 84.

FIG. 84. Plat of the claims in Kennedy, etc., Co. vs. Argonaut, etc., Co., 189 U. S. 1, from the decision.

By compromise of a contest in the Land Office the line A-B was agreed upon as the boundary between the Pioneer and the Kennedy and patents issued accordingly. The ore in dispute was taken from underneath the Silva Claim (which also belonged to the Kennedy Co.), but was found in a vein which apexed in both the Pioneer and the Kennedy. The Supreme Court decided

19 Eureka, etc., Co. vs. Richmond, etc., Co., 4 Sawyer, 302; McGee vs. Stone, 9 Calif., 600.

that the extralateral rights of the Pioneer were bounded by the extension A-B-B' of the compromise line A-B, although this line was not parallel with the other end line of the Pioneer claim.

Rule. Where end lines between adjoining claims are moved by agreement of the respective parties, and patents issued for the claims as readjusted, such readjusted end lines determine the extralateral rights of the respective claims by a vertical plane through the same extended in the direction of the dip of the vein, even though such readjustment of the end lines leaves the end lines of one or both of the claims non-parallel.

CONFLICT BETWEEN MINING CLAIM AND AGRICULTURAL PATENT

Naturally, nearly all cases of conflicting rights to ore-bodies, arising under the extralateral provision of the statute, originate in disputes between the owners of different mining claims. But if a mining claim which has extralateral rights under the statute is so situated that the vein apexing therein extends into land held by an agricultural patent, what is the result of the conflicting rights between the miner and the farmer? This case has actually occurred; and the law thereon and the reasons therefor are so clearly stated in the decision of the case that I quote in full the part of the decision relating to this question: 20

"The only question is whether, under the Revised Statutes, a party discovering and acquiring title by patent from the United States to a mineral gold-bearing vein or lode having its apex within the land purchased is entitled to follow the vein or lode down on its dip, across the boundaries of his own lands into the agricultural lands of an adjoining proprietor, who has the older title? In my judgment he, clearly, has not. The equitable title to the agricultural lands, held by plaintiff, fully vested on the entry and payment by Hammack on June 15, 1874. After that the United States merely held the dry legal title in trust for the purchaser without any pecuniary or beneficial interest in it. From the moment of the entry, payment, and issue of the certificate of purchase, these lands cease to be public, and became private property, Milling Co. vs. Spargo, and Same vs. Fick, 8 Sawy, 647, 16 Fed. Rep., 348, and cases cited. Also Wirth vs. Branson, 98 U. S., 118; Deffeback vs. Hawke, 115 U. S., 405, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 95. By the entry and payment by Hammack, there being no known mine on the land, the entire interest to the center of the earth vested in him, and there was nothing left in the United States for a subsequent grant to other parties to operate upon. The only exceptions in the patent relate to easements and other prior rights already 20 Amador, etc., Co. vs. South Spring, etc., Co., 36 Fed., 668; 13 Saw., 523.

vested in other parties, before the date of the entry, as was held in the case of Milling Co. vs. Spargo, cited. No other exceptions are authorized by the statute to be inserted, and exceptions not so authorized, if inserted, would be void. Cowell vs. Lammers, 10 Sawy, 254, 21 Fed. Rep., 200; Deffeback vs. Hawke, 115 U. S., 402, 406, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 95. Section 2322, Revised Statutes, relied on by defendant, does not authorize any such exception, and it only applies, at most, to public lands, and to rights acquired to such lands before other parties acquire interest therein. It, certainly, does not apply to agricultural lands disposed of years — perhaps half a century—before by the Government and before any easement, or other right, has become vested in other parties. The United States can undoubtedly grant easements, and other limited rights, in any portion of the public lands, and subsequent purchasers must take them burdened with such easements or other rights; but when it has once disposed of its entire estate in the lands to one party, it can, afterwards, no more burden it with other rights than any other proprietor of lands."

This same case came before the United States Supreme Court, 145 U. S., 300, but the South Spring Hill Company had, pending the litigation, become owners of both properties. However, there were minority stockholders of Amador Company who might possibly be interested in having the question determined, but they did not appear; consequently the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court to save any possible rights of such minority stockholders, expressly stating that this was done "without considering and passing on the merits of the case in any respect"; so that the decision, through that of a lower United States court, still stands and is the authority on the subject. Being based on sound reasoning it is not likely to be disturbed in the future.

Rule. In case a vein passes on its dip out of a mining location into the land of an agricultural patent, it has no extralateral rights in the agricultural land, and the miner can only follow his vein to the vertical plane through boundary of the agricultural patent.

NO EXTRALATERAL RIGHTS FOR VEINS FOUND IN AGRICULTURAL LAND OR PLACER LOCATIONS

When the patent has been issued for agricultural land it carries with it the right to all mines and minerals beneath the surface to which no adverse right has attached at the time of issuing the certificate of purchase or patent.21

21 Colorado, etc., Min. Co. vs. Turck, 50 Fed., 888; Milling Co. vs. Spargo, 16 Fed., 348; Amodar Medean G. M. Co. vs. South Spring Hill G. M. Co., 36 Fed., 668.

Where a vein is discovered in a placer location after a patent is obtained, or where discovered in land held under an agricultural patent, such vein or lode does not carry the right of extralateral pursuit of the same by reason of the nature of the grant, which is only of what is contained within vertical planes through the surface boundaries.22

EXTRALATERAL RIGHTS OF SECONDARY VEIN WHICH IS PARALLEL TO LEGAL END LINES

The rights accruing to a secondary vein which crosses a claim parallel to the legal end lines is a puzzling question. In Fig. 85 G-H is a secondary vein and parallel to the end lines.

The end lines for the secondary vein are the end lines, s-vo and re-p of the known veins. The question is, how far can the owners of claim No. 1 and claim No. 2 each go in working the secondary vein G-H? The legal end lines for the claims do not. furnish any limitation; for they do not intersect the secondary vein, nor would lines parallel thereto at any point within the claim do so. The side lines of the claim do not become end lines for the cross veins, but are also side lines for secondary veins within the claims, just as the legal end lines, are also end lines for all veins within the claims.23

Can such a cross vein be pursued beyond the side lines of the

22 Lindley on Mines, 2d ed., sec. 413.

23 See p. 220 et sq.