$5 per volume in numbers. (INVARIABLY IN ADVANCE,) SPECIAL NOTICE! All remittances must be sent by Post office Order or Draft to All exchanges and legal communications should be sent to NEW YORK: H. CAMPBELL & CO., LAW BOOKSELLERS AND PUBLISHERS, Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1878, by THE NATIONAL REGister In re James M. Seeley. 315085 The rule that every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts is only a rule of evidence, and where the testimony is conflicting it is for the jury to find the actual intent existing in the mind of the party. Though the necessary consequence of a payment by an insolvent debtor may be to give a preference, he will not be conclusively presumed to have intended such preference where the evidence shows he was actuated by a different motive. But where the party is insolvent, and the payment necessarily operates as a preference, and no explanation is offered, the presumption is conclusive, and there is no question for the jury. 11 The words fraudulent preference as used in the Bankrupt Law do not import moral fraud. Nothing more is meant than that a payment shall have been made under circumstances which the law inhibits as a prefer ence. The acts enumerated in R. S., Sec. 5110, are not in the nature of offences or forfeitures of a right to a discharge, but are rather in the nature of violations of conditions precedent. Quare: Whether it is competent to show that a general assignment for the benefit of creditors was not executed for the purpose of defeating the operation of the Bankrupt Law? Duffield, Assignee, v. Horton et al. 1 An attachment issued within four months preceding the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy is absolutely dissolved by such proceedings. An attachment was issued in an action against one Y., within four months preceding the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy against him and was served on defendants as debtors of Y. Pending the bankruptcy proceedings a general judgment was recovered in said action, and an execution issued thereon, and the defendants paid to the sheriff the amount of their indebtedness. Held, That such payment was voluntary, and did not discharge their obligation to the bankrupt or his assignee. 13 Hall, Assignee, v. Waterbury. An assignee in bankruptcy cannot be required to give security for costs in an action pending in a State Court, although he is a non-resident of the: State. Neither is he personally liable for costs, only where he is guilty of misconduct or bad faith. In re Ebenezer and James W. Cheney. 15 A register has power to adjourn a meeting of creditors when, in his judgment, the interest of the whole body of creditors or of sound policy requires it..! Creditors, when duly convened, have power to choose assignees-to declare dividends-to consider and act upon propositions for a composition. But it is for the register primarily, or for the District Judge, on the register's certificate, to determine when and what meetings shall be held. The register's discretion in such action will not ordinarily be interfered with. A register who, against the remonstrance of the bankrupt's counsel, adjourned a composition meeting in order that creditors might be afforded the option of electing an assignee, was held to have exercised a proper discretion. 16 BANKRUPTCY REGISTER REPORTS. VOLUME XIX. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT-E. D. MICHIGAN. The rule that every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts is only a rule of evidence, and where the testimony is conflicting it is for the jury to find the actual intent existing in the mind of the party. Though the necessary consequence of a payment by an insolvent debtor may be to give a preference, he will not be conclusively presumed to have intended such preference where the evidence shows he was actuated by a different motive. But where the party is insolvent, and the payment necessarily operates as a preference, and no explanation is offered, the presumption is conclusive, and there is no question for the jury. The words "fraudulent preference" as used in the Bankrupt Law do not import moral fraud. Nothing more is meant than that a payment shall have been made under circumstances which the law inhibits as a prefer ence. The acts enumerated in R. S., Sec. 5110, are not in the nature of offences or forfeitures of a right to a discharge, but are rather in the nature of violations of conditions precedent. Quare: Whether it is competent to show that a general assignment for the benefit of creditors was not executed for the purpose of defeating the operation of the Bankrupt Law? In re JAMES M. SEELEY. On motion for a new trial. Seeley petitioned for a discharge, and the case was tried before a jury upon the following specifications in opposition thereto: 1. A general assignment for the benefit of his creditors to VOL. XIX.-1 In re Seeley. Francis G. Russell, alleged to have been made in contemplation of bankruptey and for the purpose of preventing the property so assigned from coming into the hands of the assignee in bankruptcy, and being distributed in satisfaction of his debts. This assignment was executed on Monday, the 11th day of December, 1877, at the Russell House in this city, whither Seeley had gone, partly at least, to avoid the importunity of one of his creditors. It seems that Seeley had contracted to sell his stock to one Auringer for five thousand dollars, for the purpose of paying his debts, but the bargain had fallen through, and by the advice of counsel he finally concluded to execute the assignment. 2. In making a fraudulent preference to one Scott, two days before his general assignment, and when insolvent. The facts were, that Seeley was indebted to Scott in about the sum of twelve hundred dollars, for money loaned; that on the Saturday before the assignment was executed he permitted Scott to take goods from his store to the amount of eight hundred dollars. This and the transfer to Harris, hereafter mentioned, were the only important transactions for several days before the assignment. Scott had formerly occupied a produce store upon Woodward Ave., near Mr. Seeley's place of business, and had become intimate with him there. For the past twelve or fourteen years, however, he had been a farmer, and it seems had been accustomed to loan Seeley money from time to time, for which a note had been taken, payable on demand. Both Scott and Seeley swear that Scott did not surrender his note, and that there was no agreement that the goods were to be received in payment. On the other hand there was no mention of the amount of goods Scott was to take, and no particular credit agreed upon. Scott swears that he had intended to open a store himself for the sale of essential oils, had rented a building for that purpose, and had engaged one or two of Mr. Seeley's clerks, but, owing to some failure to raise the money, this plan was never carried out, and the goods were stored in another building, and subsequently bought back by the assignee in bankruptcy at seventy-five cents on the dollar. In re Seeley. 3. In making a fraudulent preference to one Harris also, upon the Saturday before the assignment, and when insolvent. There was no conflict here as to the facts. Seeley was indebted to Harris in about the sum of one hundred and twelve dollars, and upon the same day of the transfer to Scott he turned out to him goods to the amount of his debt, in consideration of his surrendering a note for one hundred dollars. On Seeley's journal there is an entry, under date of December 9, 1876, of "bills payable to A. R. Harris, for he surrenders note July 7, 1876, interest at ten per cent., one hundred dollars, half interest on the above note six months, five dollars." This was the entire testimony as to the transaction. The case was submitted to the jury under instructions that if they found the assignment was made in contemplation of becoming bankrupt, for the purpose of preventing the property from coming into the hands of the assignee or of being distributed in satisfaction of his debts, or if payments were made to Scott or Harris when insolvent, with an intent to prefer them, they should return a verdict of guilty. Exceptions were taken to the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that as matter of law they should return such verdict. E. E. Kane, for the motion. Don M. Dickinson, for the bankrupt. BROWN, J.-With some hesitation, I submitted the question to the jury whether the assignment and payments in this case were made with the prohibited intent. I am free to say their verdict did not command my approval. Counsel for the creditors claims that every person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own act, and as it was the necessary effect of the assignment to withdraw the property from the hands of the assignee in bankruptcy, and of the payments to Scott and Harris to prefer them over the other creditors, the court was bound to find the intent as matter of law and to take the case away from the jury. The position of the bankrupt was, that this rule, that a man is held to contemplate the necessary con |