sick and weary of the controversies and debates waged and waging on every side, in which each party is contending, not for truth, but victory, and which have effected just nothing, for the want of some arbiter recognised by all, and whose decree shall be final and infallible. Now such an um

pire we have. Whatever importance others may attach to the deductions of human reasoning, and thus impiously array against the Scriptures those "oppositions of science falsely so called," which the Apostle terms "profane and vain babblings," you and I have long since put on our shields one motto "Let God be true and every man a liar.” There are, indeed, some truths which are seen, like the sun, by their own light; but when the character of any human action admits of discussion at all, it admits, almost always, of indefinite discussion. The question itself of innocence and guilt is necessarily complex; and it is vain, too, in this day of knowledge and mental discipline, to expect any such signal results as formerly belonged to the trial by battle. No matter how an advocate seems to establish his opinions, they will not prove invulnerable. "He that is first in his own cause, seemeth just; but his neighbor cometh and searcheth him ;" and the result of this searching invariably is, that, at least in the judgment of the neighbor's party, the first becomes last and the last first.

It is, then, the responses of the sacred oracles to which we must after all appeal. But as we may rest assured that no science, truly so called, will be found opposed to revelation; and as I abhor and abjure the blasphemy which would charge the

Bible with countenancing sin; I shall suspend what still appears to me (with deference) to be the unequivocal argument from the Scriptures, until I examine the logic usually employed on this subject-my principal object being to vindicate the inspired volume from having, at any time or place, permitted and regulated a crime of the darkest malignity.

Now, in order to clear away rubbish, and arrive at once at the point, let me remind you that it is simply the essential character of slavery which we are discussing; and that slavery is a term whose meaning can be easily and accurately defined. Slavery is bondage. It is (to give Paley's idea in other language) the condition of one to whose ser vice another has a right, without the consent or contract of the servant. The addition you make to this definition is really included in it; the original right involving, of course, all rights necessarily and properly implied. But, my dear brother, while I concur fully in the conclusions you draw from the premises assumed, it really seems to me that those premises beg the whole question, and take for granted the only thing I ever denied. I am now referring to your second communication. Nothing can be more carefully and lucidly reasoned, and the abolitionists declare they "have read no argument from any quarter so simple and yet so conclusive against slavery." And yet,

after several times perusing this letter, will my brother forgive my saying that it presents to my mind precisely the following problem, and no other-Slavery being admitted to be an aggregate of crimes, it is required to prove that slavery

is criminal. As to which you very justly add, "I do not perceive how the subject, in this view, admits of any argument."

66

Let me go a little into detail. Your conclusion is, that slavery is not only a moral evil, but as great a sin as we can conceive of;" and this you derive from two propositions, both of which I humbly apprehend to be fallacious. First, you affirm that the right of the master is irreconcilable with the right of the slave to "the blessings of moral and intellectual cultivation, and the privileges of domestic society;" which I deny. Why, indeed, should it be? When you hire a servant for a year, he is under obligation to "labor for your benefit" that year; but does your right to his service, or your right to "use all means necessary to the original right," conflict with his right to "the blessings of moral and intellectual cultivation, and the privileges of domestic society?" The terms "moral cultivation" signify, I presume, improvement in holiness. Now, suppose a slave to have the word of God, and to enjoy all the means of grace, why should his moral improvement be impossible because he labors for my benefit? In fact, might not his very position shelter him from many of those temptations of pride, and avarice, and ambition, which are most fatal to piety ?* Then, again, as to intellectual cultivation: the laboring population in all countries have but little taste or time for literature; but if our slaves were taught to

* All the Greek fathers, and many eminent commentators, maintain that the true meaning of 1 Cor. vii. 21, is, "Even if liberty may be thine, remain rather in the state of the slave, as it is propitious to piety." See Chrys. Hom

read, I know no class of people employed in manual industry who would have more leisure for books. Many Roman slaves were hard students: they were employed as amanuenses, and their value was in proportion to their education. And

so, too, as to domestic society; why should it not be enjoyed by those who labor for a master? The right of the master, I repeat it, does not confer any such rights as you suppose. He may require the just and reasonable service of the slave, but it is a service exactly such as is due from a servant hired for the year or for life. Nor does the absence of "the contract or consent of the slave," nor the right of transfer, at all alter the nature and extent of the master's right. The case is analogous to that of parents and children. A father has a right to the services of his child during minority, without the contract or consent of the child; and he may transfer that right, as in case of apprenticeship. But is he therefore justified in debasing the moral and intellectual character of the child? Nay, does not the very law which gives him the control of his child, place him under the strongest obligations to promote that child's best and eternal interests? And, beyond a doubt, this is the true light in which Christianity would have masters regard themselves-a view which must cause the holiest among us to tremble at our fearful responsibility, and bow down in contrition and penitence at our unfaithfulness. But this is only what I fear

to be too true as to most parents; and, in each case, it is not the relation which is sinful, but infidelity to the solemn trust which that relation cre

ates.

The proposition adduced by you is only a modification of another which has so often been urged; viz., that man cannot be made a subject of property; as to which who but sees that the whole perplexity arises from a confusion of terms? The affirmants mean, that it is wrong to treat human beings as brutes and inanimate chattels; which is self-evident. Those who support the negative intend only, that one man may have a just right to the services of another, and that this right may be transferable; which is also self-evident. Here the dispute would at once cease, if the term property were defined. And just so with us. Your conclusions are quite indisputable, if slavery be essentially and necessarily the compound of palpable infractions of right which you suppose. But this you surely do not maintain. You certainly do not believe that in Abraham's family, and among Christians in the apostles' days, the right was claimed, and exercised, to deprive the slaves of "the blessings of moral and intellectual cultivation and the privileges of domestic society." Indeed, in your third letter, when speaking of a slaveholder, you say, "he may cultivate their" (the slaves') "intellects, and improve their morals." It is conceded, then, that slavery may exist without those evils which you mention. The right, therefore, to commit them is not necessary to ensure the exercise of the original right of the master, and slavery does not confer it as you affirm.

If instead of right you had used the word power, and had asserted the great danger of confiding such irresponsible power in the hands of any man, I should at once have assented. There is quite