a man. a being a public officer, being presumed to be a better judge, in that situation, of the fitness of a presidential candidate, than if he were a private Hence, in 1826, he, as a member of the committee, came to the conclusion that it was dangerous to leave so vast a power in the hands of the executive; and through their chairman, (Mr. Benton) expressed that opinion to the world. The change of administration had not changed his views. His opinions were not controlled by party considerations. Under the laws as they then were, office hunting would become a science. Men would come to Washington, to get one set turned out and another put in by misrepresentations and stratagem. This practice the proposed law would discourage. It would also check the thirst for office; because, if a man was removed, his fault, whether incapacity, dishonesty, or intemperance, would be exposed. And if a man should be injured, he would know how and by whom, and he could vindicate his character, not by a controversy with the president, but against him by whose falsehood the president had been misled. It would also secure honest officers with honest political opinions. No president would remove an officer for a mere difference in politics, when he knew this reason was to be put on record, and to remain through all time. We very much mistake if these sentiments do not meet with a cordial response in every intelligent, unprejudiced mind. The practice of dispensing rewards and punishments according to services rendered or refused to the successful candidate for the executive chair, naturally tends to destroy the independence of those who seek to secure a participation in the patronage which it has to bestow. If a man depends for his bread upon his political opinions, there is no assurance that these opinions will be honestly and fearlessly expressed. And in proportion as the elective franchise is corrupted, will the tenure of our liberties be impaired. An act was passed at this session establishing three branches of the mint: one at New Orleans for coining gold and silver; one at Charlotte, in North Carolina, and one at Dahlonega, in Georgia. On the question of the passage of the bill for creating these mints, Mr. Hill spoke in opposition to it. If he believed it would be the means of displacing a paper circulation by one of specie, he would consent to some expense to effect the object. But he believed the quantity of gold to be coined at those places was insufficient to justify the expense necessary to erect these establishments and to keep them in operation. The mint at Philadelphia had been found ample for all the wants of the country. The senator from Missouri had declared the system of mints to be a part of the hard money system, and supposed hard money could not be diffused through the west and south if these mints were not established. He (Mr. H.) also was a friend of a hard money currency; but it should be recollected that banks were the natural enemies of a hard money circulation. Small bank notes would destroy the circulation of hard money. He objected also to the bill, that it would increase the executive patronage to the amount of at least one hundred thousand dollars. Mr. Benton viewed the question as one of currency. Not less than six hundred banks in the union were employed in coining paper money. It was time that this miserable trash should be utterly proscribed. He wished to see the country return to that species of currency which existed forty-five years ago, when the federal revenues were paid in gold and silver. The gold bill passed at the last session was the first step towards a sound circulating medium-gold and silver. This was a question of paper on one side, and of gold on the other. The bill was supported farther by Messrs. Calhoun, Waggaman, Brown, of N. C., and King, of Georgia ; and opposed by Messrs. Clay, Frelinghuysen, and others. It was passed by ayes, 24, against 19 noes In the house, ayes, 115; noes, 60. CHAPTER LI. FRENCH SPOLIATIONS.— PROSPECT OF WAR WITH FRANCE. -DEBATE ON THE LOST FORTIFICATION BILL. The delay of the French government in making provision for the debt due the United States under the treaty of 1831, has been already mentioned. The chambers having repeatedly refused to make the necessary appropriations, the president, in his annual message of December, 1834, suggested, as a measure of redress, reprisals upon French commerce, in case the chambers should again adjourn without making provision for the indemnity. The subject was in each house referred to the committee on foreign relations. On the 6th of January, 1835, the senate committee made a report concluding with a resolution, that it was inexpedient to pass such a law during the present session of the chambers. It was thought most proper to await the issue of the new appeal to that body. The act, though contingent on that issue, would imply a distrust of the French government, and by being construed into a menace, might prevent the passage of the bill. This opinion was afterward strengthened by that of Mr Livingston, our minister at Paris, who in a despatch to the secretary of state, dated January 11, advised the same course. On the 7th of February, 1835, in compliance with a request of the house, the president communicated to that body extracts from despatches received from Mr. Livingston at Paris, representing the passage of the bill by the chambers as improbable. The house was surprised by a motion from Mr. Adams, that the message and extracts be referred to the committee on foreign relations, with instructions to report on the subject forthwith. The papers were read, and after an animated debate, were referred without instructions. The singular motion to require, on a subject so important, an immediate report, which is usually asked for only on subjects already well understood, induced the belief that it was intended to propose a speedy resort to reprisals, if not a declaration of war itself. He only wished, however, as he afterwards explained his remarks, that the house should avail itself of all the time it had remaining in deliberating on the posture of affairs, as the measure of the president, or some other which the national bonor might require, might possibly eventuate in war. The senate had deliberated, and determined to dodge the question: the house might come to a like conclusion. In the house, on the 27th of February, the committee made a report, and submitted three resolutions: (1.) That it was incompatible with our rights and honor farther to negotiate in relation to the treaty, and that the house would insist on its execution. (2.) Discharging the committee from the farther consideration of the subject. (3.) That contingent preparation ought to be made to meet any emergency growing out of our relations with France. The resolutions were unanimously adopted, after the first had been modified by striking out the first part of it which declared against farther negotiation, leaving that optional with the president. This modification was the result of a motion of Mr. Adams. The debate on this question was not one of a party character. Mr. Adams went farther in support of the measures proposed by the president, than others of the same party, and most of the administration members. It may be inferred from the general tenor of the debate, that if the chambers again adjourned without making the appropriation, some retaliatory measure would thereafter receive the sanction of the house. On the 25th of February, the president communicated to the senate fresh correspondence between the two governments, which was referred to the committee on foreign relations, who reported, the 3d of March, that nothing in the correspondence gave cause for changing the position which the senate had taken on the subject: It appeared that the king of France had been greatly irritated by the president's recommendation of reprisals, and by what he conceived an imputation to him of bad faith, He recalled his minister at Washington, and directed the substitution of a chargé d'affaires; and passports were tendered to Mr. Livingston at Paris. Mr. L., however, remained, awaiting the orders of his gov. ernment. These, had been transmitted, and required bim to return to the United States; and in the event of the passage of the bill, to leave a chargé d'affaires. The passage of the bill by the French chambers was supposed to have been retarded by the injudicious publication of extracts from Mr. Rives' correspondence, boasting that he had overmatched the French ministers in the negotiation, and also of certain portions of Mr. Livingston's correspondence, equally offensive, he having suggested that the French government might be influenced by fear. These, and especially the recommendation of the president's message of a law authorizing reprisals, which was regarded as peculiarly offensive to the dignity of France, were made the pretext for delaying justice. In April, the bill was passed, by the strong vote of 289 to 137. Before its passage, however, it received an amendment–intended, probably, as a salvo to their wounded pride--providing, that certain payments should be made only after a satisfactory explanation or apology as to the message of the president should have been received by the French government. Before leaving Paris, (April 25, 1835,) Mr. Livingston, with the approbation of the president, addressed a letter to the duke de Broglie, with the view of satisfying that government in regard to the required explanation. The form of our government, and the functions of the president were such, that no foreign power had a right to ask for explanations of any communication he might make to congress. Mr. L. said there was no just ground for the charge, that the message impeached the good faith of his majesty's government. As to the measure of redress proposed in the message, it was in accordance with the law and practice of nations; it was necessary, and not objectionable, unless couched in offensive language. Mr. L. cited a case. While France and England were making aggressions upon our commerce, congress passed a law declaring that if these aggressions did not cease, we should hold no intercourse with them. But neither government complained of the act as a threat, or thought it dishonorable to deliberate under its pressure. France was even induced to accept its condition, and repealed her Berlin and Milan decrees. Although war was not generally apprehended, yet as preparation for such an emergency might become necessary before the next meeting of congress, on the last night of the session, March 3, 1835, and without any previous intimation, as was alleged, an amendment to the fortification bill was offered in the house, proposing to add $3,000,000, to be expended under the direction of the president, if he should deem it necessary, for the defense of the country. The amendment was adopted by the house; but it was opposed in the senate as conferring on the president unlimited military power, and rejected, 29 to 16. The house insisted on its amendment; and the senate adhered to its disagreement, by a vote of 29 to 17. A committee of conference was appointed. Instead of three millions, there was inserted, $300,000 for arming the fortifications, and $500,000 for repairing and equipping the ships of war. The senate awaited the action of the house; and, at eleven o'clock at night, sent a message to that body, which, for some cause not stated, did not act upon it: and, as a consequence, the whole bill was lost; and not a dollar for fortifications of any kind was appropriated ! The loss of this bill, became, at the next session, a subject of exciting debate in both houses ; each house, or rather, members of each house, charging it to the neglect or dereliction of the other. In the house of representatives, particularly, the debate was criminating and virulent. The explanation of Mr. Livingston failed to satisfy the French gov. ernment; and the bill which had passed the chamber of deputies, afterwards received the sanction of the chamber of peers and the king : and no farther steps were taken for the payment of the indemnity. The president, in his next annual message, December, 1835, again presented the subject to congress. He vindicated the message of 1834, as giving no just cause of offense; and although he firmly maintained the ground he had taken, his language was of a pacific character. Advices, he said, were daily expected from France, which would be promptly communicated. Accordingly, on the 18th of January, 1836, a message, accompanied by the official correspondence between the two governments, was communicated to congress; from which it appeared, that France still required, as a condition of paying the indemnity, an apology, which the president considered “incompatible with the honor and independence of the United States." And he says: “This pretension (that of interfering in the communications between the different branches of our government) is rendered the more unreasonable by the fact, that the substance of the required explanation has been repeatedly and voluntarily given before it was insisted on as a condition -a condi. tion the more humiliating, because it is demanded as the equivalent of a pecuniary consideration." In this state of affairs, the president recommended, as a just measure of retaliation, the prohibition of French vessels and French products from our ports, or the adoption of some other proper remedy. The 1 |