Becnel v. Tournillon. another place, leaving to him to ascertain where the notices are to be addressed, as the domicil or place of residence of such endorser. So, in the case of Nott's Executors v. Beard, 16 La. 310, we held, that the law requires notaries to put the notice in the nearest post office to them, and that the law is satisfied by its being directed, as to the drawer or endorsers, to the post office nearest to them. So, also, in the case of Gale v. Kemper, 10 La. 209, it was held, that a notice of protest is properly directed to the post office nearest to the residence of the endorser, where there are more than one in the parish; and in the case of the Union Bank v. Brown, 1 Rob. 107, we recognized the doctrine, that notice of protest to an endorser, when sent by mail, must be directed to the post office nearest his residence, where it is not shown that he was in the habit of receiving his letters from another office. So it was held, also, in the case of the Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Compton et al., 2 Robinson, 4; and in the case of Mead v. Carnal and Bryce, ante, 73. From the uniform jurisprudence established in all the cases above referred to, it is obvious that we never entertained the idea that a simple direction of the notice to the parish in which the endorser resides was sufficient, unless, as was shown in the case of Gale v. Kemper, 10 La. 209, the post office be kept at the seat of justice, where the letters, generally addressed "to —, parish of -" are always sent, and it is proved to be the nearest to the endorser's residence. This is in accordance with the rules of the commercial law, with regard to the manner of serving notices of protest. Again, the law of 1827, has not operated any other change, but points out a new mode of proof of the diligence required to be used by the commercial law. Here, one of the letters, addressed to "the parish of Assumption," was undoubtedly sent to the seat of justice, according to the post office regulations; and the evidence shows, that the Towncourtville post office is nearest to the defendant's residence. The notice should, therefore, have been directed to him at the latter place. We are aware of the great inconvenience which notaries generally labor under, when they have to make a protest in a parish far distant from the residence of the endorsers; and of the difficulty which they experience in discovering or ascertaining the Becnel v. Tournillon. exact post office to which the notices are to be forwarded. This difficulty sometimes amounts to an impossibility, and it often happens, that the endorsers are discharged for want of sufficient means of ascertaining, by the notaries, to what particular post offices the notices must be addressed. This is an evil which, perhaps, should be remedied; for, although, as we said in the case, 16 La. 310, post offices are establishments authorized by the laws of the United States, and our public officers are, perhaps, bound to recognize such as are established in our own State at least, and although notaries may sometimes get their information from the holders of the notes and bills to be protested, still, those means are often insufficient, as it is generally difficult to know or ascertain the distance which there may be between the house of the endorser, and the different post offices that may have been established in his parish. But, however inconvenient and injurious this may often be to our public officers, and citizens in general, it is an evil which our legislature alone can remedy; and so long as the law shall stand as it now is, on this subject, our duty must be to obey it, and to say, as we have done repeatedly, that a notice of protest, simply directed to a particular parish, and not addressed to the post office nearest to the endorser's residence, in case there are several post offices in the parish, and the one at the seat of justice is not the nearest, is insufficient, and cannot legally bind the endorser. It is, therefore, ordered and decreed, that the judgment of the District Court be annulled and reversed, and that ours be for the defendant, with costs in both courts. M. Taylor, for the plaintiff. Ilsley, for the appellant. Succession of Oyon-Blondelee and others, appellants. SUCCESSION OF PIERRE FRANÇOIS OYON.-LOUIS JEAN BAPTISTE AUGUSTIN BLONDELEE, and others, appellants. A law should never be considered as applicable to cases which arose previous to its enactment, unless the Legislature have, in express terms, declared such to be their intention. The 4th section of the act of 26 March, 1842, imposing a tax of ten per cent on all sums, or on the value of all property, received by any non-resident alien. as heir, donee, or legatee, from any succession opened in this State, or on so much thereof as is situated in this State, applies only to successions opened, by the death of the ancestor, subsequently to the passage of the act. APPEAL from the Court of Probates of Lafourche Interior, McAllister, J. MORPHY, J. The petitioners, aliens and residents of the kingdom of France, have appealed from a decree of the inferior court, homologating an account rendered by the defendant, as administrator of the succession of the late Pierre François Oyon, who died in the parish of Lafourche Interior, on or about the 20th December, 1835. They contend, that as heirs at law of the deceased, they have been wrongfully and unjustly charged in said account with the tax of ten per cent imposed by the law of the 26th of March, 1842, on property inherited by non-resident aliens; that this law should not be made to apply to successions opened before its promulgation; and that their rights as heirs having vested in 1835, they are not liable to the payment of this tax. We think that the Judge erred in subjecting the appellants to the payment of the tax. It is a sound rule of construction, never to consider laws as applying to cases which arose previous to their passage, unless the Legislature have, in express terms, declared such to be their intention. They might, indeed, have imposed a tax on all sums to be paid over to aliens not residing in the State, without reference to the opening of the successions from which they may be entitled to receive such sums; but unless that intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed, we are bound to suppose that, according to the ordinary rules of legislation, they intended to provide for the future, and not to affect in any way rights previously acquired. The language of the law is "that each and Succession of Oyon-Blondelee and others, appellants. every person not being domiciliated in this State, and not being a citizen of any State or Territory in the Union, who shall be entitled, whether as heir, legatee, or donee, to the whole, or any part of the succession of a person deceased, whether such person shall have died in this State or elsewhere, shall pay a tax of ten per cent on all sums, or on the value of all property which he may actually receive from said succession, or so much thereof as is situated in this State," &c. We understand this law as referring only to aliens who may become entitled to the whole, or any part of a succession, after its promulgation. When did the petitioners become entitled to the sums they claim? Surely not in 1843, when they came forward to receive them; but in 1835, when the succession was opened by the death of their ancestor. A law imposing a similar tax was passed by the General Assembly in 1828, but was repealed in 1830. The heirs of one Arnaud, who presented themselves after the passage of the repealing act to receive their inheritance, contended that, as the law imposing the tax had been repealed, they were no longer liable to pay it; but this court held, that the right of the State to the tax having accrued by the opening of the estate of Arnaud under the law of 1828, was not affected by its repeal. 3 La. 336. 3 La. 336. See also, same volume, p. 561. Laws of 1828, p. 178. We would surely not decide otherwise under the law of 1842, if, after its repeal, aliens should come forward to claim a succession opened while it was in force. If so, we must hold that the tax is due only by such aliens as have become entitled to successions opened in this State after the promulgation of the law. It is, therefore, ordered, that the judgment of the Court of Probates of the parish of Lafourche Interior, be so amended, as to reject from the defendant's account the item charging the appellants with ten per cent on the amount accruing to them from the succession of the late Pierre François Oyon; and that it be affirmed in all other respects. The appellee to pay the costs of this appeal out of the funds of the estate. B. Winchester, for the appellants. J. C. Beatty, District Attorney, for the State. McCollom v. McCollom. SUCCESSION OF PIERRE FRANÇOIS OYON.-BENJAMIN WINCHESTER, Attorney in Fact of Anne Josephine Virginie Patrix and others, appellant. APPEAL from the Court of Probates of Lafourche Interior, Mc Allister, J. MORPHY, J. This case presents the same question as that just decided on the appeal of Louis Jean Baptiste Augustin Blondelee, and it must be decided in the same way. It is, therefore, ordered, that the judgment of the Court of Probates, of the parish of Lafourche Interior, be so amended as to reject from the defendant's account the item charging the appellants with ten per cent on the amount accruing to them from the estate of the late Pierre François Oyon; and that it be affirmed in all other respects. The appellee to pay the costs of this appeal out of the funds of the estate. M. Taylor, and B. Winchester, for the appellant. ANDREW MCCOLLOM v. JOHN MCCOLLOM. A purchaser of a tract of land and slaves, who has been evicted as to one-third of the property, has a right to have the sale cancelled in toto, and to be relieved from the payment of the price. C. C. 2487. APPEAL from the District Court of Ascension, Nicholls, J. Connely, for the appellant. BULLARD, J. The plaintiff asserts title to one undivided third of a tract of land containing two thousand acres, and the improvements thereon, and to five slaves, and some moveable effects appurtenant to the plantation, which he acquired by purchase from one Bishop, jointly with Williams and Rightor, by an act of sale which was duly recorded in the parish of Pointe Coupée, in |