Queries respecting the Blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. 321 those who commit civil offences, yet 2. As the Jews had not been preheretics, both by the church and Chris-ously warned of a sin which would tian princes may be put to death. Is not this persecution? Would not Roman Catholics call it so if they were the victims? So also Luke xiv. 23, the Rheimish translation is: "Compel them to enter, that my house inay be filled." In the annotation we are told, “ St. Augustine also referreth this compelling to the penal laws which Catholic Princes do justly use against heretics and schismatics, proving that they who are by their former profession in baptism subject to the Catholic church and are departed from the same after sects, may and ought to be compelled into the unity and society of the universal church again." Can any one be so blind as not to see to what this leads? If it be supposed, that these annotations were written by the spirit of infallibility, and if the sanction of the Roman Catholic clergy extends to them, and that by the same spirit, I see not how the church of Rome can give up the doctrine they contain, which is persecution. If, Sir, you permit this to have a place in the Monthly Repository, it will give an opportunity for any Roman Catholic, and particularly the writer of the letter who has been the occasion of these lines, to inform the public, whether the sentiments of persecution contained in the above annotations, are now sanctioned by the Roman Catholic clergy or not. I for one should be glad to hear on this subject. SIR, A. BENNETT. TOT being satisfied with the expla phemy against the Holy Spirit, (see Matt. xii. 31, 32. Mark iii. 28, 29.) I beg leave to submit the following queries on the subject to the consideration of your readers, and shall be thankful to any one who will candidly answer them. 1. Have we sufficient authority from the above passages to conclude that any of the Jews had, at the time when our Lord uttered the words, blasphemed against the Holy Spirit; as he does not charge this crime upon them, but warns them of the danger of committing it? be unpardonable, if they had already uttered this blasphemy when the condemnation to which it exposed them was declared, would not their total exclusion from forgiveness be the same as proceeding against men on the ground of an ex post facto law? Is it not more consistent with the character of Jesus, and the conduct of God towards his creatures, to suppose the above passages contain an awful warning, than to construe them as expressive of the penalty of a crime already committed? 3. Were not the most malignant expressions which the Jews had uttered at the time spoken against Jesus personally, against the Son of man; for they did not admit that he had the spirit of God? Is it not contrary to the whole account to say the blasphemy they had uttered was directed against the spirit; did they not evidently intend to degrade the character, and invalidate the pretensions of Jesus; was not this their whole object, and is it not the inten tion that characterizes the action un-. der a moral view? 4. If the blasphemy they had al ready uttered was against the Spirit, how are we to distinguish between their speaking against the Son of man and their speaking against the Holy Spirit? 5. Are we not told that the Holy Spirit was not given till Christ was glorified: John vii. 39. Acts ii. 33. and could they blaspheme against the Holy Spirit before it was given in the sense in which the expression is used in the evangelical writings? 6. The Editors of the Improved Version, in a note on the place, say, 66 Jesus and his apostles to demoniacal agency, resisted the strongest possible evidence of the Christian religion, and were therefore incapable of being converted to the belief of it." But can this observation be just, if restrict ed to the miracles wrought during our Lord's personal ministry; for he said to his Apostles, "He that be, lieveth on me, the works that I do shall he do also, and greater works than these shall he do because I go unto my Father?" John xiv. 12, Did not the resurrection of Jesus, and the Holy Spirit given to the apostles, furnish stronger evidence than any that had preceded? 7. Can the supposition that some of the Jews had sinned beyond the possibility of forgiveness during our Lord's personal ministry, be reconciled with the accounts at large? Did not Jesus after his resurrection direct that forgiveness should be preached to them indiscriminately; and was their condemnation finally sealed before they rejected the gospel, contradicting and blaspheming, when preached by the Apostles with the Holy Spirit sent down from heaven? A SCRIPTURIST. SIR, ment are offered to consideration as alone consistent in themselves, or as having any pretensions to reason or the common apprehensions of mankind. The first holds forth that all things are subjected to fixed laws;-that all is an universal settled scheme of Providence; every thing was foreseen and determined, and happens as the Author of all appointed that it should. Now I do suppose that all events, all effects of power, are not subjects of intellectual determination, or objects of appointment; but on the contrary, that there are many natural results of force, which are not parts of any scheme, or any matters of device or ordination whatever. Indeed all things are necessarily what and as they are: but we need distinct evidence of appointment-that all events are, or ever were, objects of divine contemplation, or devised, determined parts of provident plan. No doubt, Deity is source of all order, all systematic work, all manage ment. But is God actually the designing cause of all movement and result? Is all movement and consequence, issue of intellect, pure offspring of wisdom and good-will? True, the natural standing order of the world indisputably betokens wise and good design; and all men must be agreeably affect ed thereby by the beauty and benefit of the provident succession of things; the orderly, eligible course which actually prevails throughout the system of nature. Every man must be more or less impressed with those characters of design and contrivance with which he is constantly surrounded and upheld. But sure every successive fact that we witness, cannot be justly considered a necessary component, or requisite mean, to any purposed end whatever. Can we reasonably think that all movement is judicious change; and all operation intentional effect? If this is "Inquirer's" view of Providence, I must say that all men do not decidedly think with him. Under this notion I cannot believe it possible to form a consistent character of Deity. The laws of nature indeed, are divine emanation, and of course perfectly characteristic of Deity, and accomodation and final welfare of his sentient creatures. But fally admitting this providential order of things, I apprehend not that it amounts to destiny, or positive assignment of every separate atom in respect of every other in the universe, all possible relation and state of being: but rather suppose that it does not necessarily follow, from hence, that all states and relations of being and every consequent result are subjects of divine device, or any mental concern whatever. It seems to me, and it is my present opinion, that though every phenomenon in nature is (essentially natural) necessary issue of eternal principle, nevertheless all bearing of objects, every event, every movement and consequence, is not a part of divine scheme; not a link, or distinct subject of direct will, device, purpose and ordination. And that man's personal character and end, is not (it may be) absolutely prescribed and preordained. I suppose that it is by divine pleasure and purpose that I am constituted capable of a certain measure of action: but must or may I thence infer and affirm, that I cannot do more or less than was the pleasure and purpose of God in my make? This seems to me tantamount to saying that all efficiency is strictly divine will-deed; that every instant motion and operation is personal act of Deity, to all intents and purposes. However, I do suppose, think and believe. that we are not justly authorized to aflirm that the supreine legislator of the universe actually appointed every temporary fact-all events whatever, Inconsistencies of Writers on Future Punishment. that take place through the action of man or other (provident ordination, or) creature energy. Finally, I will repeat, that I cannot think that every natural effect is subject or object of parpose and appointment. This said scheme of divine determination and ordination, now lies before us simple say-so. But as it is seriously thought that facts do not altogether answer to the tale, the matter demands some elucidation. And it is hoped, Sir, that this ingenious theoretic correspondent will engage himself herein to our cominon interest, and he will oblige an OLD INQUIRER. Whether natural evil be the cause of moral evil. January, 1816. Tis commonly said that if moral or produce misery, it would be no evil at all, and I see no reason to dispute this position. There is another question, however, connected with this subject, and that is, if the previous existence of natural evil be not the cause of the subsequent existence of moral evil, or whether if there were no natural evil moral evil could be possible in man? Now, all natural evil, is to sensible beings, unhappiness; so the question will be, if men were all perfectly happy, could an immoral volition or act take place? I think not. Every immoral act ap pears to be produced by the imperfection of the agent's happiness. He is stimulated by some apprehended good which he has not and which he desires, and if he were perfectly happy he could have no desires, and there fore could have nothing to draw forth an immoral wish. If the will be determined by desire, take away that desire, and no volition will be exerted. A human being perfectly happy, can do no immoral act, because he can have no desire to change his condition. Take away from inan in his present state, uneasy passions, bodily and mental, and all wants, and the dread of want, and all moral evil must cease. The first pair are represented as not perfectly happy, they had uneasy desires, and criminal volition followed. Moral evil, therefore, is caused by natural evil, and indeed in proportion to the extent of natural evil; moral evil exists in a very limited 323 degree. Take away the natural evil and it would cease to exist at all. Will this reasoning apply to the Deity? If we conceive that the Deity is really the Creator of all things, which all men now allow; that he must be perfectly happy, possessing all things, and having nothing to counteract his views, seems to be an undeniable inference, the contrary of which cannot be conceived, but seems to involve a contradiction. If the Deity then be a perfectly happy being, it will follow that he can have no desire, contrary to the happiness of any Being. It will now be asked, why then has this happy being pro duced natural evil, and that moral, in a word, why has he made any suffering and unhappy beings? I cannot answer this question. The usual solution of thinking men is, all or will be happy, and I confess that if this be not true, the difficulty adinits of no solution whatever. Without this, all is a riddle, an inexplicable mystery, all reasoning on the divine character and conduct, vain. This is universally, or nearly so, the doctrine held by Unitarians, and no other has the appearance of common sense, connected with the present condition of man and the belief of a perfectly happy Creator., SEARCH. P. S. May I be permitted to ask your correspondent, Mr. Belsham, who is one of the most diligent stu dents in the scriptures now living, if he have found any prophecy in the Old Testament, which speaks of the Messiah's dying and rising again the third day, which seems to be clearly designated by Jesus after his resurrection, as recorded in Luke. SIR, March 28, 1816. THE suggestion in a late number, if I take it right, that the Author of "Armageddon," [M. Repos. X. 649] probably intended in that poem, indirectly to oppose the common notion of future punishment, hath induced me to send you a few scattered thoughts drawn up under a similar idea, somewhat amplified, a few years ago: an idea, with which I was forcibly impressed, on perusing Dr. Young's Poem "On the Last Day." They are part of others on the subject in general, much too long on the whole, for a periodical work. If the present fragment be not out of time or unacceptable, it is at your service. AN OCCASIONAL READER. Apparent Inconsistencies of great Minds, exemplified in a series of Extracts on Future Punishment. There yet remains one collateral argument, of great weight and importance in the writer's opinion, against both the schemes already treated of, namely, the indiscriminate notion of future punishment, as represented by some, or the doctrine of absolute, eternal and unremitting torments; and secondly, that of punishment limited in degree, but strictly everlasting in duration-an argument, distinct in itself, and not much adverted to in books; and that is-the indeterminate and equivocal language employed by the advocates of eternal punishment, either in explaining their ideas of the doctrine itself, or of circumstances connected with it. If a writer lays down a specific opinion, and presently shuns the investigation of it, and elsewhere, perhaps in the next page, expresses a sentiment diametrically opposite, or utterly inconsistent with the former one; we may fairly conclude, either that he hath not formed any precise ideas upon the subject; or that he means to compound with different parties; or wishes to retract in some measure what he had before advanced. Nothing ean be a surer proof of a weak argument, than a man's authority against himself. A prodigious mass of evidence might be furnished of this kind; at present we shall produce only a few instances, without regard to chronology. Calvin, in his Institutions, B. III. Ch. 25, Section 5, having slightly mentioned some of the common arguments for eternal punishment; as to the contrary opinions, only says, "Let us leave these trifles, lest we should seem to consider such dotages as worthy of confutation." No doubt many a zealous Romanist has said the same, respecting any sentiments contrary to the peculiar dogmas of his community: nevertheless, of the greater part of these, this pious reformer justly thought it necessary to enter into the most minute and laborious investigation. The Rev. W. Wisheart, a profound divine of the church of Scotland, in his "Theologia," 1716, a work, which, allowing for some parts of the author's creed, contains an inexhaustable fund of theological matter, treating of the divine patience, says: Of all the other perfections of the divine nature, this of patience hath the shortest time to act its part, having no other stage but this world to act in: after the end of which, it will remain, shut up in the Deity, without any further operation. The time of this life is the only time of long suffering." Yet, he afterwards tells us, that the consideration of the divine patience is to be used as an argument, to manifest the gracious, merciful, and reconcileuble nature of the Deity, and to clear and justify the divine judgments in a future world;-an abundant patience, called the riches of forbearance and long suffering, far beyond the patience of good men, of glorified saints, or angels." Not to advert here to the singular freedom of speech in the former part of this quotation, it may be observed, than which nothing can be plainer, that the divine patience and long suffering, are often very limited in their exercise in the present life. The Deity doth not often interpose, that we know of, by miracles, or by remarkable deviations from the common course of nature and Providence, to prevent the usual, or the accidental effects as they are called, of transgression. The pious author himself observes, "How many candles have we seen put out, before they were half burnt!" War and pestilence, famine and intemperance, destroy their thousands and ten thousands in the first acts of sin, and many of them perhaps in the possession of a previously moral, if not religious character: now, to propose. that, as a general argument, which at present applies only to particular cases, is a false and absurd method of reasoning. Again, under the head of divine justice, he tells us, "The justice of God, in a future state, is inexorable:" but afterwards, that "This vindictive justice, though essential to the nature of God, is not natural to him, as heat is to the fire, though it be necessary that he should punish sin, because of his righteous nature; yet, not by a natural, or physical necessity, as the fire burns, but by a moral, or rational necessity. Inconsistencies of Writers on Future Punishment. The fire burns, without any influence of a free and rational principle, but the Deity is a free agent, and therefore determines the mode, seasons, degree, and other circumstances of punishment by his sovereign will and pleasure. Further, when we say that God cannot let sin go unpunished, we do not thereby limit the power of God, but it is the justice and righteousness of his own nature that bounds him. As he cannot lie or deny himself, so he cannot do any thing unjust, and it would be unjust to let sin go unpunished." These sentiments are strictly just, but utterly inconsistent with the foregoing assertion: for if we are to argue upon the grounds of "a moral or rational necessity," as to the proceedings of the Supreme Being as sovereign judge in a future world; how does it thence appear, that his primitive justice will be "inexorable?" Or where is it said in scripture that it will be so? Rather, as his patience and longsuffering are only, so to speak, branches of his infinite goodness, which is essential to his nature, is it not far more probable, that these will continue as long as that?-that is, be coeval with his being For, as our author well observes on the Divine Eternity, "God always is what he was, and always will be what he is!" Sir Thomas Brown, in his "Religio Medici," treating of future punishment according to the high orthodox system of his day, among some exquisite passages, introduces others which, separately considered, might lead a hasty reader to conclude that the au "I thank God, that, with joy I mention it, I was never afraid of hell, nor ever grew pale at its description: I have so fixed my contemplation on heaven, that I have almost forgot the idea of its contrary, and am afraid rather to lose the joys of the one, than endure the sufferings of the other! To be deprived of them, is a perfect hell, and needs, methinks, no addition to complete our affliction! That terrible term bath never detained me from sin, nor do I owe any good action to the name thereof: I fear God, yet am not afraid of him; his mercies make me ashamed of my sius, before his judgments alarm me for their consequences. These are but the forced and secondary methods of his wisdom; a course rather to deter the wicked, than incite the virtuous to his service."---Rel. Medic. 325 thor had possessed neither grace, reason nor humanity: he closes his remarks thus: "the one," the eternity of happiness, "being so far beyond our deserts; the other," the eternity of suffering, "being so infinitely below our demerits!" What did this good man require further, or what could he expect, more than all? Sir Kenelm Digly, his annotator, expresses upon this occasion a little alleviation of sentiment: he tells us, that the victim of divine anger, deprived of former criminal enjoyments, restless and insatiable," will neglect all other contentments he might have, for want of a due taste and relish; hating whatsoever good is in his power, and thus pining away a long eternity:" hereby plainly supposing, that there is some real good to be obtained in that state, if the proper means could be discovered and adopted. The luminous author of "A Gentleman's Religion" dismisses this subject in a very summary way. "Eternal damuation, of which we have fair warning given us, and may therefore avoid if we please, is as little as can be threatened, and often is but too little to keep us back from all manner of sin and wickedness." Thus taking for granted the question proposed, and confounding a supposed divine threatening with its execution; though, to do the author justice, he clearly holds out the difference of degrees. Richard Baxter, in his Treatise of Universal Redemption, or the Sufficiency of the Gospel in itself to save all Mankind, has the following passage:"All divines that I know, say that God loveth those in hell, as his creatures and as men. Aquinas and the schoolmen have it frequently; and many Protestant divines say, that he punisheth those in hell short of their deserving, and so sheweth some mercy there. That I will not meddle with." There might be some reason for this: the pious and laborious minister was branded as a heretic by many of his brethren; and would probably have been still farther advanced on the black catalogue had he hinted at the possibility of universal restoration. But let us attend to his sentiments in another part of this work, which should be deeply impressed upon our minds. say that God followeth not the rules of human laws; 1 answer, He is the If any |