503 Estimate of the Philosophical Character of Lord Bacon. siological theory concerning their causes, or to any analogical explanations founded on the caprices of metaphorical language. If, on some occasions, he assumes the existence of animal spirits, as the medium of communication between soul and body, it must be remembered, that this was then the universal belief of the learned; and that it was at a much later period not less confidently avowed by Locke. Nor ought it to be overlooked (I mention it to the credit of both authors), that in such instances the fact is commonly so stated, as to render it easy for the reader to detach it from the theory. As to the scholastic questions concerning the nature and essence of mind,--whether it be extended or unextended? whether it have any relation to space or to time? or whether (as was contended by others) it exist in every ubi, but in no place ?— Bacon has uniformly passed them over with silent contempt; and has probably contributed not less effectually to bring them into general discredit, by this indirect intimation of his own opinion, than if he had descended to the ungrateful task of exposing their absurdity.* cussions about the nature of mind, he decidedly states his conviction, that the faculties of man differ not merely in degree, but in kind, from the instincts of the brutes. "I do not, therefore," he observes in one occasion," approve of that confused and promiscuous method in which philosophers are accustomed to treat of pneumatology; as if the human soul ranked above those of brutes, merely like the sun above the stars, or like gold above other metals.” While Bacon, however, so cautiously avoids these unprofitable dis Notwithstanding the extravagance of Spinoza's own philosophical creed, he is one of the very few among Bacon's successors, who seem to have been fully aware of the justness, importance, and originality of the method pointed out in the Novum Organon for the study of the mind. "Ad bæc intelligenda, non est opus naturam mentis cognoscere, sed sufficit, mentis sive perceptionum historiolam concinnare modo illo quo VERULAMIUS docet." Spin. Epist. 42. In order to comprehend the whole merit of this remark, it is necessary to know that, according to the Cartesian phraseology, which is here adopted by Spinoza, the word perception is a general term, equally applicable to all the intellectual operations. The words of Des cartes himself are these: "Omnes modi cogitandi, quos in nobis experimur, ad duos generales referri possunt: quorum unus est, perceptio, sive operatio intellectus; alius verò, volitio, sive operatio voluntatis. Nam sentire, imaginari, et pure intelligere, sunt tantum diversi modi percipicndi; ut et cupere, aversari, affirmare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi modi olendi." Princ. Phil. Pars. L. § 32. Among the various topics started by Bacon for the consideration of future logicians, he did not overlook (what may be justly regarded, in a practical view, as the most interesting of all logical problems) the question concerning the mutual influence of thought and of language on each other. "Men believe," says he, "that their reaason governs their words; but, it often happens, that words have power enough to re-act upon reason." This aphorism may be considered as the text of by far the most valuable part of Locke's Essay, that which relates to the imperfections and abuse of words; but it was not till within the last twenty years, that its depth and importance were perceived in all their extent. I need scarcely say, that I allude to the excellent Memoirs of M. Prevost and of M. Degerando, on 66 Signs considered in their connection with the Intellectual Operations." The anticipations formed by Bacon, of that branch of modern logic which relates to Universal Grammar, do no less honour to his sagacity. "Grammar," he observes, is of two kinds, the one literary, the other philosophical. The former has for its object to trace the analogies running through the structure of a particular tongue, so as to facilitate its acquisition to a foreigner, or to enable him to speak it with correctness and purity. The latter directs the attention, not to the analogies which words bear to words, but to the analogies which words bear to things; or, as he afterwards ex"to lanplains himself more clearly, guage considered as the sensible portraiture or image of the mental pro cesses. In farther illustration of these hints, he takes notice of the lights which the different genius of + De Aug. Scient. Lib. vi. cap. 1. different languages reflect on the characters and habits of those by whom they were respectively spoken. "Thus," says he," it is easy to perceive, that the Greeks were addicted to the culture of the arts, the Romans engrossed with the conduct of affairs; inasmuch, as the technical distinctions introduced in the progress of refinement require the aid of compounded words; while the real business of life stands in no need of so artificial a phraseology."* Ideas of this sort have, in the course of a very few years, already become common, and almost tritical; but how different was the case two centuries ago! With these sound and enlarged views concerning the philosophy of the mind, it will not appear surprising to those who have attended to the slow and irregular advances of human reason, that Bacon should occasionally blend incidental remarks, savouring of the habits of thinking prevalent in his time. A curious example of this occurs in the same chapter which contains his excellent definition or description of universal grammar "This too," he observes, is worthy of notice, that the ancient languages were full of declensions, of cases, of conjugations, of tenses, and of other similar inflections; while the modern, almost entirely destitute of these, indolently accomplish the same purpose by the help of prepositions, and of auxiliary verbs. Whente," he continues, " may be inferred (however we may flatter ourselves with the idea of our own superiority), that the human intellect was much more acute and subtile in ancient, than it now is in modern times."+ How very unlike is this last reflection to the usual strain of Bacon's writings! It seems, indeed, much more congenial to the philosophy of Mr. Harris and of Lord Monboddo; and it has accordingly been sanctioned with the approbation of both these learned authors. If my memory does not deceive me, it is the only passage in Bacon's works, which Lord Monboddo has any where condescended to quote. These observations afford me a convenient opportunity for remarking the progress and diffusion of the philosophical spirit, since the beginning * De Aug. Scient. Lib. vi, cap. i. of the seventeenth century. In the short passage just cited from Bacon, there are involved no less than two capital errors, which are now almost universally ranked, by men of education, among the grossest prejudices of the multitude. The one, that the declensions and conjugations of the ancient languages, and the modern substitution in their place, of prepositions and auxiliary verbs, are, both of them, the deliberate and systematical contrivances of speculative grammarians; the other (still less analogous to Bacon's general style of reasoning), that the faculties of man have declined, as the world has grown older. Both of these errors may be now said to have disappeared entirely. The latter, more particularly, must, to the rising generation, seem so absurd, that it almost requires an apology to have mentioned it. That the capacities of the human mind have been in all ages the same; and that the diversity of phenomena exhibited by our species, is the result merely of the different circumstances in which men are placed, has been long received as an incontrovertible logical maxim; or rather, such is the influence of early instruction, that we are apt to regard it as one of the most obvious sug gestions of common sense. And yet, till about the time of Montesquieu, it was by no means so generally recognized by the learned, as to have a sensible influence on the fashionable tone of thinking over Europe. The application of this fundamental and leading idea to the natural or theoretical history of society in all its various aspects;-to the history of languages, of the arts, of the sciences, of laws, of government, of manners, and of religion,-is the peculiar glory of the latter half of the eighteenth century; and forms a characteristical feature in its philosophy, which even the imagination of Bacon was unable to foresee. It would be endless to particularize the original suggestions thrown out by Bacon on topics connected with the science of mind. The few passages of this sort already quoted, are produced merely as a specimen of the rest. They are by no means selected as the most important in his writings; but, as they happened to be those which had left the strongest impression on my memory, I thought them as likely Estimate of the Philosophical Character of Lord Bacon. as any other, to invite the curiosity of my readers to a careful examination of the rich mine from which they are extracted. The ethical disquisitions of Bacon are almost entirely of a practical nature. Of the two theoretical questions so much agitated, in both parts of this island, during the eighteenth century, concerning the principle and the object of moral approbation, he has said nothing; but he has opened some new and interesting views with respect to the influence of custom and the formation of habits ;-a most important article of moral philosophy, on which he has enlarged more ably and more usefully than any writer since Aristotle. Under the same head of Ethics may be mentioned the small volume to which he has given the title of Essays; the best known and the most popular of all his works. It is also one of those where the superiority of his genius appears to the greatest advantage; the novelty and depth of his reflections often receiving a strong relief from the triteness of his subject. It may be read from beginning to end in a few hours, and yet, after the twentieth perusal, one seldom fails to remark in it something overlooked before. This, indeed, is a characteristic of all Bacon's writings, and is only to be accounted for by the inexhaustible aliment they furnish to our own thoughts, and the sympathetic activity they impart to our torpid faculties. The suggestions of Bacon for the improvement of political philosophy, exhibit as strong a contrast to the narrow systems of contemporary states men, as the inductive logic to that of the schools. How profound and comprehensive are the views opened in the following passages, when compared with the scope of the celebrated treatise De Jure Belli et Pacis; a work which was first published about a year before Bacon's death, and which continued, for a hundred and fifty years afterwards, to be regarded in all the Protestant universities of Europe as an inexhaustible treasure of moral and jurisprudential wisdom! The ultimate object which legislators ought to have in view, and to which all their enactments and sanctions ought to be subservient, is, that De Aug. Scient. Lib. vii. cap. iii. 505 the citizens may live happily. For this purpose, it is necessary that they should receive a religious and pious education; that they should be trained to good morals; that they should be secured from foreign enemies by proper military arrangements; that they should be guarded by an effectual police against seditions and private injuries; that they should be loyal to government, and obedient to magistrates; and finally, that they should abound in wealth, and in other national resources.' -"The science of such matters certainly belongs more particularly to the province of men who, by habits of public business, have been led to take a comprehensive survey of the social order; of the interests of the community at large; of the rules of natural equity; of the manners of nations; of the different forms of government; and who are thus prepared to reason concerning the wisdom of laws, both from considerations of justice and of policy. The great desideratum, accordingly, is, by investigating the principles of natural justice, and those of political expediency, to exhibit a theoretical model of legislation, which, while it serves as a standard for estimating the comparative excellence of municipal codes, may suggest hints for their correction and improvement, to such as have at heart the welfare of mankind."† How precise the notion was that Bacon had formed of a philosophical system of jurisprudence (with which as a standard the municipal laws of different nations might be compared), appears from a remarkable expression, in which he mentions it as the proper business of those who might attempt to carry his plan into execution, to investigate those "LEGES LEGUM, Exemplum Tractatus de Fontibus Juris, Aphor. 5. This enumeration of the different objects of law approaches very nearly to Mr. Smith's ideas on the same subject, as expressed by himself in the concluding sentence of his Theory of Moral Sentiments. "In another dis- ex quibus informatio peti possit, quid in singulis legibus bene aut perperam positum aut constitutum sit."* I do not know if, in Bacon's prophetic anticipations of the future progress of physics, there be any thing more characteristical, both of the grandeur and of the justness of his conceptions, than this short definition; more particularly, when consider how widely Grotius, in a work professedly devoted to this very inquiry, was soon after to wander from the right path, vague in consequence of his wavering idea of the aim of his searches. we and re The sagacity, however, displayed in these and various other passages of a similar import, can by no means' be duly appreciated, without attending, at the same time, to the cautious and De Fontibus Juris, Aphor. 6. From the preface to a small tract of Bacon's, entitled The Elements of the Common Laws of England, (written while he was Solicitor-General to Queen Elizabeth), we learn, that the phrase legum leges had been previously used by civilian." To what civilian 'some great Bacon here alludes, I know not; but, whoever he was, I doubt much if he annexed to it the comprehensive and philosophical meaning, so precisely explained in the above definition. Bacon himself, when he wrote his Tract on the Common Laws, does not seem to have yet risen to this vantage-ground of universal jurisprudence. His great object (he tells us) was "to collect the rules and grounds dispersed throughout the body of the same laws, in order to see more profoundly into the reason of such judgments and ruled cases, and thereby to make more use of them for the decision of other cases more doubtful; so that the uncertainty of law, which is the principal and most just challenge that is made to the laws of our nation at this time, will, by this new strength laid to the foundation, be somewhat the more settled and corrected." In this passage, no reference whatever is made to the universal justice spoken of in the aphorisms de Fontibus Juris; but merely to the leading and governing rules which give to a municipal system whatever it possesses of analogy and consistency. To these rules Bacon gives the title of leges legum; but the meaning of the phrase, on, this occasion, differs from that in which he afterwards employed it, not less widely than the rules of Latin or of Greek syntax differ from the principles of univeral grammar. temperate maxims so frequently inculcated by the author, on the subject of political innovation. "A stubborn retention of customs is a turbulent thing, not less than the introduction of new."—" Time is the greatest innovator; shall we then not imitate time, which innovates so silently as to mock the sense?" Nearly connected with these aphorisms, are the profound reflections in the first book De Aug mentis Scientiarum, on the necessity of accommodating every new institution to the character and circumstances of the people for whom it is intended; the peculiar danger which literary men run of overlooking this consideration, from the familiar acquaintance they acquire, in the course of their early studies, with the ideas and sentiments of the ancient clasics. and on The remark of Bacon on the syste matical policy of Henry VII. was manifestly suggested by the same train His laws (whoso of thinking. marks them well) were deep and not vulgar; not made on the spur of a particular occasion for the present, but out of providence for the future; to make the estate of his people still more and more happy, after the manner of the legislators in ancient and heroic times." How far this noble eulogy was merited, either by the legislators of antiquity, or by the modern Prince on whom Bacon has bestowed it, is a question of little moment. I quote it merely on account of the important philosophical distinction which it indirectly marks, between "deep and vulgar laws;" the former invariably aiming to accomplish their end, not by giving any sudden shock to the feelings and interests of the existing generation, but by allowing to natural causes time and opportunity to operate; and by removing those artificial obstacle which check the progressive tenden cies of society. It is probable, that, on this occasion, Bacon had an eye more particularly to the memorable statute of alienation; to the effects of which (whatever were the motives of its author) the above description cer tainly applies in an eminent degree. After all, however, it must be ac knowledged, that it is rather in his general views and maxims, than in the details of his political theories, that Bacon's sagacity appears to ad vantage. His motions with respect to Estimate of the Philosophical Character of Lord Bacon. commercial policy seem to have been more peculiarly erroneous; originating in an overweening opinion of the efficacy of law, in matters where natural causes ought to be allowed a free operation. It is observed by Mr. Hume, that the statutes of Henry VII. relating to the police of his kingdom, are generally contrived with more judgment than his commercial regulations. The same writer adds, that "the more simple ideas of order and equity are sufficient to guide a legislator in every thing that regards the internal administration of justice; but that the principles of commerce are much more complicated, and require long experience and deep reflection to be well understood in any state. The real consequence is there often contrary to first appearances. No wonder, that, during the reign of Henry VII. these matters were frequently mistaken; and it may safely be affirmed, that, even in the age of Lord Bacon, very imperfect and erroneous ideas were formed on that subject." 66 The instances mentioned by Hume in confirmation of these general remarks, are peculiarly gratifying to those who have a pleasure in tracing the slow but certain progress of reason and liberality. During the reign," says he," of Henry VII. it was prohibited to export horses, as if that exportation did not encourage the breed, and make them more plentiful in the kingdom. Prices were also affixed to woollen cloths, to caps and hats, and the wages of labourers were regulated by law. IT IS EVIDENT, that these matters ought always to be left free, and be entrusted to the common course of business and commerce.”—“ For a like reason," the historian continues, "the law enacted against inclosures, and for the keeping up of farm-houses, scarcely deserves the praises bestowed on it by Lord Bacon. If husbandmen understand agriculture, and have a ready vent for their commodities, we need not dread a diminution of the people employed in the country. During a century and a half after this period, there was a frequent renewal of laws and edicts against depopulation; whence we may infer, that none of them were ever executed. The natural course of improvement at last provided a remedy." These acute and decisive strictures on the impolicy of some laws highly 507 applauded by Bacon, while they strongly illustrate the narrow and mistaken views in political economy entertained by the wisest statesmen and philosophers two centuries ago, afford, at the same time, a proof of the general diffusion which has since taken place among the people of Great Britain, of juster and more enlightened opinions on this important branch of legislation. Wherever such doctrines find their way into the page of history, it may be safely inferred, that the public mind is not indisposed to give them a welcome reception. The ideas of Bacon concerning the education of youth, were such as might be expected from a philosophical statesman. On the conduct of education in general, with a view to the developement and improvement of the intellectual character, he has suggested various useful hints in different parts of his works; but what I wish chiefly to remark at present is, the paramount importance which he has attached to the education of the people,-comparing (as he has repeatedly done) the effects of early culture on the understanding and the heart, to the abundant harvest which rewards the diligent husbandman for the toils of the spring. To this analogy he seems to have been particularly anxious to attract the attention of his readers, by bestowing on education the title of the georgics of the mind; identifying, by a happy and impressive metaphor, the two proudest functions entrusted to the legislator, the encouragement of agricultural industry, and the care of national instruction. In both instances, the legislator exerts a power which is literally productive or creative; compelling, in the one case, the unprofitable desert to pour forth its latent riches; and in the other, vivifying the dormant seeds of genius and virtue, and redeeming from the neglected wastes of human intellect, a new and unexpected accession to the common inheritance of man kind. When from such speculations as these we descend to the treatise De Jure Belli et Pacis, the contrast is mortifying indeed. And yet, so much better suited were the talents and accomplishments of Grotius to the taste, not only of his contemporaries, but of their remote descendants, that, while the merits of Bacon failed, for a |