out of the twenty-four at offices continually operated night and day, nor more than thirteen hours out of the twenty-four at oflices operated "only during the daytime," except in case of emergency, when four additional hours may be required on not more than three days in any week. No other provision of the law can be extended or modified by the Commission.

The power to extend under this proviso is extremely limited. This is evident from the plain import of the language above quoted, from the context to which it relates, and from the obvious purpose of the entire enactment. It seems clear to us that nothing more was intended than to authorize the Commission, in exceptional instances where conditions are unusual or unforseen, to enlarge somewhat the time allowed to prepare for compliance. Conditions which are common to many railroads or to a substantial percentage of telegraph stations are conditions which must have been taken into account when this law was passed and do not constitute "a particular case" for relief by the Commission.

We are therefore of the opinion that the petition filed by this company does not show "good cause" for extending the period within which it shall comply with the law at the several stations named, because it sets forth no exceptional or peculiar conditons which render observance impracticable at any of these stations, but merely alleges a state of facts tending to show that the law ought not to be there enforced on account of the small number of train orders and messages handled and the absence of any need or occasion for increasing the force of telegraphers. This is purely a question of legislative policy which was and must have been determined by the Congress adversely to the company, and the Commission has no right or authority to postpone the taking effect of the act merely because compliance with its provisions will involve inconvenience and financial hardship. The situation at the stations in question, as described in the petition, is in no sense unusual or of recent origin. It is a situation with which the Congress was well acquainted when the law was enacted, for it is practically identical with the situation which has existed for years at hundreds if not thousands of stations and has long been a matter of common knowledge. The act was passed with full understanding that conditions substantially the same as those here considered were so numerous in nearly every part of the country as to be characteristic of railway practice, and the law was evidently intended to apply at stations of this familiar type. To extend the time allowed for compliance at this class of stations, for extension in this case logically involves like extensions in all similar cases, would practically nullify the law during the period of postponement as to a large percentage of the employees for whose benefit

the law was enacted, and presumably deprive the traveling public meanwhile of the added safeguard against accident which the law was designed to secure. The purpose of this enactment and the intention to give it application to all employees who handle train orders, whether much or little of their time is occupied with that duty, are so clear and explicit as not to be open to question. It is equally clear that the authority of the Commission to grant an extension was intentionally limited to instances of special and unforeseen conditions. It was plainly not contemplated that conditions which are common and well known, which are so frequently found on every railway as to comprise a recognized class, should be regarded as a sufficient basis for administrative relief.

Moreover, in this case there is nothing to show nor is it even suggested that the petitioning company will be any better able to comply with the law three months or six months hence than it is at present. This would be equally true for the most part, we apprehend, on other roads and as to stations generally of the class in question. The real desire in such cases is not for temporary postponement, but for permanent exemption. Manifestly this was never intended and therefore the Commission should hold that good cause for extension is not shown because any financial burden which the law imposes may be somewhat harder to bear now than it will be at a later date. The year allowed for preparation by the act itself must have been deemed sufficient in all cases save those of an exceptional character, and any extension which might be properly granted in such cases should have some reasonable relation to the time fixed by the Congress for general compliance.

We perceive nothing in the facts here presented to justify or authorize a relieving order and the petition must therefore be denied.

131. C. C. Rep.

No. 1029.

JOHN H LEWIS, P. W. WATKINS, A. G. BARTON AND J. A. FESPERMAN

2.

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.

Submitted November 18, 1907. Decided February 10, 1908.

Complainants prayed for an order requiring defendant to reestablish facilities at Fanshawe, Okla., for the receipt and delivery of interstate traffic, and at the hearing defendant agreed to put in certain facilities satisfactory to complainants and it appearing that the public interest would be subserved by the fulfillment of this understanding, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

John H. Lewis for complainants.

M. L. Bell for defendant.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION.

CLEMENTS, Commissioner:

The complaint in this case was that the defendant had established a station at Fanshawe, Okla. (formerly Indian Territory), about 1892, which it maintained until 1901, when it was discontinued. Complainants claimed that this resulted in unjust discrimination. The prayer is that an order be made requiring the defendant to establish facilities at Fanshawe for the receipt and delivery of interstate traffic.

The answer of the defendant denies the jurisdiction of the Commission in the premises and also makes general denial of the allegations.

At the hearing much testimony was introduced tending to support the allegations of the complaint, and at the close the representatives of the defendant company stated that it was willing to build a spur track at Fanshawe for the receipt and delivery of freight, and to have stopped every day, upon signal by flag, one passenger train in each direction, and if in the future the business should justify it, a regular station, with an agent in charge, would be established.

Mr. Lewis, one of the complainants, and other citizens of Fanshawe present at the hearing stated that this arrangement would be entirely satisfactory to them at this time, and they were confident

that it would be to the residents of Fanshawe generally, and asked that the complaint be disposed of in accordance with this understanding.

The Commission has, since the hearing, been advised by complainants that defendant has complied with this understanding in respect to passenger facilities.

Since it appears that the public interest, so far as involved, will be subserved by the fulfillment of this understanding, and in the expectation that this will be accomplished by the defendant at an early date, the Commission will not review the facts or express an opinion upon the merits of the controversy, but an order will be entered dismissing the case without prejudice.

13 I. C. C. Rep.

No. 1425.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITIONS OF VARIOUS CARRIERS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO COMPLY WITH "AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE SAFETY OF EMPLOYEES AND TRAVELERS UPON RAILROADS BY LIMITING THE HOURS OF SERVICE OF EMPLOYEES THEREON."

Submitted February 29, 1908. Decided March 2, 1908.

Petitioners ask extension of time within which to comply with an act of Congress approved March 4, 1907, at a number of stations covered by the thirteen-hour provision and at nearly two-thirds, in the aggregate, of the stations on their lines to which the nine-hour provision relates, alleging in some cases inability to secure the additional force required and in most cases the financial hardship which compliance imposes. Held:

1. That to grant such wholesale orders of extension would in effect interfere with the policy of this legislation in its fundamental aspects and amount to an amendment of the law by the official body charged with its administration.

2. That to grant extension on account of financial distress would open the door to endless uncertainties, because there is no possible means of determining the degree of financial distress which would justify extension, and if mere financial hardship is good cause for postponing compliance, it was equally good cause for refusal to pass the law.

KNAPP, Chairman:

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION.

The brief time in which these petitions must be passed upon forbids any detailed statement of the facts relating to the several applications or any extended explanation of our views upon the questions presented.

In all 43 petitions are embraced in this report. Of these the earliest was filed on the 7th of February and only 10 were filed prior to February 18. Several were received while the hearings were in progress, during the last three days of the month, which was all the time that could be allowed for that purpose, and three were filed on