in any kind of manufacture or construction. U. S. v. Stores, 14 Fed Rep. 824. The court said: "The term 'timber,' as used in common, refers generally only to large sticks of wood, squared or capable of being squared for building houses or vessels; and certain trees only having been formerly used for such purposes, namely, the oak, the ash, and the elm, they alone were recognized as timber trees; but the numerous uses to which wood has come to be applied, and the general employment of all kinds of trees for some valuable purpose, have wrought a change in the general acceptation of terms in connection therewith, and we find that Webster defines 'timber' to be that sort of wood which is proper for buildings or for tools, utensils, furniture, carriages, fences, ships, and the like.' This would include all sorts of wood from which any useful articles may be made, or which may be used to advantage in any class of manufacture or construction. With so many peculiar significations, the intended meaning of the word usually depends upon the connection in which it is used or the character of the party making use of it, as for instance, a ship-carpenter would understand something quite different when he made use of it from what a cabinet-maker, a last-maker, or a carriage-builder would, and the question is therefore not what is the popular meaning as understood by any one class, but its meaning as used in the statute, and how the legislators have employed it; and this must be its most general and least-restricted sense, including in such signification what each and all classes would under such circumstances understand 'timber' to be. The language of the section under which this indictment was found mentions particularly live-oak and red-cedar trees, and then speaks of other timber, showing conclusively that it was not the intention of Congress to confine the protection intended to any particular class or kind of trees, but to apply it in its most general sense."

CONCEALMENT. - Under a statute against carrying concealed weapons, which declares that having the weapon upon the person is prima facie evidence of concealment, there can be no conviction of a merchant who buys a pistol merely as a sample, and carries it in his pocket from the store where he buys it to another near by to have it packed with other goods. State v. Gilbert, 87 N. C. 527.

SUBVERT. This does not mean corrupt." Chesley v. King, 74 Me. The charge was "Subverting" the water of a spring. The court said: "We do not think these allegations give the defendant any notice that he would be called upon to answer any charge of corrupting the water in the spring. Subvert' has no such natural signification as applied to material objects like a vein or stream of water, however it may be as to the minds of the hearers' spoken of in 2 Tim. 2, 14, by which Web. ster illustrates the definition on which the plaintiff's counsel relies." Webster gives "to corrupt the mind," as a secondary definition, and the apostle speaks of "the subverting of the hearers."

MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE.-Intoxication is not

“misfeasance in office." Commonwealth v. Williams, 79 Ky. 42. The court held: "Bouvier defines misfeasance to be the performance of an act, which might be lawfully done, in an improper manner, by which another person receives an injury; and misfeasance in office would therefore seem to be the im proper doing of an official act. The second Constitution of this State provided that clerks should be removed from office by the Court of Appeals 'for breach of good behavior.' In proceedings under that provision, this court held that the inquiry must be confined to misconduct in office, and that conduct however immoral, which did not relate to the official action of the clerk, constituted no ground for his removal. Commonwealth v. Barry, Hardin, 238; Commonwealth v. Chambers, 1 J. J. Marsh. 160. In the latter case the court said it was 'proper to separate the character of the man from the character of the office,' and that it has 'no power to remove a clerk for crimes committed so long as he discharged the duties of his office well.' In this case no complaint is made that the appellee did not faithfully, honestly and correctly discharge all his duties as an officer. There was therefore no misconduct as an officer on his part, however reprehensible his conduct as an individual may have been. It is only for misconduct in connection with his official duties that the Constitution authorizes him to be removed from office upon an indictment, and as the only misconduct charged was individual and personal, and not official in its character, the judgment must be affirmed."

*

GOOD HEALTH. -In Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 28, Hun, it is said: "Neither was there any misdirection as to what was 'good health.' The judge said he was bound to know the truth of his statements, there is no question about that; * * of course, if the brother was in fact sick at the time-was in fact out of health at the time, and was suffering in the manner you claim, the simple fact that this party may not have known it would not excuse him from the effect of that statement. What I meant to say to the jury was, that if from all the appearances of the brother he was in good health, in fact in good health, so that everybody would so pronounce him, and there was nothing to indicate to any person that he was not in good health, then the fact that he might have had some latent, some hidden disease, which had not exhibited itself, and which might subsequently develop itself, would not necessarily render that an untruthful answer to that question, viz., the statement that his health was generally good.' We see no error in this charge. A latent and undeveloped germ of disease probably exists in every mortal body, and if a person answers that his present health is good, the answer is not untrue because in his system there is a seed of disease already sown, and subsequently to germinate. This is all the judge charged, and it was not erroneous. 99 So, in Peacock v. New York Life Ins. Co., 20 N. Y. 293, it is said: "The word 'health,' as ordinarily used, is a relative term. It has reference to the condition of the body. Thus

it is frequently characterized as good, as perfect, as indifferent, and as bad. The epithet 'good' is comparative. It does not require absolute perfection. When therefore one is described as being in good health, that does not necessarily nor ordinarily mean that he is absolutely free from all and every ill which 'flesh is heir to.' If the phrase should be so interpreted as to require entire exemption from physical ills, the number to whom it would be strictly applicable would be very inconsiderable. In applying terms somewhat indefinite, reference should be had to the business to which they relate. This rule is very necessary in construing a language which like ours is defective in precision. The most important question on applications for life insurance is whether the proponent is exempt from dangerous disease, which frequently terminates fatally. It is not usually deemed an objection that one has some slight physical disturbance of which in all human probability he will soon be relieved, although it might possibly lead to a fatal disease. A slight difficulty, such as the sting of a bee, the puncture of a thorn, a boil, or a common cold has sometimes induced complaints which have shortened human life; but this result is so infrequent and improbable that the mere possibility is disregarded in the business of life insurance.

WILL STEAL. Charging that one "will steal" is not equivalent to charging that he has stolen. Bays v. Hunt, Iowa Supreme Court, Dec. 1882.

QUICK DESPATCH. These words in a charter partly mean that the consignee is to take the cargo as rapidly as the vessel can deliver it. Stone v. Woodruff, 28 Hun, citing Terjeson v. Carter, 9 Daly, 193; Sleeper v. Puig, 17 Blatch. 36; Clarke v. Crabtree, 2 Curt. C. C. 87.

POOR PERSON. An insane, starving and shelterless wife, absent from her husband, is a poor person," although her husband is able to support her. Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513.

ROAD. In a deed in fee, a reservation of a "road ten feet wide along the line of C. D., to be shut at each end by a bar or gate," carries only a right of way, and not the fee to the strip of land. Kister v. Reeser, 98 Penn. St. 1. The court said: "The word road has never been defined to mean land."

HOLLAND'S

THE

HE analysis of the primary or fundamental conceptions of jurisprudence, begun in England, of the seventeenth century by Hobbes, has received its latest, and perhaps its best addition in Professor Holland's work, the second edition of which has recently issued from the Oxford press.

Before indicating the leading features of Professor Holland's contribution to the jurisprudential branch of social science, it may be not altogether inopportune to recall the brief history of the analytical method of jurisprudence in England. It has been often stated that Hobbes was the pioneer in this method of investigating jurisprudence; but Mr. Frederick Harrison attributes to Jean Bodin that Bodin whose con

tributions to the philosophy of government and legislation Sir William Hamilton classed with those of Aristotle and Montesquieu - much which we are accustomed to refer to the philosopher of Malmsburie. But without following further the discussion concerning the precise origin of the analytical method in England and elsewhere a discussion reaching in all probability far back of assigned boundaries we may briefly notice the more famous analysis of John Austin. This distinguished jurist has been well said to be the first writer who detached the elements of jurisprudence from the political philosophy of Hobbes and the utilitarian and ethical speculations of Bentham. It may be said also that it is to Austin, and not to the German development of legal and philosophic thought that Englishmen of this generation owe their marked comprehension of legal analytics.

The main effort of Austin's teaching, at least in its more obvious and practical aspect, was directed to making clearer the realm of law. Positive law, or the jurist's law, with Austin rested exclusively on the command of a political sovereign, and the limitations of sovereignty, the basis of his theory, fill, therefore, the important, perhaps the too important place in his system. Disregarding Austin's digression from his proper theme when he discoursed on the theory of utility as the basis of moral truth, or as the index of the Divine law when unrevealed, the great merit of his teachings is that they prevent, though by a fatiguing process of reiteration, our failing to perceive the line of demarcation between positive law and a rule of morality, between positive laws and laws metaphorical or the unvarying order discernible in the material universe.

The various elements of the Austinian analysis of sovereignty and law have been most briefly stated by Mr. Harrison, as follows: "The source of all positive law is that definite sovereign authority which exists in every independent political community, and therein exercises de facto the supreme power, being itself unlimited, as a matter of fact by any limits of positive law." "Law is a command relating to the general conduct of the subject, to which command such sovereign authority has given legal obligation by annexing a sanction, or penalty in case of neglect." It is unnecessary to remind the reader that these elements of law, as Sir Henry Maine has shown us apply more particularly to modern political societies and with less force, if at all, to archaic and primitive political societies. In so far as the Austinian analysis fails to be universally true, just in so far it fails to respond to all the requirements of legal science. Yet it is not in any sense worthless; the imperfection simply denotes that the analysis is of particular application. Sir Henry Maine has in this connection pointed out that the procedure of the analytical jurists is closely analagous to that followed in mathematics or political economy. It is strictly philosophical, but the practical value of all sciences founded on abstraction depends on the relative importance of the elements rejected and the elements retained in the process of abstraction." The critics of Austin forgetting the last fact are often tempted to forget also the true value of Austin's incomplete or partial analysis.

But however Austin may have come to be regarded in England, in this country he is still revered as the real founder of the analytical method in jurisprudence. The vigorous school of jurisprudence, which is at present flourishing in England, owes its greatest debt, its debt of originality to John Austin. In this estimate of the value of Austin's work, the fact that he himself owed much to the suggestive genius of Bentham is not over-looked. The extreme indifference with which Englishmen at first greeted Austin's

lectures was doubtless due in part to Austin's own indifference to the prejudices of his hearers, idola theatri, only to be removed by deferent appeals to their higher intelligence. His obvious contempt for Blackstone was felt intuitively to be unjust. Whatever defect Blackstone's treatise had, its superior literary merit, its success in reducing the technicalities of an ancient and complicated system to the level of popular comprehension, had justly earned for it a distinguished place in public opinion; that Blackstone failed in the analysis of the leading elements of jurisprudence which precedes his treatise and in his classification, would soon have been conceded to Austin had it not been for his mis-conception of Blackstone's true greatness and his forgetfulness of the fact that Blackstone wrote for laymen and not for jurisprudents. Of late years Austin's writings seem to have gained for him what he himself lost by his intolerance; it may be said now,indeed, that he has a firmer hold upon the intellectual life of English jurists than he has ever had before.

Posi

is

Professor Holland, in his treatment of the elements of jurisprudence, pursues strictly, as did Austin, the analytical method. This method of investigating jurisprudence is forcibly contrasted with the other methods in which jurisprudence is taught by a familiar English writer, Mr. Frederick Pollock, (now professor of Corpus Christi), in the last November number of the London Law Magazine and Review. Mr. Pollock divides jurisprudence into positive jurisprudence, final jurisprudence and international jurisprudence. By positive jurisprudence he means, as Hobbes meant, the laws of a given country. tive jurisprudence he classifies as (a.) practical; (b.) historical; (c.) comparative; (d.) analytical. It apparent that Mr. Pollock means by this that jurisprudence is susceptible of being investigated in four modes, or by practical application, by the historical processes, by comparison with known systems and by analysis. He can mean nothing else, for as the basis of a classification of law, the divisions mentioned would be erroneous. In the sense indicated here, the practical and historical methods may be roughly stated as synthetical and the other two methods as analytical modes of investigating the phenomena of jurisprudence, this brief indication will serve to display the method pursued by Professor Holland in its proper relation to the historical, practical and comparative methods in jurisprudence.

It may be doubted whether the epoch has yet arrived when a perfect analysis of jurisprudence may be made; the analytical method of investigating any science depends for its success so largely on the degree of perfection which the descriptive and comparative methods have præ-attained in that science. An example of what is meant may be perceived from Sir Henry Maine's criticism of Austin's definition of law, now recognized to be a most just criticism, namely, that it fails to take into consideration the political and social condition observable in archaic and primitive polital societies. Sir Henry Maine arrived at this conclusion only after profound investigations of the sociological conditions of primitive communities. Still wider investigations of the same kind, aided by the always progressive modern scholarship, may possibly demonstrate that no such analysis can be perfect until the laws of all countries and ages have been systematically tabulated in some such way as Leibnitz proposed for his theatrum legale.

Meanwhile Professor Holland's “Elements'of Jurisprudence" very accurately sums up the current learning of the analytic method. This author has superior qualifications for the work he has undertaken; he is an eminent civilian, profoundly versed in the literature relating to that, which in obedience to the suggestions

of Bentham is now known as international law, and will react in the graver works of the common law. It can hardly be questioned that the common law and the Roman law are the root systems of all civilized nations. It is not strange therefore that the greatest analysis of the elements of law yet made should have been made by an English civilian, and published at Oxford, so long the seat of an active protest against the exclusive claims of the common law.

Jurisprudence with Professor Holland is the formal science of positive law, that is, it is a formal science as opposed to a material science. In his own attractive language "it is not a science of legal relations a priori, but is abstracted a posteriori, from such relations as have been clothed with a legal character in actual systems, that is to say from law which has actually been imposed or positive law." Professor Holland criticises Austin's division of jurisprudence into general jurisprudence and particular jurisprudence, and not without reason: there is but one science of jurisprudence which is inclusive of all systems of law. And yet we cannot but think that the common use 'of the term "jurisprudence" with a limiting or denotative word prefixed, is often a harmless violation of strict propriety, otherwise Story's "Equity Jurisprudence" and even Austin's "Particular Jurisprudence," in the sense of the laws of a given country, are equally erroneous with "Medical Jurisprudence" which must be conceded to be indefensible. From Mr. Pollock's late adherence to the older and commoner usage it seems doubtful whether Professor Holland's suggestion has taken deep root even among jurists of the Oxford school. In so far as Professor Holland's restricted employment of the word jurisprudence' assists the work of more accurately defining the province of the science of positive law, it is important to follow the distinction he observes, for there is a manifest tendency, discernible in the expository writings of all legal systems, to enlarge the sphere of positive law by the inclusion of purely ethical and psychological problems. Professor Holland's effort is to prevent this confusion.

Positive law, Professor Holland defines, as those "general rules of external human action enforced by a sovereign political authority." This definition does not seem to differ widely from that of Austin's, but it is much more compact, yet more comprehensive, for it includes those laws which are not strictly commands, and excludes all rules of purely moral influence. But latitudinarian as this definition is, it fails, as has been elsewhere noticed, to provide for a condition sometimes visible in political societies when the sovereign authority is for the time being unable to enforce these rules of external human action. For example, this definition does not provide for such a case as was visible in the Southern States of this country when during the late internal war, the federal authority was temporarily prevented from enforcing what were nevertheless the laws of that part of this land. The definition in question is however as excellent a nominal definition as any yet advanced.

In

and

From the definitions Professor Holland proceeds to the species and sub-species of his summum genus. the chapter on the sources of law, positive laws are divided according to their source or origin into (1) customary laws, (2) laws ex religione, (3) laws pronounced by the courts, which last appear to be the equivalents of Bentham's judge-made-law Austin's laws introduced and obtaining obliquely, (4) laws derived from scientific discussions, jus prudentibus compositum, (5) laws derived from the prætors or chancellors, and called equity, and (6) Iaws imposed by legislation proper; i. e., by statutes and by rules of courts. Custom or usage as a source of law compels the author to notice the endless discussion concerning the time at which and the mode by which customs

become law. Professor Holland does not agree with Austin that custom is never to be regarded as law, and that it becomes such only by virtue of the indirect legislation of courts of judicature. On the contrary, Professor Holland thinks that custom itself evolves a rule which responds to his definition of law antecedently to any adjudication confirming it; and that its efficiency is not necessarily dependent on the judicatories whose function it is to pronounce the validity of the custom only when impeached, just as it is to pronounce the validity of an act of a parliamentary body only when questioned. The entire chapter on the sources of law, and particularly that part relating to customs, is of a high order, terse, suggestive and comprehensive. The brief limits of the discussion do not, however, permit that exhaustive treatment of the subject which may be necessary to convince those who are wedded to the Austinian conception of custom, while those who prefer the German ideas of the intrinsic force of custom may find little which is entirely new.

Having defined the province of jurisprudence and analyzed its constituent, law, Professor Holland proceeds to the consideration of that which it is the object of jurisprudence to conserve, namely, legal rights. Substantive law and adjective law taken together comprise all those rights which the law regards. By taking rights as the pivotal point of jurisprudence one definite limitation of the subject matter of legal science is better attained. The difficulty with this view is that it has been hitherto supposed to exclude the consideration of certain absolute duties which were thought to have no corresponding rights. Professor Holland elaborates his own arrangement with great skill, correlating the absolute duties with rights of the State as a determinate person. The ele ments of a legal right according to the author's analysis are; (1) a person in whom the rights reside; (2) in many cases the object over which the right is exercised; (3) the acts or forbearances which the person in whom the right resides is entitled to exact; (4) a person whose duty it is to act or forbear for the benefit of the subject of the right. The person entitled, Professor Holland calls "the person of inherence" and the person obliged, "the person of incidence." Though there has been some disposition to quarrel with this eccentricity it seems a happy figure of speech, enabling the desired points of difference to be easily borne in mind. These elements enumerated are said to be "the permanent phenomena of a legal right; its statical elements." When the right is set in motion phenomena of a new kind intervene, and are called generally facts. It is impossible for want of space, to follow the author's analysis of "person,' "" 66 thing," "fact," ," "event" and "act," although they are important elements of a right in motion.

Passing on to that part of Professor Holland's work which treats of the classification of right, we come to a subject of immense interest to those who are engaged in the present controversy, relating to the codification of the laws of the States. Classification in one sense is but another name for codification, both schemes having reference to the proper arrangement of any body of positive laws. It has been said, in the highest quarters, that the analytic groupings and divisions are inapplicable to the concrete purposes of technical law, and that any re-arrangement of the common law must, in order to prove successful, be not far removed from these concrete purposes of technical law. Without attempting to refute the truth of this doctrine which is irrefutable in one way, as no existing code, or known corpus juris, is arranged on a purely scientific basis, we can only point out, what is obvious, that any attempt to discuss with intelligence the subject of codification should follow and not precede the

mastery of those known systems of classification, proposed by such demonstrators of jurisprudence as Savigny, Austin, Kant, Mill and Holland, for a discussion of codification without the appropriate knowledge which belongs to that subject, is purely empirical, if not altogether worthless.

Professor Holland signifies his preference for that classification which has been greatly preferred by Roman jurists, but which is ignored by Blackstone, strange to say, with Austin's approval - a classification based upon the public or private character of the persons concerned. Blackstone's division of the subject matter of law into Rights and Wrongs is entirely ignored by Professor Holland, and with reason, as this division is generally conceded to be defective and trivial, although it has lately found an intelligent apologist in Professor Hammond of the Iowa State University (Intd. to 1st American edition of Sander's Justinian). The other possible divisions or modes of classifying rights, Professor Holland makes dependent (a) upon the normal or abnormal status of the persons concerned, (b) upon the limited or unlimited extent of the person of incidence, (c) upon the act being due for its own sake, or being due merely in default of another act. But possible systems of classification are endless, and the author's conservative preference for the safer and most trodden way shows that he has no desire to indulge in those fanciful novelties which are often mistaken for displays of originality and even genius. To the main divisions of law into public and private, Professor Holland adds, as an apparently distinctive third class, international law. While the connection of this last department of laws with the departments or divisions, public and private, is neither very close nor very obvious, yet it enables the author to embrace, in the exposition of his theme, those rules, which on account of their striking analogies to the positive laws of a State, have come to be regarded by lawyers as a part of the science of jurisprudence in its more extended arrangement.

The commentary on the rights which go to make up the department of private law is most masterly and fairly represents, in outline, all the learning on the several subjects discussed. Normal antecedent rights in rem, or those rights sometimes called primordial or absolute rights, which exist in favor of the ordinary type of person against all the world, irrespective of any breach of duty calling such rights into being,— are divided into six classes, rights to personal safety, and freedom, to the society and control of the family, to reputation, to the advantages of trade and the like, as well as to the complete legal environments of people in a like social and political condition, to possession of property, and to immunity from damage by fraud. The first four classes of rights in rem relate to no tangible external object. Proprietary rights, ou the contrary, are extensions of the power of a person over portions of the physical world. The precise foundation on which rights arising from mere possession rest, has long been one of the favorite points of juristic controversy. Some persons deny that mere possession confers a right in re upon the possessor; others, including Professor Holland, class possession as a right in re. The elements of this right, corpus and animus, are briefly, yet fully considered. The great modern authorities on possession, such as Savigny, Alciatus, Halm, Gans, Thibaut, Von Vangerow, and we may now include Judge O. W. Holmes, Jr., are far from being at one concerning the precise place which possession should occupy in jurisprudence. It is evident that Professor Holland has considered all the high authorities on this abstruse subject, though not all of them are cited by him.

After possession, that aggregation of rights which constitutes what we commonly term ownership, is

analyzed and considered. Ownership is said to be exercised in its primary, and fullest sense over physical subjects only, but in a secondary sense, ownership is exercised over a certain collection of rights, such as patents confer on their owner, and which it is convenient to treat on the analogy of physical objects. The discussion of jura in re aliena is next in order, and is so unusually lucid in its exposition of first principles, that its closer study might have been of benefit to the late controversy with us, regarding those provisions of the proposed Civil Code of New York which relate to easements. The principles which underlie jura in re aliena are applicable to all systems of law; thus the "fiducia" of the Roman law, the Scotch wadsett, and the primitive mortgage of the English law are but the same modification of property.

The last class of antecedent rights in rem, the right to immunity from damage by fraud, seems hardly entitled to be regarded as co-ordinate with the other classes, enumerated by the author. It would appear to be a subordinate species, properly included in the right to possession and property. It would have been more satisfactory had Professor Holland mentioned more fully the reasons why he elevates the right to immunity from fraud, above the right to immunity from any other invasion of the rights of property.

After completing the enumeration of antecedent rights in rem, Professor Holland takes up antecedent rights in personam for both rights in rem and rights in personam are subordinated to the division of rights into antecedent and remedial. Antecedent rights in personam are divided, according to the facts to which they owe their origin, into ex contractu and ex lege. Rights ex lege are such as exist in favour of a person in a domestic relation, or in favor of a cestui que trust, or of a salvor, or of a citizen against a public official, or of a traveller against an inn-keeper. All these rights are regulated by law as contradistinguished from contract. The rights of the marital relation are properly included among rights arising by operation of law, for all the incidents of marriage are attached by uniform rules of law, and do not depend on the agreement of the parties.

The author's treatment of the more extended rights in personam arising ex contractu, is entitled to be regarded as an example of the higher order of expository writings. A casual reference to the loose expression, so common with us, which treats the contract, itself, rather than the rights under it, as assignable, is made the occasion of a brief plea for a more accurate terminology. The analysis of the leading elements of contract is most excellent, and in the preparation of a brief, its complete indications must often point the way to the subordinate principle most wanted. In another aspect the chapter on contractual rights in personam is entitled to the consideration of those who are interested in codification of the entire body of the law. Most of the existing codes make no attempt to arrange the various departments of the law of contract in any scientific order. In this last particular the proposed Civil Code of New York is an improvement on the French Code, which is very confused. Professor Holland pursues the following plan: Contracts are either principal or accessory. Principal contracts are: I. Alienation; II. Permissive use; III. Marriage; IV. Service; V. Negative service; VI. Aleatory Gain. Accessory contracts, or those which are entered into for the better carrying out of principal contracts, are: I. Suretyship; II. Indemnity; III. Pledge; IV. Warranty; V. Ratification; VI. Account stated; VII. For further assurance. It is doubtful whether a better arrangement can be proposed, although some persons may prefer that marriage should be placed in that portion of the code which is concerned with status.

In the chapter relating to the remedial rights of

private law, several modes of classification of the wrongful acts which give rise to remedial rights are given. It will be remembered that remedial rights are those rights which arise when antecedent rights are invaded. They are those rights which we have been accustomed to term sanctioning rights, or the rights which arise by reason of a violation of the absolute rights. Professor Holland here inclines to that classification which is based on the nature of the right invaded, rather than according to the state of the will of the wrong-doer. The classification thus preferred has the advantage of being the least abstruse and therefore the nearest to the practical wants of administrative law.

The law regulating the rights attached to a status, Professor Holland terms "abnormal law." The normal juristic person is of the leading type; the abnornal juristic person is the deviation from the leading type. It must be obvious that a code can not be constructed without more or less reference to abnormal persons, for even a code based solely on a classification of rights must embody rights peculiar to the abnormal personality only. In several systems of classification status occupies a more prominent place than it occupies in that devised by the author. The main question in regard to the law attached to abnormal persons, or the law relating to the rights inhering in abnormal persons arises in connection with codification. In codification, how is the divisive principle to be applied. Should the law relating to the rights of abnormal persons stand wholly apart from the law relating to the rights of normal persons, or should both be subordinated to a scheme of rights. More or less dislocation is inevitable in any arrangement, and the best plan doubtless, is to separate absolutely, as the author has done, the abnormal law from the normal law.

Very little space is occupied by the chapter on adjective law, although the extent which this department of law embraces is sufficiently pointed out. It corresponds roughly with the law of procedure, most of which, excepting the rules of evidence, is now codified in this State.

Public law is not arranged in accordance with the classification adopted in private law. This department of a corpus juris, Profesor Holland would divide into constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law, adjective criminal law, law of the State as a juristic person, and the law of procedure. It is beyond the scope of the treatise, as the author intimates, to apply the analytic process to the minute subdivision of public law. It is therefore unnecessary to notice this chapter at length.

The brief chapter on international law, which is picturesquely termed the "vanishing point of jurisprudence," is necessarily an incomplete review of so vast a field. But this chapter is rich in definition and in suggestions. It would have been instructive to have had the opinions of the learned editor of Albericus Gentilis upon the relations of the jus gentium and the jus naturæ to modern international law. The source of international law is so uncertain that the views of so profound a jurisprudent as Professor Holland must have been instructive. To be sure, Professor Holland briefly intimates his conclusions, which to some extent reveal his opinions on the point in question, but it would have been satisfactory to have had a more definitive basis for the analogies which are presented in this chapter. The empirical treatment of international law is never wholly satisfactory, though sometimes useful, just as Blackstone's statement of substantive law is useful without regard to the imperfect conceptions, which that author indulged in when he wrote of the law of nature and the rights of things. It is somewhat vague to say that international law is "the vanishing point of jurisprudence,'