attorney, authorizing the agent to sign the principal's name to any paper or papers, notes, etc., does not justify the signing of such documents for purposes outside of the principal's business. Gulick v. Grover, 4 Vroom, 463; Stainer v. Tyson, 3 Hill, 279. The holder of a note, signed by the agent, under such a power, with the principal's name, for the purpose of raising money for the agent's own use, must show that he is a bona fide holder, for value, before maturity, in order to recover against the principal. North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill, 262; Duncan v. Gilbert, 5 Dutch. 521; Hamilton v. Vought, 5 Vroom, 187; Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass. 494. Camden Safe Deposit Co. v. Abbott. Opinion by Dixon, J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IMPAIRING CONTRACTUNENFORCEABLE CONTRACT.- The obligation of a contract which, when made, was unenforceable by reason of some irregularity, but which has been validated by reason of a subsequent law, is protected by the Constitution to the same extent as if the contract had been strictly legal at first. The obligation of such a contract includes the remedies which would have been available for its enforcement if it had been valid when made, or such other remedies as may have been lawfully substituted therefor. Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203; Baldwin v. Flagg, 14 Vroom, 495; Munday v. Rahway, 14 id. 338. State ex rel. Rader v. Township of Union. Opinion by Dixon, J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TITLE TO ACT OF LEGISLATURE.- Under a constitutional provision that "every law shall embrace but one object and that shall be expressed in the title, it is not necessary that the title of a charter of a railroad company, which charter contains a clause limiting the time for bringing suits against it, should refer to such provision. Vail v. Easton & Amboy Railroad Co. Opinion by Beasley, C. J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION — LIMIT OF POWER OF ORDINANCE FORBIDDING BILLIARD PLAYING GAMING.-The power of a municipal corporation to pass a by-law or an ordinance which establishes a rule interfering with the rights of individuals or the public, must emanate from the creating body, and clear authority must be found for it in the legislative enactment under which the corporation exercises its functions of government. Carron v. Martin, 2 Dutch. 594; Taylor v. Griswold, 2 Green, 22; Dillon, Mun. Corp., § 251. A provision in the town charter that the common council may pass and enforce ordinances and by-laws for the suppression of gambling houses, and such other by-laws and ordinances for the peace and good order of the town as they may deem expedient, not repugnant to the Constitution or laws of this State or of the United States, does not warrant the passage of an ordinance forbidding the keeping of a billiard table for hire. The general words of the statute are used in their ordinary acceptation, and authorize any such local legislation as will prevent disorder or disturbance, or breach of the peace. It having been decided in this court (State v. Hall, 3 Vroom, 158), that the practice permitted by the keeper of a ten-pin alley that the loser should pay for the use of the alley, did not subject his house to indictment as a common gaming house, the keeping of a billiard table in the same manner must be regarded as a lawful businesss which cannot be outlawed by the common council under the authority given them by the Legislature. In a recent Indiana case (Hamilton v. State, 75 id. 586), it was held that playing for the use of the table constituted gaming within the meaning of the statute forbidding any one to keep a house to be used for gaming. The New Jersey case is cited and a distinction drawn between the indictment of a house as a public nuisance

and an indictment for gaming under the statute. The distinction is a narrow one, although the following cases furnish some support for it: State v. Records, 4 Harr. 554; Ward v. State, 17 Ohio St. 32; State v. Leighton, 3 Foster, 167; Mount v. State, 7 Ind. 654; Crawford v. State, 33 id. 304; Walker v. State, 2 Swan, 287. State of New Jersey v. Treasurer of Belvidere. Opinion by Van Syckel, J.

SHERIFF DUTY AS TO SECURITIES TAKEN IN THE EXECUTION OF PROCESS-RELEASE.— Where property levied on by an officer by virtue of an execution has been taken from his custody by a writ of replevin, the replevin bond is substituted in the place of the levy; and if the officer deprives the plaintiff in the execution of the advantages to be derived from the bond by surrendering it or canceling a judgment recovered on it, an action will lie against him for a breach of duty in not making the money under his process. Securities taken by officers in the execution process are regarded as securities held by them in trust for parties whom they represent in an official capacity; and courts of law will extend a liberal protection over the rights of parties equitably interested, against the acts of mere nomina parties. Shann v. Jones, 4 C. E. Green, 251; Keogh v. Delaney, 11 Vroom, 97. But the court will not set aside a release given by the party on the record, unless the person beneficially interested owns the entire interest in the suit, or the party releasing is insolvent. See Payne v. Rogers, 1 Doug. 407; Manning v. Cox, 7 J. B. Moore, 617; Hickey v. Burt, 7 Taunt. 48; Phillips v. Claggett, 11 M. & W. 84; Rankine v. Gandell, 15 id. 304; Wright v. Burroughs, 3 C. P. 344. Harrison v. Maxwell. Opinion by Depue, J.

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EXTRA COSTS IN SUITS AGAINST RAILROAD COMPANIES FOR ANIMALS KILLED.

A statute giving an allowance of extra costs against a railroad company in actions for the value of domestic animals killed upon its road which it has neglected to fence, held, not to be unconstitutional on the ground that it was discriminating and partial legislation, and denied to the railroad company the equal protection of the laws. The allowance and regulation by the statute of costs in any particular class of actions is a matter properly within the reasonable discretion of the Legislature. At the common law no costs were allowed eo nomine, but in actions where the plaintiff recovered damages, the jury were allowed to include his expenses, though the defendant, in case he prevailed, had no indemnity for his. Bouv. Law Dict. tit. 'Costs; " " 3 Bl. Com. 399. At an early day the matter became a subject of legislative enactment. The chief purpose of the allowance of costs is compensation or indemnity for expenses incurred in enforcing a legal, or resisting an illegal claim, though in some cases the legislature is also influenced by considerations of public policy. The right of the legislature to regulate the practice and proceedings of suitors in the tribunals of the State, including such reasonable regulations as to the adjustment of costs and expenses between the parties as may best promote the ends of justice and the public good, has been too long exercised and established to be questioned. The principle that governs the allowance of costs does not require that they should be uniform in all actions, nor the same to each of the litigants in an action; and so double or extra costs are sometimes allowed to the plaintiffs or defendants as the case may be, because deemed proper from the nature and circumstances of certain species of litigation; in England, for example, in favor of public officers and in favor of the defendants in certain

actions of ejectment. 2 Tidd, Prac. 988. So in New York double costs are allowed in actions against public officers, and in the case of officers of the militia treble costs. 3 Wait Pr. 490. The object is the protection of the officer against harassing suits and compensation for his expenses. McFarland v. Crary, 6 Wend. 302. And by section 308 of the New York Code a special additional allowance is made to plaintiffs (only) in actions to foreclose mortgages, or in which an attachment has been issued, etc. Of the propriety and justice of such enactments within reasonable limits the legislature must judge. The grants of railway franchises in this State are wholly to corporations, either by special charters or under the general law. It is not questioned that such corporations own and manage all the railroads of the State. There is therefore no unlawful discrimination against them. "If," says Mr. Cooley, "the laws be otherwise unobjectionable, all that can be required in these cases is that they be general in their application to that class or locality to which they apply; and they are then public in character, and of their propriety and policy the Legislature must judge.' Const. Lim. (3d ed.) 390; Jones v. Railroad Co., 16 Iowa, 9, 10; Tredway v. Railway Co., 43 id. 528; Cairo & St. Louis R. Co. v. Warrington, 92 Ill. 162. Johnson v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. Opinion by Vanderburgh, J.

[Decided Oct. 12, 1882.]

NEGLIGENCE -IN KINDLING FIKE ON ONE'S OWN LAND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TITLE TO DESTROYED PROPERTY-CROPS RAISED AND GATHERED BY TRESPASSER.- (1) The servants of a railroad company negligently kindled and guarded a fire on the company's own land, whereby plaintiff's property near by was fired and destroyed. Held, that plaintiff could not be charged with contributory negligence in not foreseeing and guarding against the negligence of the company. (2) The property was in plaintiff's possession. A part of it consisted of hay cut by plaintiff on land upon which he was a trespasser, and a part of it of wheat and oats which he had raised, cultivated and gathered on land upon which he was a trespasser. Held, that he could not recover from the company for the loss of the hay, but could for that of the wheat and oats. As to the hay, it is clear he was not the owner and could not recover; for all the cases hold that product of the soil which comes by nature or the act of God, as trees and grass,- when severed by a wrongdoer, still belongs to the owner of the soil. The only difference in the cases is on the question, whether when suing the wrong-doer for converting the thing severed, the owner may recover the value at the time of the conversion, including the value which may have been added by act of the trespasser. This court has held that he may. Nesbitt v. St. Paul Lumber Co., 21 Minn. 491. With respect to the wheat and oats, there is no more difficulty, for they were not natural products of the soil, but came by the act and industry of the plaintiff. If he had not taken possession of and sowed the land they would not have existed. It was held in Tifford's case, 11 Coke, 51, that upon re-entry by a disseizee the property in grain sowed and cut by the disseizor reverts in the disseizee. The same was held in Dyer, 31b, and again 173a. In Thomas v. Moody, 11 Me. 139, the disseizee, upon being restored to possession of the land by legal process, converted grain raised and gathered by the disseizor and still on the laud, and it was held the disseizor could not recover for the conversion. In such circumstances it was held in Simpkins v. Rogers, 15 Ill. 397, that the owner could recover for a conversion by the disseizor; and the same was held in Crotty v. Collins, 18 Ill. 567. On the other hand, it was decided in Brothers v. Hurdle, 10 Ind. 490, that though crops attached to the land when

the owner is put in possession passed to him, he cannot maintain trover for those gathered by the trespasser while in possession, but that his remedy is damages by way of mesne profits. And in Demott v. Hagerman,8 Cow. 220, it was held that the owner could not maintain replevin for crops sowed by him and cut by a trespasser, but that his remedy was in trespass quare clausum. It seems more consistent with principle and justice, even where the controversy is between the owner and wrong-doer, and whether the entry by the latter amounts to a disseizin or a mere trespass, that with respect to crops sowed and gathered by the wrong-doer which are the result wholly of his act, the sole remedy of the owner should be in damages done to, and for withholding possession of the land, and that the right to follow the thing severed should be confined to those things which were upon the land at the time of the wrongful entry, or which would have existed without the act of the trespasser. Lindsay v. Winona & St. Peter Railway Co. Opinion by Gilfillan, J. [Decided Aug. 30, 1882.]

SURETYSHIP

- OFFICIAL BOND OFFICER HOLDING OVER TERM - STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.- The Minnesota statutes provide thus: "In each county there shall be elected a county treasurer, whose term of office shall commence on the first day of March next succeeding his election, and continue for two years, and until a successor is elected and qualified." They also provide that the county treasurer shall file an oath and bond, and if he shall not do so before the fifteenth of January succeeding his election, it shall be deemed a refusal to serve; that in case of a vacancy by death, resignation or otherwise in the office of treasurer, the county commissioners shall appoint a treasurer, and that every office shall become vacant among other things from the refusal or neglect of the incumbent to give or renew his official bond. R. was elected county treasurer for a term commencing March 1, 1878, and in 1879, was again elected for a term commencing March 1, 1880. For the first term he gave a bond but did not renew it for the next one. Held, that R. could not remain in office after the commencement of the second

term so as to make the sureties on his bond liable for his acts for a longer time than was necessary to enable county commissioners to fill the office by appointment. Statutes like that referred to, fixing a definite period as the term of an office, with an alternative clause added providing for an extension of the incumbency until a successor should be elected and qualified, have been generally considered as establishing, as the proper term of an office, the period specifically named. The provisions for a contingent holding over that time is a precautionary one, to prevent a possible vacancy or lapse in the office, and is not intended to create an unlimited term or to indefinitely extend the prescribed term. Welch v. Seymour, 28 Coun. 387; Mayor of Rahway v. Crowell, 40 N. J. 207; Mayor of Wilmington v. Horn, 2 How. 190; Dover v. Twombly, 42 N. H. 59; State Treasurer v. Mann, 34 Vt. 371; County of Wapello v. Bigham, 10 Iowa, 39; Bigelow v. Bridge, 8 Mass. 275; Chelmsford Co. v. Demorest, 7 Gray, 1; Mutual Loan & Building Ass'n v. Price, 16 Fla. 204. See also Harris v. Babbitt, 4 Dill. 185. Commissioners of Scott County v. Ring. Opinion by Dickinson, J. [Decided Aug. 28, 1882.]

KANSAS SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. JANUARY TERM, 1882.*

CONFLICT OF LAW FOREIGN JUDGMENT — JURISDICTION-STATUTE OF LIMITATION. On July 19, 1881, an action was commenced in the District Court of

* Appearing in 28 Kansas Reports.

Johnson county, Kansas, against K., on a certified transcript of certain proceedings bad in the court of common pleas of Bedford County, Pennsylvania, which transcript, it is claimed, shows that a judgment was rendered in said common pleas court against K. on May 26, 1864, and that such judgment was revived on November 8, 1867, and again on February 26, 1877. These revivals however were had without any actual or personal notice to the defendant; and at the time of such revivals the defendant was not within the jurisdiction of the State of Pennsylvania, but within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Kansas, and was a bona fide resident thereof. The defendant set up as a defense, that the plaintiff's cause of action, if he ever had any, was barred by the five-years statute of limitations of Kansas. On the trial it was shown that the defendant became a bona fide resident of Kansas on November 1, 1865, and that he has contin. uously resided in the State of Kansas ever since, and has never since been within the State of Pennsylvania. Held, that the revivals of said judgment were merely ex parte proceedings, and for the purpose of enforcing them beyond the jurisdiction of the State of Pennsylvania, are absolute nullities; and further held, that the plaintiff's supposed cause of action is barred by the five-years statute of limitations. See Litowich v. Litowich, 19 Kans. 451; Mastin v. Gray, id. 461; Ferguson v. Crawford, 70 N. Y. 253. Kay v. Walter. Opinion by Valentine, J.

FRAUD IN PROCURING DEED DOES NOT AFFECT INNOCENT PURCHASER FROM FRAUDULENT GRANTEE.

-Where a person holds the position of a bona fide purchaser of real estate for a valuable consideration without notice of the original owner's equities, he will not be deprived of his title by proof of fraud practiced by his grantee upon the person executing to such grantee the conveyance thereof. Where a person who is the owner of and in the actual possession of real estate desires to convey it to her mother, and employs an attorney at law to prepare a deed therefor, and after the deed is drafted by him, she examines and finds it written out in accordance with her directions, and then, at the attorney's request, accompanies him to the office of a notary public to execute it, and at the office the attorney without her knowledge fraudulently produces in the place of the deed already examined, another deed containing his own name as the grantee therein, and the owner supposing the deed so produced to be the identical one which she had previously looked over without examination of its contents, affixes her signature thereto in the presence of the notary and acknowledges its execution, and then delivers it to the attorney to be deposited by him for record, and the deed is filed by him for record in the office of the register of deeds of the proper county, and thereafter the attorney conveys the premises to innocent persons for value, the owner of the premises so executing the deed is estopped from denying its validity, so as to affect the rights of the subsequent bona fide grantees. See Everts v. Agnes, 4 Wis. 343, and 6 id. 453; Andrews v. Thayer, 30 id. 228; Fisher v. Beckwith, 30 id. 55; Burton v. Boyd, 7 Kans. 31; Ayres v. Probasco, 14 id. 196; Somes v. Brewer, 2 Pick. 184; Jordan v. McNeil, 25 Kans. 459; Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137; In re Payson, 23 Kans. 757; Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Mich. 405; Burson v. Huntingdon, 21 id. 415; Douglas v. Matting, 29 Iowa, 498; Putnam v. Sullivan, 3 Mass. 45; Bishop Contr., § 169; Cook v. Moore, 39 Tex. 255; Deputy v. Stapleford, 19 Cal. 302. McNeil v. Jordan. Opinion by Horton, C. J.

PRACTICE-UNUSUAL PROCEEDING-HOLDING COURT ALL NIGHT.—It is an unusual and unjust proceeding and a great abuse of discretion, for a justice of the peace, without special circumstances existing therefor,

to proceed with the trial of an action during all the night, against the objection and protest of one of the parties litigant. McGowen v. Campbell. Opinion by Horton, C. J.

WILL -JOINT BY HUSBAND AND WIFE OF PROPERTY OF HUSBAND.- Where the husband and wife join in the execution of what is in form a joint will, but which only disposes of property of which the husband is the sole owner, and the husband thereafter dies sole seized thereof, such instrument is the several will of the husband; the joinder of the wife has no effect upon the legal and disposing power of the husband, and all her declarations and acts are to be rejected as surplusage. Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157. Allen v. Allen. Opinion by Horton, C. J.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

ATTORNEY -AUTHORITY AND LIMIT OF.-The authority of a solicitor in an action does not extend to putting in a fraudulent defense. If a solicitor, having authority to defend an action, deliver a fraudulent defense (without the knowledge of his client) containing admissions on which the plaintiff obtains judgment, the court will, on proof of the fraud (although the plaintiff was no party to it), set aside the judgment, and give leave to the client to withdraw the fraudulent defense, deliver a fresh defense, and adduce evidence in support of his case. Ct. of App., May 15, 1882. Williams v. Preston. Opinion by Lord Coleridge, C. J. (47 L. T. Rep., N. S. 265.)

CHATTEL MORTGAGE ON CROPS GROWING AND TO BE GROWN.- By bill of sale the grantor assigned to the grantee (inter alia) the "growing crops" then in and about certain specified premises, and also (inter alia) the "growing crops" which at any time thereafter should be in or about the same or any other premises of the grantor during the continuance of the security. Held, that the assignment was sufficient to pass the property in the future growing crops on their coming into existence, and to entitle the grantee to maintain an action at law for their recovery, or for damages for their conversion. Lazarus v. Andrade, 43 L. T. Rep., N. S. 30; Holroyd v. Marshall, 3 id. 527; Collyer v. Isaacs, 45 id. 567. The case of Belding v. Reed, 3 H. L. Cas. 955, distinguished. Q. B. Div., July 8, 1882. Clements v. Matthews. Opinion by Lopes, J. (47 L. T. Rep., N. S. 251.)

EASEMENT OF LIGHT - BUILDINGS BUILT ON PLAN KNOWN TO GRANTOR - IMPLIED NOTICE.-J., a draper and outfitter in a large way of business at L., having acquired a large space of ground held from the corporation of L., the buildings on which were afterward destroyed by fire, obtained from the corporation fresh leases of the land, containing stipulations for the erection upon it of buildings to be erected according to plans approved by the corporation. These buildings consisted of seven blocks, which were separated by fireproof walls, but which communicated with one another. Two of these blocks were mortgaged, before the building had gone far, to secure 35,000l. J. having failed, the mortgagee foreclosed, and let the blocks to the plaintiff, who occupied them as a hotel. Several rooms in this block derived their light entirely from an adjoining block-which had become vested in the defendant by another mortgage from J., prior to the mortgage under which the plaintiff derived title, and which was occupied by the defendant as business premises by means of windows in the separating wall. The defendant having blocked up these windows, the plaintiff brought an action for an injunction to restrain him from interfering with

igan Sup. Ct., June 21, 1882. Becker v. Farmers' Mutual Insurance Co. Opinion by Campbell, J.

FIRE POLICY -FORFEITURE BY OTHER INSURANCE - WAIVER — AGENCY NOTICE -- ESTOPPEL.- (1) A condition annexed to and made part of a policy of insurance, provided that in case the insured should effect other insurance on the property, and should not, within ten days, give notice thereof to the company insuring, and "have the same indorsed on this instrument or otherwise acknowledged by them in writing," the policy should cease and be of no further effect. By other conditions, power was reserved to the company to terminate the risk for certain reasons, but not for excessive insurance. Held, that the act of the company in indorsing or acknowledging the additional insurance included approval thereof, and the company might refuse to indorse or acknowledge. (2) An agent of a company issuing a policy with such a condition was authorized to receive notice of additional insurance; to transmit to the company any policy delivered to him for the action of the company under the condition; and to return the policy to the insured when received from the company. Held, that what such an agent said and did, in the course of such communication between the company and the insured, would bind the company. (3) When one insured under such a policy gave notice of subsequent insurance to such an agent, and delivered to him the policy for transmission to the company, and the agent afterward returned the policy asserting that it was all right, and the insured acted upon the assertion and treated the policy as still in force, to the knowledge of the company, held, that the company is estopped from contesting the performance of the condition, although no indorsement was made on the policy, and no acknowledgment in writing was produced. (4) If the company issuing such a policy is a mutual one, of which each person insured is a member, and the by-laws of the company require such a condition in all its policies, and prohibit the alteration of the by-laws, except by a vote of the directors, the insured is not thereby debarred from claiming an estoppel, arising out of the conduct of officers or authorized agents of the company, against contesting by the company the performance of such a condition. Authorities referred to: Fire Ins. Co. v. Building Assoc., 14 Vroom, 652; Potter v. Ontario Ins. Co., 5 Hill, 147; Horwitz v. Equitable Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 557; Planters' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 38 Texas, 253; Hadley v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 55 N. H. 110; Mentz v. Lancaster Ins. Co., 79 Penn. St. 475; Pechner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 195; Pitney v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 65 id. 6; State Ins. Co. v. Maackens, 9 Vroom, 564; Belleville Ins. Co. v. Van Winkle, 1 Beas. 333; Mitchell v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 51 Penn. St. 402; Hale v. Mechanics Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 169; Brewer v. Chelsea Ins. Co., 14 id. 203; Catoir v. America Ins., 4 Vroom, 487; Viele v. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Iowa, 9; Keenan v. Missouri Ins. Co., 12 id. 126; Keenan v. Dubuque Ins. Co., 13 id. 375. New Jersey Sup. Ct., June Term, 1882. Redstrake v. Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance Co. Opinion by Magie, J. (15 Vroom, 294.)

LIFE POLICY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT TO DELIVER.-Equity has jurisdiction to enforce the performance of a contract to deliver a policy of insurance, and having taken jurisdiction for that purpose, will, in case there has been a loss or death, retain it for the purpose of decreeing payment of the policy. A contract to issue a plain life insurance policy upon the life of the applicant for $15,000, payable to his wife, according to the form in use by the company, is sufficiently certain to be enforced; and if there is any extrinsic reason why it should not be enforced, as that it was procured by fraud or falsehood, it must be set up

as a defense. Perkins v. Washington Ins. Co., 4 Cow. 645; Carpenter v. Insurance Co., 4 Sandf. Ch. 408; Brugger v. Insurance Co., 5 Sawy. 304. U.S. Circ. Ct., Oregon, July 19, 1882. Hebert v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. Opinion by Deady, D. J. (12 Fed. Rep. 807.) FIRE POLICY ·

CONDITION AGAINST OTHER INSURANCE COVERS SUBSEQUENT INSURANCE. A condition annexed to and made part of a policy of fire insurance, which provides that "all and every person insuring in this company must give notice of any insurance effected in their behalf on said property, in which case each office shall be liable to the payment only of a ratable proportion of any loss or damage which may be sustained," etc., is not restricted to other insurance effected prior to the execution and delivery of the policy in question. It is applicable to all other insurances, whether effected before or after the policy in question. The rule to be applied in the construction of such a condition is well settled. Stipulations of this sort are restrictions on the right of redress of the insured against the insurer upon the contract. As such, they impose a burden on the insured for the insurer's benefit, and must therefore be strictly construed. State Ins. Co. v. Maackens, 9 Vroom, 564. Such conditions, besides, are prepared by the insurers for their protection, and ought to be set forth in language so clear that the insured will not be misled as to the burden imposed on him. Wood on Ins. 140. Lord St. Leonards said, in Anderson v. Fitzgerald, 4 H. L. Cas. 484, in respect to such a condition: “It is of course prepared by the company, and if therefore there should be any ambiguity in it, must be taken according to law, more strongly against the person who prepared it." In Chandler v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85, it was held that for any ambiguity in the terms of such a contract the company was responsible, and could not complain if any doubt as to its meaning is resolved in favor of the insured. But such a rule cannot apply unless the condition, when strictly construed, is in fact ambiguous, and at least fairly susceptible of the meaning the insured has attributed to it. It could not be pretended that the rule would operate to compel a forced construction of such a condition for the benefit of the insured, which would deprive the insurers of a protection fairly included within the terms of the contract. New Jersey Sup. Ct., February Term, 1882. Warwick v. Monmouth County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. Opinion by Magie, J. (15 Vroom, 83.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

PUBLISHING OPINIONS TWICE. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

As

You are not a sinner, above all others, in the matter of publishing "every minute" the same opinion of some learned court. In the current (14th) volume of "The Reporter," you will find in full on p. 118, and again on p. 693, the opinion of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey in Hesketh v. Murphy. "The Reporter seems to discriminate a little against the Supreme Court of Connecticut, perhaps in not publishing twice, encoring, the opinion of that court in Hughes v. Daly, which is given on p. 55 of the volume above referred to. The New Jersey court holds that a bequest to "the most deserving poor" of Patterson is a valid bequest, and that the court would, if necessary, appoint a trustee to distribute the cash. The Connecticut court, on the other hand, holds that a bequest to "the most deserving poor" of New Britain is void for uncertainty. The uncertainty of the bequest can't be greater, I fancy, than the uncertainty of the law-" glorious