word 'missionary' was sometimes used in a far more oose way, as for instance, in connection with the promotion of a new method of spelling the English language, and it was pointed out that the term might be employed by an atheist to express the promotion of ideas directly opposed to christianity. This reasoning is not easy to confute, though if the term could have been explained by the practice of the testator in his life-time, there would have been no difficulty in appreciating his motives. The case shows how necessary it is to clearly understand the meaning of words when legal rights and duties are being created or dealt with, and how a term of even the most familiar application may be capable of unintended interpretations. There is, of course, the common observation also how little people are able to apply in their own cases the principles which would at once occur to them with regard to other people, and the importance of not trusting solely to one's own judgment, however practiced and educated, in matters concerning oneself." CHANGE OF GRADE. "A change from the natural grade is a change of grade just as clearly as if changed from a grade previously made by the authorities." Borough of New Brighton v. United Presbyterian Church, 96 Penn. St. 331. So held under a constitutional provision giving owners of lots compensation for damage sustained by reason of the authorities of any borough changing the grade of a street. morals, and the result is the same whether the unlawful acts are denounced by the common law or by statute. The Legislature must be the judge of what is injurious to public morals, and it having declared that betting on horse-races is immoral, it is as much an offense to invite or induce persons to habitually attend in a house for the purpose of violating the statute as it would be if the acts there done were forbidden by the common law." It is somewhat singular that three works on the subject of "Common Words and Phrases" should be in press at the same moment. One by Mr. Lawson is a complete lexicon, giving the words and phrases, with references to the reports where they may be found, but without quotation or comment; another by Mr. Winfield, gives a smaller number of words and phrases, with references and some quotations; the third, by Mr. Browne, gives a selection of words and phrases, with references and copious quotations, and with considerable comment, comparison, and criticism. The first and last are on the point of publication; the second, we are informed, is issued, but we have not seen it. RULES RELATING TO OPINION EVIDENCE. IX. PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS AND DISEASE. (cont'd.) RULE IV. The law does not recognize to the exclusion of others any particular school of medicine or class of practitioners.(1) ILLUSTRATION. 1. A singer agreed with the manager of an opera manager that if he failed to appear at any entertainment he should forfeit a month's salary-except in the event of sickness certified to by a doctor to be appointed by the manager. The manager notified the singer that he had appointed a certain doctor. The singer failed to attend a concert. In an action to recover his salary forfeited for failure to attend, the singer offered the evidence of an allopathic physician to the effect that he was confined on the evening in question with a disease of the throat, and claimed that the manager's appointment was nugatory, his appointee being a physician of the homoeopathic system of medicine. Held, that the selection of the doctor being left to the manager, and he having appointed a practitioner of medicine, the plaintiff could not recover. (2) DISORDERLY-HOUSE -GAMING. One who sells "pools" in his house upon horse-racing is indictable for keeping a "disorderly-house." Cheek v. Commonwealth, 79 Ky. 359. The court observed: "A game is a contest of chance or skill, where the party in whose favor the result appears wins or receives something by reason thereof, which he would not otherwise have received, and for which he paid no consideration. Appellant's commissions were not dependent upon the result of any race in which he sold pools, nor did any element of chance enter into his compensation or in any way affect it. His fees were the same without regard to the result of the race or of the disposition of the pools. But while it is admitted that the selling of pools is not, in terms, prohibited by statute, it is insisted that because its tendencies are evil in that it encourages persons to violate the law against betting, the act of selling pools, without regard to the manner in which it is done, is within the common-law offense of keeping a disorderly-house.' In this we concur. A disorderly-house, in its restricted sense, is a house in which people abide, or to which they resort, disturbing the repose of the neighborhood; but in its more enlarged sense it includes bawdy-physic. The system pursued by the practitioner is houses, common gaming-houses, and places of like character, to which people promiscuously resort for purposes injurious to the public morals, or health, or convenience, or safety. Nor is it essential that there be any disorder or disturbance in the sense that it disturbs the public peace or the quiet of the neighborhood. It is enough that the acts there done are contrary to law and subversive of public "By the terms of the contract," it was said in case 1, "the selection of the doctor was left entirely with the defendant (manager); and it was for him to judge of the fitness or capacity of the person to be selected. All that he was required to do, in the fair interpretation of the contract, was to appoint a person who made it his business to practice physic, and it was wholly immaterial to what school of medicine the person so selected belonged, or whether he belonged to any. The legal signification of the term 'doctor,' when employed as it is in this contract, means simply a practitioner of immaterial. The law has nothing to do with the merits of particular systems. Their relative merit may become the subject of inquiry when the skill or ability of a practitioner, in any given case, is to be passed upon as a matter of fact. But the law does not and (1) If the witness is proved to be a practicing physician, he is qualified as an expert. Livingston's case, 14 Gratt. 592 (1857). (2) Corsi v. Maretzek, 4 E. D. Smith, 1 (1855). cannot supply any positive rules for the interpretation of medical science. It is not one of those certain or exact sciences in which truths become established and fixed, but is essentially progressive in its nature, enlarging with the growth of human experience, and subject to those changes and revolutions incident to any branch of human inquiry, the laws of which are not fully ascertained. The labors of the anatomist, the physiologist, and the chemist, have contributed an immense storehouse of facts, but the manner in which this knowledge is to be applied in the treatment and cure of diseases has been, and will probably continue to be open to diversity of opinion. No one system of practice has been uniformly followed, but physicians, from the days of Hippocrates, have been divided into opposing sects and schools. The sects of the dogmatists and the empirics divided the ancient world for centuries until the use of the methodics, who in their turn gave way to innumerable sects. Theories of practice believed to be infallible in one age have been utterly rejected in another. For thirteen centuries Europe yielded to the authority of Galen. He was implicitly followed, his practice strictly pursued. Every thing that seemed to conflict with his precepts was rejected, and yet in the revolutions of medical opinion, the works of this undoubtedly great man were publicly burned by Paracelsus and his disciples, and for centuries following the medical world was divided between the Galenists and the chemists until a complete ascendancy over both was obtained by the vitalists. This state of things has been occasioned by the circumstance that medical practitioners have often been more given to the formation of theories upon the nature of disease, and the mode of its treatment, than to that careful observation and patient accumulation of facts by which, in other sciences, the phenomena of nature have been unraveled. *** It is not to be overlooked, that as an art it has been characterized in a greater degree by fluctuations of opinion as to its principles and the mode of its practice than perhaps any other pursuit. That it has been distinguished by the constant promulgation and explosion of theories. That it has alternated between the advancement of new doctrines and the revival of old ones, and that its professors in every age have been noted for the tenacity with which they have clung to opinions and the unanimity with which they have resisted the introduction of valuable discoveries. They still continue to disagree in respect to the treatment of diseases as old as the human race; and at the present day when great advances have been made in all departments of knowl. edge, a radical and fundamental difference divides the allopathists from the followers of Hahnneman, to say nothing of those who believe in the sovereign instrumentality In fact nothing comparatively is known of the philosophy of disease. Its eradication or cure where the result of human agency is in the great majority of instances attributable, rather to the careful observation, judgment and experience of the particular practitioner than the application of general or established methods available by all. The popular axiom that doctors differ is as true now as it ever was, and as long as it continues to be so, it is impossible for the law to recognize any class of practitioners or the followers of any particular system or method of treatment, as exclusively entitled to be regarded as doctors." RULE V. To give an opinion on medical questions, one may be qualified by (a) study without practice, or (b) by practice without study. Nor is it absolutely necessary (c) that he should be a physician or have studied for one. ILLUSTRATIONS. A. 1. In a trial for abortion, F., a physician, gave his opinion as to the effect of a certain drug on the womb. F. had no personal knowledge of the effects of the drug; what he knew on the subject was derived from his reading. His opinion was admitted. (3) 2. The question was as to whether the disease called the foot-rot was a spontaneous disease or was com municated by contact. W. was an editor of a stock journal and as such had read extensively on the subject, but had had no practical experience in the treatment of sheep for any disease. He was offered as an expert to give his opinion on the question. Held, competent.(4) "The practice in this State," it was said in case 2, "permits the skilled practitioner who has made himself familiar with the science of medicine or surgery by a long course of study and practical experience with kindred subjects to testify as an expert, and common sense demands that such a man shall have respect given to his opinion, though he may have had no actual experience with a particular case. The Supreme Court then examines the qualifications of W. and concludes that he was not qualified, but holds that it has no power to revise the ruling of the court below, that he was sufficiently qualified. This therefore can scarcely be considered an authority against the rule, as the trial judge who the Supreme Court admits was the proper one to decide the question, gave its decision that he came within it, and was for the purpose of his evidence an expert. ILLUSTRATION. B. 1. On a trial for bastardy, the question arose as to whether the birth of a child was premature. A. was a midwife, but had no knowledge upon the subject except as derived from her experience. Her opinion was admitted. (5) In case 1 it was said: "The witness A. by her experience and observation appears to have acquired knowledge of the subjects about which she was testifying, that persons generally do not have. To the extent of this peculiar knowledge she was a person of skill and science, and her opinion founded upon it was evidence competent to go to the jury." ILLUSTRATION. C. 1. The question was whether T. was sane at the time she executed her will. S., a priest, who had attended her before her death was introduced to testify as an expert as to her mental condition. S. was educated in a Spanish college and had officiated as a priest for ten years. It was part of his preparatory education to become competent to pass upon the mental condition of communicants in his church, and for that purpose physiology and psychology were branches of his studies. Previous to officiating as a priest it was requisite that he should be skilled in determining the mental condition of those who sought the sacraments. In every case of the administration of the rites of his church to invalids or dying persons, it was necessary for the priest to make an examination of the mental condition of the recipient, to ascertain if his mind was in a proper state to reason or act of its own volition. The sacrament could only be administered after such a preliminary examination, and therefore a priest was daily required to exercise and pass his judgment on the mental condition of persons. Held, that S. was competent to testify as an expert. (6) In case 1 it was said: "Physicians in general practice who have never made a specialty of the subject of (3) State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 484 (1873); Taylor v. Railway, 48 N. H. 304 (1869). (4) Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. H. 452 (1870). insanity, as well as physicians who are not engaged in the practice of their profession, and also nurses are deemed experts on this subject, and on what principle or for what reason could the witness S. be held not to be an expert? It was a part of his collegiate education, and it was especially a matter of daily practice with him for ten years to familiarize himself with the mental condition of persons upon whom he was called on to attend in his character as a priest, and it does seem that from both education and experience he was peculiarly qualified to express an opinion, as an expert, on the question of mental disease." RULE VI. The opinion of a medical man is competent as to matters which he has not made a specialty in his study or practice. The principle is well settled that physicians and surgeons of practice and experience are experts, and that their opinions are admissible in evidence upon questions that are strictly and legitimately embraced in their profession and practice; and it is not necessary that a witness of this class should have made the particular disease involved in any inquiry a specialty to make his testimony admissible as an expert. If he has, that perhaps may make his opinion of more value than that of one who has not.(7) ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. The question was as to how certain injuries to a person's eyes had been produced. The opinion of a physician not an oculist was admitted.(8) 2. The question was whether a testator was of sound and disposing mind and memory at the time of executing his will, which took place between seven and eight o'clock on the morning of the day of his death from cholera, with which he had been sick three days. A., a physician, was called to attend him professionally at three o'clock on the previous afternoon, remained with him till four o'clock in the morning, and returned at eight o'clock. B., another physician, was called to attend him at eleven o'clock on that morning. Neither A. nor B. had made any special study of mental disease. Their opinions were held admissible.(9) 3. The question was whether a particular act of a prisoner was an act of insanity. B., a physician and surgeon of many years' practice and experience, had studied psychological medecine, and had experience in the incipiency of mental diseases. He had not made diseases of the mind a special study. His opinion was admitted.(10) 4. In an action for breach of warranty of a mule, the question was whether the disease in the animal was of recent standing. A physician of eleven years' standing testified that he had no particular acquaintance with diseases of stock, but from his books, observation and general knowledge of diseases of the human family he could tell whether certain symptoms indicated that a disease is of short or long standing. His opinion was admitted.(11) 5. On a trial for murder by poisoning, two physicians were called to testify as to the tests applied in the chemical analysis made of the stomach of the deceased, and also as to the tests usually applied for detecting the existence of poison in such cases. Both were practicing physicians. One stated that he was not a professional chemist but understood some of the practical details of chemistry, including that por(7) Hathaway v. National Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335 (1875) (8) Castner v. Silker, 33 N. J. (L.) 97 (1868). (9) Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. 622 (1868). (10) State v. Reddick, 7 Kans. 143,(1871) and see Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496 (1871). (11) Horton v. Green, 64 N. C. 64 (1870). tion which pertained to his profession. He had no practical experience in the analysis of poisons; but had been acquainted with the means of detecting poisons. The other testified that he was not a practical chemist; that he understood the tests to detect strychnine, though he never experimented on the subject; he had seen experiments made. Held, that both witnesses were competent. (12) 6. The question was as to the effect of strychine upon the human stomach and the human system. The opinion of a chemist and toxicologist, not a physician and surgeon, was admitted.(13) 7. The question was as to the sanity of a testator. O. had been a practicing physician for many years in the neighborhood of the testator's family, and had at times been his medical adviser. He never had had special charge of insane persons, as he uniformly advised that patients in whom insanity appeared to be developed should be sent to the asylum. His opinion as to the san ty of the testator was admitted. (14) In case 4 the court said: "Dr. R. is a physician of eleven years' standing and had observed the symptoms of the deceased animal. He swears that although he has no particular knowledge of the diseases of stock, yet from his books, observation, and general knowledge of diseases of the human family, he can tell whether certain symptoms indicate that the disease is of recent or long standing; and although he never saw a case of glanders unless this is one, yet he was able to form an opinion as to whether the symptoms of this mule indicated a disease of recent or long standing. This is assumed by the objection to the question which was ruled out by the court, on the ground that the witness had not qualified himself as an expert. * * It is said that the witness, although an expert in regard to diseases of the human family, had no particular acquaintance with the diseases of stock, and that in this lies the distinction. We do not think the distinction well taken, to the extent of making the opinion incompetent, however much it might have been matter of comment before the jury. Stock and the human family are animals with many similitudes and some variances. The circulation of the blood, the respiration, and the laws of nervous and muscular action in a mule are similar to those in a man. In the organs of digestion and other functions, there are variances, owing to the differences of food, etc., so that although it be admitted, that one acquainted with the mode of treating diseases of the human family should not be relied on to select from the materia medica substances apt for the treatment of stock (for non constat that a medicine which will produce a given effect administered to a man will have the like effect administered to a mule), still we think it clear that one having a scientific knowledge of the diseases of men must be presumed to have so much knowledge of the diseases of a mule as to enable him to determine whether a disease with which the animal is afflicted be of a recent or of long standing; and that this knowledge gives to his opinion, when he has had the opportunity of observing the symptoms, a peculiar weight which does not belong to the opinions of those who have not devoted themselves to the study of disease as a science. The law will not reject the aid in the investigation of truth to be derived from science merely because the witness has conformed his observation and practice to one branch of it. In other words an expert in the diseases of man is necessarily an expert in the diseases of animals, so as to make his opinion competent evidence (12) State v. Hinkle, 6 Iowa, 380 (1858). (13) State v. Cook, 17 Kans. 392 (1877). (14) Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray, 1 (1856) as to opinions of family physician being competent on question of insanity, see Pigg v. State, 43 Tex. 108 (1875); Van Horn v. Keenan, 28 Ill. 449 (1862). upon a matter in reference to which he will swear that his scientific knowledge has enabled him to form an opinion. For further illustration; it becomes material to prove that a colt was dead when foaled. A physician swears that he made a post-mortem examination and has formed an opinion by means of his knowledge of physics, that the lungs of a child if it ever breathed can be easily distinguished from the lungs of one still-born, and that in that respect the colt and the child are the same. Shall his opinion be held incompetent and the light of science excluded because the witness has no particular acquaintance with the diseases of such animals, and has never dissected a colt except on the one occasion?" As well put in case 5, to say that none shall be permitted to give their opinions in such cases, except those of the highest professional skill or those who have given their lives to chemical experiments, would, in this country at least, render it impossible, in most cases, to find the requisite skill and ability. In case 7 it was said: "We think the settled practice in this Commonwealth has been to admit the opinion of educated practicing physicians upon subjects of medical science. Until quite a recent period the disease of insanity has not been made a specialty. That it is now made a special study by a small number of physicians may be a good reason for giving to their opinion greater weight; but it is not a sufficient reason for excluding the opinions of other physicians. It is well known' that various classes of diseases, as those of the spine, the eye, the ear, the skin, have become specialties, especially in our larger cities, where such division of labor becomes practicable. But this fact does not render incompetent upon these subjects the testimony of other physicians who must necessarily have less experience. The difference is in the weight rather than the competency of the testimony. * To adopt the limitation made by the rule of the preceding judge would be to confine opinion on questions of insanity to those physicians who have made insanity a special study and pursuit. As most cases of insanity are treated in hospitals and public institutions, the limitation would practically confine parties to physicians who were or had been engaged in those institutions. The number of these is so small and their attendance so difficult to be procured that the limitation would be in effect an exclusion of matters of opinion upon subjects where it is difficult even for the best trained minds to distinguish and adhere to the line which separates opinion from fact. For with respect to the powers and facultics of the mind it is obvious we can directly know nothing. We know them only as they are manifested in action. Nor if the opinions of persons who have made the subject of mental disease a special study could be had, would it be wise to limit matters of opinion exclusively to them? Large as is the debt which science and humanity owe to them, great as are the advantages which spring from the devotion of the mind to special study, a not unfrequent result is what it used to be said was the mark of a good judge a tendency to enlargement of jurisdiction. As it is it cannot be wholly avoided. To put upon the stand a skillful physician (and such a one has never understood the bodies of his patients, unless he has known also something of their minds and the action of one upon the other), to get from him the history of his patient, the state of his bodily health, his conversation, conduct, traits of character in sickness and in health, and then to exclude the opinion which as the result of all his mind has almost insensibly and necessarily formed (and yet upon this imperfect history of his patient to ask a perfect stranger to to that patient to give his opinion of his mental condition, because he has made mental disease a special study) would be to expect the most valuable evidence for that which, in the nature of things, must be of far less worth." RULE VII. A medical man is not disqualified to give an opinion because (a) he is not a graduate of a college and does not possess a license to practice, or (b) is not at the time in practice or (c) because a case exactly like the one in question has never been seen or read of by him before. ILLUSTRATION. A. 1. The question was as to the effect of injuries received by the plaintiff in a railroad collision. S. was not a graduate of any medical college and had no license to practice medicine, but he had attended one course of medical lectures, and had studied the science three years before he commenced its practice. Held competent.(15) ILLUSTRATION. B. 1. An action was brought against a common carrier for injuries received by a passenger. A witness was asked his opinion as to the extent of the injuries and their proper treatment. The witness was a graduated physician, but at the time had retired from active practice, though he still occasionally visited patients. Held that he was competent. (16) 2. On a trial for murder, the questions were as to the cause of the death, the effect of wounds, etc. T. had practiced medicine for twenty years, but had retired as a general practitioner. His opinion was admitted.(17) 1. S. was murdered by C. by cutting him with a knife on the throat. A surgeon on the trial was asked his opinion whether the skin of the throat had been cut with a sharp instrument or torn. In answer to the counsel for the prisoner he stated that he had never read of or seen a case exactly like he one before him. Held that his opinion was nevertheless admissible.(18) In case 1, the court said: "The circumstances that the witness said he had not seen or read a case in which the body had been exposed for three months, as here, did not touch the question of competency, though it may lessen the credit given to the testimony. * * The man of science is distinguished from the empiric in nothing more than in not relying on specifics, and also not waiting for the exact smilitudes in things material and immaterial before forming a judgment, whether two patients are laboring under diseases of the same character and requiring the like treatment. It is the province of science to discover general principles from long and accurate observation and sound reasoning, and it must be sufficient to induce courts of (15) New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Allbretton, 38 Miss. 247 (1859). (16) Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613 (1874). justice to receive assistance from men of science in making their investigation, when assured by them that the principles of their science applicable to a particular subject of inquiry established certain results even though the witness may not have seen or read of a case in all its particulars like that under consideration." JOHN D. LAWSON. VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF FOREIGN DIVORCE. WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT, NOVEMBER 21, 1882. COOK V. COOK. Although marriage is a status, and every State has the right to fix, regulate and control the same as to every person within its jurisdiction, even though one of the parties may at the time actually reside in another State, yet a judgment of divorce granted in another State, under statutes making jurisdiction dependent entirely upon the residence there of the party applying for a divorce, at the suit of a husband against a wife who resided in this State, and who was not personally served with notice, and did not appear in the action, but was ignorant of its pendency until after judgment was rendered, is not a bar to subsequent action by such wife in this State for divorce, alimony, allowance, and a division of the property of such husband situated within this State, especially where such foreign judgment was based upon an alleged cause of action which was false in fact. A CTION for divorce brought by the wife. The hus band set up in defense as a bar to the action a divorce from plaintiff previously obtained by him in Michigan. The court below found as facts that the parties were married in New York, came to Wisconsin in 1867 and lived together there until 1875, when the husband went to Michigan, where he has since resided continually, his wife remaining at their former home in Wisconsin. In 1880 he commenced proceedings in Michigan for divorce on the ground of the wife's desertion, making service on her by publication, according to the laws of that State. Judgment in such proceedings was rendered by default and a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage in his favor made. The wife had no notice and did not learn of such proceedings until some months after their conclusion, after which she commenced this action for divorce in the courts of Wisconsin on the ground of his desertion of her. The court found as conclusion of law that the divorce obtained by him in Michigan was valid to dissolve the marriage contract even though the charge of desertion on which it was founded was untrue, but that it did not bar the Wisconsin action. Judgment in favor of the wife was given in the latter action and the title to certain property of defendant in Wisconsin declared to be in her. Defendant appealed. F. K. Conover and J. H. Carpenter, for appellant. CASSODAY, J. It is urged by the learned counsel for the defendant that the Michigan divorce is a complete bar to this action for any and all purposes. The question is important, and we are not aware that it has ever received the consideration of this court. Certain questions have however been determined, which may be indirectly involved in the proposition. It has frequently been held that courts in this country possess no power in actions for divorce, except such as are conferred by statute. Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis. 367; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 39 id. 167; Bacon v. Bacon, 43 id. 197. Under our statute several questions have been determined by this court. In Damon v. Damon, 28 Wis. 817, it was held that a claim for alimony is not the subject-matter of a separate suit, but is only auxiliary to or an incident of an action for divorce. In that case both parties were residents of Wisconsin. In Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206, both parties resided in this State at the time of the judgment of a divorce a vinculo was rendered. Several years after the judgment each party presented petitions respecting the alimony adjudged. It was held, in effect, that the court had continuing authority, after the divorce, to make changes as to the alimony allowed and the custody of the children decreed, depending largely on the need, age, and other circumstances of the wife and children, and the ability of the husband. The late chief justice there said: "And for somewhat similar reasons, these questions of alimony and custody of children may, in the first instance, be included in the judgment of divorce, or in a subsequent and separate judgment." Similar ground was taken in Hopkins v. Hopkins, 40 Wis. 462, where it was held that a judgment for partition or division of the real and personal property of the husband between the parties to a divorce suit is final; but a judgment for alimony, whether payable annually or in a gross sum, may be revived by the court from time to time on the petition of either party. These positions are enforced in Bacon v. Bacon, 43 Wis. 197. This court has held, under our statutes, that a resident. plaintiff may maintain an action for divorce in the courts of this State, notwithstanding the marriage was solemnized abroad, and the cause for divorce occurred in another State, and the defendant has never been a resident of this State, nor served with process therein. Manly v. Manly, 3 Pin. 390; Hubbell v. Hubbell, 3 Wis. 662; Gleason v. Gleason, 4 id. 64. * In Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651, it was held that a non-resident plaintiff could not maintain an action for divorce in the courts of this State; and this is the rule even when the marriage has been solemnized in this State, and the cause for the divorce occurred here. In that case the late chief justice took occasion to say: Wisely or unwisely, it is the policy of the statute to vest jurisdiction of divorce here upon the residence of the plaintiff alone. [Page 657.] * * Doubtless, for certain purposes, the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife. That rule however goes upon the unity of husband and wife; and very generally, if not always, implies continuing, though temporarily interrupted, cohabitation. It excludes, or should exclude, permanent separation. Permanent separation implies separate domiciles of husband and wife. If the rule were to be applied to cases of desertion, it would imply something like an absurdity. The weight of authority is against the application of the rule as applied to cases of divorce when the parties are actually living in different jurisdictions. * * *The question cannot be considered an open one in this court." Page 659. The case, as well as the statute, excepted actions "for adultery alleged to have been committed while the plaintiff was a resident of this State." Section 2359, Rev. St. By the late revision, a wife, whose husband has deserted her in another jurisdiction and become a resident of this State, is enabled to follow him into the courts of this State, even though she is not a resident. Section 2359, Rev. St. But that is immaterial here, since it is the husband, and not the wife, who is the non-resident. The Michigan statute, like ours, provided that "no divorce shall be granted unless the party exhibiting the petition or bill of complaint therefor shall have resided in this [that] State one year immediately preceding the time of exhibiting such petition or bill." Section 8, ch. 170, Comp. Laws 1871. From these decisions and this statute it is clearly |