people' and in the assumption that all the time' means the same as 'every time'. All the people' in the second sentence means all the people at the bargain-sale; but Lincoln meant by it all the people in the country. Every time' as it is used here means every time Mr. G. has a bargain-sale; but all the time' as Lincoln used the phrase means for a long continuous period in the life of a nation.

'A saving man is a blessing to the community; a miser is a saving man; therefore a miser is a blessing to the community.' Here the word 'saving' may be ambiguous or it may not. If we understand by a saving man' in the first sentence any one whatever who saves his money instead of spending it, then the conclusion follows from the facts assumed. But it is more likely that any one who grants the truth of the first statement is thinking of a saving man' as one who exercises reasonable economy in contrast to a spendthrift. If this is so, we make him say more than he intended if we extend the meaning of the word 'saving' so as to include those who exercise unreasonable economy; and thus the argument is unfair.

A teacher must know how to teach; Mr. R., who has just taken up the work, does not know how to teach; therefore Mr. R. cannot be a teacher.' Here there are several ambiguities. 'A teacher' may mean any one who earns his living in a schoolroom, or it may mean a 'true' or ideal teacher. When we say he must know how to teach we may mean that if he does not he is not a teacher (as when we say a square must have four sides); we may mean that he ought to know; or we may mean that if any one does not know he will not be allowed to attempt the work. 'Know how to teach' is ambiguous in two respects. In the first place, to 'know how' may mean to understand the principles involved, it may mean to have a certain amount of practical skill whether one understands the principles or not, and it may mean to have both principles and skill. In the second place the phrase know how' is vague because it does not tell us

When he

how much knowledge the speaker has in mind. says that a teacher must know how' to teach, does he mean that he must be able to do it according to the latest approved principle, or does he merely mean that he must be able to do it as well as any intelligent person could? Even 'teach' is ambiguous. Does it mean merely to give instruction in certain subjects, or does it mean also to keep order in the schoolroom and instil good morals and manners? The phrase 'cannot be' in the conclusion of the argument has much the same ambiguities as 'must' in the first part of it. Does it mean 'certainly is not', 'will not be permitted to be', or 'cannot become '? If the premises mean that an ideal teacher has a certain amount of knowledge or skill and that Mr. R. has not, the conclusion follows that Mr. R. is not an ideal teacher; but it does not follow that Mr. R. is not earning his living in a schoolroom, that he is excluded from the teaching profession, or that he cannot become an ideal teacher; and so with the other meanings of the various

sentences.

The following curious arguments are taken from a book written to prove that a lie is never justifiable, and have doubtless imposed upon a large number of readers as well as the author himself.*

A) Truth is, so to speak, the very substratum of Deity. . . . As there is no God but the true God, so without truth there is and can be no God."

B) "As Christ is Truth, those who are in Christ must never violate the truth. . . . This would seem to be explicit enough to shut out the possibility of a justifiable lie."

C) "We cannot conceive of God as God, unless we conceive of him as the true God, and the God of truth. If there is any falsity in him, he is not the true God. Truth is of God's very nature. To admit in our thought that a lie is of God, is

* Trumbull, "A Lie Never Justifiable", pp. 135, 145-6, 223, 224. The first extract is given as a quotation from Hodge's "Systematic Theology", and the second as a summary of Martensen.

to admit that falsity is in him, or, in other words, that he is a false God."

D) "A lie is the opposite of truth, and a being who will lie stands opposed to God, who by his very nature cannot lie. Hence he who lies takes a stand, by that very act, in opposition to God. Therefore if it be necessary at any time to lie, it is necessary to desert God and be in hostility to him so long as the necessity for lying continues."

Let us examine these arguments. In A the author supposes his reader to take for granted that 'There is no God but the true God'. From this it is supposed to follow that 'Without truth there is and can be no God'; from this that 'Truth is, so to speak, the very substratum of Deity'; and from this that a lie is never justifiable under any circumstances. But what do these words all mean? When he expects every one to admit that there is no God but the true God', he must mean by it that there is no God but the god that really exists, whatever we may call him, and whatever his nature may be. If the next step follows from this,' Without truth there is and can be no God', these words must be taken to mean that if there is no reality—if there is nothing real—there is and can be no real God. This same thought is expressed in the next set of words: Truth'-that is to say, reality is the very substratum of Deity'. But from this fact that God would not exist if nothing real existed it surely does not follow that a lie is never justifiable. The only reason that it seems to follow is that the word 'truth' is ambiguous, and when the author says that 'truth' is the very substratum of Deity he forgets that when this was proved it meant that reality was the substratum of Deity, and now he takes it to mean that always making true statements and disapproving of every false statement is the very substratum of Deity'; and from this it follows that a lie is never justifiable. Hence we have to take the words in one sense in order that they should follow from what every one is supposed to admit, and take them in quite another sense in order

that the conclusion should follow from them. So long as we think only of the words it is possible to be deceived by the argument. When we ask their precise meaning and look carefully at the things about which they are supposed to tell it is not.

In B what is meant by the statement that Christ is Truth'? It certainly does not mean that he is an accurate statement. Hence this must be taken more or less metaphorically to mean that in his life there is to be found a revelation of the deepest spiritual truths, that he is a true or genuine manifestation of God, or something of that sort. Christ then revealing the true spiritual life, it follows that those who are in Christ must never violate the truth', that is, it follows that those who are in communion with him should not do anything inconsistent with that highest spiritual life. But why does this shut out the possibility of a justifiable lie' unless we assume what was to be proved, that a lie never is justifiable, or in accordance with the highest spiritual life? Here again it is only the ambiguity of the word 'truth' that makes the conclusion seem to follow. Unless the statement that those who are in Christ must never violate the truth means what I have said, it does not follow from what was said about Christ; and unless the sense is then twisted and the statement is taken to mean that they must never tell a lie under any circumstances whatever, the conclusion does not follow from it.

In C there is the same play on the words 'true' and 'truth' as in A, and a similar play on the words 'false' and 'falsity'. This becomes very apparent if we omit these ambiguous words altogether and substitute for them the synonyms that seem to express the meaning most accurately in each individual case. The passage will then read something like this: We cannot conceive of God as God unless we conceive of him as the real God, and the God of reality (or who is trustworthy, or who never approves of a lie). If there is any unreality (or untrustworthiness) in him, he is not

the real (or trustworthy) God. Reality (or trustworthiness) is of God's very nature. To admit in our thought that a lie is of (i.e., approved under any circumstances by) God, is to admit that unreality is in him, or, in other words, that he is a fictitious God.' So long as we do not make any attempt to interpret the words the conclusion may seem to be proved; but when we drop the words and consider only the relations that they ought to be used to point out it is perfectly evident that it is not.

In D the ambiguity lies in the word 'opposed' and its derivatives. When we say that a lie is the opposite of truth' we mean that a false statement is unlike a true one and can be contrasted with it just as large can be contrasted with small; and if God by his very nature cannot lie', then a being who can and will lie stands opposed to God' in the sense that the two can be contrasted, just as a large man can be contrasted with a small one. It does not follow in the slightest that there is any hostility' between them. The only reason that the conclusion appears to follow is that the words opposite', 'opposed' and 'opposition' are all derived from the same root, and we therefore assume when they are being used that they all have essentially the same meaning without stopping to ask what that meaning is until the verbal manipulation is over. Then we are told that 'in opposition' means 'in hostility', and we cannot deny it.

As

a piece of reasoning this sort of verbal jugglery is almost on a plane with that which proves something, I have forgotten what, by saying that a beehive is a bee-holder, a beholder a spectator, and a specked 'tater a bad vegetable.

This last example shows the danger of so-called Paronymous terms. When a word is not ambiguous in itself we may introduce an ambiguity by substituting for it some other word derived from the same root and so constructed that Paronymous terms. it seems to point to exactly the same relations, when it does not. We have a perfect right to say, 'Romeo is in love; lovers are impetuous; therefore Romeo is im