which change has raised the wages paid on board a first-rate line-of-battle ship by an annual sum of 8,555l. To this must be added the sums for wear and tear of the ships. The new method of propulsion is not only itself more expensive, but, by the shaking of the ship which it occasions, renders the more costly structure the less durable one. The screw,

in this respect, is even worse than the paddle. Some idea of the magnitude of this item may be formed from the fact that the sum of 14,3257. has to be spent annually in keeping a first-class ship-of-the-line in working order. However, it is satisfactory to reflect that these expenses must be borne equally by every nation that aspires to maintain a large steam navy, and must eventually tell most against those whose resources are least able to stand such an exhausting drain.

So much then for quality. In that respect we seem nearly equal. As far as we have the means of knowing, the mechanical contrivances of France are as good as our own. Let us now see how we stand with regard to numerical strength since the reconstruction of both navies.

The year 1850 was destined to begin a new era in the French Navy. The commission of inquiry appointed by the Revolutionary Government had commenced its sittings. It would be a mistake to imagine that the change of government in France was the cause of its appointment. The policy which its existence indicated had already been inaugurated and steadily pursued by one of the Princes of the fallen Dynasty. As far back as the year 1844 the Prince De Joinville was appointed head of the French Navy. Possessed of considerable scientific knowledge and patriotism, and, from his position, enjoying better opportunities than any one else for carrying out his plans, he set to work to recreate the French Navy, and by that means to restore to his country the maritime influence of which the unsuccessful issue of the last war had deprived her. The experiments in the construction of steam ships of war which this country had been making were not lost upon the

Prince. His sagacity anticipated the revolution with which his success must be attended. Accordingly, his chief care was directed to build and improve steam ships of war; and specimens highly creditable to French skill were turned out of the dockyards. The revolution of 1848 put a stop to his maturing his plans; but the policy which he had traced was adopted and expanded by the government which succeeded him. The commission to which we have before alluded was appointed. It first reduced to a determined scheme the visions of naval aggrandizement which had been floating before Joinville's eyes, and sketched the gigantic proportion of the present steam navy of France. To the present Emperor has fallen the task of realising the designs of his predecessors; and it is but bare justice to him to say that he has applied himself to it with great skill and indomitable energy. Some idea of the way in which he has worked may be formed from the fact that, from the year 1851 to the beginning of the year 1854, France has produced not less than twenty-four line-ofbattle ships, and that in the course of the year 1854, thirteen men-of-war were launched from French dockyards, nine of which were ships of the line. These efforts have produced a very sensible effect upon the relative naval strength of the two countries, inasmuch as the superiority of four to one in ships of the line which England had at the end of the war, was in the course of 1859 reduced to equality. Great as

have been the energies displayed by the French government in the construction of ships of war, no less pains have been taken to man them with efficient crews. During the late war it is scarcely possible to conceive anything more clumsy than the way in which a French fleet was manned. On board every ship were two distinct corps, separately officered, neither of which possessed any knowledge of the duties of the other-the seamen who navigated the ship, the artillerymen who had charge of the guns. A divided command was the necessary consequence, and confusion

worse, confounded the necessary result. This evil has now been remedied, and a body denominated Corps des équipages de Ligne, the members of which combine the seaman and artilleryman in one, have been substituted in their place: other improvements have been likewise effected.

Alive to the fact that no small part of English success in the last war was due to precision of aim and the rapidity of fire, special attention has been directed to all that relates to naval Artillery. A subdivision in the équipages de la ligne has been effected, and a corps of 8,500 matelots cannoniers, or picked gunners, has been formed. These men undergo a special training. Everything relating to the manning of the French fleet bespeaks the most careful organization, and every improvemeut which could be derived from our own navy, or that of any other nation, has been sedulously adopted.-"The équipages de la ligne," numbering in the whole rather above 60,000 men, are stationed at the five great naval ports of France, Brest, Toulon, Cherbourg, Rochefort, and Lorient. This, however, is by no means the only force available for manning the fleet. Besides these, there is the corps de l'artillerie de la marine, engaged in the manufacture of ordnance and ammunition, who number above 6,000 men; the infanterie de la marine, who are 20,000 strong; 400 gendarmerie maritime stationed at Lorient ; 1,600 gardes maritimes; 500 corps Impérial du Génie Maritime or engineers; to say nothing of a body of shipwrights, riggers, and other workmen employed about the dockyards, who may be collectively reckoned at 3,500. The sum of these figures presents a total of 92,000 men, which represents the effective strength of the French navy.

The

number of French merchant-seamen, according to the returns of last year, was 102,000 men. Like that of this country, the merchant-service in France forms the body of reserve, from whose ranks the navy must be recruited. unlike ourselves, the French for a long time past have done their utmost to make their reserve as efficient and

But

available as possible. The system that has been pursued operates upon the whole of the maritime populations of the country. Every Frenchman who takes to a sea-faring life is obliged by law to register himself. While his name remains upon the register he is allowed certain advantages, and subject to certain duties. The advantages are the exemption from military service, and right to fish and navigate in the waters of France. The duties are those of compulsory service on board the fleet at stated periods. The whole number of men on the rolls is divided into classes. The first class includes all seamen between twenty and forty, as well as officers of the merchant-service under forty-five; the second class, men who have served above four years; the third class, men above six years. Six years' men are exempt from ordinary levies. Men who have served three years are free till their turn comes round; and so by means of this machinery, in the course of nine years, the entire body of French merchant seamen must pass through the Imperial Navy and learn its dutieswhile, in case of sudden emergency, enables the Government to know the whereabouts of these seamen, whether they are at home or in port. Thus France not only possesses a fleet of enormous strength, perfectly equipped and manned, but also a powerful reserve, easy of access, by which she may at pleasure recruit or increase her power.

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We have, before proceeding to inquire into the state of our own navy, spoken of and examined into the resources and condition of that of France, because it is, with reference to it, and it alone, that the efforts we are now making can be explained, or their efficiency tested. Nothing can be so mischievously misleading as any attempt to estimate our present strength by retrospective comparisons; and we confess we trembled when we heard our First Lord of the Admiralty state, with evident satisfaction, "that at NO TIME were our naval "preparations in so forward a state as at "present." Let us proceed briefly to investigate what are the naval necessities of the country; how far they are at pre

sent supplied, and what are the reserve resources available for recruiting them.

The necessities of this country are not confined to the means of self-defence. A large commerce and numerous colonies make large demands upon us. In the year 1858, the total force thus employed, exclusive of the Mediterranean fleet, was 139 ships, manned by 21,928, or something very like half our effective navy for that year. With France, the reverse of this is the case; her trade is not a quarter the amount of that of this country; and with the exception of Algeria, which, so to speak, lies at her door, and her settlements on the South American coast, she is destitute of colonies. This would enable her to concentrate what forces she possesses, whilst ours must necessarily be dispersed a fact which is alone sufficient to convert a numerical equality in the fleets of the two countries into a practical inferiority on the part of this country. But in the early part of last year such an allowance need not have been made, as in the larger and more important ships France not only enjoyed a practical but even a numerical superiority-both nations having 29 first-rate screw line-of-battle ships, while the French frigates were 34 to our 26. It is true that this alarming disparity has been somewhat diminished by the efforts of the late and present Governments, so that the following lists of the relative strength of both powers present a more reassuring aspect.

FRANCE.

32 Ships-of-the-line afloat, and 5 building. 34 Frigates afloat, and 13 building. 5 Iron-cased ships building. 17 Corvettes afloat, and 2 building. 39 Gunboats afloat, and 29 building. 5 Floating batteries afloat, and 4 building. 31 Transports. 86 Avesus.

This is better, but terribly bad. If both nations had finished their frigates we should again be inferior, and in the very arm calculated to harass our commerce, especially our gold ships. We look, however, for better things; Government proposes in addition 8 line-ofbattle ships, 12 frigates, 4 iron-cased ships, and 4 corvettes. When this addition is made (supposing France suddenly to leave off ship-building) we shall be again superior, though not comfortably so. Let us now turn from ships

to men.

The prospect here is far from satisfactory, though, like most things in these days, mending. Previous to the year 1853, men were only hired nominally for eight years, but generally paid off in four, or thereabouts. The fruits of this system were seen in the difficulty we had in manning the Baltic fleet, and in the quality of the men we got together with such infinite trouble. According to Sir Charles Napier, they were by no means first-rate. Now, however, the Duke of Somerset tells us that he can afford to pick and choose, and that he takes none but able or ordinary seamen. Let us, however, see what we require, and what we have got. According to the latest returns of the number of men that would be required to provide established or estimated complements for the whole of our steam vessels afloat, building, or converting, it seems that for the 59 steamships of the line, 50,620 men would be required; for the 43 frigates, 20,055; for block ships, 5,535; for iron-cased ships, 1,900; for 21 corvettes, 5,690; for 95 sloops, 13,545; for 27 smaller batteries, 1,987; for 192 gunboats, 8,086; for 8 floating-batteries, 1,680; for 61 transports, tenders, &c., 2,804; and for 4 mortar-vessels, 840. In all, the total number of men would

be 112,742, or 95,813 officers and seamen, and 16,927 marines. The number voted in the present year for the navy is 85,500 men and boys; and this includes 18,000 marines and 6,862 coastguards, which latter force is generally reckoned as forming part of the reserves. These figures show a deficiency of 27,242, which would have to be made good before all our ships built, or in process of construction, could be made actually available. We have already, in the course of our observations on the French Navy, pointed out that a body of 92,000 men now in the employ of Government could be made use of for manning their fleet. It is true that these numbers comprise artizans working in the dockyards, which are not included in our own 85,500 men; but allowing for the deduction of these latter, consisting of somewhere about 3,500 men, the result would still show a balance in favour of the French Navy of something like 2,000 fighting men. Were the reserve forces of both nations in an equal state of efficiency, this disparity would be of comparatively small importance. But this is not the case: the inscription maritime before described maintains a reserve of at least 102,000 men, now employed in the merchant service. Upon the most moderate computation, a third of these may be looked upon as immediately available should an emergency occur. Our own reserves, on the other hand, fall far short of such a number. Exclusive of the coast-guardsmen, which form part of the 85,500 men, they are only 7,988, or little more than one-tenth of the number recommended by the Commissioners. If the men are really pressing to be regularly employed in the navy in the manner described by the Duke of Somerset, it seems hard to understand why-considering that the terms were at first said only to be too liberal, and that there has been sufficient time to allow of the men understanding that it is a bond fide offer that is made-there should be such difficulty in obtaining men. Mismanagement there must be somewhere; but at whose door ought it to be laid?

An answer to this question may perhaps be found in the Duke of Somerset's speech on the 2d of last May, when he stated that one of the reasons for the little progress made in the enlistment of men for the Royal Naval Reserve was the fact that Government did not begin to pay the men till last April; adding, by way of making his reason conclusive, that it was well known that seamen were not likely to come forward till pay began. Now the Report of the Commissioners was presented to both Houses on the 9th of February of the preceding year, and it does not argue any extraordinary zeal or alacrity on the part of the authorities, considering the matter was so important and pressing, to allow a whole year to elapse before any attempt was made to carry out the suggestions it contained. It is idle to talk of the difficulty of raising money for such a purpose, when we are spending millions in building ships, which without men to man them must be useless. Nor are we able to understand the Duke's arguments against increasing the bounty paid to the volunteers, or the objection to enrolling an inferior class of men. With regard to the first of these questions, his argument, when he urges that such an increase would prevent men from regularly joining the navy, by making the Royal Volunteer Corps too popular, would be a perfectly legitimate one, if the recruiting for that body was to be indefinite; but as the number is limited, its competition with the regular navy could only be temporary, and the effect of the increase of bounty, supposing it to have any, would simply be that the Reserve Corps would be filled up first, and might consist of better men. for the objection that first-class men would refuse to join the reserve if inferior men are allowed to do so, we cannot help being sanguine enough to believe that any such reluctance might be overcome by the very simple process of dividing the corps into two divisions, distinguished, if thought advisable, by pay and dress; the first of which should alone be open to the best men, while the latter should embrace the inferior

As

class. Thus, without any sacrifice of efficiency, numbers might be obtained. But, while we thus boldly examine into our difficulties, it is satisfactory to reflect that they proceed solely from inability to utilize our resources, not from any paucity in the resources themselves. The mercantile marine is that alone which will sustain a lasting maritime supremacy. The tonnage of the English merchant service is four times that of France, and the number of men engaged in it is more than double that of France. If, with such advantages, we are unable to man our fleets as speedily and effectually as France can man hers, something may without injustice be laid at the door of official blundering. Second only to the difficulty of getting a sufficient number of men to man our ships, is that of getting rid of a sufficient number of the officers who compete for the command of them. Two distinct schemes for effecting this object are now before the public,-that of the late First Lord of the Admiralty, and that of the present Secretary to the Admiralty. On the nature of the evil both these gentlemen are agreed. The only question between them is, whether it can be dealt with by means of a permanent and comprehensive scheme, or whether the remedy must be applied from time to time as the exigencies of the case may require. The variation in the number of officers, according as the navy is on a war or peace footing, constitutes, according to Lord C. Paget, an insuperable objection to dealing with the question systematically. A system of retirement which would only promote a wholesome emulation when the lower ranks of the service are full, would, when they have ceased to be so, be imposing a heavy burden on the country without conferring corresponding advantages. The force of such an argument depends materially upon the probable duration of the present state of things. If it can be proved to be permanent, Lord C. Paget's argument falls to the ground; as the slowness of promotion would be a crying evil with the navy on a peace footing.

In the course of the foregoing observations we have already pointed out what must regulate the amount of our naval forces. Is there any chance, and if any, what, of the French armaments being reduced? To this query we must reply in the negative. Fostered by three successive governments, resulting from three successive constitutions, there is nothing in these efforts that can make us hope that they are of a transient nature. Our navy may therefore now be considered in its normal condition, and we submit that it is on that assumption that any scheme for regulating promotion in it should be based. But its want of system is not the only objection that forbids the adoption of Lord C. Paget's plan. The fact that it deals in a different way with different orders of officers, is alone sufficient to condemn it. Why should septuagenarian admirals be allowed to impede the promotion of captains any more than sexagenarian captains are allowed to impede that of lieutenants? With all deference to Lord C. Paget, we are not quite sure that this, which to ordinary individuals appears to be a slight flaw in his plan, was not in fact the reason for its adoption; and, without imputing to him guilt of the deepest dye, we cannot help suspecting that the thought of having to encounter the expostulations and remonstrances of his sorrowing brother admirals has been slightly too much for his official virtue. Even we, to some extent, must sympathise with the weakness, if such it can be called, and it would give us real pain to feel that any mortification had been reflected on a class of men who have deserved so well of their country. But the public interest is paramount even to such a consideration as this, and we are bound to say that preference should be given to any plan which, while meting out the same measure to every rank in the service, promises to deal with the question systematically. In conclusion, although, as we have before told our readers, there is everything in the vast extent of our resources to inspire a legitimate confidence, there is nothing that authorizes