the act of 1912 was passed, and no one questioned the validity of the classification. It is equally clear that the legislature might alter, amend or modify the old statute without submitting the changes to a new vote of the people. City charters which have been submitted to a referendum have been frequently amended thereafter by the legislature alone. To hold otherwise would be to hold that a referendum tied the hands of the legislature. The important provisions of section 9 might properly have been made the subject of a distinct act applicable to all counties that had adopted the act of 1902. Those counties formed a natural class and no other counties might require the legislation. If the provisions might properly have been made the subject of a distinct act, they are not bad because inserted in an act dealing with the general subject of the organization of boards of freeholders. From the fact that counties that had already adopted the act of 1902 formed a distinct class, it logically follows that counties that had not adopted the act of 1902 also formed a distinct class, and naturally might require legislation that would be inappropriate for the others which had already adopted the form of government provided in 1902. The legislature sought to give both classes the advantage or disadvantage of a referendum, and in case of an affirmative vote, to have both classes governed by the same law. To accomplish that object without producing chaos in the county governments, it was proper, if not necessary, to make a temporary provision for the continuance of members of the boards in office until their successors could be elected and could qualify.

It must be confessed that counties voting at a referendum after April 1st, 1912, would have the chance to reject certain provisions in that act which were not in the act of 1902, while counties that had accepted the act of 1902 would have those provisions forced upon them by the legislature. If the constitution required that all counties should be treated alike, the argument would be forceful. Such, however, is not the case. On the contrary, the power of the legislature to control its subordinate agencies has always been recognized. All that the constitution requires is general laws, and, as has already

been decided, legislation which removes differences between the governmental powers of different municipalities is constitutional, though it affect one municipality only. The act of 1912 may be tested in another way. Suppose it had enacted, first, that all counties that had accepted the act of 1902 should thereafter be governed by the act of 1912; and had then added that any county might come under the act by accepting it at a referendum election. Can it be doubted that such legislation would have been valid? It would differ from the present act only in the order in which the sections were arranged Test it still another way. By this time, the terms of office of all freeholders elected under the act of 1902 have expired. All counties that adopted that act are now governed by the act of 1912, if valid; but so, also, are all other counties that choose to accept it, and the choice is open to all. The result is uniformity, except so far as diversity may be produced by popular vote, or failure to vote; and diversity so produced is not the result of the legislation, but of popular action or failure to act. It is too late now to contend that diversity so produced renders unconstitutional the legislation that makes it possible. From In re Cleveland, 51 N. J. L. 319, to Attorney-General v. McGuinness, 78 Id. 346, 381, our cases hold to the contrary.

Only one thing remains. I suggested at the argument that the clauses providing for repeal of inconsistent legislation, contained in the act of 1912, might have the effect of repealing the act of 1902, and the amendments thereto, and destroying the existing governments in counties like Middlesex and Monmouth. Upon reflection, I think such could not have been the legislative intent. The clauses are not harmonious. Section 7 repeals all inconsistent acts, but adds that none of the foregoing provisions shall take effect in any county until adopted by the voters. This would not apply to Middlesex and Monmouth. Section 10 repeals all inconsistent acts without qualification, but I think that means to repeal the act of 1902 and the amendments only so far as inconsistent with the act of 1912. Section 10 provides that the act shall

take effect immediately; section 8 that it shall take effect immediately as regards the submission to popular vote. Reading them together it is not difficult to construe them as meaning that the act shall take effect immediately, so far as a popular vote is not required, and only after a favorable popular vote when that is necessary.

The rule is discharged, with costs.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JAMES BOSSONE.

Submitted July 1, 1915-Decided December 15, 1915.

1. Where the record shows that an indictment was found in the Oyer and fails to show an order sending it to the Sessions for trial, but shows that the defendant pleaded in the Sessions an objection for the apparent irregularity is waived.

2. A motion to quash an indictment found in the Oyer is not a proper way to raise an objection to a trial in the Sessions.

3. The granting of a severance to a co-defendant and a refusal to postpone the trial are matters within the discretion of the trial judge.

4. In an indictment for burglary it is not error to refuse a demand of the defendant for a "bill of particulars," when what he really seeks is that the state elect the count on which it will ask a conviction.

5. It is proper for a prosecutor in opening a case against one defendant, after a separate trial has been granted a co-defendant, to state that he intends to try the co-defendant or make some disposition of the indictment as to him.

6. It is proper on an indictment for burglary, containing also a count for larceny, to prove that certain jewelry was stolen, even though it is not specified in the count for larceny.

7. Questions asked of a witness on cross-examination as to his guilt of other crimes without asking if he had been convicted thereof, are properly excluded. State v. Barker, 68 N. J. L. 19, followed.

8. It is not error to charge that a defendant may be convicted on the unsupported evidence of an accomplice.

On error to the Monmouth Sessions.

Before GUMMERE, CHIEF JUSTICE, and Justices SWAYZE and BERGEN.

For the plaintiff in error, Thomas P. Fay.

For the state, Charles F. Sexton.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SWAYZE, J. The objection that the Court of Quarter Sessions did not have jurisdiction to try the case because the indictment was found in the Oyer and no order was made sending it to the Sessions for trial is untenable in the face of our repeated decisions. Winters v. State, 61 N. J. L. 613; State v. Polhemus, 65 Id. 387; State v. Goldman, Id. 394; State v. Woods, 66 Id. 458; State v. Turner, 72 Id. 404; State v. Spina, 75 Id. 270. The attempt to differentiate the case by the fact that the plea of not guilty was withdrawn and a motion to quash made on the ground that there was no order of the Oyer and Terminer sending the case to the Sessions for trial, is ineffectual for two reasons-first, because under the authorities cited the plea entered in the Sessions amounted to a waiver of the irregularity which could not afterwards be withdrawn; second, because even if the waiver could have been withdrawn, there was no reason for quashing the indictment. Confessedly, that had been properly found in Oyer; it might have to be tried there, but could not be quashed even if the prosecutor had erred in bringing it on for trial in the Sessions. The indictment could not be vitiated by action subsequent to its finding. The defendant's motion was not the proper way to present the question. All he could do, if his view was correct, was to object to the trial in the Sessions, and he had waived this right, if he ever had it, by pleading in that court.

The granting of a severance to the co-defendant, and the refusal to postpone the trial, were matters entirely within the discretion of the trial judge. This discretion was not abused in this case.

There was no error in refusing to compel the state to furnish a "bill of particulars," as counsel calls it. What he seems to have wanted was that the state elect the count on which it would ask for a conviction. This was done in time.

It was proper for the prosecutor in opening to state that he intended to try the co-defendant under the indictment or to make a disposition of it. He was entitled to explain to the jury why both defendants were not on trial when both had been indicted.

It was proper to prove under the count for burglary what jewelry was stolen, whether it was specified in the count for larceny or not. The fact might be a very important circumstance tending to prove the crime of burglary.

The evidence as to defendant's knowledge that Mrs. Cubberly had a bull dog was all stricken out.

The statement of Zump was entirely harmless, and if the refusal to strike it out was error it was harmless error.

The exclusion of questions asked of Criscuolo, on his crossexamination, as to his being guilty of other crimes without asking if he had been convicted thereof, might raise the interesting question so well discussed by Professor Wigmore, sections 979 and following, were it not already settled adversely to the defendant by a decision of this court. State v. Barker, 68 N. J. L. 19, 27. We there said that we had no doubt that similar questions asked by the prosecutor of the pleas of the defendant were incompetent and should have been excluded, and we sustained the judgment only because the defendant's negative answer prevented any prejudice to his defence on the merits. A fortiori, similar questions asked, not of the defendant but of a witness, are incompetent. In the face of State v. Barker, it is idle to cite cases from other jurisdictions. The ruling of the trial judge was correct.

There was no error in charging that the defendant might be convicted on the unsupported evidence of an accomplice. State v. Hyer, 39 N. J. L. 598; State v. Lieberman, 80 Id. 506. The trial judge properly cautioned the jury as to the weight to be given to such evidence.

The judgment is affirmed.